

UNIFIED ACTION – SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNIFIED ACTION – SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

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ABSTRACT

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Unified Action Civil-Military cooperation has long been recognized as essential to success in COIN, but execution on the ground has often been uneven and difficult. While agency cultures and doctrinal differences are always present, truly integrated civil military operations are clearly the way ahead. During its Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) rotation, Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82), located in ISAF's Regional Command (East), broke new ground with "Unified Action" – the first ever attempt to fuse military and civilian organizations into one operational headquarters at an ISAF Regional Command.

UNIFIED ACTION – SEPARATE BUT EQUAL

“One unified effort to build and reinforce GIRoA legitimacy at all levels: Coherence across governance, security and development actions.”

—Lt. Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti
Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-82¹

Afghanistan 2009

As learned in recent conflicts, challenges facing commanders in operations can only be understood in the context of other factors influencing the population.² Full spectrum operations conducted among the population are effective only when commanders understand the issues in the context of the complex issues facing the population.³ To accomplish this mission, commanders need more than military expertise to assist them in obtaining our national objectives in Afghanistan.

In 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan that included the core objectives of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its safe havens.⁴ In addition to calling for an increase in military personnel, the new strategy announced an increase in civilian-led efforts to build capacity in Afghanistan.⁵ By the fall of 2009, the number of U.S. civilians deployed to Afghanistan increased to a level where NATO’s Regional Command (E) (RC (E)) and the supporting U.S. Embassy were able to consolidate the civilian and military staff into a unified team to implement the Unified Action process.⁶ The implementation of this consolidation highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the Joint Unified Action concept.

Unified Action Defined

Joint Publication 1-02 defines Unified Action as “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”⁷ Due to the complexity of

conflict following the Cold War, neither the uniformed services nor their civilian counterparts have the capacity and in some cases the expertise to deal with the challenges of the twenty-first century alone.⁸ As stated in Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,

The nature of these challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the range of military operations. These operations may take place with the military forces of allies and coalition partners, US and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The challenges are best met when the unified action of the Armed Forces elicits the maximum contribution from each Service and Department of Defense (DOD) agency and their unique but complementary capabilities. The resulting synergy from their synchronized and integrated action is a direct reflection of those capabilities.⁹

As an instrument of national power, military power, combined with the other Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) elements, Unified Action allows the U.S. to employ a wide scope of actions including the synchronization of activities with other government agencies, taking place within unified commands, subordinate Unified Commands, or Joint Task Forces (JTF) to achieve unity of effort.¹⁰

The National Strategic Direction is governed by the Constitution, federal law, U.S. Government policy regarding internationally recognized law and the national interest. In turn, this direction leads to Unified Action of both our military and civilian agencies.¹¹ The result of effective Unified Action is unity of effort to achieve national goals. At the strategic level, unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with NGOs, IGOs, the private sector, and among nations in any alliance or coalition.¹² The term “Unified Action” in military usage is a broad term

referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Within this general category of operations, subordinate commanders of assigned or attached forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation.¹³ Unified Action's goal is to synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs (e.g., United Nations [UN]), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.¹⁴ While Unified Action has a distinct military tone, it should be noted that there are several definitions and descriptions in military doctrine, which includes definitions in Joint, Army, Marine Corps manuals. Key components found in all three definitions include: Integration, Synchronization, and Commonality of Objectives during Joint, Multinational, Intergovernmental and Non-governmental organizations.¹⁵ This Joint Doctrine definition is, however, only a Department of Defense interpretation of interagency cooperation. It was not until very recently that the non-Defense Department agencies published documents addressing the why and how for interagency cooperation with documents like the jointly published *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* and *Overview of Concepts of Operation for S & R*. In past large-scale Reconstruction and Stability (R&S) operations, the U.S. Government or international community have cobbled together individuals and organizations with varied degrees of expertise and experience across a disparate range of skills (security, medical care, restoration of power, provision of potable water, sanitation, food distribution and re-establishment of agriculture, policing, judiciary, economics and business development, humanitarian relief, representative governance and

administration, provision of services, civil society, construction, etc.) to serve in interim functions until local capacity can assume these responsibilities.¹⁶

Until recently, with the implementation of *Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008*, there had been no comparable increase in the capacity of U.S. armed forces or of U.S. civilian agencies to conduct post combat stabilization and reconstruction operations since President Bush authorized a surge of civilian personnel in Iraq in 2005 as part of NSPD 44.¹⁷ The 2008 Act, required the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the Department of State to anticipate the need for reconstruction and stabilization globally, plan to address such needs, coordinate the relevant agencies to address such needs, and ensure the necessary training and education of civilian responders is adequate and carried out.¹⁸ This of course, was long overdue, given the long history of U.S. military intervention and nation building operations that date back to the 19th century.¹⁹

Unified Action History

Before the U.S. began combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the history of Unified Action was at best, hit or miss, depending on the nature of the conflict and goals of the United States. From the post-War of 1812 period up to the Plains Indians War and the Civil War, military forces maintained order and provided security. These forces also initiated comprehensive measures to establish new state governments, hold elections, ensure the well-being of freed slaves, and provide for economic and social development.²⁰ The first real implementation of a civil-military operation occurred during the Spanish-American War, where the combined operations depended more on the personalities of individual commanders and civilian territorial governors for successful

integration, rather than official policy. Later, the occupations of Germany and Japan following World War II serve as models for modern post-conflict stability operations as the Army reorganized and retrained its forces for a peacetime role focused on the reconstruction and development of war-torn nations.²¹ Additionally, Vietnam earned America invaluable experience with the complexity of conducting operations *among the people*.²² While the overall war effort was ultimately unsuccessful, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support provided valuable lessons that helped shape contemporary approaches to stability operations.²³

In an effort to prevent the mistakes of the past, the post-Vietnam and Cold War eras saw some of the lessons learned from the war applied to “The New World Order” of the 1990s.²⁴ In the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Army led or participated in more than 15 stability operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, and the Balkans. Many of these efforts continued into the new century and incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world: the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty.²⁵ However, the U.S. government inter-agency process found itself woefully lacking with the extended combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To address the shortfalls, the State Department created the S/CRS and developed a deployable civilian capacity called the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) to be staffed with 250 full-time U.S. government personnel from eight U.S. agencies who are available to deploy within 24 hours (along with an additional 4000 standby and reserve personnel).²⁶ Currently, the CRC has 138 Active Component members who can deploy within 48 hours, 1068

Standby members.²⁷ The Reserve Component still does not exist and has not been authorized by Congress.²⁸ It should also be noted, that as of June 2010, only 170 CRC personnel had actually deployed to locations worldwide.²⁹

Many of the lessons include the combining of military and civilian staffs, the synchronizing of military operations with civilian reconstruction efforts, and the creation of a dual civilian-military command structure, were applied at the Operational level when CJTF-82 redeployed to NATO's RC (E) Afghanistan in 2009. Among the lessons was the consolidation of Civilian and Military Interagency and Civil Affairs personnel who had previously operated as separate or disjointed staff sections into one operational team that implemented and epitomized the Unified Action concept.³⁰ This reorganization placed a Civil Affairs Officer and USAID SES in a joint leadership position over the entire Stability Operations Team.

CJTF-82 Unified Action

Unified Action Civil-Military cooperation resulting in true Unified Action has long been recognized as essential to success in COIN, but execution on the ground has often been uneven and difficult. While agency cultures and doctrinal differences are always present, truly integrated civil-military operations are clearly the way ahead based on historical lessons learned. During its OEF rotation, CJTF-82 broke new ground with "Unified Action" – the first ever attempt to fuse military and civilian organizations into one operational headquarters.

The Stabilization Main Effort

At Transfer of Authority (TOA) from the CJTF-101 to CJTF-82 on 4 June 2009, there were three civilians posted to the headquarters. That began to change quickly. In July 2009, the U.S. Embassy (USEMB) in Kabul converted the Political Advisor

(POLAD) position to that of “Senior Civilian Representative” (SCR) of the Ambassador. In September 2009, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) SES Ms. Dawn Liberi was appointed as SCR at RC (E).³¹ Like her counterpart in RC (S), Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry empowered her to coordinate and direct all U.S. Mission-related civilian personnel and programs in RC (E) to achieve unity of civilian effort and effective implementation of an integrated Coalition government and military strategy.³² Additionally, Ms. Liberi was granted Chief of Mission authority at the RC level that directed her to coordinate and direct the work of all U.S. government civilians under Chief of Mission authority within RC (E), and to manage civilian assignments through lead civilians co-located with subordinate Brigade Combat Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and District Support Teams (DSTs).³³ Despite this level of authority, the SCR still had no authorities over IGOs and NGOs operating in RC (E); which still required RC (E) to conduct “Ask-con” to coordinate these non-affiliated organizations.³⁴

Ms. Liberi was also directed to serve as the U.S. civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command (RC), senior Coalition civilians and senior local Afghan officials.³⁵ She would also provide foreign policy and development advice to the commander and, in turn, receive security advice from the commander. Both she and the Commanding General (CG) also conducted joint battlefield circulation to highlight their co-equal partnership. In this role, Ms. Liberi co-signed, with the CG, the CJTF-82 campaign plan on 17 October 2009. The appointment also altered the Line of Operation concept in deference to the SCR as the acknowledged senior official and lead in Governance and Development, now merged under the rubric “Stability

Operations” or STABOPS. As a result of this decision, Ms. Liberi’s position as the CJTF SCR gave her the equivalent authority of what *Joint Publication 1-02* refers to as Operation Control or OPCON assigned civilian and military personnel.³⁶

Interagency Focus

Led by Ms. Liberi, the move to consolidate the Governance and Development Lines of Operations (LOOs) into a civilian-led combined staff section had several goals. It aimed at creating synergy among related functions on the CJTF staff and with similar organizations at the IJC and ISAF levels. It leveraged resident expertise on both the civilian and military sides. And, it enhanced cooperation and coordination between two different worlds and cultures: a military traditionally focused on conflict and combat and a civilian interagency focused on diplomacy and development. This unique organization, a true civilian/military hybrid, built on the CORDS concept and OIF PRTs which used a DOS lead. Like the OIF models, the RC (E) model included senior military Civil Affairs officers as well as career experts from DOS, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other government agencies up to SES rank. Drawing on the assets and capabilities of the entire CJTF staff and tying in with parallel organizations above and below, it quickly energized development and governance efforts and brought coherence and focus using resources never before available in RC (E), similar to the model used in 2007 by then MG Robert L. Caslen in northern Iraq.³⁷

A key forcing function used to drive this process was the Interagency Stability Operations Review Board (ISORB), a bi-weekly meeting co-chaired by the CG and SCR and attended by all command group, primary staff officers, and assistants, both military and civilian. Subordinate commanders and senior civilians participated by secure video

teleconference (SVTC). Every 14 days, the ISORB provided an opportunity for the entire RC (E) leadership to review and synchronize operational and stability priorities and programs, and to track progress towards key development and governance goals. The ISORB constituted one of the two premier CJTF battle rhythm events, the other being the Joint Network Targeting Board, which both members of the STABOPS team's military and civilian members participated, although the ISORB was the only civilian led economic, social, and diplomacy stability based battle rhythm event.³⁸

The civilian surge began in earnest in early September with the arrival of eight USAID specialists in water, agriculture, governance, rule of law, program management, and economics – specialties with applications for both Governance and Development. The Stability Operations section consolidated into new office space in the CJTF headquarters on 4 October 2009 as it began to grow in size. As the STABOPS team expanded, the SCR directed the STABOPS staff to organize to support four major objective areas.

RC (E) Objective Areas

Ms. Liberi saw four objective areas as vital to the success of RC (E)'s efforts. These areas included: development in the commercially viable provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman (NKL); support to four identified “pilot” districts (Baraki Barak in Logar Province, Sayed Abad in Wardak Province, Khogyani in Nangarhar Province, and Sarkani in Kunar Province); provincial transition to lead security responsibility (TLSR), beginning with the stable provinces of Bamyan and Panjshir; and stabilization throughout the rest of RC (E). Other cells, such as a planning “Tiger Team” and a STABOPs Information Cell, were added to support these focus areas.

As with the formation of any new organization, STABOPS experienced operational and infrastructure challenges. Civilian and military leaders worked together to address a host of issues, including assignment of working and living quarters, transportation, connectivity and Automated Data Processing, and other administrative support. Most challenges were solved through staff cross-talk and training. Larger administrative and logistical challenges were addressed through mutual support agreements signed by the Commander of USFOR-A and the Commander of CJTF-82, as well as by the equivalent Senior Civilian Representatives at their respective command levels. Finally, the CJTF-82 Chief of Staff hosted a weekly Chief of Mission Life Support Working Group, attended by the CJ4, CJ6, CJ7, CJ8, STABOPS, and Senior Civilian Administrative Representative, allowing the CJTF to track and address Inter-agency civilian life support and logistical challenges that brigade TFs were unable to address at their level.

While the objective teams worked to address the challenges described above, the “civilian platform” continued to mature across RC (E), expanding Unified Action to brigade, battalion and even company level.³⁹ The platform eventually grew to more than 175 personnel from U.S. Department of State (DOS), USAID, and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). An interesting development was the “Board of Directors” concept, used at the brigade level to coordinate and prioritize development projects. Here the brigade commander co-chaired regular working groups with his affiliated DOS, USAID, USDA and PRT leaders to plan, coordinate and prioritize funding and support for governance and development projects. However, the disadvantage to the “Board of

Director” concept was the military’s occasional need to use a “Trump Card” (like a CEO or President) when military necessarily dictated overruling their civilian counterparts.⁴⁰

Over the past decade, PRTs continued to play a critical role as they have for most our involvement in Afghanistan. Manned with both civilian and military personnel (some with expertise in developmental skill sets), they provided a primary interface and capacity-building services with Provincial Governors and their staffs, serving as an “execution arm” for development and governance in the provinces. The PRTs were led by U.S. Air Force or Navy O5s (Lieutenant Colonels and Commanders, respectively) with USG civilian deputies. RC (E) also fielded Czech, Turkish and New Zealand PRTs. Each included diplomacy, development and governance professionals and security elements to enable freedom of movement. All US PRTs were placed OPCON to BCTs to establish a clear link to nearby supporting headquarters and to ensure close integration with all stability actors across the brigade area. While this may seem like a contradiction placing the PRTs OPCON, it should be remembered that under the RC (E) task organization, the BCT Commander shared responsibility for development efforts with a Senior Civilian counterpart assigned to the BCT (similar to a board of directors) to ensure efforts were synchronized and coordinated.⁴¹ This eliminated the confusion created when PRT Commanders tended to report directly to the Regional Commander and by-passed the BCT Commanders.

An important innovation was the District Support Team (DST). In order to more directly support the GIRoA effort to build sub-national capacity and implement the President’s Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. Embassy proposed a new platform, in April 2009, for integrating civil military efforts at the district level.⁴² The

DSTs model included at least three civilians depending on needs. They employed tailored expertise such as agriculture, urban planning, or rule of law. Instead of “cooperating” with nearby military forces, DSTs were apportioned to the battalions or companies to form a collective capability. These teams worked for the aforementioned board of directors at the BCT to ensure their efforts were coordinated with on-going security and stability efforts. The first three DSTs were launched in September 2009 to the pilot districts of Baraki Barak, Khogyani, and Surobi. By April 2010, civilians were fielded to twenty different DST locations throughout RC (E).

Like everything in Afghanistan, Stability Operations are a hard and grinding business, fraught with setbacks and obstacles.⁴³ As the most populated region in Afghanistan, RC (E) has one of the most complex security environments. The main enemy groups are forces loyal to the Haqqani Group and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). Along the eastern border, shared with Pakistan, fighters from Pakistani Islamist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-e Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) are also a concern, particularly in Kunar and Nuristan provinces.⁴⁴ Endemic corruption, lack of trained host nation administrators and officials, widespread illiteracy, an active insurgency, and complex coordination challenges between US, NATO, UN and NGO bodies defined the operating environment. Still, Unified Action enabled CJTF-82 to achieve real and sustained progress with projects that help set conditions for stability progress. Some metric examples include the completion of 47 schools, 206 kilometers of roads, 39 bridges, and numerous micro-hydro, generator, and solar power projects, electrical systems projects that will provide approximately 339,000 Afghans with access to reliable power and one of the first economic growth conferences held in

eastern Afghanistan.⁴⁵ Additionally, an accumulated backlog of more than 1700 unfinished Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects dating back to 2006 was reduced to 510 between July 2009 and April 2010, refocusing CERP to primarily small-scale, sustainable projects providing immediate results.⁴⁶

Unified Action also enabled some progress on Rule of Law in RC (E), supporting advancements in evidence collection, the identification and removal of corrupt officials, the establishment of sitting Supreme Court judges and mobile trial judges. As one example, five District Governors were removed for corruption in Nangarhar province in the spring of 2010, and in early May a judicial commission from the Afghan Supreme Court charged five district line managers with corruption and opened investigations on another 13 in Paktika province.⁴⁷ Gains on this front were incremental and halting, but essential in combating the corrosive corruption that threatens our gains in Afghanistan.

While the previously mentioned gains reflect an improvement in systems and projects, the real measure of success is found in the attitudes of the Afghan people themselves. From July to November 2010, there was a 50% increase in the proportion of Afghans that saw security improve across all of Afghanistan.⁴⁸ Even with the rise in violent events against ANSF and ISAF forces and the civilian population, considering the dispute over the August elections, the populated areas perceived more improvements than declines.⁴⁹ When asked who brings improvements to their area, the population saw the Afghan Government as the source of those improvements.⁵⁰ The Afghan population also saw the improvements in the ANSF in Regional Command-East (RC-East), with 91% agreeing that national security forces work for a better Afghanistan.⁵¹

Additionally, security operations (Champion Spear, Arrow, and Tolo-E-Aftab) executed during CJTF-82's tenure were synchronized with the ongoing development operations (Champion Farmer).⁵² Synchronizing both the security and development operations allowed for the realignment of stabilization forces throughout the region which better enabled the execution of population-centric COIN and reduced the insurgency's ability to influence the population.⁵³ Synchronizing these efforts, by implementing police pay reform, agricultural and timber policy conversations and other community outreach, with local tribal and community leaders immediately after or in conjunction with major combat operations, increases the success of both. An example of such realignment and consolidation of forces during the execution of combined action is the increased partnering of ANSF and international forces at Torkham Gate, allowing security presence to increase from eight hours per day to 16 hours per day, improving the flow of trade and increased customs revenue along highway 1A between Torkham Gate and Kabul.⁵⁴

Strategic Implications

Full spectrum operations achieve results when commanders and civilian leadership fully understand the complexity of challenges necessary to influence populations threatened by an insurgency. In RC (E), Unified Action strove for unity of effort by synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating civilian capacities and expertise with military operations in keeping with the intent spelled out in *National Security Presidential Directive 44*.⁵⁵ Additionally, the 2008 *Unified Command Plan*, tasks Combatant Commands like U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) to conduct,

planning for and conducting military support [emphasis added] to Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, as directed.⁵⁶

With this guidance in mind, the RC (E) Unified Action plan was driven both from the top-down, starting with the ISAF Commander and the US Ambassador and from the bottom up, based on the need to coordinate the myriad of PRTs, Agricultural Development Teams (ADT), Inter-agency, and NGO efforts.⁵⁷

Unified Action has been considered theoretically for years; its conceptual framework in fact is taken directly from Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations and applied earlier in Iraq in 2007 and RC (E) applied the concept in 2009. As a new construct it experienced many of the birthing pains that always accompany new ideas and new practices. But the return has been well worth the investment. Today, a foundation has been laid for interagency cooperation in conflict areas that offers some possibilities for better efficiencies and integration of both military and interagency expertise. The STABOPS concept adopted by CJTF-82 is an example of the Unified Action model stressed by the President, both Secretaries of Defense and State whereby non-military aspects of national power are brought to the forefront of contingency operations.⁵⁸ As stated in the *Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook*,

Recent history has demonstrated that the Department of Defense is not the most appropriate instrument of such non-military aspects of national power as diplomacy, economic power, or law enforcement. When an operation or conflict necessitates application of these tools, the department or agency with the appropriate mission and expertise must be brought in.⁵⁹

CJTF-82's use of Civilian Team Leads, supported by military personnel with operational backgrounds, combined the various levels of experience and backgrounds to the better organize RC (E)s efforts.

Consolidation of Expertise

The consolidation of the Task Force's CJ9 Civil Affairs Officers, CJ5 planners, and civilian experts from DoS, USAID, and DoA into one team is an example of the realigning of Department structures spelled out in the 2008 National Defense Strategy which allows U.S. efforts to maximize interagency planning and response efforts, to better address the ever changing COIN environment.⁶⁰ This model allowed the right people with the most experience and knowledge at the Operational level to support tactical level operations at the Brigade and company levels, as well as at the ADTs, DSTs, and PRTs by creating a board of directors at all levels that gave equal authority to both the BCT Commander and the Task Force Civilian Team Lead.⁶¹ This meant all security tasks spelled out in both CJTF and BCT CONOPS were synchronized with the Operation Champion Farmer stability tasks.⁶² To sustain this level of effort however, the manning of such teams must also include greater numbers of non-military personnel. Currently, the Department of State only has about 6,600 officers.⁶³ The Bush administration in its FY09 budget proposed increasing that number by an additional 1000.⁶⁴ However, to sustain the kind of operations associated with the ongoing contingency operations, more will be needed and even then, an additional parallel increase is needed in USAID if the United States is to effectively use its power and influence.⁶⁵ This point is highlighted in *The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power*, which states that

strengthening civilian capability to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict is improved by:

recognizing that civilians are the first line of defense abroad and making conflict prevention and response a core civilian mission [and] integrating an effective capability to reform security and justice sectors in fragile states.⁶⁶

U.S. operations, based on this proposed increase, may mean future civilians will take a greater role in how both security and stability are conducted provided Congress provides funding.

Combined Authorities

The authority granted to the SCR by the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, combined with the teaming of the SCR with the CJTF Commander greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the Unified Action efforts in CJTF-82. As noted by RAND Researcher Robert E. Hunter,

Local commanders (military and civilian) are usually in the best position to assess local needs and opportunities . . . devolving authority and responsibility to the lowest level practicable not only applies to military operations; it is also important for nonmilitary activities and personnel . . . [and] will be critical for the success of hearts and minds efforts targeted at the local population.⁶⁷

By assigning an SCR with Chief of Mission authority in the same Area of Operations (AO) as the CJTF commander, where together they share responsibility over the PRTs, the civilian leadership in Kabul ensured there were clear lines of authority with a civilian lead over all U.S. civilian personnel in the assigned region. This authority allowed the SCR to have the same level of control over U.S. civilians in RC (E) that mirrored those of the CJTF Commander, while simultaneously both maintained an equal level of authority.

Policy Planners

The synchronization of efforts was enhanced by the consolidation of operational and strategic planners from both the military and civilian agencies. The amalgamation of these planners, especially those graduates of Schools of Advanced Military Studies programs and Department of State Civilian Response Corps personnel greatly improved the integration of non-kinetic activities into the CJTF operational plans and helped align military and civilian activities with U.S. policy goals.⁶⁸ Additionally, civilian planners provided a vital link to Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and IOs, who may not normally deal with military personnel. These three points highlight recommendations that will enhance future Unified Action employment.

Recommendations

As the United States continues to find itself involved in regions of volatile instability where the employment of the Unified Action must include the development and implementation of overarching, integrated strategies to achieve common objectives.⁶⁹ These are two strategic recommendations, based on RC (E)'s experiences during the 2009-10 OEF deployment that would greatly enhance future Unified Action operations.

Information Sharing

Sharing information amongst participating agencies is vital to leveraging all the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Information (DIME) assets the U.S. brings to bear during operations and should be unencumbered from "Stove-piping" or "Fire-walls" that hamper the free exchange of ideas between agencies.⁷⁰ The full integration of all CJTF-82 military staff sections and civilian representatives into a single operations section

greatly enhances the effectiveness of the Task Force's Unified Action through daily information sharing. As noted by John M. Kamensky, the former Deputy Director of Vice President Al Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government,

A recent Government Accountability Office report found that "U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security counterparts due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and national security clearances." GAO cited the creation of state fusion centers as one effort to improve collaboration in homeland security and found that "To facilitate information sharing, it is important to establish clear guidelines, agreements, and procedures that govern key aspects..."⁷¹

The sharing of information is the key to tactical and operational effectiveness.

But this sharing is not always easy nor is it without price. As noted by the GAO, "Agencies may not share information because doing so may be outside their organizational cultures or because of political concerns, such as exposing potential vulnerabilities within the agency."⁷² Additionally, the recent turmoil caused by the recent Wiki-leaks, highlights some of the dangers of sharing information among agencies and, worse, a return to "Stove-piping" of information by agencies to protect themselves from future leaks. To paraphrase former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Christopher Hill during a recent National Public Radio interview,

"Frankly, it would have an effect on what I would put in the next cable," Hill says. "I would be very, very careful about putting anything of any interest in telegrams for some time... They will have an impact in terms of American diplomats going out and trying to do their jobs — that is, try to have candid, frank discussions," Hill says. "It's hard to have a senior official of a foreign government say things in front of a note taker just to begin with, and now to worry that those notes will be not only turned into a cable but that the cable will be turned into a newspaper article is worrisome."⁷³

GAO Director John Pendleton, who led the studies on interagency cooperation, was interviewed about the challenges of collaboration on *Federal News Radio*. He said “The bottom line is people...having good people can sometimes make all the difference.” This is true in civilian, as well as national security agencies.”⁷⁴

Civilian Surge

Next, the available pool of non-DoD civilian man-power should not be underestimated when seeking efficiencies to current Unified Efforts. While CJTF-82’s “Civilian Surge” increased the number of U.S. non-DoD civilians from 3 to 175, the fact remains their numbers could clearly not match the efforts of the 30,000 Coalition Soldiers deployed in the RC (E) AO.⁷⁵ The GAO’s *National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen the Interagency Collaboration* study found,

“Furthermore, some interagency coordination efforts have been impeded because agencies have been reluctant to detail staff to other organizations. . . because they are short-staffed or because “interagency assignments [are] often not being considered career-enhancing or recognized in agency performance management systems. . .”

In response, GAO recommends increased training opportunities, such as the National Security Professional Development Program, and better strategic workforce planning efforts.⁷⁶ As noted in the program mission statement,

Executive Order 13434 states that “In order to enhance the national security of the United States, including preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters, such as acts of terrorism, it is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies (agencies).”⁷⁷

While the executive order provides the direction, Congress and the various non-DoD agencies will need to request funding for additional personnel and training to ensure the same level of emphasis for agency contingency support, like the DoS CRC. As of March 2010, there were nearly 1,000 American civilians in Afghanistan representing at least 10 different U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, as well as the CIA, FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.⁷⁸ While this number seems large, it highlights the fact that many of these civilians are DoD/DoJ employees (of which a majority are contractors) and not DoS, USAID, or USDA. Not only does the previously mentioned 2010 QDDR note a need for a larger force of DoS personnel, so does noted writer and former U.S. Soldier John Nagl who pointed out in an ABC News interview, "We as a nation, I think, have not invested in the civilian capacity, the civilian resources we need to succeed in the wars we're currently fighting."⁷⁹ During the Vietnam War, more than 1,000 civilians were involved in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, or CORDS.⁸⁰ What is needed today is a base of civilians with the necessary expertise to support stability operations, comparable to the 30,000 U.S. military surge currently deploying to Afghanistan, up to the necessary 1600 as outlined in the 26 October 2010, Office of the Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report.⁸¹ This base could be built on the pool of contractors currently employed by DoS and USAID. Such a base would provide both a ready reserve of expertise and not require the Federal Government to maintain a base of full-time employees in an era when federal agencies are adapting to constrained budgets.

Conclusions

The future success of current and future contingency operations, whether they involve combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or potentially all simultaneously, must be conducted with the full support of the U.S. government as a whole and not just one or two agencies. To accomplish future mission, commanders need both civilian and military expertise to assist them in obtaining our national objectives in Afghanistan. Since the Vietnam War, the U.S. has become increasingly reliant on the Department of Defense to take the lead in overseas operations. In a “bi-polar” world, this approach made sense, given the necessities of dealing with the Soviet Union and her military power. However, the majority of U.S. overseas operations have involved more Stability and less kinetic operations. As the U.S. enters its 10th year of war in Southwest Asia, the likelihood of a sustained U.S. military presence, combined with the current challenges of the U.S. deficit, could mean a reduction of combat forces, rather than an increase. This means the U.S must strategically have in place a United Action plan that can support the drawdown of force, while simultaneously balancing the number of civilians capable of sustaining Stability Operations.

Only through the implementation of Unified Action programs that maintain a free-flow of information sharing between agencies, a realignment of global DoS and DoD areas of responsibility, alignment of objectives, assignment of resources and the training of large cadres of civilian experts who are expeditionary in nature, can the U.S. hope to maintain and sustain its global commitments. As noted in the 2010 National Security Strategy, “Our collective action will be our engagement with other countries...the cornerstone of this engagement [being] the relationship between the

United States and our close friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East—ties which are rooted in shared interests and shared values, and which serve our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world.”⁸²

Endnotes

¹ “Regional Command East Update” briefing slides with commentary, Bagram, Afghanistan, CJTF-82, June 14, 2010, 4.

² U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, Field Manual 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 2010), 3-4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as Implementation Continue*, October 26, 2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 26, 2010), 1.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Based on the author’s personal discussions with the RC (E) Deputy Commanding General (Support), Chief-of-Staff, and CJ3, while serving as the RC (E) CJ5 from May 2009 to June 2010.

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, September 30, 2010), 487.

⁸ Available capacity is an important point. Many scholars note that the post-World War Two Germany and Japanese occupation models are examples the U.S. Government should use in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, unlike today, the United States was able to mobilize large numbers to address the occupation and reconstruction challenges following the allied victory with the U.S. Army alone mobilizing 5.4 million men and women. U.S. Department of the Army, *Mobilization: The U.S. Army in World War Two, The 50th Anniversary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1992), 18.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 20, 2009), i.

¹⁰ The one weakness of Unified Action is its inability to coordinate International and Non-Governmental Organizations, many who reject the concept. In many cases, NGOs objected to military involvement in many of these projects as they saw a duplication of their own efforts and a threat to NGO staff by blurring the lines between military and civilian actors. Volker Franke, *The Peace Building Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations*, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2006, <http://www.gmu.edu/>

programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf (accessed 23 January 11), 10.

¹¹ Ibid, xii.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, February 13, 2008), II-3

¹⁶ Scott R. Feil et al., *Joint Interagency Evaluation: Manning a Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Capability* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, August 2006), 1.

¹⁷ William J. Flavin, "Comprehensive Approach," lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1, 2010, cited with permission of Mr. Flavin; James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), xxviii.

¹⁸ The S/CRS brings the following support to Unified Action in the field, "Civilian Capacity: The Civilian Stabilization Initiative, funded with \$65 million in the FY2008 Supplemental, and with an additional \$75 million included in the FY2009 Omnibus under consideration in the Congress, will create an interagency Civilian Response Corps with Active and Standby components. A third Reserve component is authorized, but not yet funded. Train & Exercise: even new Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) training courses are being offered for civilians and military at the Foreign Service Institute as part of an integrated training strategy under development. A joint exercise strategy for R&S operations tests the new USG capabilities. Plan: The U.S. Government Planning Framework for R&S and Conflict Transformation and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, approved in July 2008, integrate planning and assessment across all agencies. Conduct: The Interagency Management System for R&S, approved in March 2007, provides a new three-tiered system to manage interagency planning and operations." Flavin, "Comprehensive Approach," lecture.

¹⁹ According to State Department planner Beverly DeWalt, who served with the author in Afghanistan in 2009, the effectiveness of S/CRS in doing all these things is somewhat in question due to resourcing, bureaucratic organization in the interagency, leadership and actual authority. Interview with Beverly DeWalt, Department of State, February 3, 2011.

²⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), 1-1.

²¹ Some military scholars and research organizations like RAND have argued that an expanded military with the capacity to conduct Stability Operations without support from other governmental organizations. Rand researchers have argued that as the United States increasingly becomes involved in operations that often require "high-end" police skills, e.g., crowd control or intelligence collection. Military units typically lack such skills, and thus the question arises whether the United States should develop such a force. The authors

recommend creation of a 6,000-person force located in the U.S. Marshals Service. It should be a hybrid force composed of active and reserve personnel, and a battalion-sized element should be able to deploy within 30 days. Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ James H. Embry, "Preventing and Responding to Conflict," lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1, 2010, cited with permission from Mr. Embry.

²⁵ *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07, 1-2.

²⁶ Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), xi.

²⁷ Interview with Gwendolyn "Wendy" Webb, Deputy Team Lead – Afghanistan Engagement, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, March 7, 2011.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ John Herbst, "Briefing on State Department Civilian Response Corps," *America.org*, March 1, 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/March/20100303155724_eaifas0.668861.html# (accessed February 3, 2011).

³⁰ While this concept certainly fully fell under the concept of Unified Action – it must be noted that it lacked full IO/NGO participation described under the definition.

³¹ According to DeWalt, while Ms. Liberi was an USAID employee – during her time with RC (E) she was seconded to the DOS as their official representative. Interview with Beverly DeWalt.

³² Ms. Liberi noted in a 2010 interview, "First and foremost [Unified Action is the] enabling all of the civilian agencies under the United States government to essentially work together in a chain of command, if you will, under chief of mission authority, which comes from the ambassador. So instead of having separate agencies doing different things on their own, Unified Action enables there to be one structure and one unified chain, which didn't exist before. The second thing that it does is enables the civilians at each level to be counterparts to the military." Spencer Case, "Development in Eastern Afghanistan: Keys to Success", *International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan*, 1 June 2010, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/development-in-eastern-afghanistan-keys-to-success.html> (accessed October 12, 2010).

³³ "Regional Command East Update," 13.

³⁴ This need to ask IGOs and NGOs to coordinate and de-conflict efforts within existing Unified Action plans is not a "one-off" at any level as seen in the U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) Annex V to USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan 7000-10, Interagency Coordination.

³⁵ Ibid, 12.

³⁶ DeWalt explains that Ms. Liberi's authority to direct/employ forces/delegate was the equivalent of OPCON authority. Additionally, Joint Publication 1-02 defines OPCON as "Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, 270.

³⁷ Robert L. Caslen, "The Operations Targeting and Effects Synchronization Process in Northern Iraq," *Military Review*, May 1, 2010, <http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201005/2066325611.html> (accessed February 10, 2011).

³⁸ Due to certain sensitivities working with members of USAID, their attendance was not required at the Joint Network Targeting Board, unlike the ISORB.

³⁹ It should be noted that this expanded version was planned for by State Department personnel previous to the arrival of C JTF-82 and taken independent of the declaration of "Unified Action". Interview with Beverly DeWalt.

⁴⁰ Based on the author's observations, while military necessity occasionally required a commander to overrule his civilian counterpart, the long term risk of using the "Trump Card" could be alienating the civilians from participating in future decisions.

⁴¹ "Regional Command East Update", 11.

⁴² Although initially proposed in 2008, Interview with Beverly DeWalt.

⁴³ The complicated nature of the development mission means there is no easy way to gauge the success of a given PRT, ADT or DST. Circumstances may dictate that it is best for a PRT to avoid pushing a project too quickly so that it can make its way through the proper Afghan channels. A good example of this is how the Panjshir PRT worked to establish a landfill in their area of operations. The unit met with the mayor of Bazarak, the capital of Panjshir Province, to discuss the project of building a landfill, [Major Bryce] Jones said. Getting the mayor to accept the idea was the easy part. A landfill expert worked with the mayor to find an area that met all the specifications. "We realized it wasn't going to come to fruition while we were there and we didn't care," Jones said. "The key thing is we wanted to get it started so the new PRT could come in and say 'oh guess what we have an area for a possible landfill, in our nine months we can make progress toward that. We may not get it running, but we can make progress.'" It may sometimes seem like "three steps forward, two steps back" to those at the

local level who deal with the nuts and bolts of the issues, but the big picture numbers give some reason for encouragement. Spencer Case, "Development in Eastern Afghanistan: Keys to Success", *International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan*, 1 June 2010, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/development-in-eastern-afghanistan-keys-to-success.html> (accessed October 12, 2010).

⁴⁴ U.S. Congress, *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2009), 11.

⁴⁵ A clear example of Unified Action in operation was the first ever "Eastern Region Economic Growth and Investment Promotion Conference," held in March 2010 in Jalalabad and supported by CJTF-82 civilian and military stability experts. Held in the Governor's palace, the conference attracted five national ministers, the governor of Afghanistan's central bank, three eastern provincial governors, and a wide range of speakers from the development, finance, and business sectors. The conference highlighted a range of opportunities for investment, obstacles to further economic growth, and the importance that high-level officials place on development in this critical area bordering Pakistan. CJTF-82 SCR Liberi addressed more than 500 participants in the plenary session, highlighting the immense resources that exist in Afghanistan (including an estimated \$1 Trillion in raw materials like copper, gems, marble and timber) and the country's potential as an investment opportunity and emerging market.

⁴⁶ According to Colonel James E. Karas, "Finally, large infrastructure projects, like schools and roads, were developed jointly by USAID, CJ7, STABOPS, and CERP Board members from PRTs and BCTs collaborated efforts with Chief of Mission personnel getting a vote. This was an important step forward and all audit agencies now look for this process when evaluating the effectiveness of unit's CERPs." Interview with Colonel James E. Karas, Director, J9, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, March 6, 2011.

⁴⁷ From the author's experience, the removal and charging of government officials at this level had not previously been done in this province and RC (E) and was therefore a significant success.

⁴⁸ U.S. Congress, *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2010), 7.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Operation Champion Spear (September – December 2009), disrupt IED networks and prevent future attacks within Wardak and Logar provinces; Operation Champion Arrow (January – June 2010), improve the protection of the populace and set the conditions for spring operations within RC (E) focusing on Paktya, Paktika, and Knowst provinces; and Operation Tolo-E-Aftab (February 11-15, 2010), RC (E) provided support to ANSF/Afghan government during snow removal and personnel recovery operations. Ibid, 27.

⁵³ Ibid, 29

⁵⁴ This increase in revenues is a result of better governance and various revenue enhancement measures initiated by the Afghan Government over the past year, including strict performance monitoring of regional directors by Afghanistan's Customs Department headquarters in Kabul; roll-out of the ASYCUDA (the Automated System for Customs Data) transit and declaration processing system to Customs Houses at Torkham Gate, Jalalabad, Kabul Inland Customs Depot, Kabul Airport, Hairaton-Mazar-e-Sharif, Islam Quala-Herat, and Shirkan Bandar; removal of several incompetent and corrupt officials from sensitive posts; institution of a daily revenue collection reporting system; and capacity building of officers engaged in critical work such as data analysis and enforcement. However, Afghanistan's recent customs revenue jump is also a reflection of an increase in imports – indicative of Afghanistan's weak domestic production capability and stagnant exports. In the medium-term, Afghanistan's fiscal sustainability must come from stronger domestic economic growth and a broader private-sector tax base. U.S. Congress, *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Force*, 61.

⁵⁵ The *National Security Presidential Directive 44* states, "The fiscal year (FY) 2008 supplemental budget in the summer of 2008 provided S/CRS with \$50 million and the USAID with \$25 million to begin standing up the civilian response capacity with the hiring of 100 active component personnel and the identification and training of 500 standby component personnel. The National Defense Authorization Act has now officially authorizes S/CRS to build the civilian response capacity, including its reserve component." Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kugler, "Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations," in *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, ed. Han Binnedijk and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, July 2009), 12.

⁵⁶ *Unified Command Plan*, 17 December 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 17, 2008), 7, 9.

⁵⁷ Spencer Case, "Development in Eastern Afghanistan: Keys to Success", *International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan*, 1 June 2010, (accessed October 12, 2010).

⁵⁸ As noted in the *National Defense Strategy, June 2008*, signed by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, "This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves." U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy, June 2008* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2008), 8.

⁵⁹ The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, *Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook* (Laurel, MD: John Hopkins University, December 2009), 1-5.

⁶⁰ *National Defense Strategy, June 2008*, 18.

⁶¹ "Regional Command East Update," 11.

⁶² RC (E)'s Operation Champion Farmer was the consolidation of all stabilization efforts into a single operational plan which supported the overall Operation Champion Eagle plan.

⁶³ Robert E. Hunter, *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008), 19.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ U.S. Government, *The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), iv, 135-137.

⁶⁷ Robert E. Hunter, *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners*, 29.

⁶⁸ The RC (E) CJ3/CJ35/CJ5 planners responsible for developing stabilization efforts included 2 School of Advanced Military Studies and 1 School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduates (the author), as well as one Department of State Civilian Response Corps planner.

⁶⁹ According to DeWalt, a predecessor to RC (E)'s Unified Action was the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan (which the Embassy, in conjunction with the military developed for RC-E in 2008, but was never adopted as the one plan – more as a “supplementary” plan to the military’s main plan. John M. Kamensky, “Interagency Collaboration Practices,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, August 17, 2010, <http://www.businessofgovernment.org/blog/business-government/interagency-collaboration-practices> (accessed December 1, 2010).

⁷⁰ According to Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Howard, STABOPS, CJTF-82, “A need to remain separate is what drives our problems, STABOPS is a good first step, however better yet would be the STABOPS and Operations being melded into a single Operations (Full Spectrum) planning cells. As an example, Current Operations (OPS) (CJ33) should be 75% military 25% Civilian, Future Operations (FUOPS) (CJ5) 50/50 and Future Plans (FUPLANS) (CJ35) 25/75. I think personally one of the issues were that the FUOPS and FUPLANS sections viewed STABOPS as a necessary evil. OPS should be more integrated by continuing the Board of Directors concept with the CJ3, CJ9, and SCR having equal billing over the OPS section. STABOPS is a patchwork organization to satisfy all the stakeholders.” Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Howard, STABOPS, CJTF-82, March 03, 2011.

⁷¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, “National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 9, 2010), 16; Kamensky, “Interagency Collaboration Practices,” (accessed December 1, 2010).

⁷² To be fair, as Kamensky notes, “The DOD hierarchical approach, for example, hinders sharing military plans with other agencies in the formative stages because the plans have to first be formalized and approved by the Secretary of Defense before they could be shared.” Ibid.

⁷³ Ambassador Christopher Hill, interview by Michele Keleman, "Ex-Diplomats Fear Leaks Will Lead to Cautious Cables." *National Public Radio*, November 30, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/2010/11/30/131686336/ex-diplomats-fear-leak-will-lead-to-cautious-cables> (accessed November 30, 2010).

⁷⁴ Kamensky, "Interagency Collaboration Practices" (accessed December 3, 2010).

⁷⁵ "Regional Command East Update," 3, 11.

⁷⁶ Kamensky, "Interagency Collaboration Practices" (accessed December 3, 2010).

⁷⁷ "National Security Professional Development Program," [http://www.cpms.osd.mil/ASSET/S/EF2435B2205346B5851BEDDF3ECBE9B6/NSPD%20101%20April%](http://www.cpms.osd.mil/ASSET/S/EF2435B2205346B5851BEDDF3ECBE9B6/NSPD%20101%20April%20) (accessed December 2, 2010).

⁷⁸ Kirstina Wong, "Afghanistan Civilian Surge Could Last Decade," *Afghanistan: Can We Win*, ABC News, March 4, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Afghanistan/us-civilian-surge-afghanistan-decade/story?id=9971367> (accessed 25 November 2010).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as Implementation Continue*, October 26, 2010, 7.

⁸² *National Security Strategy, May 2010* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2010), 3.