

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION  
AT THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION AT THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS, by MAJ Erik M. Brown, 61 pages.

This thesis examines how the Army might enhance and improve integration of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and conventional forces at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Given the current nature of operations, integration of ARSOF with conventional forces is a routine event during operations worldwide. As the premier training venues for the Army, the CTCs provide battle-focused, relevant, full-spectrum training to Army units. The necessity to train as the Army fights means that ARSOF integration should occur at the CTCs just as it occurs during actual operations. This study examines the status of integrated training at the CTCs today and assesses elements of the training that need to be continued, as well as those elements that could be improved. Finally, this study concludes by proposing a series of feasible, acceptable, and suitable solutions for more effective integration at the CTCs. The recommendations are based on feedback from subject matter experts at the CTCs, as well as a number of outside organizations.

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## ACRONYMS

AFSOF	
ARSOA	
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
AWE	Advanced Warfighting Experiment
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
CA	Civil Affairs
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
COE	
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CTC	Combat Training Center
FORSCOM	Forces Command
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MOUT	Military Operations in Urban Terrain
NAVSOF	
NTC	National Training Center
O/C	Observer/Controller
ODA	
OPFOR	Opposing Force
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PSYOP	Psychological Operations

SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCOORD	Special Operations Coordination Element
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	
STX	Situational Training Exercise
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USASFC	United States Army Special Forces Command
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has experienced a period of incredibly dynamic and unpredictable change. The transition from a bipolar, global balance of power centered around two superpowers to a new world order characterized by a single, dominant hyperpower has brought significant challenges to the forefront of US national policy, plans and politics. The US is a nation faced with the challenge of sustaining a global economy in a world where the political, social, economic, and ethnic landscape can change almost overnight. Concurrently, the Department of Defense is faced with the challenge of meeting a new breed of diverse, asymmetric, and dangerous threats. This new breed of threats and the types of operations that the Department of Defense conducts to deter, dissuade, or counter them require transformation not only of U.S. force structure, but also its equipment, technology, doctrine, and mind-set about the nature of war in the twenty-first century. One of the most significant trends to arise from this forced transformation is increasing frequency with which the Army conducts operations of a joint and multinational nature. Significant to this trend is the fact that joint operations are being conducted at lower levels than ever before. During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, an infantry brigade headquarters served as a Combined, Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF) (101st Airborne Brief, 2002, slide 4).

Until recently, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) have traditionally operated unilaterally, with little or no support or contact with conventional forces. Only in

rare exceptions did SOF participate in combat action, side by side with conventional forces. Today, it is common, if not expected, for ARSOF to be completely integrated, synchronized, and often collocated with conventional forces on the battlefield. While this trend provides great synergy and complementary capability on the battlefield, often it is the battlefield where ARSOF and conventional Army forces work together for the first time.

The Army employs the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to prepare its forces for full-spectrum operations. The CTCs provide a fully instrumented, observed, full-spectrum training environment complete with a professional opposing force (OPFOR). This training experience is unmatched by any nation in the world. Army units rotate through the centers on a regular basis, participating in highly realistic, scenario-based combat training and receiving expert feedback from observer/controllers (O/Cs). This feedback allows units to correct training deficiencies upon return to home station. Almost every soldier in the Army has been to a CTC rotation at some point in his or her career (Rocke 2002, 1).

Each CTC is focused on conducting a specific type of training. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin is focused on armored and mechanized training for a major theater war in a desert environment. The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) is focused on armor and mechanized training for a regional conflict in a European environment. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is focused on light and to a lesser extent special operations training in a smaller-scale contingency environment. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is a simulation-based center that exercises division and corps commanders and their staffs in a range of scenarios (Rocke 2002, 1). Both the JRTC and the CMTC conduct regular mission rehearsals for Bosnia and Kosovo

peacekeeping operations. Several of the CTCs have assisted in the conduct of experiments of new concepts and equipment. While none of the CTCs are focused on training Special Operations Forces (SOF), JRTC conducts six-to-eight, battalion-sized ARSOF rotations per year. During these ARSOF rotations, about twenty ARSOF personnel will actually participate in some form of integrated combat training with the conventional, rotational unit. Aside from one experimental exercise (Millennium Challenge) ARSOF have not participated in an NTC rotation in over three years. Occasionally, a small liaison element will participate in some part of a CMTC rotation. As for the BCTP, Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCEs) routinely participate in the simulation. The JRTC is the only CTC where ARSOF and conventional Army forces actually integrate on the ground and conduct operations on a routine basis. This is, at best, small scale.

The gap between the reality of routine and extensive ARSOF-conventional force cooperation during real-world operations and the small-scale, infrequent, or nonexistent combined training at the CTCs is cause for concern. The question of how to better integrate ARSOF at the CTCs is a complex one. To begin with, doctrine about when, how, and to what extent ARSOF are to be integrated with conventional forces is scarce, vague, and open to interpretation. Since the CTCs are doctrinally based entities that teach the doctrinal solution to battlefield problem solving, the lack of extensive, published doctrine on the subject leads to debate. Add to the mix the fact that the Army is reinventing itself to become more relevant and effective in the current operational environment and progress towards ARSOF integration seems hopeless. Doctrinal challenges and transformation

aside, the Army must train as it fights. This means that ARSOF should be a significant and active participant in the CTC program.

The primary question that this thesis seeks to answer is how the Army can more effectively integrate ARSOF and conventional force training at the CTCs. Effective integration means that both the conventional and ARSOF units are challenged by the CTC experience to the extent that they not only meet their own training objectives, but, in essence, enhance and enrich the training experience for each other. The challenge in this problem is that there may not be a single solution that applies across the CTCs. Specifically tailored solutions may be necessary for the unique circumstances of each CTC. In examining this question of effective integration, the researcher seeks to devise and employ some measures of effectiveness to ensure consistency. The disparity between a typical ARSOF unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) and that of its conventional counterpart will create a challenge for Army leaders. Trainers must seek opportunities to take advantage of METL overlap or situations that allow both units to exercise their METL in conjunction with one another. If the Army is transforming to an Objective Force that will be more capabilities based than threat based, then the CTCs must create training environments that require the capabilities of both entities. Traditionally, SOF training is resource intensive. Land, aircraft, ammunition, fixed facilities, and complex target sets are all required to a great extent by SOF. This has the potential to shift the balance of available resources at a CTC towards the few ARSOF that are present while seconding the requirements of the conventional forces, a solution which will certainly be unacceptable to conventional units.

This thesis research methodology will follow a simple path. The process will examine how ARSOF integration is done now, what is working, what is not, and then examine possible solutions based on evidence. The three secondary questions that support the primary question are as follows: How is ARSOF training currently integrated with conventional force training at the CTCs? Which elements or aspects of current ARSOF participation and integration need to be sustained at the CTCs? And, Which elements or aspects of ARSOF participation and integration with conventional force training need to be improved at the CTCs? Figure 1 depicts the methodology as a two-pronged approach.




Figure 1. Research Methodology

The first step in the research design involves a discussion of how ARSOF-integrated training is currently conducted at the CTCs. The key to answering this question will lie in identifying how ARSOF are integrated at each, determining the quantity of personnel, number or rotations per year. Additionally, the research design will examine the

type of training conducted, as well as the extent of ARSOF and conventional force integration.

There is a body of knowledge at the CTCs with ARSOF experience. JRTC has a permanent ARSOF cadre assigned and integrates permanent party ARSOF planners with its conventional planners. BCTP has a limited number of ARSOF cadre present for planning and execution of training rotations. The NTC and CMTC have no ARSOF personnel assigned and consequently, conduct very few ARSOF integrated training events. Since the JRTC's client base is primarily the light, airborne, and air assault community, it appears that the heavy side of the Army does not train with ARSOF at the CTCs.

The next question is, Which elements or aspects of current ARSOF participation and integration need to be sustained at the CTCs? In other words, where has the Army enjoyed success with respect to ARSOF integration? What was the nature of the circumstances that created the conditions for this success, and how can the Army repeat these successes? Finally, the research seeks to uncover untapped resources and training opportunities that could lead to further ARSOF integration.

Logically, the next step would be to address which aspects of current ARSOF participation and integration need to be improved at the CTCs. The research will delve into current and past shortcomings in ARSOF training, as well as current and past challenges with ARSOF integration.

The final step will synthesize recommended solutions for better ARSOF integration based on research results. These recommendations will focus on trends identified during the research. Trends could include areas needing to be sustained, improved, or multiple

recommendations for a given solution. High-payoff solutions with a high probability of implementation will exist where more than one CTC agrees on an issue, or both conventional and ARSOF sources agree on an issue.

The scope of this thesis will be bounded by several key principles. First and foremost, the research will be Army-centric. The purpose of the CTCs is to train Army units. While units from other services and even other nations participate on a regular basis, the core mission of the CTCs is Army war fighting. The second limiting factor of the thesis is that it will only address integration of ARSOF-conventional Army unit training at the CTCs. Finally, in seeking to find creative courses of action for a greater ARSOF role in the CTC program, this thesis will not consider the establishment of a SOF-specific CTC. This concept has been proposed in both SOF and conventional circles in an informal manner, but has never gone beyond the concept stage. This course of action would defeat one of the primary reasons that ARSOF participate in the CTCs: the opportunity for ARSOF and conventional units to train and operate together while appraising each other's capabilities and limitations.

In addition to limiting the scope of the research, the researcher makes several assumptions with regard to the research. The first assumption is that ARSOF integration in training leads to successful ARSOF integration in combat, which leads to enhanced mission performance. All idealism aside, integration of ARSOF with conventional units is often a complex, frustrating, and challenging affair. To go to the trouble of making this combined training happen, there must be a significant cost-to-benefit ratio.

The second assumption is that the CTCs will remain the capstone of the Army's training program. While the Army transforms into a more diverse and capabilities-based organization, the CTCs must also transform from threat- and scenario-based training events to capabilities-based training centers that can provide a full spectrum of scenarios and challenges to player units. This transformation to capabilities-based training platforms will ensure that the CTCs stay relevant to the combat readiness of the Objective Force.

The final assumption is that ARSOF will continue to play a more integrated role in the Objective Force. Although the doctrine has not been written yet, current trends in the last decade indicate that ARSOF will be an integral part of the Objective Force team in United States power projection scenarios. To assume otherwise would defeat the cause for greater integration of ARSOF at the CTCs.

#### Key Terms

Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA or 160th SOAR): Composed of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. The unit supports other SOF units by planning and conducting special air operations in all operational environments. Its specially organized, trained, and equipped aviation units provide the capability to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF elements engaged in all core missions and collateral activities (JP 1-02 year).

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF): Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations (JP 1-02 year).

Civil Affairs (CA): Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations (see also civil affairs activities and civil-military operations) (JP 1-02 **year**).

Combat Training Center Program (CTC): An Army program established to provide realistic joint service and combined arms training in accordance with Army doctrine. It is designed to provide training units opportunities to increase collective proficiency on the most realistic battlefield available during peacetime. The four components of the CTC Program are: (1) the National Training Center, (2) the Combat Maneuver Training Center, (3) the Joint Readiness Training Center, and (4) the Battle Command Training Program (**Army Regulation 350-50 year**).

Integration: The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1-02 **year**).

Mission Essential Task List (METL): A compilation of collective mission essential tasks which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission (JP 1-02 **year**).

Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives (JP 1-02 **year**).

Rangers: Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional non-Special Operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms (JP 1-02 **year**).

Special Operations: Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-Special Operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets (JP 1-02 **year**).

Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE): The focal point for the synchronization and deconfliction of special operations forces activities with conventional forces. It performs command and control functions according to mission requirements. It normally collocates with the command post of the supported force. The SOCCE can also receive special operations forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special operations elements and provide them to

the supported component headquarters. The SOCCE remains under the operational control of the joint force special operations component commander or commander, joint special operations task force (JP 3-05 [year](#)).

Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE): A Special Forces or joint special operations element that conducts liaison between U.S. conventional forces division-level headquarters and subordinate host-nation or multinational forces brigades and battalions. SFLEs conduct these functions when host or multinational forces have not practiced interoperability before the operation, do not share common operational procedures or communications equipment, or when a significant language or cultural barrier exists (FM 100-25 [year](#)).

Special Forces (SF): US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans (FM 100-25 [year](#)).

Transformation: Army Transformation represents the strategic transition the Army will have to undergo to shed its cold war designs in order to prepare itself now for the crises and wars of the twenty-first century (U.S. Army Homepage [year](#)).

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

There are no significant published works on the integration of ARSOF and conventional forces at the CTCs. Numerous papers published by various organizations and activities abound, making for a diversity of viewpoints. One particularly interesting work published by the Combined Arms Center, entitled *Army Training Revolution, 1973 to the Present*, details the conceptualization and creation of the CTCs. It provides the background into the original intent of the CTC program, as well as some information about the history of the sweeping changes the Army made in how it trained soldiers and units. Another work by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Rocke, entitled *The Evolution of the Combat Training Centers: Preparing for Tomorrow Today*, provides an account of the current state of affairs of the CTCs. A third paper, produced by the Government Accounting Office and entitled “Military Readiness--Full Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not Being Realized,” highlights some of the challenges facing not only the CTCs, but also the Army as a whole, as it struggles to meet competing demands in an era of constrained resources and ever-increasing operational tempo. Another information paper by Colonel Michael Findlay, the current Special Operations Command Commander for Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM), entitled “SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF Into Joint Task Forces” provides some insight into how SOF will be incorporated into joint operations in the future. While not doctrine, JFCOM is the proponent for joint doctrine and, therefore, carries significant weight with respect to potential future roles for SOF.

Most of the sources located to date are web-based information papers culled from the various websites of Army organizations and commands. Of particular interest are the on-line notes from the Council of Colonels, which oversees the CTC program. The briefings contained on this website provide insight into the resource challenges and issues that the Army faces as it transforms itself and its CTCs. The researcher was able to attend the October 2002 Council of Colonels CTC Conference in Kansas City and gained some firsthand insight into the resourcing process for the CTCs. While little discussion occurred pertaining to SOF integration, the discussion about the implementation of the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) proved valuable. The implementation of this approach at the CTCs creates opportunities for ARSOF participation. Contact with the United States Army Special Operations Command, the proponent for ARSOF participation at the Army's CTCs, yielded the promise of a telephone interview with the CTC program director which was later granted. Further inquiry led to the promise of a telephone interview with the Chief of SOF Plans at JRTC which was eventually granted. The researcher was able to establish points of contact at NTC and the BCTP to gather primary source information on ARSOF integration at each center, as well as unique challenges, issues, and opportunities that each center faces. Unfortunately, no contact was established with the CMTC during the research period, despite repeated attempts. Critical to the utility of these primary sources will be the formulation of a list of relevant questions for each subject matter expert (SME) to address.

Additionally, the researcher was able to obtain a copy of the "Final Conference Report from the Doctrine, Training, and Leader Development Conference on SOF and

Conventional Forces Integration” at the CTCs. The conference was held at JRTC in July 2002, and the lessons learned from Afghanistan were highlighted. This work provides the most up-to-date status on initiatives for further integration.

The researcher was also able to acquire copies of the minutes and briefing slides from the CTC conference at Fort Leavenworth in March 2003. During this conference, ARSOF integration was one of the major topics.

One source that must be noted is the researcher’s significant personal experience in planning and executing numerous JRTC rotations that focused on the integration of ARSOF with conventional forces. While limited in scope, this experience will be called upon to illustrate how one CTC was able to meet the challenge of integration while addressing the training objectives of both conventional and ARSOF player units.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

This thesis ultimately seeks to determine the most effective way that the Army can integrate ARSOF and conventional force training at the CTCs. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the design and construction of the research methodology for this thesis. Throughout the research, the researcher will attempt to maintain a balance between the ARSOF perspective and that of conventional forces.

The research construct consists of five sequential phases that revolve around the implementation and results of a questionnaire, supported and enhanced by the sources discussed in chapter 2. The lack of significant published works on the topic make it necessary to go directly to the primary sources in the field for the necessary information. Due to the dynamic nature of the CTCs, it becomes all the more significant that the current leadership cadre of the CTCs be surveyed to maintain the relevance of the research. The four sequential phases of the research methodology developed by the researcher will lead to relevant solutions that may enhance Army effectiveness in near-and-far-term, full-spectrum operations.

Phase one of the research methodology is the Assessment Phase. During this phase, the current status of integrated training at the CTCs will be assessed. In other words, How is the Army currently operating at the CTCs, and how does it integrate ARSOF with conventional training? The foundation to this phase is a laydown of the quantity and type of integrated training that occurs at the CTCs. The assessment will

consider the number of integrated rotations that occur each year, as well as the number of personnel actually participating in the integrated portion of the rotation. This quantitative analysis provides a snapshot of the level of integration. It does not address the effectiveness of current integration. Next, the research will determine the type of integrated training occurring. Possible categories include, live, scenario-driven, force-on-force, scenario-driven live-fire, virtual/simulation, CPX, as well as STX, and finally opportunity training that was not planned but occurred based on circumstances. Mission rehearsal exercises, congressionally mandated exercises (Millennium Challenge) and advanced warfighting experiments (AWE) will be excluded, as their purpose is separate and distinct within the context of the situation. Finally the research will determine the extent, frequency and duration of the integrated training that takes place at the CTCs based on the feedback from the questionnaire. Once this status report has been completed the research is ready to progress to phase two.

Phase two of the research is a discussion of the elements or aspects of ARSOF integrated training that need to be sustained or improved. This phase will first delineate current and past examples of successful integrated training at the CTCs. Analysis of these examples will include a discussion of the key ingredients or aspects of the training that made them a success. Was leadership willingness to integrate, METL overlap, or a habitual relationship at home station a key to the successful execution of the integrated training? Next the research will attempt to identify trends among the successes, as well as untapped opportunities or resources that exist for further successful integration. Finally the research will address possible methods to repeat these successes in the future.

After addressing past successful integration of ARSOF and conventional force training at the CTCs, the research will address past shortcomings of integrated training. In much the same fashion as the successes, the research will look for examples of shortcomings in current CTC operations, as well as past opportunities that were overlooked. Of significance to this section will be a discussion by the experts of the effects of operational tempo (OPTEMPO), resource constraints (budget, personnel, land, time), diversity of training objectives, and the impact of attitudes and perceptions that ARSOF and conventional force leaders have about each other and each other's units. This phase will be the most critical to the research because the only way to a solution is to admit that there is a problem or, at least, a better way of doing things. This phase will not seek to point fingers or lay blame, merely to uncover what most probably will be practical, common sense reasons why integration of ARSOF and conventional forces is not occurring in the most effective and efficient manner today.

Phase three, analysis of results and synthesis of possible solutions, will pull together the information gathered during phase one and two into solutions that could be implemented by Army leadership to improve integration. The first step to this phase is an analysis of the current status of integrated ARSOF training at the CTCs, combining the snapshot of how the training is accomplished currently with the examples of current and past successes and shortcomings. The research will focus on answer trends during this phase. In other words, if multiple respondents to the questionnaire identify a specific success or shortcoming, there exists the opportunity for a high payoff solution. This is not to say that unique or creative responses will be ignored or overlooked. Instead, it suggests

that the greatest potential for change exists when multiple parties agree on the definition of a particular problem. All identified successes and shortcomings will be addressed, but the researcher will place the most emphasis on those that are identified by multiple parties, particularly those identified by both ARSOF and conventional respondents. The final step to this phase will involve the synthesis of possible solutions or courses of action that address methods to increase integrated ARSOF and conventional training at the CTCs. Recommendations from both conventional and ARSOF respondents with respect to possible solutions will be incorporated in the solution set development. The goal is to create a pool of feasible, acceptable, and suitable solutions from which the most effective can be selected for possible implementation by Army leadership. The number and extent of solutions developed remain to be seen and rest in the quantity and quality of information gleaned from the questionnaire.

Phase four, the final phase, is the screening of the solutions developed during phase three. Each solution will be screened for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability within the context of the current CTC missions, budget, and player unit OPTEMPO and training objectives. The solutions will not be compared because the goal is not to determine the single best solution that will solve the problem, but to select a handful of common sense solutions that can be posed as recommendations to senior Army leadership for implementation. This final phase will answer the research question of the thesis.

This methodology looks quite a bit like the military decision-making process (MDMP) with good reason. It sets out to define the problem, develop possible courses of action, analyze the courses of action, and finally, recommend the best for implementation.

The instrument for research will be a questionnaire. The questionnaire is broken down in accordance with figure 1 depicting the question methodology. The questionnaire below attempts to conform to and answer the methodology above.

### Questionnaire for MMAS

#### Category #1 Current Status of ARSOF Integration at your CTC / Organization

1. How many rotations per year does your CTC conduct that involve ARSOF. If not in the last year, when was the last rotation involving ARSOF? (SF / Rangers / 160th SOAR / CA / PSYOP )
2. What was the composition of the unit (s) that participated? (type / size / # personnel )
3. What type training was conducted? ( CA / IO / Tactical Field Training / Live Fire / Air Ops / PR / Simulation )
4. Was there integration between the ARSOF and conventional player units? If so, what was the nature of the integration and to what extent?
5. Remarks / Comments / Suggestions:

#### Category #2 What Aspects of ARSOF Integration need to be Sustained?

1. What are some examples of past / current ARSOF integration at your CTC or by your organization that were successful?
2. What made these examples a success?
3. Were there trends or common features of these examples of successful integration? (integrated planning / flexible scenario / overlap of training objectives? )
4. How can the Army repeat these successes in the future?
5. What other untapped resources or opportunities exist for further successful ARSOF integration?
6. Remarks:

#### Category #3: What Aspects of ARSOF Integration need to be Improved?

1. What are the current / past shortcomings in ARSOF training at your CTC or by your organization at a CTC?

2. What are the current / past challenges with ARSOF integration at your organization / CTC? (OPTEMPO / Resources / Training Objectives Differ / Attitudes & Perceptions)

3. Remarks:

Category #4: What are possible solutions to enable your CTC / organization to more effectively conduct integrated ARSOF / Conventional training?

1. What does ARSOF need to do to more effectively integrate training?

2. What does the Army need to do to more effectively integrate the training?

3. What do the CTCs need to do to more effectively integrate the training?

4. Remarks:

The intended population for this questionnaire is the leadership of the CTCs, leadership within the ARSOF community at the group/regiment/MACOM level involved in CTC planning and participation, and leadership within the conventional community at the brigade, division, and MACOM level involved in planning and participation in the CTCs. Of particular interest will be leaders who recently conducted integration of ARSOF and conventional forces during real-world missions during the last ten years.

The schedule for implementation of the research methodology follows.

Step 1. Instrument Design, Approval, and Dissemination: October-19 December.

During this phase the researcher intends to complete the design of the research instrument, gain approval from the appropriate CGSC faculty, and disseminate the instrument

worldwide to the target population. Additionally, the researcher will design the database for organizing, tracking, and collating the results of the questionnaire.

Step 2. Collection of Responses to Questionnaire: 20 December-7 February. During this step, the researcher will collect, organize, and integrate the results of the research questionnaire with the results of research already conducted. As results arrive, they will be analyzed and incorporated in a database of respondent information that will track not only responses, but also the population from which they came.

Step 3. Analysis and Synthesis: 1 February-14 February. During this step, the results will be analyzed as they arrive and then possible solutions will be synthesized based on the total population or responses following the deadline date of February 7 for respondents. Additionally, evaluation criteria for the comparison and evaluation of the results will be developed during this step. Of note is the fact that this step will overlap with the previous one in order to allow the researcher to begin analysis of results as they arrive rather than simultaneously, following the deadline.

Step 4. Comparison and Evaluation: 15 February-21 February. This phase completes the research effort and includes the screening of possible solutions for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability, as well as the evaluation and comparison based on developed evaluation criteria.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the results of research. This chapter will consolidate the research results, organize the information into categories, and define key characteristics of the information. Additionally, this chapter will identify trends among the research results that can be exploited during synthesis of solution sets in the next chapter.

The researcher set out to answer the question of how the Army can more effectively integrate Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and conventional forces at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). After gleaning the currently published sources, the researcher developed and distributed a questionnaire. The questionnaire sought to gain insight from the subject matter experts (SME) at the CTCs, as well as key individuals at FORSCOM, TRADOC, and USASOC. Response to the questionnaire was limited, but proved sufficient to continue with the analysis of the problem and formulation of possible solution sets.

This chapter will first assess the status of integrated training at the CTCs. It will quantify the amount of integrated training executed yearly in terms of number of rotations, as well as number of personnel participating by CTC. Next, this chapter will quantify the extent of the integration that took place, that is, what percentage of time, personnel, and resources is actually dedicated to integrated training versus unilateral training at each CTC.

This chapter will next analyze the type of training conducted. Examples of possible types of training included tactical field training; live-fire training; combat search and rescue

training; civil affairs and out training; and simulation, information operations, and situational training exercises (STX).

This chapter will then analyze the effectiveness of the integrated training that takes place at each CTC. Using the classic “sustain” and “improve” methodology, the researcher queried a purposive population of SMEs who provided valuable and focused insight into current challenges and successes with respect to integrated training at the CTCs.

Before proceeding it is important to define what effective integrated training is. For the purpose of this research, effective integration means both the conventional and ARSOF units are challenged by the CTC experience to the extent that they not only meet their own training objectives, but, in essence, enhance and enrich the training experience for each other. Effective integrated training is both relevant and significant to both conventional and ARSOF player units. Relevance is achieved by linking the training tasks and environment directly to the unit’s wartime mission in a challenging and realistic forum. Significant means that the integrated training is extensive enough to actually exercise the unique dynamics of integration, as well as the “friction” of integration in a training environment. During the analysis of effectiveness, characteristics of the training that need to be sustained or improved will be analyzed with respect to their uniqueness or applicability at a single CTC versus all of the CTCs. During this analysis the researcher will attempt to identify trends among the aspects of training that require sustainment or improvement. For the purposes of this research, a trend is any characteristic requiring sustainment or

improvement that is common to three or more respondents to the questionnaire or is echoed by three or more of any of the sources.

The final phase of the analysis consists of synthesis of a population of recommendations for enhanced ARSOF integration as indicated by the research. The recommendations can apply at the Army level, the major command level, the CTC level, and or the client unit level. Trends among recommendations will highlight areas where high-payoff solutions may exist. For example, if the NTC and the JRTC identify the same problem and have similar recommendations, an opportunity exists for concurrence and cooperation in the implementation of the recommendation

#### Phase 1: Assessment of Current Training

The most critical aspect of change is the identification of a problem. The sources consulted varied to great degree on their willingness to acknowledge that there was even a problem. Several sources touted the relevance and effectiveness of the CTCs while others painted a dismal picture of wasted resources, time, and effort. The following sections discuss the status of training at each of the CTCs as derived from the results of the research questionnaire, except as indicated.

The JRTC leads the way for quantity, variety, and extent with respect to integrated training. The center hosts between seven and eleven rotations per year that include some level of ARSOF participation and integration. All JRTC rotations include civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) forces under the operational control (OPCON) of the maneuver brigade in the box. On average, five rotations include direct integration of

Army Special Forces (SF), Rangers, and or Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA) with the conventional maneuver brigade. The average size of the ARSOF unit is from 100 to 200 personnel, but only 15 to 30 personnel are actually integrated with the maneuver brigade in the box. ARSOA supports the infiltration and exfiltration of SF units while conducting extensive unilateral and joint training with other services outside the maneuver box. Often, ARSOF missions at outstation locations may have impact on the events in the maneuver box, but normally these missions are of minimal significance to the conventional maneuver commander.

Types of ARSOF integrated training conducted on a regular basis at the JRTC include force-on-force training, CPX (prerotation), live fire, personnel recovery, CA, PSYOP, IO, and air operations. Of note is the fact that ARSOF live fires and air operations are not integrated with Army conventional maneuver forces, but almost always incorporate U.S. Air Force aircraft, U.S. Marine Corps aircraft, and even the U.S. Coast Guard. The most common form of integrated training is the participation of a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) and one or more Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) with the conventional brigade. Army SF most typically conduct special reconnaissance in support of the initial entry of the maneuver brigade into the box. On occasion, and frequently as of late, ARSOF, to include SF and Rangers, have conducted direct action (DA) and foreign internal defense (FID), as well as various aspects of unconventional warfare (UW), as shaping operations in support of the conventional maneuver brigade. While command and control arrangements vary from rotation to rotation, there is even one case, where an 82nd Airborne Division rifle company was

placed TACON to the ARSOF element for execution of a combined personnel recovery mission. The company provided security to an SFODA, whose job it was to recover isolated friendly personnel. One rotation per year is dedicated to supporting United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). This rotation involves no conventional forces and typically is used to exercise either a Special Forces Group headquarters or the Ranger regimental headquarters.

Constraints on resources and scenario as well as doctrinal differences with respect to proper employment of ARSOF in conjunction with conventional forces limit the amount of integration that is feasible at the JRTC. Nevertheless, small-scale, effective integration does take place on a routine basis in a complex battle space scenario.

An interview with the Commander of Operations Group at the NTC on 30 March 2003 provided the following insights on the status of training. The NTC has very little participation by ARSOF at its rotations. With the exception of Millennium Challenge, which was not a CTC rotation, the only ARSOF to conduct integrated training with conventional forces at the NTC in several years are CA and PSYOP. Until recently, the NTC had ten rotations per year, which consisted of primarily mechanized and armored units conducting force-on-force and live-fire training in a scenario-driven environment. Typically, a light infantry battalion trains with the mechanized or armored brigade during the rotation. Recent initiation of COE implementation at the NTC has significantly transformed the center. The opposing force (OPFOR) no longer portrays a purely armored threat. Asymmetric OPFOR now has the ability to conduct a variety of operations that pose significant challenges for maneuver commanders. Additionally, the NTC is constructing six

new military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) sites. Several cave complexes similar to those seen in Afghanistan by U.S. forces and a terrorist training camp are also in full swing at the NTC, making the battlefield more complex and dynamic with each rotation.

The last participation by Army Special Forces was in the summer of 2000, when a SOCCE integrated with the maneuver brigade headquarters and one ODA, flown in by ARSOA, conducted special reconnaissance (SR) of the OPFOR. At this rotation, none of the information collected by the ODA was relayed to the maneuver brigade. The ODA was able to observe the OPFOR depart their motor pools on main post, move to an administrative staging area for twelve hours, and then launch on their deliberate attack, but all spot reports, calls for fire, and information were intercepted by O/C before they could be reported to the brigade.

Rangers have not participated in an NTC rotation in years. United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) has a limited number of units that have a desert orientation, limiting the number of units available each year for participation.

The implementation of COE which is already well underway in conjunction with an enhanced emphasis on joint training may significantly increase the opportunity for ARSOF, as well as Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) and Naval Special Operations Forces (NAVSOF), to participate in rotations at the NTC.

The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth hosts ten to eleven simulator-based rotations, labeled “War Fighters” per year that include CA and PSYOP. Special Forces normally participate in seven to eight of these rotations each year. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) or ARSOA is scripted in each

rotation, but does not actually provide personnel to conduct the training. Rangers do not participate in the BCTP program. War Fighter exercises are conducted for either corps headquarters or division headquarters. If the rotation is a corps headquarters, Special Forces provides a SOCCE. If the rotation is a division headquarters, the Special Forces player unit provides a Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE). Either way, about forty ARSOF personnel participate in a BCTP rotation.

The training at the BCTP centers around scenario-based, simulation-driven, command post exercises (CPX). Each rotation is unique and is tailored to the requirements of the training force headquarters. The typical role for CA and PSYOP is standard CMO and IO support to the headquarters. The typical role for SF is execution of virtual (simulated) SR and DA missions that are synchronized and deconflicted by the SOCCE or SFLE. The typical role for ARSOA is infiltration and exfiltration of SFODAs for their SR and DA missions. Due to a lack of participation by ARSOA, BCTP officials find it difficult to adjudicate engagements against ARSOA aircraft.

The CMTC in Germany is a USAREUR facility and supports training of USAREUR units. CA and PSYOP routinely participate in the rotations there, but SF participation is limited to small elements from the single SF battalion in Europe. Since most CMTC rotations consist of a battalion-sized element, ARSOF integration is rare and usually consists of a small liaison cell and, occasionally, an SFODA employed on a mission. Of the four CTCs, CMTC does the least amount of integrated training in terms of quantity of rotations, variety of training and extent of integration (Rocke 2002, 5).

To summarize the assessment of current ARSOF integration at the CTCs, the JRTC provides the greatest quantity and variety of integrated training. It is the only CTC truly resourced to conduct integrated training and is the only CTC with a permanent party ARSOF planning staff and ARSOF O/C. While primary participation at the center revolves around ARSOF, elements of NAVSOF and AFSOF routinely participate as well, allowing for truly joint SOF training.

NTC has the capability to provide limited ARSOF-integrated training, with support from JRTC ARSOF O/Cs and planners. The fact that the center has not conducted integrated training in several years does not in any way indicate a lack of capability or requirement. More likely, it reflects the current challenges of the operational tempo of certain client units, as well as the limited client base of ARSOF units that are regionally oriented towards the desert environment.

BCTP provides routine integration of ARSOF in its rotations. While limited, the integration of a SOCCE in corps level rotations and an SFLE in division level rotations is a means to force commanders to consider the friction points that can develop when ARSOF and conventional forces operate together in a complex area of operations. The potential exists for the participation of a Joint Special Operations Task Force in war-fighter exercises, but only when the corps or division headquarters is acting as a joint force land component command (JFLCC) or as a joint task force (JTF).

## Section 2: Analysis of Effectiveness of Integrated Training

This section will examine and analyze the current effectiveness of integrated training conducted at the Army's CTCs. Effective integration means that both the conventional and ARSOF units are challenged by the CTC experience to the extent that they not only meet their own mission essential task list (METL) training objectives, but also, in essence, enhance and enrich the training experience for each other. Effective integrated training is relevant and significant to both conventional and ARSOF player units.

The following list, compiled from the results of the questionnaire, as well as various sources at TRADOC and USASOC, USASFC (Army Special Forces Command), and so forth, incorporates the aspects of integrated training that various sources saw as necessary to sustain or improve. Finally, several of the results are generated by the researcher's own experience as a CTC O/C and planner at the JRTC. Each recommendation is either word for word or paraphrased for clarity; the source by MACOM, CTC, or other entity is indicated. To protect anonymity, no names are indicated. The raw results in order of compilation as acquired by the researcher are shown in table 1.

Before conducting some initial analysis of the results it is important to note several key factors that may affect the validity of the data. First, there were no responses to the questionnaire from either the CMTC or the NTC, although numerous copies were mailed to both institutions. The Commander of Operations Group for the NTC did participate in a telephone interview after receiving a copy of the questionnaire. His insights on the status of ARSOF integration as well as information on the transformation taking place at the NTC were invaluable to the research.

The researcher grouped the results into ten categories. Some trends crossed over between organizations, as well as between the two broad categories of “sustain” and “improve.” Some information did not fit into any of the categories and was relegated to the category “other.” The categories, in alphabetical order, are:

1. Attitudes and Perceptions
2. COE/Transformation and Organizational Change
3. Commander Emphasis and Involvement
4. External Training and Development
5. Integrated and Effective Planning and Preparation
6. Participation / OPTEMPO / Available Forces
7. Risk Taking/Open Mindedness
8. Rotational Timeline/Overlap of Forces
9. Staffing and Resources at the CTCs
10. Unfiled/Other

The following section defines each category, displays the results for each, and analyzes and discusses those results.

Table 1. Raw Results of Questionnaire	
<b>SUSTAIN</b>	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	If SF shows up the rotational training and integration are usually good
BCTP	SF soldiers find a way to make things happen during the rotation
BCTP	Overlap of Corps and ODB (Operational Detachment Bravo / SF Co HQ) training objectives is impossible.
BCTP	It is up to SF cdr to maximize the training opportunity
BCTP	To repeat successes ARSOF must make participation and priority
USASOC	FID SR DA at the JRTC seem to provide most bang for buck to GPF
USASOC	Integrated Planning and coordination prior to rotation
USASOC	SOF missions that are relevant to the GPF
USASOC	Risk Taking by CTC Cadre (SF success/failure effects Bde)
USASOC	COE Implementation drives requirement for ARSOF
BCTP	ARSOF as Shaping Operation for GPF
JRTC	GPF Bde allowed rotation to be event driven vs scripted
JRTC	Keep new USASOC CTC conference going.
JRTC	Execute the JNTC concept ASAP.
JRTC	Sustain FID in support of the Brigade. Great integration
JRTC	SOF/GPF Cdrs understanding each others capabilities leads to successful training
JRTC	Willingness and open minded attitude towards each other.
JRTC	Commander focus on integration
JRTC	Integrate the planning between player units and at the center
RESEARCHER	New non-SR missions at CTCs
RESEARCHER	Permanent SOF staff at JRTC/ BCTP
<b>IMPROVE</b>	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	ODB commanders must participate as assistant O/Cs in Warfighters before playing
BCTP	No command presence or emphasis! No visits by any ARSOF Bn/ Group commanders in 3 years
BCTP	OPTEMPO is the biggest challenge
BCTP	A long range campaign plan is needed to ensure success in the future
BCTP	SOAR Personnel Participation in the rotation
BCTP	More ARSOF personnel on staff at the CTCs

USASOC	More ARSOF rotations at the JRTC / NTC (7-10)
USASOC	CTCs must allow SOF failure / success to impact the rotation forcing integration
USASOC	OPTEMPO is our biggest challenge
USASOC	Perceptions and Attitudes by ARSOF and GPF Cdrs towards each other
USASOC	SOF / GPF time overlap in the box. SOF leaves early. Needs to stick around for a while
BCTP	SOF / GPF work /orientation prior to rotation ‘ “butt sniffing “
BCTP	GPF don’t trust SOF info provided to them during rotation. “trust “ issues
JRTC	SOF in every rotation
JRTC	Detailed SOF training and planning guidance incorporated into REG 350 Series
JRTC	Need Mission Support Contractors that understand current doctrine and ARSOF
JRTC	Unity of command for planning at the CTC
JRTC	Training for Conventional Planners
BCTP	Division and Corps Staffs must understand role of ARSOF
BCTP	No workstations for ARSOF
JRTC	Exploit Virtual and Constructive opportunities.
JRTC	Allow non contiguous (multi CTC) rotations for ARSOF
JRTC	Lack of flexibility due to time constrained scenarios prevent true friction from occurring. Lessons are bypassed and aren’t learned.
JRTC	Hamstrung by instrumentation/ inhibits noncontiguous operations
JRTC	Need to accept risk for SOF success/failure during rotation.
JRTC	Must understand that 75th RGR Rgt is SOF not GPF and should be trained as such
JRTC	GPF leaders must understand that ODA does not mean LRS
JRTC	Disdain and contempt SOF have for GPF units Teamwork is a must
JRTC	Infrastructure to support classified rotations (security / contractors/ unwillingness of contractors to change
USASFC	SOF Core Competencies not fully understood
USASFC	Linkage of SOF / GPF on battlefield not understood
USASFC	Need to understand dynamics of convergence on the modern battlefield
USASFC	Current and Draft Army Doctrine ignores SOF (FM 100-120 and FM 3-07.
USASFC	Army needs culture of loyalty to army as well as to the unit
USASFC	More overlap in terms of time at the CTC. Exposes Friction Points
USASFC	Need to train Friction Mitigation
USASFC	Need more realistic scenario. Convergence <b>We</b> fight as a pick up team

USASFC	Must allow surrogate warfare to work for GPF Cdrs
USASFC	CTCs must realistically evaluate effects of lethal fires. Leaders are not training to appreciate effects of joint fires
USASFC	CTCs must realistically eval the effects of nonlethal fires. CA and PSYOP are lip serviced.
USASFC	SF needs more training with precision fires at the CTCs to include Apaches
USASFC	CTCs must exercise transitions from war to post hostilities ops SASO Nobenefit of CA shown. Too often a rotation ends when the “international boundary “ is restored
	Shinsecki: Army leaders must master transitions
USASFC	Foreign Forces on CTC Battlefields/ hi/lo tech / funding / friction cultural etc
USASFC	Leader Development is ultimate goal of CTCs and must be
USASFC	D-365 for planning
TRADOC	Doctrine.SOF Paradigm Shift: SOF as Early Entry and then also as Enabling Force
TRADOC	Remains Integral to Continuing Operations
TRADOC	Doctrine No resources for LNO manning and equipment / training standards/LNOs are critical.
TRADOC	Inadequate Doctrine for Tactical unit cdrs to ingegrate SOF
TRADOC	SOF C2?
TRADOC	Who is the proponent for SOF integration?
TRADOC	Battle tracking procedures?
TRADOC	Training/ Officer Education contributes to confusion
TRADOC	Leader Development
TRADOC	Intro to SOF at all Army Distance Learning and Resident Courses
TRADOC	Teach SOF as a BOS
TRADOC	Need complex COE scenarios at the CTCs and Home Station
TRADOC	Home Station Training
TRADOC	CTCs should be based on realities of full spectrum Joint/Combined Ops in COE
TRADOC	CTCs not Full Spectrum
TRADOC	CTCs don't emplace realistic demands on C4ISR
TRADOC	CTCs don't replicate Joint/ Coalition nature
TRADOC	SOF participation limited to SR
TRADOC	CTCs Don't portray complex terrain and battlespace of COE
TRADOC	Not enough urban terrain
TRADOC	Linear/Contiguous battlefield

TRADOC	CTCs don't realistically portray effects of lethal/nonlethal fires
TRADOC	Failure to replicate effects of IO/PSYOP and CA as nonlethal fires
USASOC	Need more ARSOA to support training / operational requirements
USASOC	Need better training on SOF Medical and Conventional Logistical Lashup
USASOC	Play PSYOP and CA realistically at the CTCs
RESEARCHER	COE Implementation (superficial vs actual)
RESEARCHER	Stop using CTCs as evaluation tool for Bde / Bn Commanders
RESEARCHER	Stop "cookie cutter" approach to rotations
RESEARCHER	Enforcement of SOF Participation
RESEARCHER	Command Emphasis on CTC training
RESEARCHER	Cross pollenate SOF and Conventional officers during home station training and as guest O/Cs at the CTCs
RESEARCHER	Manning of ARSOF personnel at NTC / BCTP
RESEARCHER	Emphasis on Capabilities Based CTCs vs Scenario Based CTCs
RESEARCHER	Ranger Participation at the CTCs
RESEARCHER	Security and Classification Capability of CTCs (Comms / Facilities / Instrumentation )
RESEARCHER	Freeplay at the CTCs: Every rotation doesn't have to end at a certain phase. Some may end "prematurely" due to friction and chaos.
JRTC	Operations Group JTOC should be capable of operating as a JSOTF / JTF HQ
JRTC	Operations Group Personnel should receive SOF Orientation / Training (no cross pollination as there are with other BOS)
RESEARCHER	Infrastructure at the NTC (15 COBs and one MOUT Site)
RESEARCHER	Put the emphasis on T at the CTCs. Too often an AAR looks like an evaluation
RESEARCHER	Time overlap of Forces in the rotation
RESEARCHER	Definition of what the "maneuver box" is from physical to conceptual
RESEARCHER	Transparency of O/Cs / Support Facilities and Functions (AAR schedules

Category 1 is Attitudes and Perceptions. These are the personal and institutional beliefs, stereotypes, and assessments that conventional forces and ARSOF hold to be true about each other (table 2). Whether founded in fact or purely imagined, perceptions can become reality and therefore have a tremendous impact on the ability of units to conduct

integrated training. The responses in table 2 portray some of the perceptions that unit commanders, leaders, and trainers have about each other and about themselves.

Words like “trust,” “disdain and contempt,” and “loyalty” display the kind of feelings that ARSOF and conventional forces have for each other. The results indicate a desire to sustain “can-do” attitudes and open mindedness, while admitting the requirement to improve trust and perhaps focus less on egos and personal gain and more on the training event. The comment by the Special Forces Command respondent may indicate a direction towards a solution. Perhaps more emphasis on loyalty to the Army as a unifying identity and less emphasis on an individual’s or unit’s status as ARSOF or conventional may be the beginnings of an answer.

Table 2. Attitudes and Perceptions	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	SF soldiers find a way to make things happen during the rotation
JRTC	Willingness and open minded attitude towards each other.
USASOC	Perceptions and Attitudes by ARSOF and GPF Cdrs towards each other
BCTP	GPF don’t trust SOF info provided to them during rotation. “trust “ issues
JRTC	Disdain and contempt SOF have for GPF units Teamwork is a must
SFC	Army needs culture of loyalty to army as well as to the unit

Category 2 is COE/Transformation and Organizational Change. While these may seem like three distinct concepts lumped together in a rather haphazard fashion, in actuality

they are so closely related to one another that they become virtually inseparable in practical application. COE is the new world disorder that the Army faces today (table 3). At its core, COE is about fighting someone who does not look, act, or think like you in an ambiguous, dynamic, and high-threat environment. It is the combination of a variety of threats, a variety of terrains, and a variety of scenarios all thrown at a unit simultaneously. Transformation is the Army's effort to change doctrinally, technologically, and organizationally to meet the challenges presented by the COE. Organizational change represents the efforts by the CTCs to adapt training to meet the mission training requirements of a transformed force. The days of battle-focused training are over. Today's organizations must conduct mission focused training. This was by far the largest category of results acquired by the researcher. They span all the entities, as well as the sustain and improve category.

Table 3. Coe, Transformation and Doctrinal Changes	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
USASOC	COE Implementation drives requirement for ARSOF
JRTC	Execute the JNTC concept ASAP.
RESEARCHER	New non-SR missions at CTCs
JRTC	Exploit Virtual and Constructive opportunities.
JRTC	Allow non contiguous (multi CTC) rotations for ARSOF
SFC	Current and Draft Army Doctrine ignores SOF (FM 100-120 and FM 3-07).
SFC	Need more realistic scenario. Convergence <b>We</b> fight as a pick up team
SFC	Must allow surrogate warfare to work for GPF Cdrs
SFC	CTCs must realistically evaluate effects of lethal fires. Leaders are not training to appreciate effects of joint fires
SFC	CTCs must realistically eval the effects of nonlethal fires. CA and PSYOP are lip serviced.

SFC	SF needs more training with precision fires at the CTCs to include Apaches
SFC	CTCs must exercise transitions from war to post hostilities ops SASO Nobenefit of CA shown. Too often a rotation ends when the “international boundary “ is restored
	Shinsecki: Army leaders must master transitions
SFC	Foreign Forces on CTC Battlefields/ hi/lo tech / funding / friction cultural etc
TRADOC	Remains Integral to Continuing Operations
TRADOC	Doctrine No resources for LNO manning and equipment / training standards/LNOs are critical.
TRADOC	Inadequate Doctrine for Tactical unit cdrs to ingegrate SOF
TRADOC	Who is the proponent for SOF integration?
TRADOC	Battle tracking procedures?
TRADOC	Teach SOF as a BOS
TRADOC	Need complex COE scenarios at the CTCs and Home Station
TRADOC	CTCs should be based on realities of full spectrum Joint/Combined Ops in COE
TRADOC	CTCs not Full Spectrum
TRADOC	CTCs don’t emplace realistic demands on C4ISR
TRADOC	CTCs don’t replicate Joint/ Coalition nature
TRADOC	CTCs Don’t portray complex terrain and battlespace of COE
TRADOC	Linear/Contiguous battlefield
TRADOC	CTCs don’t realistically portray effects of lethal/nonlethal fires
TRADOC	Failure to replicate effects of IO/PSYOP and CA asnonlethal fires
USASOC	Play PSYOP and CA realistically at the CTCs
RESEARCHER	COE Implementation (superficial vs actual)
RESEARCHER	Emphasis on Capabilities Based CTCs vs Scenario Based CTCs
RESEARCHER	Definition of what the “maneuver box “ is from physical to conceptual

Several themes echo among the responses in this category. They include enhancing the realism and relevance of the CTCs, adding new dimensions, such as joint, interagency and nonlethal effects, and full-spectrum operations, and implementation of the latest doctrine as a framework for training. To address the first theme of realism and relevance it is necessary to understand some of the disconnects between what a unit experiences at a CTC and what it can expect to experience during actual operations. The CTCs have traditionally been geared towards symmetric, maneuver warfare in an Army-centric environment. At the NTC, armored forces face armored forces in a high desert battlefield devoid of human habitation or complex terrain. At the JRTC, light infantry forces face light infantry forces in a combined arms maneuver battle to control terrain. There is limited complex terrain and more involvement of civilians in the battle space, but at its heart a JRTC rotation is about fire and maneuver. The implementation of COE turns this paradigm on its head. No longer is military-on-military combat the focal point of the rotation. Objectives, decisions, and planning are more likely to be impacted by civil considerations, information, and dynamic scenarios that make it difficult to define success. This is precisely the environment that Army units face today in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq. In the past, CTCs focused on observing and providing feedback on combat power, force ratios, and quantity of terrain controlled. These concepts are measurable and easy to portray graphically in an after-action review (AAR). Many of the concepts of the COE are ambiguous, abstract, and often difficult, if not impossible, to quantify clearly. The challenge for the CTCs is to determine how to immerse a unit in this environment while still accomplishing the charter mission of

providing objective feedback on unit performance. Implementing the COE at the CTCs is not about updating opposing force (OPFOR) technology and equipment and adding more civilian role players and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) sites. It is about allowing nonmilitary elements of the scenario and training environment to significantly impact on player units to the extent that military considerations are often seconded in importance to civil, cultural, political, religious, ethnic, and informational considerations.

The second theme addresses adding new dimensions to the CTCs. Since their inception, most of the CTCs have been one dimensional, focusing on Army tactical operations in a symmetric, maneuver warfare context. The responses indicate a requirement to add new dimensions to the CTC training experience. These dimensions can include joint, interagency, multinational, full-spectrum, and effects-based operations. Army units experience these on a routine basis in the real world. They should experience them at the CTCs as well. For example, in Afghanistan an infantry brigade headquarters was a combined joint task force (CJTF) during Operation Anaconda. This illustrates the necessity for realistic, full-spectrum operations in a COE at the CTCs now.

ARSOF provide a rotational unit the least benefit in a force-on-force, maneuver-centric CTC rotation. They can perhaps be of greatest utility and training value in a complex, ambiguous, COE-driven training event. True versus superficial implementation of COE at the CTCs may well be a significant factor in more effective integrated training.

Category 3 is Commander Emphasis and Organizational Change. This category deals with the necessity for both conventional and ARSOF commanders to place emphasis, provide guidance, and set priorities prior to and during a CTC rotation. The bottom line is

that a unit gets out of a CTC rotation, exactly what it puts into the CTC rotation. Table 4 contains the results that fit this category.

Table 4. Commander Emphasis and Involvement	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	It is up to SF cdr to maximize the training opportunity
JRTC	SOF/GPF Cdrs understanding each others capabilities leads to successful training
JRTC	Commander focus on integration
BCTP	ODB commanders must participate as assistant O/Cs in Warfighters before playing
BCTP	No command presence or emphasis! No visits by any ARSOF Bn/ Group commanders in 3 years
RESEARCHER	Command Emphasis on CTC training

Category 4 is External Training and Development. This category includes leader development and unit training at home station, prerotation, and at the Army's training and educational institutions (table 5). This category is the foundation of successful CTC training, integrated or not. Leaders and units that arrive prepared to execute the training will learn and grow far more than units and leaders who arrive unready.

It should be noted that most of these results focus on the ARSOF commander's emphasis versus the conventional commander's emphasis. It is the emphasis on integrated training that sets the conditions for effective execution of the event. Units that dedicate time, effort, and resources to integrated training walk away with a quality training

experience. Units that view integration as a necessary evil often experience frustration, confusion, and validation of their belief that their counterparts in the SOF or conventional force are not worth working with. Successful integrated training is the responsibility of unit commanders. This category is tied closely to the next one, external training and development. Commanders who are not educated on the roles, missions, and capabilities of their counterparts often fail to understand the significance of integrated training.

Table 5. External Training/Development	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	SOF / GPF work /orientation prior to rotation
JRTC	Training for Conventional Planners
BCTP	Division and Corps Staffs must understand role of ARSOF
JRTC	Must understand that 75th RGR Rgt is SOF not GPF and should be trained as such
JRTC	GPF leaders must understand that ODA does not mean LRS
SFC	SOF Core Competencies not fully understood
SFC	Linkage of SOF / GPF on battlefield not understood
SFC	Need to understand dynamics of convergence on the modern battlefield
SFC	Leader Development is ultimate goal of CTCs and must be
TRADOC	SOF C2?
TRADOC	Training/Officer Education contributes to confusion
TRADOC	Leader Development
TRADOC	Intro to SOF at all Army Distance Learning and Resident Courses
TRADOC	Home Station Training
USASOC	Need better training on SOF Medical and Conventional Logistical Lashup
RESEARCHER	Cross pollenate SOF and Conventional officers during home station training and as guest O/Cs at the CTCs
JRTC	Operations Group Personnel should receive SOF Orientation/Training (no cross pollination as there are with other BOS)

Awareness of each other's capabilities and roles is a redundant aspect of these responses. One respondent even indicated that his institution did not understand the fact that the 75th Ranger Regiment was an ARSOF unit. Such ignorance leads to frustration and mistrust when units do not understand each other. Another theme that repeated itself was the need for CTC personnel to cross-pollinate with each other. Planners and O/Cs at the CTCs must understand both SOF and conventional operations. External training and development may be a way to a long-term solution for effective integration. The CTCs should not bear the load alone.

Category 5 is Integrated and Effective Planning and Preparation. This means that the complexity of a CTC rotation requires that ARSOF and conventional commanders and planners must work together prior to the rotation to synchronize efforts for successful training (table 6). This may include prerotational conferences to address integration issues and prerotational training exercises, and definitely involves integrated planning by the staffs of the CTCs.

Table 6. Integrated and Effective Planning and Preparation	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
USASOC	Integrated Planning and coordination prior to rotation
JRTC	Keep new USASOC CTC conference going.
JRTC	Integrate the planning between player units and at the center
BCTP	A long range campaign plan is needed to ensure success in the future
JRTC	Detailed SOF training and planning guidance incorporated into REG 350 Series
JRTC	Unity of command for planning at the CTC
SFC	D-365 for planning
USASOC	SOF missions that are relevant to the GPF

The results, as well as the researcher's own experience, indicate that in the past, planning and coordination for integrated training at the CTCs have been an ad hoc affair. While regulations may have minimally addressed requirements for integration, the process was not formally recognized, officially endorsed, or uniformly applied. Recent events in Afghanistan have led to a more formal and methodical approach to planning for ARSOF integration at the CTCs. Of note is USASOC's new CTC conference to address issues and set priorities prior to rotations.

Category 6 is Participation, Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), and Available Forces.

This category is defined as the extent of ARSOF participation in CTC rotations as impacted by the limiting factors of OPTEMPO and available forces (table 7). Certain ARSOF, particularly the 160th SOAR have extremely high OPTEMPOs and often are challenged to provide personnel and aircraft to train at the CTCs. In this specific case, SOAR has been granted a reclama from all CTC training for an indefinite period due to real world requirements. When one element of the ARSOF team falls out, it impacts the rest of the ARSOF training units, thereby impacting negatively on integrated training.

This category is particularly challenging to work around. Suffice to say that ARSOF commanders must make CTC participation a priority. Balancing operational requirements with training readiness is a continuing challenge that must be met with creative and innovative solutions.

Table 7. Participation, Optempo, and Available Forces	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	If SF shows up the rotational training and integration are usually good
BCTP	To repeat successes ARSOF must make participation and priority
BCTP	OPTEMPO is the biggest challenge
BCTP	SOAR Personnel Participation in the rotation
USASOC	More ARSOF rotations at the JRTC / NTC (7-10)
USASOC	OPTEMPO is the biggest challenge
JRTC	SOF in every rotation
TRADOC	SOF participation limited to SR
RESEARCHER	Enforcement of SOF Participation
RESEARCHER	Ranger Participation at the CTCs

Category 7 is Risk Taking and Open Mindedness. This category is defined as the commander's willingness to allow CTC training to be event-driven versus scripted (table 8). It means displaying a willingness to try new concepts and exploit new opportunities presented by full-spectrum operations in the COE.

Table 8: Risk Taking and Open Mindedness	
USASOC	Risk Taking by CTC Cadre (SF success/failure effects Bde)
JRTC	GPF Bde allowed rotation to be event driven vs scripted
USASOC	CTCs must allow SOF failure / success to impact the rotation forcing integration
JRTC	Need to accept risk for SOF success/failure during rotation.
RESEARCHER	Stop using CTCs as evaluation tool for Bde / Bn Commanders
RESEARCHER	Stop "cookie cutter" approach to rotations
RESEARCHER	Freeplay at the CTCs: Every rotation doesn't have to end at a certain phase. Some may end "prematurely" due to friction and chaos.

For lack of a better term, the researcher will use the phrase “cookie cutter” to describe the past modus operandi of the CTCs. For years, most CTC rotations followed a formula. Whether it was the same scenario, same time phasing or same escalation of hostilities, in general most CTC rotations at a given center looked pretty much the same as the next. There was good reason and justification for this. Repetitive training events in a set context or formula made it easy to conduct numerous complex rotations on a repetitive basis, year after year. Everything from infrastructure to mission support contractors to OPFOR was structured around a “recipe for success” at the CTCs. The repetitive nature of CTC rotations minimized expenditure of resources and provided a common framework for training Army units.

There are significant drawbacks to this approach. First and foremost, the CTCs are still fighting the same types of battles in the same scenarios that they were in 1987. While superficial changes have been made to reflect COE implementation, for the most part, a brigade combat team (BCT) in 1990 experienced pretty much the same training event as a BCT in 2002. The repetitious cookie-cutter approach has led to a degree of stagnation that endangers the relevance of the CTCs as a training instrument for the Army. There is another, unwritten reason for this approach to rotational planning. All too often CTC rotations are used as an evaluation tool for brigade and battalion commanders. Despite all the verbiage espoused about nonattributable training and observation versus evaluation, careers of senior field grade officers are made and broken at the CTCs. For this reason, there is immense pressure on the leadership of the CTCs to provide a common basis for

comparison. In other words, Colonel Smith's rotation at a given CTC must look pretty much like Colonel Jones' rotation in order to provide a fair evaluation of each officer's performance. This is why assistant division commanders are present throughout every CTC rotation and are privy to all O/C radio traffic and unit performance information.

This employment of the CTCs as an evaluation tool does not foster a spirit of creativity or risk taking. Rotations are seen as a test that must be completed rather than as an opportunity to experiment and try new concepts. This may be part of the reason why ARSOF is prohibited or inhibited to a great extent from having an impact, positive or negative, on events involving the rotation. Making CTC rotations, or at least certain aspects of them, unique may reawaken the spirit of non-attribution. Additionally, changing the definition of success at a CTC from accomplishment of all training events in the scenario to that of conducting the training events to standard, regardless of how many are completed, may enhance the training.

Recently, the JRTC allowed an ARSOF mission failure to negatively impact on a conventional brigade. The ARSOF mission failure led to a twenty-four-hour delay of the brigade's initial entry operation. Numerous friction points were exposed by this event, and great training and lessons learned about integration were the results for both units. This example illustrates a case of risk taking and willingness to let events drive a rotation. CTCs are already moving in the direction of more free play and a greater variety of training possibilities. This change will be critical to their enduring relevance as the premier combat training instruments for the Army's Objective Force.

Category 8 is Rotational Timeline and Overlap of Forces. The comments in this category revolve around the constraints imposed by short rotational timelines and the fact that all too often ARSOF rotations begin early and end shortly after commencement of the conventional force's rotation (table 9).

Table 9: Rotational Timeline and Overlap of Forces	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
USASOC	SOF / GPF time overlap in the box. SOF leaves early. Needs to stick around for a while
JRTC	Lack of flexibility due to time constrained scenarios prevent true friction from occurring. Lessons are bypassed and aren't learned.
SFC	More overlap in terms of time at the CTC. Exposes Friction Points
TRADOC	Doctrine. SOF Paradigm Shift: SOF as Early Entry and then also as Enabling Force
RESEARCHER	Time overlap of Forces in the rotation

This offset in execution of ARSOF and conventional rotations was necessary for a variety of reasons. Foremost among them was the availability of land and resources. An SF team's area of operations takes up a considerable portion of what is already a limited maneuver area at the JRTC. In order to have enough room for an infantry brigade to maneuver, it was necessary for the SF to accomplish their mission and exfiltrate prior to commitment of the brigade into the maneuver area.

The shift in concept from that of SOF being an early entry force to that of SOF being an enduring part of operations as an enabling force negates the validity of early show, early go. CTCs must explore creative ways to integrate ARSOF and conventional

forces in a resource-constrained environment. Shared areas of operation will be a significant characteristic of future operations.

Category 9 is Staffing and Resources at the CTCs. The results were varied, but indicate that presence of a permanent ARSOF planning staff, as well as ARSOF O/Cs, is critical to continuous, effective integration (table 10).

Table 10. Staffing and Resources	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
RESEARCHER	Permanent SOF staff at JRTC/BCTP
BCTP	More ARSOF personnel on staff at the CTCs
JRTC	Need Mission Support Contractors that understand current doctrine and ARSOF
BCTP	No workstations for ARSOF
JRTC	Hamstrung by instrumentation/inhibits noncontiguous operations
JRTC	Infrastructure to support classified rotations (security /contractors/unwillingness of contractors to change)
TRADOC	Not enough urban terrain
RESEARCHER	Manning of ARSOF personnel at NTC/BCTP
RESEARCHER	Security and Classification Capability of CTCs (Comms/Facilities/Instrumentation)
JRTC	Operations Group JTOC should be capable of operating as a JSOTF/JTF HQ
RESEARCHER	Infrastructure at the NTC (15 COBs and one MOUT Site)
RESEARCHER	Transparency of O/Cs/Support Facilities and Functions (AAR schedules)

Additional results indicated the requirement for infrastructure to support unique training requirements of ARSOF. Conveniently enough, most of the infrastructure mentioned is also required for COE, as well as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Technology was a theme. Communications architecture, battle tracking, and

instrumentation of player units must be seamless and connectable to both conventional force communications systems and those unique to ARSOF. Another response indicated the requirement for the CTCs to conduct classified rotations. With the advent of the Advanced Battle Command System (ABCS) this requirement applies to both conventional and ARSOF player units.

The final category is the Unfiled/Other Category. These results did not fit into one of the first nine categories, but were recorded (table 11). Most of these responses were “sustains. “

Table 11. Other	
ORGANIZATION	RESPONSE
BCTP	Overlap of Corps and ODB (Operational Detachment Bravo / SF Co HQ) training objectives is impossible.
USASOC	FID SR DA at the JRTC seem to provide most bang for buck to GPF
BCTP	ARSOF as Shaping Operation for GPF
JRTC	Sustain FID in support of the Brigade. Great integration
USASOC	Need more ARSOA to support training / operational requirements

The nine trends identified from the results of research will be used as the basis for possible solutions or recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of integrated training at the CTCs. From these trends, the researcher will develop recommendations that will be screened and then discussed.

## CHAPTER 5

### SYNTHESIS OF SOLUTION SETS

In chapter 4, the researcher identified nine trends among the results of his research into how the Army can more effectively integrate ARSOF and conventional force training at the CTCs. The trends, in alphabetical order are.

1. Attitudes and Perceptions
2. COE/Transformation and Organizational Change
3. Commander Emphasis and Involvement
4. External Training and Development
5. Integrated and Effective Planning and Preparation
6. Participation/OPTempo/Available Forces
7. Risk Taking/Open Mindedness
8. Rotational Timeline/Overlap of Forces
9. Staffing and Resources at the CTCs

The researcher identified early on in the research process that consensus on the nature of a given problem is the key to identification and implementation of a solution. The trends identified cross boundaries among the CTCs, as well as the boundary between conventional forces and ARSOF. The recommended solutions below vary in complexity, scope, and importance. They are meant to serve as feasible, suitable, and acceptable recommendations that could be implemented by the Army as a means of enhancing integrated training at the CTCs. They are presented in no particular order.

Recommendation 1: Embed ARSOF familiarization training in Army leader education at all levels and across all institutions.

Discussion: In order to integrate ARSOF training at the CTCs and, more importantly, in combat, Army leaders must have an institutional awareness of ARSOF's roles, missions, and capabilities. This requirement goes beyond the standard thirty-minute slide briefing to the assembled masses at Command and General Staff College. It should begin during the Officer Basic Course and be an integral part of the officer education system throughout the Army. Beyond formal institutions, commanders must implement programs at unit level that foster cross training and open relationships between ARSOF and conventional units at home stations. Another method might be a shadow program for ARSOF leaders to ride along with conventional forces during a field training exercise (FTX) or at a CTC rotation. Finally, the SOCOORD at corps headquarters is ideally positioned to establish and manage an educational and leader development program to enhance ARSOF awareness within active and reserve component units.

Proposed Executive Agents: All levels, all educational institutions

Trends Addressed: 1,4

Recommendation 2: Update Army doctrine on ARSOF integration. Where a doctrinal void exists, develop and implement doctrine.

Discussion: The time has come for the Army to treat ARSOF as a battlefield operating system (BOS). Few and far between are the real operations that do not rely heavily on the integration, synchronization, and deconfliction of ARSOF and conventional operations. None of the doctrinal publications describe how ARSOF integrates into the

Army during full-spectrum operations. Most doctrine identifies command and coordination elements or discusses command and control or support relationships, but falls short of describing how the process is actually accomplished. The frequency and necessity to integrate ARSOF demand a formal and mutually understood process for integration. The paradigm of SOF as an enabling force that conducts early entry operations and then clears out prior to conventional force entry into the area of operations has been broken. ARSOF is now an integral part of the Objective Force that enables decisive, effects-based operations prior to, during, and after the fight.

Proposed Executive Agents: TRADOC, USAJFKSWC, USASOC

Trends Addressed: 2,4

Recommendation 3: Implement COE at the CTCs now

Discussion: The Army has rewritten the OPFOR manual for the CTCs.

Additionally, the CTCs have begun an evolution to replicate the COE. Unfortunately, the bulk of measures implemented to date revolves around superficial changes, such as minor technological upgrades to OPFOR equipment and increased role play. The NTC only employs fifteen civilians on the battlefield. They are contracted personnel who work an eight-hour shift. At three shifts per day this means the NTC can normally field five civilian role players at any given time to support an entire brigade size rotation (Council of Colonels Conference, 2002). It becomes difficult, if not impossible, to portray a complex battlefield with this level of resourcing.

COE implementation goes beyond resources. At its core, COE is about creative application of the resources already available to create a confusing, dynamic, complex, and

ambiguous environment at the training center where success is difficult for the player unit to define. These are the conditions under which Army units operate in the real world. Why should they train on a sterile battlefield against a mirror image opponent? True COE implementation calls for vision, foresight, and the ability on the part of the CTCs to embrace ambiguity and a variety of outcomes for any given training rotation. Another aspect of COE that needs to be implemented is joint, interagency, and multinational operations at the CTCs. While forces from other services often participate in the rotations, their presence is marginal, and often based on a memorandum of agreement versus a requirement to conduct joint training. The implementation of the Joint National Training Center may answer the mail on this issue. Finally, where resourcing levels preclude full implementation of COE, the Army must capitalize on virtual and constructive environments as a means to portray complex battle space and lend credibility and resolution to the CTC experience. Only after the Army has moved away from a maneuver-centric, attrition-based mentality can effective ARSOF integration occur. The complex dynamics of the COE provide the opportunity for ARSOF to truly demonstrate value added for conventional commanders.

Recommended Executive Agent: TRADOC and the CTCs with resource support from the Department of the Army.

Trends Addressed: 2,7,9

Recommendation 4: Accurately replicate the effects of nonlethal fires at the CTCs to show cause and effect

Discussion: CA and PSYOP routinely participate in CTC rotations Their efforts to reduce civilian interference with military operations, as well as targeted themes against enemy forces, provide Army commanders a nonlethal option during operations. Unfortunately, the CTCs do not accurately replicate the effects of these nonlethal fires. For example, whether a commander decides to engage the civilian populace in the maneuver box or not at the JRTC, he suffers the same effects. The player unit is not rewarded for making efforts to conduct civil-military operations (CMO) to shape the battlefield. Likewise, should the unit avoid civilian engagement altogether in favor of focusing on the enemy, it is not forced to experience the negative consequences of failure to work for the support of the local populace. The same holds true for PSYOP. No matter how many themes they broadcast or leaflets they drop, the OPFOR still fights at 100 percent effort. There is no cause and effect relationship shown to the training unit. This artificiality drops the expectations of unit commanders for the results they can achieve by employing nonlethal fires. The wrong lessons are being learned. Implementation of this recommendation would require more control and integration of civilian role players, as well as a willingness by the CTCs to somehow reduce OPFOR effectiveness as a result of nonlethal fires.

Recommended Executive Agent: CTCs

Trends Addressed: 2,7,9

Recommendation 5: Allow friction to take place at the CTCs, even if it means not getting to the training “limit of advance.”

Discussion: Too often, an event occurs at the CTC that threatens to “derail “ the exercise. A unit gets lost, fratricide occurs, or signals get crossed. When these events occur, trainers at the CTCs must be willing to allow events to play out so that the hard lessons are learned. Too often there is a temptation to reset the exercise, mitigate the effect, or worse, ignore the friction altogether in order to accomplish a given number of training events. Leaders at all levels must be willing to let their units learn the hard lessons at the CTCs. A little friction at the CTCs should be viewed as a good thing that is necessary and integral to the training and learning process.

Recommended Executive Agent: CTCs

Trends Addressed: 7,1

Recommendation 6: Require ARSOF to participate in all CTC rotations.

Discussion: Currently ARSOF only participate at the JRTC on a routine basis. CA and PSYOP participate as a small portion of NTC rotations, SOCCEs and SFLEs participate at the BCTP, and the CMTC hosts ARSOF on an occasional basis. This level of participation is unacceptable in the new paradigm of ARSOF as a continuous, integrated, enabling force. ARSOF must participate in integrated training in every CTC rotation at all the CTCs. When the occasional operational requirement precludes participation, virtual and constructive participation should substitute. Furthermore, all ARSOF must participate. The Ranger regiment never participates in integrated CTC rotations, yet it was called on to integrate with conventional forces in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan. ARSOF leaders must make a commitment to training at the CTCs as a priority, even if it means scaling back operational commitments. The price for failure to participate will be

felt for years to come not only in the attitudes of Army leadership, but also in the ability of ARSOF and conventional forces to integrate in full-spectrum operations. Every ARSOF unit should experience a CTC rotation as often as every conventional unit does.

Recommended Executive Agent: USASOC

Trends Addressed: 1,3,6,8

Recommendation 7: Embed permanent ARSOF staff at all the CTCs. The air defense branch has permanent representation at every CTC, yet no U.S. soldier has ever fired a Stinger missile in anger. If the air defense branch can make a case for relevance to the Army and manage to provide resources to all the CTCs, should ARSOF not do the same? ARSOF must have permanent, significant, and relevant representation at every CTC. When expertise is a part of the CTC team, integrated training becomes far more effective and a routine part of CTC rotations.

Recommended Executive Agent: USASOC, TRADOC

Trends Addressed: 1,4,5,9

Recommendation 8: Transform scenario-based CTCs into capabilities-based, mission training centers (MTC).

Discussion: In order to truly meet the training needs of both ARSOF and the objective force, the Army must broaden its definition of the CTCs. At its core, the Army is about war fighting, but as an institution, the Army must be capable of a broad range of missions that go beyond the contextual definition of “combat.” This recommendation requires a great degree of mental agility to implement because it requires the Army to rethink and virtually reinvent the CTCs as a training institution.

The current CTC paradigm is a scenario based training institution that identifies itself by its installation and its client base. In other words, the NTC is at Fort Irwin, and trains the “heavy force “ of the Army. The JRTC is at Fort Polk and trains light and Special Operations forces. This specialization allows each CTC to dedicate resources and pool expertise to meet training objectives. Unfortunately, the same specialization also imposes significant constraints. Typically, rotations focus on high intensity, conventional, force on force operations in a specified battlefield as defined by the boundaries of the installation. By thinking in terms of the missions that player units will execute during operational deployment instead of the scenario in which player units must operate, the CTCs begin the process of transformation.

There are significant differences between a CTC and a MTC. The first difference is that the centers should focus on full spectrum operations, not just on combat operations. Not all rotations need to involve force-on-force direct fire contact. JRTC conducts Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) for Bosnia and Kosovo bound forces, but these are rehearsals, not training. There is a difference. MTCs must be capabilities-based institutions versus scenario-based institutions.

Under the current program, all training objectives are tailored to fit into the scenario portrayed by the CTC. In the case of a unit requesting training that is beyond the scope of the scenario, the CTC must choose between abandoning scenario fidelity or denial of the unit’s training objectives. A capabilities-based institution would be able to tailor each rotation to the individual needs of the player unit. A scenario would still be required, but it would be flexible enough to change into any of a number of possible environments to

facilitate full spectrum operations. Even better, multiple scenarios could be tailored and adjusted, based on training objectives.

OPFOR and role players would be versatile and capable of portraying a variety of threats with a great degree of fidelity. Furthermore, the MTCs would abandon the concept of a maneuver box in favor of a noncontiguous, training objective driven approach to battlespace. A combination of virtual, home station, outstation, and constructive training environments would merge provide a custom battlespace for each rotation. Instead of defining itself by an installation and a scenario, the MTC would define itself by its capabilities. In other words, the MTC could overlay its infrastructure, capabilities, and resources on any number of installations and outstations to meet the needs of the training unit.

While this recommendation may appear beyond the scope of this thesis, it is through transformation that ARSOF integration's value truly becomes apparent. ARSOF operate and thrive in a joint, interagency, multinational context on a complex and ambiguous area of operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. The CTCs, transformed into MTCs would continue to serve as the cornerstone of readiness for the Army's objective force.

Recommended Executive Agent: DA / FORSCOM / TRADOC

Trends Addressed: 1,2,7,8,9

The recommendations above are meant to serve as options available to Army leaders in their efforts to more effectively integrate ARSOF and conventional training at the CTCs. Some of the recommendations are relatively simple, requiring limited coordination

and resources to implement. Others are extensive, requiring commitment of resources and institutional change. Furthermore, these solutions are not intended to apply to all CTCs and all situations but should instead serve as a point of departure from which innovative solutions to the problem of ARSOF integration can be developed and executed.

This thesis sought to answer the question of how the Army can more effectively conduct integrated training of Army Special Operations Forces and conventional forces at the Combat Training Centers. Four questions provided the framework for the synthesis of recommended solutions. The questions asked what the current status of integrated training was, what was working, what was not working, and what were possible solutions for more effective integrated training. The research progressed through four phases. The first phase was instrument design and dissemination. Due to a lack of published sources on the topic, the researcher developed a questionnaire to gather required information from primary sources at the Combat Training Centers and major commands. Step 2 was collection and collation of responses to the questionnaire. Step 3 was analysis of collected information and synthesis of possible solutions based on identified trends among the responses. Step 4 was screening and evaluation of the recommended solutions for suitability, acceptability and feasibility. In the end, the researcher developed a set of recommended solutions implementation by various entities within the Army. While none of these solutions is all encompassing, together their implementation may enhance training and combat effectiveness of both special and conventional forces.

The biggest challenge during the conduct of research was the fact that the Army, the CTCs and the world is changing so quickly that the situation at the initiation of

research was completely different from the situation at completion. America's war in Iraq saw unprecedented involvement of Special Operations Forces in conjunction with conventional forces. Further research might delve into the nature of this battlefield integration as well as the relevance of integration at the CTCs in Iraq. Did the training work? Additionally, implementation of the COE at the CTCs presents a huge research challenge to anyone willing to answer the call. This change will have significant impact on the Army as a whole. Finally, the development of a Joint National Training Capability/Center shows a movement to train jointly by the Department of Defense on an unprecedented scale. This topic will be of significant relevance to both special and conventional force units and commanders in the near future. In the end, the Army owes its soldiers the most challenging, realistic, and relevant training it can possibly provide. Only through constant change and cooperation among organizations can the Army meet the immense challenges of training for and performing the missions of the future.

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