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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The issue of illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration in the maritime domain presents a challenge to the organizations charged with protecting the borders of the United States. As an agency responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary instrument for interdicting illegal maritime migration. Except in extreme circumstances of mass migration, the Coast Guard has relied on the principle of effective presence to accomplish its mission and done so with measurable success. However, with the growing transnational criminal nature of human trafficking and increased pressure on U.S. maritime borders due to tougher border enforcement, the Coast Guard should seek to expand its concept of operations for interdiction of human smuggling in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard could do this by inviting relevant agencies to participate in a Joint Interagency Task Force to bring a unified effort to counter maritime smuggling. Furthermore, the Coast Guard should apply the appropriate concepts of operational art consistent with joint doctrine in planning and executing its mission to ensure the most effective and efficient application of national resources.					
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**INTERDICTING MARITIME MIGRANT SMUGGLING – APPLYING SOME  
CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL ART TO COAST GUARD OPERATIONS**

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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## Abstract

### **INTERDICTING MARITIME MIGRANT SMUGGLING – APPLYING SOME CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL ART TO COAST GUARD OPERATIONS**

The issue of illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration in the maritime domain presents a challenge to the organizations charged with protecting the borders of the United States. As an agency responsible for enforcing laws on the high seas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the primary instrument for interdicting illegal maritime migration. Except in extreme circumstances of mass migration, the Coast Guard has relied on the principle of effective presence to accomplish its mission and done so with measurable success. However, with the growing transnational criminal nature of human trafficking and increased pressure on U.S. maritime borders due to tougher border enforcement, the Coast Guard should seek to expand its concept of operations for interdiction of human smuggling in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard could do this by inviting relevant agencies to participate in a Joint Interagency Task Force to bring a unified effort to counter maritime smuggling. Furthermore, the Coast Guard should apply the appropriate concepts of operational art consistent with joint doctrine in planning and executing its mission to ensure the most effective and efficient application of national resources.

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## **INTERDICTING MARITIME MIGRANT SMUGGLING – APPLYING SOME CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONAL ART TO COAST GUARD OPERATIONS**

Although the Coast Guard is not a part of the Department of Defense (DoD), it is one of the five Armed Forces of the United States and shares many characteristics with the services that make up the department. Throughout U.S. history, the Coast Guard has participated in every major war and conflict since the Quasi-war of 1798, but it does not habitually engage in combat operations on a large scale relative to the size of its force. When the Coast Guard has recently employed forces for combat operations, it is typically with a small force in a support role under the command of a Combatant Commander.<sup>1</sup> However, there are several areas where the Coast Guard has responsibilities that have implications for the Global War on Terror such as maritime drug and migrant interdiction. While such operations do not usually involve direct action, they certainly share some characteristics with war including the overt use of force on the seas and in the air. Currently, the Coast Guard does not approach its responsibilities for maritime migrant interdiction from an operational perspective as understood and practiced by the DoD. This hinders the Coast Guard's effectiveness in contributing not only to maritime security but its ability to influence overarching Homeland Security objectives. In order to have a greater positive impact on National Security through maritime interdiction of human trafficking and illegal immigrants, the Coast Guard must establish a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) command that works across internal and interagency jurisdictions and applies operational art inherent in joint doctrine to accomplish the mission.

## **The Threat**

“Illegal migration, as well as organized human smuggling, undermines U.S. sovereignty and challenges the nation’s borders. Illegal migration adversely affects regional economies and creates unacceptable conditions of human suffering and loss of life.”<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, human trafficking and smuggling is a serious problem world-wide as the United Nations estimates that nearly four million people are smuggled across international borders annually with two hundred million living in debt to human smugglers.<sup>3</sup>

While the entry of nearly 500,000 unknown persons into the U.S. annually presents significant challenges, the threat from the criminal and exploitive nature of human trafficking is even more substantial. Converging with international terrorism, transnational criminal elements of migrant trafficking threaten the stability of peaceful nations in a similar fashion as international drug traffickers.<sup>4</sup> Criminals such as these are prepared to do business with terrorists who have a need for human traffickers’ goods and skills such as forged documents and smuggling networks that can infiltrate operatives into specific destinations.<sup>5</sup> The U.S., Mexico, and Ecuador estimate that human smuggling in just the western hemisphere generates twenty billion dollars annually illuminating the scope of the problem.<sup>6</sup> The human smuggling enterprise creates a host of criminal activity in the originating, transit, and destination country including forced labor, prostitution, money laundering, and document forgery.

The trafficking aspect of illegal migration along with its deleterious side effects are likely to grow, and are already creating a problem in the maritime domain. Increases in border enforcement have forced migrants to increasingly rely on criminal human smugglers.<sup>7</sup> The Coast Guard measures effectiveness in migrant interdictions as a percentage of migrants

interdicted or deterred who are attempting to enter the U.S. by maritime routes. In 2002 and 2003, the Coast Guard interdicted 2,409 and 5,331 migrants respectively according to Coast Guard figures, and this equated to a migrant interdiction rate of 85.3% according to the Government Accounting Office (GAO).<sup>8</sup> However, from 2001 to 2004, an estimated 250,000 illegal migrants were transported by vessel from Ecuador alone to transit countries where a land crossing to the U.S. could be made.<sup>9</sup> So while the ultimate point of entry for a smuggler and migrant may not be at U.S. shores, the maritime global commons are certainly being used on a large scale in this illegal enterprise. Furthermore, some experts contend that as the U.S. Secure Border Initiative is implemented over the next 3 years that includes strengthening land-based border enforcement, traffickers and migrants will explore more vulnerable avenues such as the seacoasts of the U.S., and this will likely put increased pressure on maritime security resources.<sup>10</sup>

### **Roots of Coast Guard Operations**

The Coast Guard traces its lineage back to 1790 with the establishment of the Revenue Marine whose purpose was to enforce tariffs, protect shipping, and interdict illegal cargoes.<sup>11</sup> At the Coast Guard's inception, the service augmented the U.S. Navy in defense of a fledgling Nation while also acting as a sentry for American ports and waterways.<sup>12</sup> However, the history and construction of the Coast Guard is more complex as it was created by bringing five federal agencies under one umbrella. With the exception of the Revenue Marine, these agencies did not have national security or federal law enforcement responsibilities.<sup>13</sup> Unlike the Navy's unambiguous charter to defend the Nation, the Coast Guard seems to have assumed responsibility for not only protecting the U.S. but also taking responsibility for any federal obligation that had a maritime complexion. The various

founding components of the Coast Guard shaped the culture, structure, and business practices of the service and generated a “stove-piped” approach to the eleven program missions for which the Coast Guard is responsible that includes maritime migrant interdiction.<sup>14</sup>

### **The Operational Level of War and the Coast Guard**

With the isolated and sometimes unrelated nature of its many responsibilities, the Coast Guard has sometimes worked directly from the national-strategic level to the tactical level of force employment. This has sometimes resulted in the Coast Guard’s failure to incorporate the operational level and operational art that contributes to the effective employment of scarce resources to achieve national objectives. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the renewed focus on those Coast Guard programs that directly contribute to Homeland Security including illegal migrant interdiction, the Coast Guard has an opportunity to fully embrace concepts of operational art that can be applied to this activity.

The operational level of war connects the national-strategic level with tactical actions of military forces. It is that level in which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives by establishing operational objectives, sequencing events to achieve those objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about these events.<sup>15</sup> The operational level implies a broader dimension of time and space than activities at the tactical level.<sup>16</sup> Operational art is art and science, the study and practice of which is the application of “creative imagination by commanders and staffs – supported by skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and employ military forces.”<sup>17</sup>

For the Coast Guard, national-strategic objectives that contribute to Homeland security and defense are set at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard Headquarters based on directives such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship identifies the transnational threat from human trafficking and illegal migration as a challenge in the maritime domain.<sup>18</sup> Currently, the Area Commanders that employ forces for each U.S. coast constitute the theater-strategic level for the Coast Guard.<sup>19</sup> The Coast Guard's nine regional District Commands depicted below designate the operational level.




Figure 1 Levels of Command<sup>20</sup>

Forces are allocated across the nine districts and thirty-five sector commands based on the capacity of the assets in terms of range, endurance, and associated personnel.<sup>21</sup> The assignment of resources meets the Coast Guard's intent of a layered defense with maritime patrol and interdiction platforms operating in the deepwater while interoperable, multi-

mission sectors protect thirty-five U.S. ports and surrounding areas.<sup>22</sup> However, the assignment of forces across several geographic boundaries in this manner can create seams and gaps that can be exploited by criminal elements.




Figure 2 – Coast Guard Districts<sup>23</sup>

When determining the suitability of operational art for the Coast Guard Districts as well as the means of integrating operational art concepts for maritime migrant interdiction, there must first be a determination of whether Coast Guard activities for such maritime security issues rise to the operational level or whether these activities are constabulary in nature. The scale of the objective determines the level of war, and the size and importance of the objective establishes the method of force employment as well as the size of the physical space and corresponding levels of command to be established.<sup>24</sup> The factors of time and space for maritime migrant interdiction support the notion that the objective resides at the operational level. When considering space, the geographic size of each Coast Guard District is extensive and warrants consideration for the operational level both in scale and the 2-star

level of command. For example, the Commander of the Coast Guard's 11<sup>th</sup> District that follows along the coast of California is responsible for 3.3 million square miles of ocean.<sup>25</sup>

Because so many of the asymmetric threats to maritime security are enduring, the issue of the operational objective is somewhat complicated as it relates to time. One criterion for an operational objective cited in Joint Publication 3-0 is that it be attainable.<sup>26</sup> However, the statutory requirements that the Coast Guard has for maritime security are indefinite so how can the Coast Guard objectives rise to the operational level where operational art might be applied? It is arguable that as long as states have borders, there will be those who will try to penetrate those borders for nefarious purposes. Considering the nearly twenty thousand miles of U.S. sea and land border combined with the resolve of criminal elements, it is not likely that any reasonable application of security could achieve 100% effectiveness.

However, in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the ability of the U.S. government to protect its sovereignty is an important part of homeland security both in terms of determining who is entering the country and the nexus between criminal activity and terrorism. In this sense, the objective of interdicting illegal migrants as well as other contraband can be achieved to a level that significantly reduces the risk and cost to the U.S..

The ability of the Coast Guard Districts to employ the level of forces that rise to the operational level is questionable when acting as the sole agency to accomplish an objective. By way of comparison, the Marine Corps establishes its operational level of command as the Component Commander to the Joint Force Commander not only as a function of the forces under command but the required level of interaction with other services and agencies.<sup>27</sup> One factor when considering the force capacity of a Coast Guard District is the dispersed nature of the force that is both a function of the multi-mission aspect of the Coast Guard as well as

the lack of excess idle forces. The Coast Guard operates at near 100% capacity during peacetime or wartime to meet its legislative requirements and maintain a force presence across 95,000 miles of U.S. coastline.<sup>28</sup> Because there is little surplus of forces, it is very difficult for the Coast Guard to mass forces to conduct major operations because doing so sacrifices other statutory responsibilities.

There are some exceptions to the Coast Guard's difficulty in massing forces for operations. One such case is evidenced in contingency operations such as Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts where the benefits of massing forces in response to an obvious disaster clearly outweighed the risks. Force employment on such a scale occurs infrequently. However, much like DoD services, when the Coast Guard integrates its efforts with the DoD and other agencies, factor force can be expanded to the operational level. Clearly, when considering the objectives of maritime security including migrant interdiction, Coast Guard responsibilities overlap, integrate, and depend on the capabilities of other agencies. When considering the total force necessary to accomplish the mission for maritime migrant interdiction, there is comparative evidence to suggest that the objective resides at the operational level.

### **Presence versus Orchestration**

While the Coast Guard Districts' objective for maritime security through maritime law enforcement including migrant interdiction is arguably at the operational level, the Coast Guard has often addressed the issue of migration through the doctrinal principle of "effective presence" which is described as "being at the right place at the right time."<sup>29</sup> Applying such a principle as a concept of operations indicates activities that are more tactical than operational in nature. In Congressional testimony Assistant Commandant for Operations

discussed the manner in which Coast Guard assets maintain an effective presence by monitoring key choke points along migrant smuggling routes.<sup>30</sup> Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Allen has recently described the need for a flexible and effective force presence.<sup>31</sup> In providing guidance for reporting of resources hours, platforms are directed to categorize their hours in terms of which program benefits from their presence.<sup>32</sup> Certainly the Coast Guard met its performance targets for migrant interdiction in 2007 by interdicting 93% of migrants based on an accepted measurement system.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, a “show of force” is among the range of military operations and this type of activity could be likened to an effective presence.<sup>34</sup> However, with the exception of massive migration and subsequent interdiction as experienced with Cuba and Haiti in 1994, the Coast Guard approach to migrant interdiction connotes a constabulary, “cop on the beat” concept of operations.

This form of mission execution underscores that Coast Guard Districts as a sole entity do not possess the force capacity to conduct operations at the operational level. In fact, the Coast Guard has had to reduce its hours dedicated to maritime migrant interdiction in recent years to meet other mandates.<sup>35</sup> This may be attributed to the Coast Guard’s scarce and widely dispersed resources that are fragmented across nine districts and thirty sectors, lack of excess capacity, and eleven program-mission areas. Attempting to achieve operational objectives without the requisite force detracts from the sequencing, orchestration, and creativity that are components of operational art. If the Coast Guard were able to better cooperate and integrate migrant interdiction activities with other instruments of national power, it might be able to broaden its operational picture and have a greater effect on the overall problem of illegal immigration and associated criminal activity.

## **The Role of Intelligence and Information Sharing**

The threats presented in the Coast Guard's law enforcement and security mission areas are asymmetric. Because of this reality coupled with the limited resources available to secure the millions of square miles for which the Coast Guard is responsible, intelligence must drive and support Coast Guard operations. The Coast Guard needs to exploit the true interoperability and complimentary nature of intelligence that can be tailored to the needs of different interdiction units to support its maritime security missions.<sup>36</sup> Intelligence preparation of the battle space must be the basis for any movement of forces.<sup>37</sup>

As an example of how the Coast Guard has sometimes failed to employ the operational function of intelligence in its maritime security missions, Coast Guard Vice Admiral Crea in 2005 described previous counter-drug activities as follows, "We used to just go out and drill holes in the water and the air and wait for the drug boat to come underneath us. We spent a lot of effort without getting a lot of results."<sup>38</sup> These previous non-intelligence driven activities are in contrast with how the Coast Guard has more recently been working with other agencies and partner countries to share intelligence generating significant results in the counter-drug arena. One of the primary instruments for this integration has been the DoD-sponsored JIATF that detects and monitors drug shipments and then passes actionable intelligence off to a host of agencies and partner countries for interdiction.<sup>39</sup>

In recent years, the Coast Guard has enhanced intelligence its organic intelligence capabilities by more than doubling its intelligence personnel and establishing intelligence fusion centers.<sup>40</sup> However, the value of fusion centers in general was questioned in a Congressional Research Service report that found little true "fusion" of intelligence – analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and proactive collection

– was actually occurring.<sup>41</sup> Further complicating the issue, until January of 2008 the Coast Guard had no rate for intelligence and training was problematic as personnel rotated in and out of the intelligence field.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, the Coast Guard is making internal efforts to improve intelligence capability, and the GAO acknowledged that the organization is also improving information sharing relative to maritime security.<sup>43</sup>

### **Command & Control and Operational Maneuver**

The Coast Guard derives its authority for migrant interdiction at sea from U.S. Code Title 14.<sup>44</sup> Coast Guard District Commands and staffs normally provide command and control for employment of forces at the operational level.<sup>45</sup> There are crisis plans for mass migrations that establish a joint task force for humanitarian aid and enforcement of U.S. laws on a surge basis.<sup>46</sup> However, because of the multiple Districts that share the responsibility for maritime migrant and smuggling interdiction, the Coast Guard relies on unity of effort within its own organization at the operational level for normal operations. As is the case with counter-drug operations, the capability, responsibility, and intelligence sources for stemming illegal immigration spans multiple agencies. There are a number of federal agencies that have responsibilities for some aspect of interdiction and prosecution of criminal smuggling and others that could contribute to the mission on the basis of homeland security. Responsible agencies include Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Department of Justice (DoJ), and Department of State (DoS) as well as state and local agencies. This broad spectrum of different agencies requires a unity of effort command structure to combat the use of the maritime domain in illegal human trafficking, migration, and smuggling.

Ultimately, the Coast Guard must be able to maneuver its forces in concert with those of the interagency into position to provide for maritime security through enforcement of laws and sovereignty. Maneuver is the placement of ships and aircraft in a position of advantage over the adversary.<sup>47</sup> As previously noted, the Coast Guard does not normally possess the force to act at the operational level for illegal migrant interdiction unless it abandons other mission areas. Furthermore, the Coast Guard relies on the doctrinal principle of effective presence at key choke points as a means of effectively applying scarce resources to the migrant interdiction mission, and this has worked with measurable success based on accepted metrics.<sup>48</sup> The Coast Guard's concept of "right place at the right time," is slightly different from the maneuver of assets to a position of advantage described in Joint Doctrine. The Coast Guard might benefit from approaching the migrant interdiction mission from the concept of maneuver by expanding the concept of operations.

### **Expanding the Scope of Maritime Migrant Interdiction**

The Coast Guard does not possess the resources to expand the maritime migrant interdiction mission internally without jeopardizing other mission areas. However, U.S. law states that the Coast Guard may avail itself of resources from other agencies in Federal service with the consent of the head of the agency.<sup>49</sup> If other agencies were willing to participate with the Coast Guard in an integrated effort, the Coast Guard would share the resources necessary to expand the scope of its maritime migrant interdiction efforts in all aspects of migration for which it is responsible. Since the Coast Guard is an armed force, one key partner in such cooperation would be the DoD with its many hard assets and surveillance capability.

There is room to expand the concept of operations for maritime migration in the physical domain as well. The maritime domain is used extensively to smuggle migrants to transit countries far from U.S. shores.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD-9) signed in 1993 directs the Coast Guard to interdict migrants as far at sea as possible.<sup>51</sup> While the Coast Guard may not have the capacity to extend its reach, it could partner with Navy vessels using Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments similar to those used in counter-drug operations. There is established legal precedent for Naval support of Coast Guard law enforcement, and there is no reason that maritime migrant interdiction would be different if the smuggling vessel were subject to U.S. law.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, in an effort to stem human trafficking, United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime and Protocol Against Migrant Smuggling enables a flag state to authorize another state to board and search vessels suspected of smuggling persons.<sup>53</sup> Because of the overlapping authorities and unique capabilities of agencies that share and have a stake in homeland security such as the DoD, leveraging the resources of these agencies can enable the proper movement of forces to improve maritime security.

### **The JIATF-South Model – Blueprint for Interagency Success**

The JIATF construct for counter-drug operations provides a blueprint for interagency and international cooperation.<sup>54</sup> This model should be analyzed for applicability to illegal maritime migration and smuggling. JIATFs have been successful in exercising the operational functions of intelligence as well as command and control with positive results. Furthermore, these interagency organizations have effectively demonstrated unity of effort by separating functions as required by legislative mandate to allow those agencies with the legitimate authority to conduct law enforcement on the high seas.<sup>55</sup> By bringing together the

relevant agencies that share responsibility for the counter-drug mission, the interagency has expanded resources and options for greater creativity that have allow it to achieve objectives at the operational level in an efficient manner.

JIATF South was created with the primary mission of detecting and monitoring narcotics shipments and coordinating interdiction to stem the flow of maritime drug traffic into the U.S..<sup>56</sup> The Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that approximately 93% of the drugs coming into the U.S. enter or spend some time in the maritime domain so the task of JIATF South is extensive. The responsibility and capacity to address the many pieces of the counter-drug mission spans several agencies and requires support from the U.S.'s international partners. JIATFs were created to bring the authorities, expertise, and capacity of many agencies that have a stake in the counter-drug mission to bear on the problem.<sup>57</sup> The task force is comprised of thirty-two agencies and partners based in Key West Florida that include the DoD, DEA, Coast Guard, and many more federal and state agencies as well as international partners.<sup>58</sup> In its current construct, each participating agency contributes core competencies and capabilities to the counter-drug mission. For example, DoD reconnaissance assets are employed to locate drug shipments that typically involve thirty-five to forty-five foot “go-fast” boats with multiple outboard engines bound for the U.S. or intermediate drop points.<sup>59</sup> The DoD then coordinates the transfer of the targets to interdiction units that include Coast Guard cutters, U.S. Navy vessels with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments embarked, or foreign enforcement units.

Ultimately, it is results that matter, and JIATF has shown that increasing intelligence and capacity along with an appropriate unity of effort at the operational level can improve mission outcomes. Considering just Coast Guard data since JIATF's inception in 1994,

seizures of cocaine have increased in ten out of fourteen years growing from a low of 33,000 pounds in 1995 to a high of 300,000 in 2005. While the seizure rate has leveled off over the last two years at around 235,000 pounds, the results are still significant.<sup>60</sup> It is noteworthy that seizures from the years of 2004 to 2006 averaged 100% higher than the previous three years despite a significant reduction in resource hours during this period while standing up Homeland Security capabilities. Furthermore, this increase in seizures does not account for contributions of partner nations such as Mexico whose interdictions increased nearly 500% from 2006 to 2007.<sup>61</sup> One could argue, and ONDCP would agree, that the U.S. is not currently meeting its goals of a 40% interdiction rate for narcotics or that the “war on drugs” cannot be won by interdiction efforts alone. However, this is a matter that does not concern the operational level of war but instead is an issue of national policy. When tasked with the mission of interdicting drugs in the maritime domain, JIATF-South appears to be a valid construct for accomplishing the mission.

## **Conclusions**

Illegal human smuggling, trafficking, and migration will persist as a threat to U.S. sovereignty and homeland security. It will also continue to foster transnational criminal organizations that could destabilize and threaten peaceful nations. These criminal elements could provide tactical capabilities that could be exploited by terrorist groups. Finally, the Secure Border Initiative and overall increased border enforcement in the U.S. will cause migrants to rely more heavily on criminal traffickers and push more human smuggling activity to the maritime domain.<sup>62</sup>

With the exception of mass migrations such as occurred in Cuba and Haiti in 1994, the Coast Guard has not tended to approach illegal maritime migration from the operational

level perspective for several reasons. The Coast Guard's assets are dispersed over nine districts, and there are persistent demands for those assets to meet other statutory mission areas. Additionally, the Coast Guard most recently exceeded performance measures for migrant interdictions based on a measurement of migrants trying to enter the U.S. by maritime routes. However, this form of measurement does not account for those who use the global commons to access transit points to the U.S.. If the Coast Guard were to include all migrant smuggling and trafficking that takes some form in the maritime domain in its assessment, this would broaden the perspective of the issue and cause the Coast Guard to look at it in a different manner.

In order to address the issue of illegal maritime migration at an operational level, the Coast Guard would have to expand capacity by leveraging interagency competencies and resources. This would include sharing surveillance, intelligence, and law enforcement authorities with other relevant agencies. Interagency cooperation would also have to include hard assets to fill the void in Coast Guard resources that are currently obligated by statutory requirements. To effectively use forces to counter the criminal and maritime security threat posed by illegal migration and smuggling, resources should be employed consistent with concepts of joint doctrine particularly intelligence, maneuver, and unity of effort.

### **Recommendations**

The Coast Guard must invite federal, state, local, and international partners that have an interest and capacity to stem the flow of illegal human smuggling in the maritime domain to participate in a joint interagency task force. JIATF-M for maritime migrant interdiction could include the Coast Guard, DoD, FBI, CBP, INS, and ICE as well as other relevant agencies. JIATF-M would expand physical resources, intelligence, investigative, and

prosecutorial capacity by leveraging authorities, competencies, and hardware in a synergistic way. An interagency task force could significantly reduce the security and criminal threat of maritime migrant trafficking while also broadly increasing maritime domain awareness.

In addition to bringing the most effective assets to bear on complex issues through interagency integration, the Coast Guard should also expand the concept of operations for maritime migrant interdiction by considering those who use the maritime domain as intermediary routes with an ultimate destination of the U.S.. If the Coast Guard were able to expand its reach through the Navy or other partners, it could have an impact on this form of smuggling that brings many illegal immigrants one-step closer to their destination. Another contributor in expanding the scope of operations in this way would be to adjust performance measurements to include these migrants who are smuggled to transit countries even if their final entry into the U.S. is on land. This could be combined with existing measurements or accounted separately. In either case, considering these migrants as part of the overall illegal immigration picture could generate new approaches to interdiction and increase U.S. security on both land and the coastal approaches.

Finally, the Coast Guard should place command and operational control for its deepwater and maritime patrol assets engaged in maritime migrant interdiction at JIATF-M. This would supply a comprehensive approach to maritime migrant smuggling. It would also provide unity of command for Coast Guard assets engaged in a single-focus mission vice a fragmented effort over nine Coast Guard Districts. Furthermore, placing Coast Guard assets under the control of JIATF-M would add credibility to the organization and underscore the Coast Guard's commitment to contributing to Homeland Security by making a concerted effort to stop illegal human trafficking, smuggling, and migration at all levels.

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