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DEVELOPING OPERATIONAL LEADERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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3 February 2003

ABSTRACT

of

DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL LEADERS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY

Advancements in Information Technology (IT) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) have promising potential for the military in the 21st Century. While technology offers a distinct advantage to the military, leadership is still a critical aspect of our fighting force. This will not change as we transform our military throughout the 21st Century. The development of operational leaders will continue to be a significant challenge for our military in the coming years.

There are many implications to fighting, operating, and developing leaders in an environment of information sharing, networking and easier access to information. One of the problems that we see is the temptation for micromanagement.

Some observations about recent conflicts offer evidence that senior leaders are tempted to micromanage based on the capability that information technology provides them. Although there are many other factors that influence this

decision, IT certainly facilitates their choice. If we continue to succumb to this temptation and establish a trend in our culture, we will create poor learning environments for

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The first duty of a leader is to create more leaders.

-General W.L. Creech, American Generalship

Introduction

The United States military is the most powerful and technological fighting force in the world. Massive advancements in information technology (IT) and military weaponry are occurring at a rapid pace and will likely make waging war more efficient, and more effective. The potential of these advancements for our military seems limitless. Joint Vision 2020 clearly outlines the direction for future U.S. military forces by stating they must be "faster, more lethal and more precise...than they are today."¹ This is great news for our military and our country, but there are implications that arise as a result of such compelling change.

One of the most critical and dynamic aspects of warfare is leadership.² However, leaders of today and tomorrow will be challenged by the characteristics of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and rapidly progressing information technology. Therefore, we must continue to develop leaders and prepare them for the complex environment that they will face. Current observations suggest an increasing capability and temptation for strategic and operational leaders to access tactical information, influence tactical actions and even make tactical decisions. This paper examines these issues and some of the implications for current military leaders and those of the 21st Century.

Thesis

There are many things that facilitate and cause micromanagement in the military, including culture, institutions, organizational change, and a lack of trust. *However, some of the most relevant enablers of micromanagement are advancements that permit rapid information exchange and access to information. A significant consequence is the potential for the military to produce ineffective operational leaders for the 21st Century.*

Scope

Although there are many consequences that we should examine regarding accessibility, networking of information, decision-making and leadership, this paper will focus on the consequence of micromanagement as it applies to the development of operational leaders for the 21st Century. Whether or not a need for an operational level leader will continue to exist is a topic of significant discussion, but not of this work. This paper will show that the concepts of NCW and advancements in information technology (among other things) are enabling micromanagement as a behavior by theater-strategic and operational level commanders down to the tactical levels of command. In addition, this work will

show that micromanagement is a technique that may have its place, but usually does not produce effective or efficient results for military leaders. Lastly, this work will examine how a trend of this phenomenon may have a negative impact and develop a new breed of high-level leaders for future conflicts.

Background and Definitions

As long as there have been armed forces, leaders have tried to find the most effective, efficient and bloodless way to lead those forces to victory. By applying leadership skills while in a position of authority, and effectively leading military forces in battle, many leaders have mastered the art of *battle command*.³ But, battle command at the operational level is particularly challenging today, in light of so much information. Today, we have so many information tools and so much information access that operational commanders are just trying to manage the information they have so they aren't "overwhelmed."⁴ Information then, will not lift the "fog" of war, and uncertainty will remain a challenge for the operational leader as he engages in the "human intercourse" of war.⁵ Leadership will remain imperative.

Before continuing, there are a few concepts and definitions that must be determined for the purposes of this

paper. First, although there are many different definitions of *leadership*, for this paper, the definition is defined as the "process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction and motivation."⁶

Operational level leadership is concerned with directing or guiding military forces to accomplish an operational objective through the conduct of a major operation or campaign.⁷ Therefore, the *operational commander*, or leader, must exercise operational art and leadership, by maintaining a broad perspective for planning and executing campaigns or operations that link the "tactical employment of forces to the strategic objectives."⁸ He not only commands, by virtue of rank and a position of authority, but he ideally leads (guides or directs) his organization, by means of a broad vision, to efficiently and effectively accomplish the stated objectives. In the military, leaders are not always commanders, but commanders have the authority and a moral responsibility to lead. *Command* therefore is the "exercise of authority and direction" given to an individual for "assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission."⁹ *Micro-management*, however, is a technique or a style of leadership by which leaders direct or guide forces by use of "excessive control or detail."¹⁰ This does not imply that a leader should ignore the details. But it does

mean that leaders who use this style are not simply observing operations two levels down, they are controlling the actions and decisions of those at that level, and possibly lower. There are occasions where a leader must be intimately involved, and even times where he should make the decisions, and control operations below his level. But, this technique should not be the paradigm for military leaders. Lastly, *Network Centric Warfare* (NCW) or *Network Centric Operations* (NCO) describes the "effective linking or networking of knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed."¹¹ It is more than just computer networking, and it encompasses the full realm of informational and technological systems and tools that we use to gain information dominance and execute combat operations.

Does IT facilitate micromanagement?

Neither the numerous organizational changes that have taken place since 500 B.C. nor the technical advances that were introduced after about 1850, have significantly altered or even reduced the quintessential problem facing any command system, that of dealing with uncertainty.

-Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*

Micromanagement is facilitated by information technology. Obviously, there are many other factors that influence and cause leaders to micromanage. History shows examples of this in nearly every military conflict from the Civil War to the Vietnam War, however, Kosovo and

Afghanistan provide the most recent examples of technology-based micromanagement.

Clausewitz recognized the impact of information technology on war, even in the 1800s and stated that "we now know more, but this makes us more, not less, uncertain."¹² One possible rationale for information access and technology-based micromanagement is that it satisfies a need for certainty in an uncertain situation. Clearly, technology is designed to increase certainty, so it is a perfect recipe for micromanagement. Micromanagement is a choice. Technological advancements facilitate that choice.

Our doctrine states, "senior commanders need to develop command styles that exploit information technology while allowing subordinates authority to accomplish their missions."¹³ In addition, there are consequences of failing to decentralize decision-making, including the fact that "commanders may lose opportunities if the quest for certainty leads them to centralize control and decision making."¹⁴ The military recognizes the temptation of using informational advances, but it seems that information technology facilitates this phenomenon, often to the detriment of the organization and its future. There are examples from Kosovo and Afghanistan to further support this.

General Wesley Clark, who served as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and European Forces Commander during Operation Allied Force in 1999, micromanaged tactical operations, including the targeting process for air operations, down to the individual target; he did not trust many of the tactical decisions to levels well below him, and he proved that he had the technological means to actively micromanage his forces by doing this from his headquarters hundreds of miles away.¹⁵ General Clark's direct involvement in the targeting process and his constant demands for information via video-teleconferencing, secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) email and a meeting-saturated battle rhythm is indicative of the fact that he had the assets available to access tactical, real-time information, and he did so regularly.¹⁶ This example clearly shows a recent leader who used modern information assets, his position of authority to access information, and he exerted direct influence over decisions that could have been made at much lower levels of command. This level of micromanagement and its frequency would not have been possible without modern technology.¹⁷ Furthermore, his behavior was reinforced by victory over the Serbs. While it was a style that was disliked by his subordinates, and criticized by many, it appeared to work.

During Operation Enduring Freedom, General Tommy Franks, the Combatant Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), micromanaged the forces in Afghanistan. General Franks did not assign responsibility for the fight in Afghanistan to an operational-level Joint Task Force Headquarters until May 2002, nearly 9 months after U.S. forces arrived there.¹⁸ Despite the lack of an intermediate command structure, General Franks used technology to command and control the fight from his headquarters in Tampa. The commander of ground forces in Afghanistan noted problems with this style early in Operation Anaconda by recalling that information assets such as the Predator (UAV) and links back to the United States caused higher staffs and commanders to micromanage the tactical fight.¹⁹ The CENTCOM J6, Brigadier General Moran, explained one of the positive impacts of technology on the command by stating, "Technology has allowed us to flatten the command and control structure" as well as "reach out and get information quickly from the lowest level of command."²⁰ However, the visibility of the war in Afghanistan, coupled with access to information (by using satellite communications, SIPRNET, secure video-teleconferencing and significant use of UAVs), made it possible and likely, that General Franks would make the decisions, instead of empowering his subordinates with the

authority to make them. Technology facilitated and possibly encouraged a centralized decision-making process with micromanagement as a technique of leadership. Again, the behavior was reinforced. By most accounts, Operation Enduring Freedom has been a success. General Franks remained in command and will likely command at CENTCOM if there is war with Iraq in the near future.

These examples clearly show that micromanagement does exist, and they illustrate the link between micromanagement and the tools that allow access to information, even down to the lowest levels. These examples are not intended as personal criticism, or to suggest that there are not times when micromanagement is appropriate. But, they illustrate the point that the recent advances in technology are directly linked to senior-level micromanagement in recent conflicts. Furthermore, they suggest an amount of reinforcement for the behavior. Among other things, the capabilities of video teleconferencing, email, secure networks, maneuver control systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and satellite technology seem to negate the factors of space and time and give the operational leader easy, real-time access to the situation in the field. With so much technology available, and so many complicated issues including the impacts of media and ad-hoc joint

organizations, technology enhanced micromanagement is a viable option for our operational and theater-strategic leaders. Commanders view them as an acceptable alternative to having boots on the ground, but some see it as a trap. If a combatant commander is busy directing the details, how can he formulate an effective vision and synchronize the plan?

Does micromanagement yield effective and efficient results?

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

-General George Patton

We won in Kosovo and we are winning in Afghanistan. So, what is the problem? Our network centric environment is fallible, and micromanagement often leads to ineffective or inefficient results. Kosovo and Afghanistan illustrate some of these flaws.

In the case of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, there are several indicators of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. First, because General Clark was so involved in the details, he failed to chart the course. He estimated the war would last only a few days, but even when it was evident that the war would last longer, he did not formulate a satisfactory long-term solution that would meet the desired end state.²¹ Furthermore, General Clark clearly tried to gain certainty by micromanaging target sets and tactical operations, creating a reactive mode of execution. Clark's control over individual targets frequently reduced the effectiveness of the bombings, and re-strikes were often needed.²² In addition, there was significant collateral damage based on targets that were identified and authorized by General Clark, and often targets took days to approve.²³ It is possible

that delays in target approval allowed Milosevic's forces to consolidate, recover or relocate.

Lastly, there were several problems with command and control (C2), and many of his subordinate commanders complained that the VTC schedule was so frequent and intrusive that it interfered with their tactical planning and execution.²⁴ Clark's frequent use of command VTCs created ambiguity of intent, not certainty in the minds of many of his subordinates.²⁵ For a variety of reasons, the war lasted 78 days, but the evidence strongly suggests that more effective and efficient use of resources was possible. Micromangement significantly reduced this possibility. Short-sighted planning, ineffective precision bombing, delays that allowed the enemy to recover, an intrusive means of issuing guidance, and an extended combat operation against an inferior enemy illustrate the ineffective and inefficient results of micromanagement.

In November, 2001 there were opportunities lost when "Air Force planes had top Taliban and al-Qaeda members in their cross-hairs at least ten times but were not allowed to fire because they didn't receive clearance from CENTCOM ...until it was too late."²⁶ Even in later operations, the rules of engagement and the decision time incurred by seeking higher headquarters approval, significantly increased the likelihood of lost opportunities on time sensitive targets in many different instances.²⁷ Major General Franklin Hagenbeck was the senior commander on the ground in Afghanistan and has termed the technology-enhanced micromanagement from CENTCOM during Operation Anaconda as very "disruptive."²⁸ In an effort to thwart this intrusive and disruptive behavior, Hagenbeck's staff developed, monitored and implemented a situational update web link. This eventually resulted in a reduction of the constant inquiries from higher. This type of oversight, and formulating a solution to reduce it, detracted from their focus on the battle. In addition to these shortcomings, planners did not fully integrate air support.²⁹ Despite lack of U.S. ground forces, the

gaps in synchronization also detracted from the effectiveness of the operation and may have allowed many of the enemy to escape.³⁰ Despite the modern communications capability and flattened command structure, CENTCOM did not synchronize the plan. It is quite possible that CENTCOM was so consumed with the close fight that they simply failed to develop a synchronized plan. CENTCOM lost the broad perspective needed when directing a complex operation because they were too concerned with the details. Although the tactical commanders bear some of the blame, the CENTCOM Commander is responsible. He chose to remain as the theater-strategic and operational level headquarters, despite his geographical location, and the forces on the ground felt the impact of this decision. Unfortunately, the issue has caused a significant inter-service debate about close air support and is detrimental to cooperation. In all, micromanagement in Afghanistan caused many lost opportunities, distractions for tactical commanders and staffs, an unsynchronized effort, and an inter-service rift. These are not indicators of an effective or efficient leadership method.

The examples of micromanagement in Kosovo and Afghanistan provide some insight to the perceived effectiveness and efficiencies of technology-enhanced micromanagement. If technology does facilitate micromanagement by our senior leaders, and we know that it produces inefficient and ineffective results in the near-term, what are the long-term effects if we don't interrupt the pattern?

Are We Creating a New Breed of Operational Leaders?

The single most difficult problem in selecting top leadership in the military is how to ensure that an individual who succeeds in the promotion process will have the independence of thought needed for high command.

- Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., *American Generalship*

Admiral Crowe's perception about this paradox in our military is insightful. Clearly, he recognized that many who survive the promotion process do so at the sacrifice of innovation and independent thought. There are many factors that determine who our leaders are, how they are selected, and how they will lead. Furthermore, there are many unknown consequences of micromanagement and how it will affect the future of our military structure, doctrine and leadership. Major General von Freytag-Loringhoven stressed the importance of information technology (even in the early 1900s) but cautioned, "commanders, however, should not permit access to telegraph and telephone to stifle the initiative of subordinates."³¹ General von Freytag-Loringhoven recognized the potential impact of technology as well as the potential to stifle the initiative of subordinates, but there is more to it. We can examine the way we develop our operational leaders, and then conduct some predictive analysis to provide good indicators about the future. The problem seems simple. If an officer does not have the experiences that develop their skills, when will he learn them? A continued trend in micromanagement will develop ineffective operational leaders by creating a restrictive learning environment where the required characteristics or skills cannot be attained or developed through experience.

With that in mind, what are the characteristics we must develop for effective operational leaders of the future? First, the timeless characteristics of leadership will remain. Moreover, the operational leader will have to develop dominant characteristics to successfully link tactical actions to the successful accomplishment of national objectives in a future with more information, more lethality, and an increasingly diverse environment. In his view of the future, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed innovation as a necessity and wrote that "the pace of technological change...and changes in the strategic environment, will place a premium on our ability to foster

innovation in our people.”³² Furthermore, “decision superiority” will “allow the force to shape the situation or react to changes.”³³ The Secretary of Defense described a “culture of creativity and intelligent risk taking” as characteristics needed in the future.³⁴ As our military transforms to meet the future challenges, leaders will have to make decisions and act in an environment where they may be operating independently. President Bush, while speaking at the commencement of the Naval Academy in 2001, stated that we need a “renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps” and the “old bureaucratic mindset that frustrates the creativity” should no longer continue.³⁵ Therefore, our military will require leaders who are superior decision-makers, creative problem solvers, intelligent risk takers and innovative thinkers. Although there are many other important characteristics, it is even more imperative that we create the environment where development of these characteristics can occur.

It is accepted that some effective leaders are born and some are grown, but regardless of the circumstance, either can develop into a better leader. Experiences shape our patterns of behavior, and leadership is not an exception. There are many ways we learn behavior, but many psychologists agree that adult learning is a “cognitive” approach where “thought processes intervene between the stimulus and the response” and that we do not just react blindly to some consequences of our actions, instead we process thoughts about them.³⁶ Adults also learn by observing behaviors and learn to make a particular response that results in “satisfying consequences” where reinforcement generally increases the frequency of this behavior.³⁷ Unfortunately, today’s developing leaders are learning to lead in an environment saturated with micromanagement and void of significant experiences in decision-making.

In the military, a leader must progress through rank to become an operational leader, or a leader in a high-level command. A young ensign cannot be promoted immediately to the rank of admiral and immediately assume command authority of a joint forces organization. Therefore, even a leader who is born with great leadership characteristics must still go through a developmental process before assuming high command. Each component has a method for doing this, but most are similar. The Army bases its developmental process on three pillars: education and training, experience through operational assignments, and self-development.³⁸ In an article about developing senior leaders, the author, Colonel McGuire, emphasized the impact of experiences in an incremental approach, where leaders are pushed beyond their “current frame of reference” and suggested that experience is the most “vital aspect of developing senior leaders.”³⁹ Unquestionably, experience is a significant component in leader development. Therefore, future operational leaders who observe or practice micromanagement in their experiences will have that frame of reference as a compelling aspect of their professional development.

This developmental process, with micromanagement as a common experience, will not allow future operational leaders to develop skills like superior decision-making, intelligent risk taking, creativity, and innovation. By examining how leaders grow, and the impact of experience and environments on behavior, it is clear that the development of certain skills does not occur when the experiences exist in an environment of micromanagement. Specifically, micromanagement denies the experience that the future operational commander needs as a reference for innovative decision-making.

Evidence to support the impact of micromanagement on learning experiences exists in several different places. In a study conducted by the U.S. Army War College on company

commanders (junior officers) in 2001, the author determined that micromanagement was prevalent, and the process of development that they experienced promotes “reactive instead of proactive thought, compliance, not creativity and adherence, not audacity.”⁴⁰ This study shows that when officers do not make their own decisions and learn from their mistakes, there is a significant decline in the progressive development of leadership skills such as decision-making and innovation.⁴¹ Despite this, leaders who conform to this process of development often receive good evaluations, promotion, and in some cases, command. Often their superiors recognize them as leaders who have their finger on the pulse of their organization. Therefore micromanagement is reinforced. Recently, the Navy conducted surveys that indicated a stunning number of junior grade officers are leaving the military because of the pervasiveness of micromanagement (including a zero-defects mentality, lack of trust, and lack of autonomy).⁴² To highlight the implications, retired General Frederick J. Kroesen points out that “there is no more effective way to destroy the leadership potential of young officers...than to deny them opportunities to make decisions.”⁴³ The fact is, we are denying our tactical leaders the opportunities to make their own decisions, and this will have an adverse impact on their development as operational leaders. In Kosovo and Afghanistan, the higher-level leadership denied subordinates autonomy and the opportunities to make their own decisions, and it yielded ineffective results. Unfortunately, this is becoming relatively common for military forces in combat and in garrison.

In an article published for an Air University course, Dr. William Klemm offers more insight to the effects of learning in an environment of micromanagement.⁴⁴ He points to a study conducted that examined over 1300 professionals in civilian and government jobs. Among other things, they concluded that experiences provided an environment that is critical to the development of creativity

and innovation; micromanagement must be avoided to create such an environment for developing innovation and creativity; and the study shows that micromanagement reduced the productivity of self-reliant individuals.⁴⁵ Contrary to conformist thought in the military, risk takers or “mavericks” should be valued because of their inclination to produce innovative, creative environments where they thrive and develop productive skills.⁴⁶ Although the authors of that study clearly concluded that an organization will benefit from an innovative environment, it also warned that some structure and direction is needed for overall success. This is similar to the military structure, but results from Kosovo, Afghanistan and many of the junior officer surveys suggest that there is too much directive guidance in our environment for innovation and creativity to develop. Another study found that workers were counterproductive when they are overly dependent on their supervisors for decisions.⁴⁷ Clearly, micromanagement creates counterproductive environments where subordinate leaders are increasingly dependent on their supervisors for decisions. Therefore, we can conclude that a continued trend will stifle the development of potential leaders for the 21st Century.

While there are few documented examples of the results of such an environment on an operational leader, the background and experience of the commander of Operation Allied Force is a good one. In his book Waging Modern War, General Wesley Clark, recalled his development as a leader as one that included significant “oversight by higher headquarters, repeated questioning of seemingly insignificant details and surprisingly little autonomy for field commanders.”⁴⁸ Although his development is not the only factor that may have created a propensity for micromanagement in Operation Allied Force, it does offer significant evidence of potential results. He admittedly developed his skills and leadership concepts through years of experience (with micromanagement). His behavior was reinforced throughout his career and he was eventually promoted to the rank of

general. It is not surprising to find that he micromanaged tactical combat operations as a senior level commander.

The business sector is now utilizing job design theories like the Hackman-Oldman Job Design with principles that use autonomy to develop subordinates and empower them with the authority to make decisions.⁴⁹ This innovative way of leadership thinking is designed to improve efficiency and grow effective future leaders, however, in a situation with micromanagement, the experiences and growth from autonomy and innovation, can not take place.⁵⁰

Instead of “steering the ship”, the military needs operational leaders who will “chart the course.”⁵¹ Our doctrine and our leadership point to characteristics that will be needed as an operational leader. Characteristics like “vision” imply the skills needed for a commander to link tactical operations to the successful attainment of the national goals.⁵² The military must challenge the leaders of today to develop operational leaders for tomorrow.

Counter-Argument

If an operational commander can make effective strategic, operational and tactical decisions, maintain his vision, and control operational and tactical combat operations, then maybe he should. He has the most and best information, and he can make the decisions based on information dominance. But, there are flaws in this argument. First, this argument is dependent on the assumption that technology will not fail. In addition, we have determined that experience is a critical dynamic in the process of development. Technology-enhanced micromanagement will not allow leaders to develop with a wealth of decision-making experiences, and the military will not have leaders in 2020 capable of making the best decisions. Eventually, the future leaders will reap what they sow.

One other argument may suggest that the leaders of today are learning to adapt to change, because we deal with it all the time. Along with advancements in technology and changing organizational structures, they are learning some innovation and creativity. Therefore, by the time today's junior leaders grow up, everything will work out. Unfortunately, this argument is also flawed. Leaders cannot fully develop innovative, creative and risk-averse decision-making skills in a stifled environment. Companies like General Motors, General Electric and Wal-Mart, Palm, McDonalds and IBM have undergone massive changes to create an environment where innovation thrives. Furthermore, special operations organizations have operated under an innovative, de-centralized leadership style for years. Their success and effectiveness is irrefutable. In both examples, the organizations have created a culture that relies on the innovation and decision-making ability of lower-level leaders. These organizations thrive on this concept. The de-centralized approach is the norm for them. Conversely, a trend in micromanagement will likely produce a legacy of ineffective operational leaders and a culture of risk-averse leaders who lack creativity and innovative problem solving skills.

Conclusion

Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.

- Unknown Philosopher, *Principle Centered Leadership*

Solving this problem is not easy. The military is a serious profession where the price of mistakes can cost lives. Therefore, those with the authority to make the changes must have the moral courage to teach their subordinates and set the conditions for success. It will take massive cultural and organizational change. Restraint is critical. Leaders must allow their subordinates to implement controls and training in peace that reinforce innovation and problem solving in combat.

This is not an assertion to create a military where mavericks run rampant and top-level leaders are not involved. Senior leaders must be involved, and they need to see their subordinates, work with them, and develop *trust* in them. Eventually this behavior will begin to resemble the concepts of Auftragstaktik (mission-orders) or a de-centralized approach. We will start to see subordinates who are no longer dependent on their leaders for decisions, who have relationships of trust, and soldiers who can operate on intent without fear of reprisal. Our current theater-strategic and operational leaders must chart the course and create the environment where this can happen.

Many view technology as our dominant advantage in combat. While it is a combat multiplier, leadership is the fulcrum that will allow us to leverage that technology. Our military must act now by providing clear guidance and start relying on the ingenuity of our subordinates to fight and win in 2020.⁵³ Doctrine predicts that “the pace of technological change...will place a premium on our ability to foster innovation in our people and organizations across the entire range of joint operations.”⁵⁴ However, technological change has its baggage. Somewhere in the military is a junior leader who is developing in an environment where micromanagement is the example. The military cannot assume that he will emerge as operational commander with the needed characteristics and skills. We cannot assume that the future battlefield will be forgiving or predictable, nor can we assume that technology will make us so dominant that effective leadership will be an irrelevant principle. Our joint forces deserve a change that will provide them with effective operational leaders who make the best decisions based on years of experience and development.

NOTES

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington D.C.: 2002), 1.

² Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, (Washington D.C.: 2001), 4-7.

³ Ibid, 5-1.

⁴ Robert K. Ackerman, "Technology Empowers Information Operations in Afghanistan," Signal Magazine, (March 2002): 17.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 120.

⁶ Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership, (Washington D.C.: 1990), 1-2.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0, (Washington D.C.: 10 September 2001), II-2 and II-3.

⁸ Ibid, II-2 and II-3.

⁹ Ibid, II-17.

¹⁰ Frederick C Mish, et al, Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, MA: 1999), 735.

¹¹ David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd edition (Washington D.C.: CCRP Publications, 1999), 6.

¹² Von Clausewitz, 102.

¹³ FM 3-0, 11-24.

¹⁴ Ibid, 11-24.

¹⁵ Benjamin Lambeth, Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 193.

- ¹⁶ Ibid., 189-203.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 196-203.
- ¹⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan, (Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2002), 74.
- ¹⁹ Thomas E.Ricks, "Beaming the Battlefield Back Home", Washington Post, 26 March 2002, A01.
- ²⁰ Ackerman, 18.
- ²¹ Lambeth, 199.
- ²¹ General Accounting Office, Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures, (Washington D.C.: 2001), 2.
- ²³ General Accounting Office, 8-9.
- ²⁴ Lambeth, 217.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Oren Harari, The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002, 185.
- ²⁷ Cordesman, 72.
- ²⁸ Ricks, A01.
- ²⁹ Rebecca Grant, "The Clash About CAS", Air Force Magazine Online, Jan 2003, Vol 86, No.1. <<http://www.afa.org/magazine/Jan2003/0103cas.asp/>> [16 January 2003].
- ³⁰ Cordesman, 63-74.
- ³¹ Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War, translated by the Historical Section, Army War College, 1938 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), 67.
- ³² Joint Vision 2020, 3.
- ³³ Ibid, 8.

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³⁷ Wortmann and Loftus, 154.

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⁴⁰ Leonard Wong, Stifling Innovation, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 3.

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⁴⁵ Ibid., 10-19.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 13.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 15-20.

⁴⁸ Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 396.

⁴⁹ Dr. Bruce Winston, Regent University, <brucewin@regent.edu> "Leadership and Micromanagement" [email with Shawn Prickett, stprickett@msn.com] 11 January 2003.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

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⁵² Joint Pub 3-0, II-2.

⁵³ Joint Vision 2020, 33.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 3.

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