AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

IMPROVING COLLABORATION BETWEEN AIR FORCE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

by

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After over a decade of relying on other government agencies for Human Intelligence (HUMINT), the Air Force is reestablishing this capability within its intelligence community. In doing so it is important for the Air Force to consider not only the best way to develop the professional expertise in this area but also evaluate the best organizational construct to integrate HUMINT with the other intelligence disciplines and functions. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recently reorganized its HUMINT capability along side Counterintelligence (CI) within the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC). The Air Force would do well to consider DIA’s approach and take this opportunity to enhance Air Force CI capability as well. This paper assesses the relationship between HUMINT and CI and offers a proposed organizational solution to ensure the Air Force optimizes its capabilities for both. While Air Force HUMINT is in its new infancy, Air Force CI is limited to the instigatory efforts of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). The Air Force should establish full spectrum CI within the intelligence community organized along side Air Force HUMINT. Doing so will provide the best opportunity to achieve the integration and collaboration between the two required by the Defense Intelligence Strategy. At the same time, the new CI organization can provide the much needed interface between the intelligence and law enforcement communities as their missions consistently overlap in combating modern threats to national security.
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Abstract

After over a decade of relying on other government agencies for Human Intelligence (HUMINT), the Air Force is reestablishing this capability within its intelligence community. In doing so it is important for the Air Force to consider not only the best way to develop the professional expertise in this area but also evaluate the best organizational construct to integrate HUMINT with the other intelligence disciplines and functions. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recently reorganized its HUMINT capability along side Counterintelligence (CI) within the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC). The Air Force would do well to consider DIA’s approach and take this opportunity to enhance Air Force CI capability as well.

This paper assesses the relationship between HUMINT and CI and offers a proposed organizational solution to ensure the Air Force optimizes its capabilities for both. While Air Force HUMINT is in its new infancy, Air Force CI is limited to the instigatory efforts of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). The Air Force should establish full spectrum CI within the intelligence community organized along side Air Force HUMINT. Doing so will provide the best opportunity to achieve the integration and collaboration between the tso required by the Defense Intelligence Strategy. At the same time, the new CI organization can provide the much needed interface between the intelligence and law enforcement communities as their missions consistently overlap in combating modern threats to national security.
Introduction

Within the United States intelligence community, there is constant debate over the relative value of various intelligence collection methods. The United States has long relied on technological advances to improve its collection efforts, and some insist technical methods are the most reliable and valuable. Others complain that there is too strong a reliance on technical intelligence gathering and call for more emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT). Technical collection has generally dominated United States intelligence gathering efforts since the 1940s, but when intelligence failures are perceived, critics have demanded increased HUMINT.¹ Most recently, HUMINT advocates pressed to raise its prominence following the 2001 terrorist attacks and throughout the Global War on Terror. HUMINT, in conjunction with counterintelligence (CI), is being touted as more appropriate than technical collection such as signals (SIGINT) and imagery (IMINT) for infiltrating terrorist groups and acquiring their plans.²

Working to strike the right balance between technical and human collection methods, the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a fresh look at HUMINT and its organization and integration with other intelligence disciplines and functions, especially counterintelligence (CI). Effective 3 August 2008, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) established the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC).³ DCHC will centrally manage DoD-wide HUMINT and CI enterprises, provide a unified strategic direction, synchronize requirements management, and determine collection strategies considering the finite resources available.⁴

In the meantime, the United States Air Force is attempting to reinstitute HUMINT capability. The Air Force intelligence community has not attended to the business of recruiting and training HUMINT experts since the mid-1990s and is effectively starting from scratch.⁵
initiating and growing its new HUMINT competence, the Air Force must determine the most effective way to organize and integrate HUMINT into the existing Air Force intelligence enterprise. In doing so, it would do well to consider DIA’s approach and take this opportunity to enhance Air Force CI capability as well.

**Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counterintelligence (CI) Defined**

HUMINT, in simple terms, is “intelligence obtained from people.” Joint doctrine calls it the “category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.” While this is the DoD and NATO accepted definition, it lacks the detail to indicate the full meaning of HUMINT. Air Force Doctrine offers this definition: “the intelligence collection discipline that uses people in the area of interest to identify or provide insight into adversary plans and intentions, research and development, strategy, doctrine, and capabilities.” HUMINT collection includes using U.S. and foreign personnel as agents in an area of interest, actively and secretly seeking intelligence information, as well as overtly interviewing prisoners of war, debriefing military members returning from an operation, researching local news and other media, and openly contacting the civilian population. The Air Force definition provides a better description of the types of information gathered by HUMINT, but it makes the mistake of relegating it to a “collection discipline.” HUMINT is an *intelligence* discipline, not merely a collection method. In the April 2002 issue of *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, Retired U.S. Army Colonel Jerry W. Jones proposes an appropriate, succinct description of HUMINT:

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is derived from the analysis of foreign positive information collected by a trained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human contacts and informants as a tool, and a variety of collection methods to gather information that satisfies the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and cues other collection resources.
HUMINT, and all intelligence for that matter, is not collected, it is derived from collected information. Finished intelligence is information that has been iteratively organized, verified, compared with previously known facts, integrated with information from other sources, and interpreted to predict possible future outcomes.\textsuperscript{10} It is what is learned by assessing the information in terms of operational context and it directly influences a commander’s course of action development. Information is educational, intelligence is actionable. In this paper, the term HUMINT refers to the full spectrum of the discipline: collection, analysis, and exploitation.

The doctrinal definition of CI is “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or international terrorist activities.”\textsuperscript{11} Jones puts it another way, stating the essence of the CI mission is to “detect, identify, track, exploit, and neutralize the multi-discipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies.”\textsuperscript{12} CI is not only reactive in attempting to thwart known threats, but its essential focus is discovering and obtaining an advantage over the enemy’s intelligence gathering procedures and capabilities before operations are launched against the U.S.

Frederick Wettering, a retired Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer and former Department of Energy CI advisor, identifies three functions of CI: protecting sensitive information, interfering with attempts to acquire that information, and apprehending those who attempt to acquire it.\textsuperscript{13} Yet, he contends, intelligence professionals often “dismiss the protection of secrets as ‘merely’ security.”\textsuperscript{14} The Air Force does indeed separate security from CI in this manner. AFI 14-104 specifically excludes physical, personnel, document, and communications security from CI.\textsuperscript{15} This may be because protection programs such as INFOSEC and
COMPUSEC are not consigned only to intelligence activities, but to all Air Force personnel in all organizations. However, security is an important component of the overall CI effort to safeguard the Air Force from discovery and interference by foreign intelligence services. Security efforts must be collaborative between the process owners possessing that which is to be protected and the intelligence community assessing known and potential threats to its safekeeping.

**Relationship Between HUMINT and CI**

HUMINT and CI do not fit one within the other. HUMINT is an intelligence discipline used to collect, process, analyze, and act on intelligence information, while CI is an intelligence function that may employ any number of intelligence disciplines, including HUMINT. The relationship is recognized in DoD strategy and doctrine, and Air Force doctrine contends that often “HUMINT, along with counterintelligence activities, are the best and only sources of adversary intentions.”\(^{16}\) HUMINT and CI complement each other, but many make the mistake of considering them one in the same, or labeling CI a sub-discipline of HUMINT.\(^{17}\) As a discipline, HUMINT uses various techniques, tactics, and procedures to obtain a specific type of intelligence that is actionable for a variety of purposes (force protection, center of gravity identification, and timing for offensive or defensive operations, among others), especially when integrated with intelligence obtained through other disciplines. CI uses various disciplines for the specific purpose of protecting friendly forces from the intelligence activities of an adversary.

Renowned intelligence expert Mark Lowenthal states on one hand that CI does not “fit neatly with HUMINT,” but he goes on to explain the importance of CI techniques such as feeding foreign agents false information or turning them into double agents to provide information on their employer; these are HUMINT endeavors.\(^{18}\) Retired CIA Associate Deputy
Director for Operations, John McGaffin, notes that CI in its most aggressive performance includes “deep human source penetration of enemy intelligence services as well as the use of double agents and deception to misinform an adversary’s intelligence services and policy makers;” these too are HUMINT actions.\textsuperscript{19} A National Counterintelligence Institute report on desired core competencies for CI professionals lists such things as interviewing and interrogation skills, elicitation, assessing people for targeting, manipulating/influencing/exploiting people, and managing human sources as key knowledge, skills and abilities; these are also core competencies for HUMINT professionals.\textsuperscript{20} HUMINT and CI are not contained one within the other, but they have areas of significant overlap, including the expertise and training required of the professionals who perform them.

HUMINT and CI have many common characteristics and operate in overlapping spheres, but should not be mistakenly categorized as the same thing. Although they share several tactical attributes, the ultimate focus of HUMINT and CI is different. The HUMINT deliverable is a better understanding of the adversary, an understanding that can then be acted upon in a variety of ways. The CI deliverable is to act on what is known about the adversary’s intelligence activities and manipulate the adversary’s understanding of friendly forces.\textsuperscript{21} Air Force intelligence doctrine recognizes the compatibility between HUMINT and CI but does not sufficiently explain the relationship or provide a construct to ensure the proper synergy and collaboration between them.

**Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC)**

With the formation of the DCHC, DIA is acting on the need for closer collaboration between HUMINT and CI while preserving their individual identities. Within DCHC, HUMINT and CI are separate directorates reporting to the Director, DCHC.\textsuperscript{22} Maintaining separate
directorates provides the necessary distinction discussed above, while placing both directorates in the same center helps to ensure DIA optimizes resources by taking advantage of the commonalities between HUMINT and CI. The new center will allow the defense intelligence community to capitalize on the overlap between HUMINT and CI; the two potentially share sources (for example, CI can validate sources for HUMINT), techniques, tactics, and procedures.²³ HUMINT and CI professionals have many common training needs and can benefit from sharing best practices and lessons learned. Since HUMINT and CI often share sources and operate in a like manner, without cooperation they can potentially interfere with one another. In the past intelligence collectors encountered problems when pursuing the same sources for different reasons.²⁴ In organizing DCHC, DIA intends to profit in the areas where HUMINT and CI converge while avoiding conflict of effort in the field.

The DCHC organizational construct is not a completely original concept, a similar structure for combatant commands is outlined in joint military doctrine. Joint Forces Commanders (JFC) normally establish a J-2X staff element containing a HUMINT operations cell (HOC) and task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA). The need for the J-2X became apparent following contingency operations where duplication of effort between scarce HUMINT and CI resources presented the false appearance of corroboration when common sources were used and caused gaps in other intelligence requirements.²⁵ As the single focal point to the JFC for HUMINT and CI, the J-2X integrates, coordinates, and deconflicts HUMINT and CI in the operational area.²⁶

At the service level, the Army is also employing a 2X concept. From the Corps to the Army level the 2X advises command on HUMINT and CI employment and provides control and management of all HUMINT and CI assets to ensure unity of effort.²⁷ The Army 2X concept
may have been founded out of necessity more than ideology. As the number of trained military
HUMINT professionals dwindled throughout the late 1990s and into the new millennium, HUMINT requirements markedly increased. Therefore, HUMINT requirements that had to be satisfied using CI resources, or HUMINT had to be obtained from other agencies. At the tactical level, commanders could not rely on relevant, timely HUMINT in sufficient quantities. As it began to add to its HUMINT capability, the Army realized its existing experience and knowledge base for this discipline resided within the CI community. Bringing HUMINT and CI together initially began as a means to support new HUMINT resources in their infancy, but it soon became evident that HUMINT and CI should be integrated for the long-term. In Afghanistan, the 2X synchronized and deconflicted operations, consolidated source registries, and ensured operations aligned with requirements from the tactical to the theater and national levels.  

The 2008 Defense Intelligence Strategy contains multiple strategic priorities calling for close cooperation and collaboration between HUMINT and CI. DIA, JFCs, and the Army have the organizational tools in place to respond to the overarching strategy. The Air Force does not currently have a paradigm within which it can pursue these USD(I) objectives.

Air Force HUMINT

Over the course of the Cold War, the United States relied most heavily on technical methods of intelligence gathering to permit remote collection against the closed off Soviet Union and its allies. During this time, the Air Force was a leading innovator in development and improvement of SIGINT, IMINT, and other technical collection methods, but also possessed capabilities for all intelligence disciplines. Air Force HUMINT capability was administered by the Air Force Special Activities Center which was responsible for policy, doctrine, and planning.
for the employment of Air Force HUMINT resources. The Air Force surrendered its in-house HUMINT capability in 1995, except for that retained by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (discussed below), upon the establishment of the Defense HUMINT Service.

The Defense HUMINT Service consolidated military HUMINT and the Defense Attache System, leaving little foundational knowledge on HUMINT after those with previous experience separated or retired.

Between 1995 and 2008, AFOSI possessed the Air Force’s only HUMINT capability. AFOSI is not an intelligence organization under AF/A2, it is an investigative organization, and does not perform the full spectrum HUMINT described earlier in this paper. AFOSI is effectively “matrixed” into the intelligence community by virtue of its responsibility and capability for CI, but investigation and intelligence are fundamentally different enterprises. AFOSI uses human sources (informants and witnesses) and HUMINT-type techniques in conducting investigations, but relies on other services and interagency HUMINT for information gathered prior to or outside of their investigation. This is the type of overlap that DIA is trying to manage with DCHC. Although it is perfectly acceptable for different organizations, with different responsibilities, to use similar procedures for different purposes, a disciplined approach is needed to ensure efforts are coordinated and deconflicted.

As a result of the formation of the Defense HUMINT Service, and simultaneous draw down of Air Force HUMINT, the Air Force currently relies on DoD and other agencies for HUMINT. However, as discussed above, there is a renewed emphasis on HUMINT at all levels in the intelligence community, and the Air Force is developing new organic HUMINT capability with the stand-up of an Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA) specialized detachment at Lackland AFB. The detachment will grow to a squadron-
sized organization as the Air Force approves personnel resource allocations. As Bill Haplin, a 35-year defense HUMINT veteran points out, refilling long vacant personnel positions does not in itself “reconstitute lost competencies.” He goes on to explain that the “industry benchmark for achieving operational competency” in HUMINT requires “five to seven years of closely supervised field experience.” The organization in place, AFISRA must now busy itself with developing expertise in an area long absent from the Air Force intelligence arsenal.

**Air Force Counterintelligence**

Air Force CI capability, apart from service-wide security programs, is wholly contained within the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI); AFOSI coordinates with the FBI and CIA as appropriate and is the sole repository for CI information. AFOSI reports to the Air Force Inspector General and has the responsibility to “identify and neutralize the sabotage, clandestine intelligence, subversive, terrorist, and criminal threat to resources.” Absent from this mandate is the responsibility to detect and exploit, two key components of CI identified in the above discussion on defining CI. The omission seems minor on the surface, but leads one to question whether the Air Force actually possesses comprehensive CI capability. Although AFOSI is said to offer the “full range of CI,” the AFI guidance on CI does not seem to include Offensive Counterintelligence (OFCO), proactively reaching out to uncover an adversary’s intelligence operations before they are carried out against Air Force targets. AFOSI does not have the resources to investigate existing and emerging threats, and also conduct on-going surveillance and assessment of adversary capabilities outside of an active or planned operation. AFOSI performs CI from an investigative and law enforcement perspective, in many respects different from an intelligence perspective. The efficacy of using law enforcement agencies to
perform intelligence functions is a subject of debate among experts both within and outside of the Air Force and DoD.

Examining the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) role in domestic intelligence, United States Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner offers some important observations regarding the competing perspectives of criminal investigation (law enforcement) and intelligence. He explains that “while law enforcement is interested in what happened, intelligence is interested in what will happen.”

The investigator is ultimately concerned with capturing and prosecuting the offender. Although law enforcement may allow some nefarious activity to continue while the case against it is being built, the investigator will “pounce” as soon as evidence of undeniable guilt is acquired.

Writing for the Joint Military Intelligence College, crime analyst Deborah Osborne states that intelligence analysis in most federal law enforcement agencies is seldom proactive, centering on “existing investigations rather than uncovering new threats.” Conversely, the intelligence professional is oriented in a prospective manner, willing to exercise great patience in gathering data “in an effort to learn the scope, intentions, membership, and affiliations” of the potential offender and detect the emerging threat.

This is not to say that law enforcement officials do not gather and use intelligence, but it is in a different manner and toward a different end than that of intelligence agencies. In “Organization of Counterintelligence within the Department of Defense – Synergies with Law Enforcement Agencies,” Scott Kieffer takes Posner and other critics of combined intelligence and law enforcement organizations to task and points out many of the benefits of such arrangements. He contends it is a false oversimplification to characterize law enforcement as entirely focused on prosecuting criminals noting that organizations such as AFOSI use intelligence on a particular threat to work with communities on crime prevention programs.
Another issue separating intelligence and law enforcement is their differing practices in handling information. Posner submits that investigators maintain their evidence in an extremely close-hold fashion so as not to inadvertently “tip off” the subject, whereas one of the key principles in generating the highest quality intelligence is the sharing of information between different segments of the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{48} Richard Best, Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service, points out several cases where law enforcement’s withholding of information put other U.S. agencies at a disadvantage; he even states that some have argued such sequestering of information helped prevent advance discovery of September 11\textsuperscript{th} attack plans.\textsuperscript{49} Kieffer concedes the information flow between intelligence and law enforcement has been less than optimal, but offers that combining the two in a single organization can more easily overcome the communication barriers. He also notes that when intelligence is sought from other law enforcement agencies, including those outside the United States, the information is often more easily obtained by a law enforcement agency than by an intelligence agency since “police are often very suspicious of intelligence agencies”.\textsuperscript{50}

Posner also notes that law enforcement is constrained by many more procedural limitations than intelligence activities on surveillance and obtaining information.\textsuperscript{51} Best explains the statutory premises for these constraints were enacted out of concern that law enforcement be a public and transparent process, while intelligence is necessarily secretive.\textsuperscript{52} This means that information gained through intelligence methods may not be admissible as evidence in law enforcement proceedings. Kieffer believes differing procedures and cultures are reasons that support the idea of combined intelligence and law enforcement organizations. He insists that such an organization can possess expertise in both types of procedures and easily transition the focus between intelligence and law enforcement as appropriate for a particular case.\textsuperscript{53}
Overall, Posner concludes that law enforcement and intelligence cultures are incompatible and dedicated intelligence organizations will therefore be more effective in performing intelligence activities than those operating in the law enforcement arena.\textsuperscript{54} Kieffer, on the other hand, concludes that an understanding of both law enforcement and intelligence in one organization provides a more complete and flexible capability in being able to conduct operations from both points of view.\textsuperscript{55}

While Kieffer’s arguments are convincing in that AFOSI offers a unique merged capability of law enforcement and intelligence, this does not mean that Air Force CI capability is as comprehensive as it ought to be. While AFOSI uses intelligence and intelligence collection methods to successfully investigate prior acts and even prevent some future threats, it does so in the environment of threat identification and neutralization, rather than in an environment of threat capability detection and exploitation. AFOSI acts against those gathering intelligence on friendly forces and those acting on that intelligence, but is not in the business of learning adversary intelligence capabilities and countering them before they are put into motion. The Air Force needs the investigative prowess of AFOSI both at home and abroad, and AFOSI should retain its intelligence-like competencies in order to optimize its performance. In addition, the Air Force should develop more complete CI capability within its intelligence community to counter adversarial intelligence efforts while threats are still in the emergent and pre-emergent stage.

\textbf{Toward More Complete and Collaborative HUMINT and CI}

In responding to the need for broad capability to obtain intelligence on a wide range of adversaries, increasingly including non-state terrorist groups, the defense intelligence community has resolved to reinvigorate its HUMINT program. The Air Force is following suit and has chartered a new HUMINT detachment under AFISRA. More HUMINT in itself is not a solution,
as Lowenthal observes, “…successful HUMINT is not a question of the mass of agents being assigned to a target…there is no reason to believe that the twentieth agent who is sent will succeed when the first nineteen have not.” But the Air Force starting point here is little to no existing HUMINT and, therefore, the new detachment is not the overreaction Lowenthal warns against. The Air Force aim in building up HUMINT resources is to produce a robust, fully capable program. According to the Defense Intelligence Strategy, this includes better collaboration with the CI program.

As determined above, the Air Force CI capability exists within a law enforcement organization, not in the intelligence community. Intelligence and law enforcement, though they must often assist one another, operate from different perspectives and under different cultural norms that make it nearly impossible for them to be truly integrated and collaborative. Nor should they be; intelligence should remain focused on intelligence matters and law enforcement focused on law enforcement. To attempt to split the personalities of either would result in a dilution of capability rather than an enhancement. In order to realize the strategic vision of USD(I), the Air Force should establish CI capability within the intelligence community.

In examining United States domestic security intelligence, Posner finds that instilling intelligence responsibility within a law enforcement organization (the FBI) to be less than effective in accomplishing intelligence objectives. On the other hand, Kieffer offers valuable insights on the worth of having an organization with capabilities for both intelligence and law enforcement (AFOSI). In recommending a new Security Intelligence Service organization, Posner provides a model for establishing domestic security intelligence within the intelligence community without depleting the capability of the FBI. His model can be applied to the Air Force in determining a solution for CI.
Posner contends that although the FBI is the wrong organization to be responsible for security intelligence, the intelligence element of the Bureau must be left intact to keep the efficiencies of its relationship with other law enforcement agencies as well as for those cases where enemy intelligence activity and terrorism overlaps with crime. The new intelligence organization would be required to notify law enforcement when, in the course of intelligence gathering and analysis, it finds serious criminal activity. It is important to maintain the ability to arrest a threatening individual on whom intelligence is being gathered when the situation warrants. In planting a new organization focused on CI within its intelligence community, the Air Force would likewise leave the responsibilities and capabilities of AFOSI in place. By law, is the only agency in the Air Force authorized to use specialized techniques for collection of information and electronic surveillance on U.S. persons in procedures 5 through 10 of DoD 5240.1-R. AFOSI must retain this authorization for use in investigations. AFOSI also has significant experience interfacing with the FBI and CIA; those long-standing relationships must be preserved. The new Air Force CI (AFCI) organization would function as the conduit through which Air Force intelligence and AFOSI would interface and share information. A key role of AFCI would be to codify and manage communication procedures with AFOSI to ensure situational awareness of sources being targeted and deconfliction of activities. This will enhance both the intelligence and investigative missions.

Founding AFCI in addition to AFOSI may at first glance seem like a duplication of effort at risk of producing what Lowenthal calls the “swarm ball effect” of multiple agents, for multiple purposes, attacking the same issue and actually inhibiting the progress of one another. But that is not the case here. The issues being worked by AFCI and AFOSI will be different. AFOSI will continue to identify and neutralize threats to physical, information, and operation security of...
friendly forces, while AFCI will focus on countering adversarial intelligence activities. Although labeled “CI”, AFOSI responsibilities are not targeted directly at the adversary’s intelligence capabilities, they are directed at the threats that emerge from those capabilities. AFOSI investigates threats and potential threats and is neither trained nor sufficiently staffed to monitor and discover adversary intelligence methods, sources, and intentions during periods when no particular activity is detected. True CI is interested in just that: learning of the intelligence capability that may be targeted against the Air Force, assessing vulnerabilities to such intelligence activity, and determining prevention methods to counter such intelligence. CI may indeed identify specific threats, and in such cases AFOSI can apply its investigative expertise to ensure the danger is effectively neutralized. To clearly denote the difference in the intelligence function that would be accomplished by AFCI and the investigative role AFOSI will continue to play, it is proposed here that doctrine and regulatory documents be revised to rename the AFOSI function in this area as Counter-Threat Investigation, rather than CI. This will assist in assuring each organization has a unique identity and commanders at all levels can distinguish between the correct resources for particular requirements.

Posner advises against creating a new stand-alone agency to undertake domestic security intelligence, but prefers placing the function within an existing department. An existing department, already with related responsibilities, would assist the new function in obtaining full operational capability by taking advantage of the existing administrative processes in the department. Following Posner’s advice, AFCI would be formed within an existing Air Force intelligence organization. In order to meet USD(I) expectations for collaboration between HUMINT and CI, AFCI should stand up within AFISRA.
Defense Intelligence Strategy Priority I.I.E. is to “Establish close collaboration between [HUMINT] and [CI] in key areas of common concern, to include source registration and asset validation.” Housing AFCI in AFISRA, along with the existing HUMINT detachment, will enable this collaboration. Combining source registration and asset validation into a single system is undoubtedly a simpler undertaking within the same parent organization where AFCI and HUMINT can share a common information technology architecture. Under AFISRA, AFCI and HUMINT can even share administrative resources, such as data entry and system maintenance, to avoid costly duplication of effort. Similarly, aligning both HUMINT and AFCI under AFISRA will help the Air Force meet Defense Intelligence Strategy Priority IV.3.A., “develop counterintelligence training and certification standards and competencies for counterintelligence professionals and foster a cooperative and collaborative environment with HUMINT, Special Operations, Law Enforcement, and national and international partners.” As Air Force HUMINT is in its new infancy, training, certification standards, and competencies are being developed. Placing AFCI in the same organization will allow concurrent development of these for both HUMINT and CI and ensure training in common areas is consistent. Collaboration between the two will be enhanced as both HUMINT and CI professionals are trained together and understand the competencies and limitations of one another.

HUMINT, CI, and law enforcement are not mutually exclusive and must collaborate to fully protect Air Force personnel, assets, and information. For too long the Air Force has relied on other agencies for HUMINT and possessed only partial CI capability within AFOSI. By standing up a dedicated HUMINT unit within AFISRA, the Air Force is filling a significant void in its intelligence capability. In addition, adding a CI unit within AFISRA address a remaining
missing competence and provides an organizational construct to ensure the required collaboration between HUMINT, CI, and investigative law enforcement in the Air Force.

**Conclusion**

The 2008 Defense Intelligence Strategy indicates the need for cooperation and collaboration between HUMINT and CI. HUMINT and CI have common requirements for training, administration, and information management, use many of the same techniques, tactics, and procedures, and may share sources of intelligence information. DIA is already moving to optimize the integration of HUMINT and CI by organizing the two together within DCHS. The DCHS construct is similar to that employed at the operational and tactical levels by the combatant commands’ J-2X and the Army’s 2X concepts; both have documented beneficial synergistic effects from organizing HUMINT and CI together. As the Air Force is in progress regrowing its HUMINT capability, it should do so in light of USD(I)’s strategic vision and ensure successful collaboration with Air Force CI.

Air Force CI capability is currently limited to AFOSI operations. AFOSI is an investigative organization and does not approach CI from the same perspective as the intelligence community. While AFOSI is an important contributor to the counterterrorism and force protection posture, it does not conduct activities specifically aimed at detecting and assessing the capabilities, methods, and intentions of intelligence efforts targeted against the Air Force while they are still pre-emergent. In addition to the vital counter-threat mission of AFOSI, Air Force requires full spectrum CI capability to continually monitor and analyze adversarial intelligence activity and determine appropriate preventive measures.

The new Air Force HUMINT and CI capabilities should be organized together, within the intelligence community. Situating Air Force HUMINT and CI in this manner will provide the
best opportunity to achieve the integration and collaboration required by the Defense Intelligence Strategy. At the same time, the new CI organization can provide the much needed interface between the intelligence and law enforcement communities as their missions consistently overlap in combating terrorism.
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