


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.



THE JOINT TASK FORCE FOR ALL OCCASIONS,  
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR TO WAR FIGHTING

by

David W. Gillard


Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

16 May 1995



Paper directed by  
Captain D. Watson, USN  
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

19950822 139

\_\_\_\_\_  
Faculty Advisor

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Abstract of  
THE JOINT TASK FORCE FOR ALL OCCASIONS,  
MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR TO WAR FIGHTING

The role of the U.S. military has expanded significantly under the National Security Strategy, "Engagement and Enlargement." Most of its new missions come under the heading Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and the variety of tasks and diverse cast of organizations with whom the military must operate has strained its ability to execute smartly in recent conflicts.

MOOTW are difficult and complex. The most critical challenge facing the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, however, is conducting MOOTW while still being able to deter or, if necessary, fight and win wars. Training for war fighting continues to be a major part of maintaining this readiness, but if the military is to be prepared to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict, as I believe it must, today's leaders need to develop new doctrine and a new way of organizing the JTF as well. The JTF organization of today and tomorrow must be prepared to cooperate with and support humanitarian relief organizations and other agencies to accomplish many different types of peace keeping missions. At the same time, it has to plan for and organize itself to make an orderly and rapid transition to war fighting.

The Civil-Military Operations Center is a concept which holds promise for enabling the JTF to balance MOOTW with possible war fighting missions. It was used with some success in Operation PROVIDE HOPE, and with further refinement in JTF exercises it should greatly improve the military's ability to operate comfortably with civilian groups in lesser intensity scenarios without hindering the potential transition to combat. Properly integrated, the CMOOC can be the tool that helps today's operational commander keep peace and win wars.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT .....	ii
I INTRODUCTION .....	1
II REVIEW OF PAST CASES .....	3
Panama .....	3
Somalia .....	4
Haiti .....	5
III ORGANIZING FOR FUTURE MOOTW .....	7
IV APPLICATION TO A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION .....	11
V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	14
NOTES .....	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	16

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification .....	
By .....	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE RELIEF, PROVIDE COMFORT, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Names of military operations? Whatever happened to tough, threatening names like SLEDGEHAMMER, ROLLING THUNDER, DESERT STORM or VIGILANT WARRIOR? The not so subtle change in naming conventions reflects a commensurate expansion in the types of missions the U.S. military is now expected to conduct within the National Security Strategy, "Engagement and Enlargement." These Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) include various forms of peace keeping<sup>1</sup> operations, often alongside other governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and human relief organizations (HROs).

The military must be prepared coordinate and perform peace keeping missions with these other organizations without forfeiting the ability to credibly deter or fight wars. Indeed, as the combined U.N. and U.S. experiences in Somalia indicate, Clausewitz's *independent will of the "enemy"* can suddenly cause a transition from low to high intensity conflict. As the situation changes, U.S. forces must be able to shift efforts to offensive combat if so directed by the National Command Authority (NCA). This challenge requires a change in the way the military plans, trains and organizes, both internally and in cooperation with other groups with whom it conducts MOOTW. It requires an organization at the operational level which

---

<sup>1</sup>For the sake of simplicity I will use the term "peace keeping" to refer to all forms of peace operations conducted in MOOTW.

optimizes the commander's ability to meet the needs peculiar to MOOTW, yet respond decisively when the "OT" is taken out of MOOTW and peace keeping turns to war fighting.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF PAST CASES

An examination of recent attempts at MOOTW reveals weaknesses in Joint Task Force (JTF) organization, training and execution which impaired mission accomplishment. Each operation is unique, and future operations will involve different players and present different challenges. But by evaluating past experiences, lessons may be judiciously applied to future MOOTW, especially when the military must shift to war fighting, where close coordination between the military and other agencies and organizations becomes critical.

Panama. Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was conducted concurrently with Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989-1990 as a civil-military restoration operation designed to apprehend Manuel Noriega, retrain the Panamanian police force, restore order, and help that country build a functioning democratic government. While the most visible part of the mission, removing Noriega, was achieved, PROMOTE LIBERTY suffered from many problems in planning and execution. It was only marginally successful primarily because the U.S. military leaders failed to establish unity of effort among the various participants. The Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) set up an organization called the Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) to conduct civil-military actions.<sup>1</sup> However, the Commander of CMOTF (SOUTHCOM J-5) answered to his SOUTHCOM chain of command, the forces of XVIII Airborne Corps reported to a separate chain of command, and other critical federal agencies were consulted hardly at all. A synthesis of the problems and lessons learned follows:<sup>2</sup>

- Planning was conducted by the SOUTHCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps staffs separately and with little coordination. The resulting execution was fragmented.
- Key civilian agencies such as the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were consciously excluded from the planning altogether due to security concerns. Early inclusion of the civilian agencies would have yielded a more realistic plan and would have developed in those agencies a better concept of strategy in terms of ends, ways and means.
- There was no "campaign plan" to link the strategic and operational levels and to ensure a coherent plan from beginning, through the hand-off of lead agency responsibility, to the desired end-state. The strategic objective was not clearly defined.
- The restoration team should have been a fully integrated inter-agency team working for the Ambassador.

Somalia. U.S. led coalition forces went ashore in Somalia on 8 December 1992 under a U.N. mandate to establish security and protect humanitarian relief operations.<sup>3</sup> The operation was called UNITAF (Unified Task Force). The Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) initially used a standard staff organization used for conventional operations. However, he soon found that the humanitarian support mission required closer cooperation with the HROs than the current organization was able to effect. The U.N. responded by establishing an Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), whose mission was to centralize and coordinate support to the HROs in the various sectors of Somalia. The HOC consisted of representatives from the U.N., the U.S. Disaster Assistance Response Team, various HROs and the military.<sup>4</sup> The military contingent was known as the Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC), which acted as

the focal point for liaison with the HROs and planned and coordinated military support to the relief effort. The CMOC was staffed by personnel from the UNITAF J-3, the seaport and each coalition force, personnel authorized to speak for their commanders.<sup>5</sup>

Once the CMOC staff determined which requests for support needed to be handled at the CMOC and which were best coordinated at the local sector level, UNITAF was able to provide appropriate support to the HROs.<sup>6</sup> However, after the mission was transferred to UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in May 1993, it lost sight of the overall objective following the attack on UNOSOM II forces by Aideed supporters. U.N. and U.S. forces (operating separately under different chains of command) retaliated. The original objective was obscured by "mission-creep" and, in the eyes of the Somali people, U.N. and U.S. forces went from impartial, legitimate peace keepers to interventionists. Despite attainment of the original goal, the forces failed to maintain order and UNOSOM II ended in disappointment in March 1995. As in Panama, the failure to establish clear objectives, appropriate organization, and unity of effort among the various military and civilian participants, prevented effective mission accomplishment.

Haiti. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY offers an interesting case of JTF organization in the face of divergent missions. In the days leading up to the invasion of Haiti, the CINC and CJTF still had no idea whether they would have to fight their way into the country or whether diplomatic negotiations would be successful and the mission could go directly to nation building and peace keeping. Their response to the dilemma was to form two distinct JTFs with two distinct plans, one (JTF 180) organized and trained to knock down the door and neutralize resistance, the other (JTF 190) organized to establish order, train police,

and restore the democratically elected government to Haiti.<sup>7</sup> It is unclear how well the two-JTF concept would have led to a smooth transition from combat to peace keeping. Fortunately, diplomatic efforts allowed JTF 190 to come ashore without resistance and begin conducting MOOTW immediately. To date, RESTORE DEMOCRACY appears to be going relatively smoothly, enjoying minimal organized opposition, with a consistency in mission and cooperation among agencies not seen in previous MOOTW.

### CHAPTER III

#### ORGANIZING FOR FUTURE MOOTW

Doctrine concerning JTF organization and inter-agency coordination has not kept up with the changing strategic environment. Current recommendations for JTF organization are oriented almost exclusively toward war fighting, using standard chains of command and divisions of responsibility with which military units are familiar. Joint Publications devote scant attention to the coordination necessary to deal with other agencies, NGOs and HROs, treating it as a matter to be handled through liaison officers.<sup>8</sup> However, if the mission is primarily peace keeping or humanitarian relief, those very organizations might play a very big role in that mission, and the CJTF will need to be able to incorporate them into planning and execution as much as any other major component of the JTF. The key will be to organize the CJTF staff in such a way that it can effectively coordinate operations other than war without decreasing the ability to deter or, failing that, prosecute war fighting.

Based largely upon lessons learned from operations in Somalia, the Joint Warfighting Center is staffing a JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations<sup>9</sup>. It recommends that the JTF Commander establish a CMOC to serve as the primary interface between all HROs and military forces. Additionally, new doctrine in the form of Joint Publication 3-08 is being written to establish procedures for interagency coordination during joint operations.

One of the first lessons that should have been learned from Panama and Somalia is that planning and execution must be conducted through one organization in order to achieve unity of effort and purpose. Only in that way can the commander formulate and issue clear

objectives, incorporate all major participants in the planning, and make necessary adjustments when conditions alter the way the mission is to be accomplished. The lead organization must be authorized to coordinate the actions of the entire federal team, and it must be prepared to work with and incorporate NGOs and HROs into the planning and execution of the mission as well. The CJTF staff, whether built around a geographic CINC staff, a core service staff (such as Commander, SEVENTH Fleet)<sup>2</sup>, or some other organization, must be prepared to take on these responsibilities.

Lead agency responsibilities for MOOTW will be dependent upon the type of mission, but will normally be assigned to the Department of Defense.<sup>10</sup> [Although possible, it is difficult to envision a scenario where the United States would use only non-combatant troops to support any kind of humanitarian or peace keeping effort. In most cases, U.S. troops won't be committed unless the situation has deteriorated to the point that security is a major issue. In the cases where *combat troops* are not involved, the Department of State may have the lead.] In all cases, however, the mission will require close cooperation between all parties involved to achieve success. If the nature of operations turns from peace to war, the military commander must have the authority to adjust the plan and organization to ensure the security of all participants and defeat the enemy. A good MOOTW Operation Plan (OPLAN) will have branches and sequels (basic to campaign plans) which enable the commander to make a controlled and rapid transition to combat. A CJTF staff organized to conduct operations from peace keeping to war fighting needs a tool like a CMOC as an integral part of its structure.

---

<sup>2</sup> Ratliffe (p. 24) recommends the CJTF staff be formed around the equivalent of a Corps or Numbered Fleet or Air Force Commander's staff.

The composition of the CMOC would depend upon the type of coalition/U.N. involvement, the types of NGOs and HROs involved, and the type of mission established by the NCA.<sup>11</sup>

Whatever the makeup, the CMOC would enhance the CJTF's flexibility. It could be very almost invaluable when the mission calls primarily for civil-military operations, but if the mission changes, the CMOC would not interfere with other types of operations.

The CMOC could report directly to the CJTF or through the J-3, depending on the relationship of the humanitarian/peace keeping operations to the overall mission. However, in most cases, placing the CMOC within the J-3 organization would help integrate it as an element of operations that could be emphasized or deemphasized depending on the situation. J-3 is in the best position to ensure the CMOC is used effectively and to implement any branches in the OPLAN if necessary. While the CMOC would coordinate civil-military support at the operational level, it would not preclude establishing smaller scale coordination methods at tactical levels to assist routine local support, similar to the way coordination evolved in sectors during UNITAF.

The composition of the CMOC should be tailored to the mission and situation. For it to be effective, however, it must contain military officers familiar with civil-military operations, knowledgeable of the theater of operations, and experienced in working with NGOs and HROs. It should also have positions for representatives (acting in advisory roles) from the State Department and other agencies and organizations necessary to mission success. All members of the CMOC should be identified and included in contingency planning and exercises, so that when the CINC calls for a JTF to be formed for a given mission, they can come together and begin operating with some degree of familiarity with each other and with their roles in the

overall scheme of operations.

One way to approach this challenge is to form a core CMOC and incorporate it as part of a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC), a concept developed by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC).<sup>12</sup> He has identified three or four senior commanders/staffs in his theater which could be potential CJTFs, and the DJTFAC regularly deploys to these staffs to develop and exercise contingency plans. If this concept holds promise for universal application, this organization could be employed in all theaters to better prepare military and civilian agencies for MOOTW, familiarize each with one another's standard operating procedures, and lessen the initial steep learning curve that hampered effective execution in Panama and Somalia.

## CHAPTER IV

### APPLICATION TO A HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION

There are several potential scenarios in the world today in which U.S. forces could start out in some type of peace keeping role but end up having to fight. The Bosnian crisis is one example. A crisis in Panama presents a more likely scenario, one in which the United States could initially become involved to stabilize a worsening domestic situation, but which could readily require transition from MOOTW to war fighting.

Scenario. The setting is some time after Panama assumes full control of the Canal Zone and U.S. forces withdraw. Panama is experiencing a rapid collapse in governmental control and social order. Crime is rampant and the government is unsteady. Panamanian leaders insist that Canal operations are not in jeopardy, but request assistance from the U.N. to help reestablish order and control interference from the powerful drug cartels to the south. The United States, due to its historic and strategic interest in the region, volunteers to take the lead in carrying out a U.N. mandate to isolate Panama from the drug cartels and to reestablish a functioning democracy. CINCSOUTH is tasked to coordinate efforts with the State Department and USAID to execute the above mission. Other major players in Panama include peace keeping coalition forces from several countries in the region, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General (UNSYG), Amnesty International, and a relief organization established by the Catholic Church.

CINCSOUTH assigns an Army Corps commander with past experience in Somalia and Haiti as CJTF. CJTF organizes the staff around the existing Corps staff, and it is augmented by

a DJTFAC and CMOC from SOUTHCOM. The CMOC, headed by a senior O-6 with extensive experience in Latin America and in civil-military affairs, reports directly to the CJTF J-3. The CMOC is staffed with officers experienced in security assistance and humanitarian relief, a former military attache, and even a senior chaplain. The CINC and CJTF carry on *strategic level* coordination with the Ambassador, the UNSYG Representative and coalition commanders. The CMOC is augmented by representatives from the U.S. Embassy and other previously mentioned major participants to help it coordinate plans and actions at the *working level*. The JTF itself is composed of a mix of combat, combat support and civil-military affairs troops.

The JTF enters Panama without resistance and begins to execute the plan for restoring order. In fact, it is so effective in disrupting the business operations of the drug cartels that the cartel leaders become desperate and decide to make a bold move to test the will of the United States to support the unstable Panamanian government. With their vast resources of money, the drug cartels put together a large paramilitary force, financed in part by terrorist-supporting countries, equipped like a mechanized infantry division, and aided by infiltration of the Panamanian government and military. The paramilitary force avoids targeting those organizations involved in humanitarian actions, but does attack and kill several U.S. and coalition forces. Despite domestic pressure to bring U.S. troops home, the NCA determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to defend Panama and maintain uninterrupted operation of the Canal. The NCA adds a major task to the mission: Eliminate or remove the paramilitary forces from Panama.

On order from the CINCSOUTH, the CJTF activates the branch of the OPLAN which

shifts the focus of effort from peace keeping to combat. Operational reserve forces are brought in to secure the Canal Zone and take offensive action against the paramilitary forces. In accordance with the plan, humanitarian support operations are scaled back and consolidated to increase protection for NGOs and HROs, and rules of engagement are adjusted as necessary. Disagreements about ways and means do arise between the various agencies and groups. However, the differences are addressed and resolved more easily because the major participants were included in the planning of the mission (including the branches), and because they have established a working relationship through interaction in the CMOC. The J-3 is able to temporarily decrease the role of the civil-military operations until the combatants accomplish the new mission, at which time the CMOC regains dominance and peace keeping can be resumed.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Past experience shows that the United States has had mixed success at conducting peace keeping, nation building and humanitarian assistance operations, collectively known as MOOTW. While the U.S. military may be accomplished at conducting and leading combat operations, MOOTW that require coordination of effort with other agencies, NGOs and HROs are in many ways much more difficult and complex problems. Existing doctrine has not kept up with the changing role of the military in national strategy, yet the post-Cold War strategic environment will likely lead to increased use of the U.S. military in such missions, and in situations of important national interest that may require the commander to shift from MOOTW to war fighting.

The challenge is to maintain clear objectives and unity of effort throughout all missions, which can only be attained if major participants work together toward the same goal in both planning and execution phases. The most efficient way to ensure that this happens is to form a CJTF staff from components that have planned and exercised together. The DJTFAC concept, employing a CMOC as a key element, is one way to accomplish this. By tailoring the CMOC to the mission and making it part of the J-3 organization, civil-military affairs can be prosecuted in a coordinated fashion and with the appropriate priority, enabling the JTF to shift to war fighting if required.

The military must continue to improve its ability to work with non-military organizations and develop doctrine that will guide it in creating the Joint Task Force for all Occasions that can support "Engagement and Enlargement". The key is unity of effort, *sine qua non*.

## NOTES

1. John T. Fischel, "The Fog Of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama," Unpublished Research Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992, pp. ii-iii.
2. Ibid.
3. U.S. Department of Defense. An Analysis of the Application of the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in Somalia, 1994, p. 3.
4. MAJ Susan G. Sweatt, "The Challenge of Civil-Military Relations in Operations at the Trailing Edge of War", Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995, p. 7.
5. U.S. Department of Defense. "Role of Liaison Officer in CMOC." Joint Universal Lessons Learned System Database. Washington: 1994.
6. Sweatt, pp. 9-10.
7. Interview with CDR Anthony Cothron, Assistant Intelligence Officer to CINCUSA during Operation UPHOLD Democracy, Newport, RI: 21 April 1995.
8. U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5-00,2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures (Washington: 1991), p. IV-4.
9. Sweatt, p. 14.
10. U.S. Department of Defense. Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations (Washington: December 1994), p. 29.
11. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
12. Macke, Richard, "U.S. Pacific Command," Address, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 7 April 1995.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Fischel, John T., "The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama." Unpublished Article, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1992.
- Nannini, Vance J., "Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1994.
- Ratliffe, Leslie L., "Joint Task Force Somalia", Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1994.
- Sweatt, Susan G., "The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations in Operations at the Trailing Edge of War." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1995.
- U.S. Department of Defense. An Analysis of the Application of the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in Somalia. Washington: 1994.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations. Washington: 1994.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington: 1994.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Washington: 1994.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning, Guidance and Procedures. Washington: 1991.
- U.S. Department of Defense. "Role of Liaison Officer in CMOC." Joint Universal Lessons Learned System Database. Washington: 1994.
- U.S. Department of Defense. "Tasking Procedures for Military Support of Humanitarian Operations." Joint Universal Lessons Learned System Database. Washington: 1994.