



AD-A264 243



2



The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
A NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY CONCERN**

BY

**COLONEL N. GLENN BLACKBURN
United States Army**

**DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 14 1993
S E D**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.**

USAWC CLASS OF 1993



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93 5 11 244

93-10577



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS			
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE						
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) ROOT HALL, BUILDING 122 CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) THE KOREAN PENINSULA: A NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY CONCERN						
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) COLONEL N. GLENN BLACKBURN						
13a. TYPE OF REPORT STUDY PROJECT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 93/03/22		15. PAGE COUNT 46	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION						
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP				
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) SEE REVERSE SIDE OF FORM.						
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL COLONEL JOSEPH C. BOWEN, PROJECT ADVISER			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717/245-3725	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAA		

North and South Korea have not responded to the New World Order—that Communism is dead and the Cold War Era is over. When the Berlin Wall collapsed and Germany became one nation, Korea emerged as the only divided country remaining in the world. Today, the Korean Peninsula remains divided by ideology, mutual mistrust of national leadership, the 155-mile DMZ, U.S. military presence, conflicting approaches to national reunification, and the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, the traditional Cold War animosities and political, economic, military paradigms remain entrenched in a divided Korean peninsula. The U.S. Intelligence Community has identified an extensive nuclear center at Yongbyon, 50 miles north of Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, which appears to be a nuclear reactor and reprocessing site. The threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea is a serious regional security concern that will not be taken lightly by such countries as Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. For almost four decades, the U.S. has provided South Korea with a credible military alliance to prevent another deliberate attack by North Korea to forcefully unify the peninsula. The deterrence achieved through this alliance is truly a military success story. Since the Korean peninsula remains as one of the most volatile regions in the post-Cold War era, this is not a political success story. Why was the Cold War won in Europe and not in Korea? What obstacles preclude a peaceful reunification of Korea? This paper will examine the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea's other security concerns and its approaches towards national unity. It will then assess implications of these issues on Northeast Asian security and offer an appropriate security policy recommendation.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE KOREAN PENINSULA: A NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY CONCERN

An Individual Study Project

by

Colonel N. Glenn Blackburn
United States Army

Colonel Joseph C. Bowen
Project Advisor

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

Abstract

Author: N. Glenn Blackburn, Colonel, U.S. Army

Title: The Korean Peninsula: A Northeast Asian Security Concern

Format: Individual Study Project

Date: 22 March 1993

Pages: 46

Classification: Unclassified

North and South Korea have not responded to the New World Order—that Communism is dead and the Cold War Era is over. When the Berlin Wall collapsed and Germany became one nation, Korea emerged as the only divided country remaining in the world. Today, the Korean Peninsula remains divided by ideology, mutual mistrust of national leadership, the 155-mile DMZ, U.S. military presence, conflicting approaches to national reunification, and the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, the traditional Cold War animosities and political, economic, military paradigms remain entrenched in a divided Korean peninsula. The U.S. Intelligence Community has identified an extensive nuclear center at Yongbyon, 50 miles north of Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, which appears to be a nuclear reactor and reprocessing site. The threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea is a serious regional security concern that will not be taken lightly by such countries as Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. For almost four decades, the U.S. has provided South Korea with a credible military alliance to prevent another deliberate attack by North Korea to forcefully unify the peninsula. The deterrence achieved through this alliance is truly a military success story. Since the Korean peninsula remains as one of the most volatile regions in the post-Cold War era, this is not a political success story. Why was the Cold War won in Europe and not in Korea? What obstacles preclude a peaceful reunification of Korea? This paper will examine the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea's other security concerns and its approaches towards national unity. It will then assess implications of these issues on Northeast Asian security and offer an appropriate security policy recommendation.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION.....	1
NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE.....	2
ADDITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS.....	9
KOREAN REUNIFICATION.....	16
U.S./ROK SECURITY POLICY-TIME TO REVIEW.....	23
SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS.....	27
RECOMMENDATION.....	34
CONCLUSION.....	37
NOTES.....	40
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	43
MAP OF KOREAN PENINSULA.....	46

INTRODUCTION

The Korean peninsula remains divided in stark contrast with the end of the Cold War in Europe. Logic dictates that change is inevitable, but the transition period is likely to be fraught with great risk.¹

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK-South Korea) have not responded to the New World Order. That is, they have yet to acknowledge that Communism is dead and the Cold War is over. When the Berlin Wall collapsed and Germany became one nation, Korea became the only divided country remaining from the Cold War era. Today, the Korean peninsula remains divided by political ideology, mutual distrust of national leadership, the 155-mile DMZ Demilitarized Zone (38th parallel), American military presence, conflicting approaches to national reunification, and the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus Cold War animosities remain in a divided Korean peninsula: two large Korean armies confront one another along the most heavily fortified dividing line of military tension in the world today.

North Korea continued to reposition its ground forces so that over 65 percent of its active forces are within 100 kilometers of the DMZ. These forces are arrayed unequivocally for attack; their disposition and arrangements bear none of the telltale signs of a defensive intent.²

Each army is poised, armed, and ready in a "standing-start" position to do battle upon receipt of attack orders from their respective national leaders: North Korea's Kim Il-Sung and South Korea's new president, Kim Young Sam, who took office on 25 February 1993. For almost four decades, the United States has provided South Korea with a credible military alliance to prevent

another deliberate attack by North Korea. Despite this successful alliance, the Korean peninsula remains as one of the most volatile regions in the post-Cold War era: a potential **FLASHPOINT**. This situation represents a political, economic and diplomatic failure. North Korea's leadership continues its self-imposed isolation by maintaining a hard-line communist regime, while South Korea has matured into a democratic nation within the New World Order.

Why was the Cold War won in Europe and not in Korea? What obstacles preclude a peaceful reunification of Korea? Answers to these questions reside in the current state of affairs on the peninsula. This paper will examine the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea's other security concerns and its approaches towards national reunification. It will then assess implications of these issues on Northeast Asian security and conclude with an appropriate security policy recommendation.

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

On 10 March 1993, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger testified before Congress that in his personal view North Korea had nuclear weapons. The next day, the State Department official in charge of U.S. policy in the IAEA reportedly told a briefing session of congressional staffers that the Clinton administration did not consider a North Korean withdrawal from the treaty [NPT] a serious possibility, since it would not be in North Korea's interest to do so. Less than 24 hours later, North Korea withdrew.³

The U.S. Intelligence Community has identified an extensive nuclear center at Yongbyon, 50 miles north of Pyongyang, North Korea's capital. It appears to contain a nuclear reactor and reprocessing site capable of producing materials for weapons of mass destruction.⁴ In February 1992, CIA Director Robert

Gates declared with a sense of urgency that "North Korea is between a few months and a couple of years from producing a nuclear bomb, and is continuing its quest for a nuclear weapon capability."⁵ This identification of a North Korean nuclear program quickly dominated international discussions of regional security interest. Subsequent pressure from near-by Asian/Pacific nations (specifically China, North Korea's closest ally) and the United States, has forced both Koreas to produce an additional nuclear safeguards agreement that reinforces the multinational Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1985 to ban nuclear weapons. The "Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" agreement between the two Koreas was signed 17 February 1992:⁶

In order to create conditions and an environment favorable to peace and the peaceful unification of our land and to contribute to the peace and security of Asia and the world at large by eliminating the danger of nuclear war through its denuclearization, the South and the North declare as follows:

1. The South and the North will not test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.
2. The South and North will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.
3. The South and North will not possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
4. In order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the South and North will conduct inspections of objects chosen by the other side and agreed to by both parties. Such inspections will be implemented according to the procedures and methods prescribed by a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee.
5. In order to ensure the implementation of the Joint Declaration, the South and the North will organize a Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

Many analysts believe that North Korea will continue its quest for a nuclear weapons program independently no matter what

agreements are signed by the two countries. In fact, it appears that North Korea intends to disregard the agreement. On 4 March 1992, approximately one month after the safeguards agreement had been signed by the two Koreas, General Robert RisCassi, Commander of the United Nations Command-Korea, informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that "North Korea will be able to produce a nuclear bomb at an early date and develop a complete system of nuclear weaponry with a delivery system by 1994."⁷ Additionally in February 1993, almost one year following RisCassi's warning, an article in the New York Times reported:

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a United Nations affiliate, took samples of the small amount of plutonium that North Korea had acknowledged producing. An analysis of the samples has led western experts to conclude that North Korea probably has more plutonium than it has declared. IAEA has asked to inspect two nuclear waste sites near the Yongbyon reactor. But North Korea has so far rebuffed the agency, suggesting it will not allow the IAEA inspections while the U.S. and South Korea continue their annual military training exercise.⁸

The IAEA gave North Korea one month to agree to inspections of the two suspected nuclear sites or the action would be transferred to the U.N. Security Council for resolution. On 12 March 1993, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in protest to the demands of the IAEA and the restart of "TEAMSPIRIT-93". Some analysts speculate that the withdrawal is a political maneuver to test the reactions of the new American and South Korean presidents. Nevertheless, South Korea's Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo was immediately dispatched to Washington, D.C. to discuss the issue

and plan countermeasures with State Secretary Warren Christopher. General RisCassi's statement, the IAEA reports and North Korea's sudden withdrawal from the NPT raise many questions about North Korea's true intentions and motives. North Korea's intent to develop a nuclear weapon system seems to offer yet another example of Kim Il-Sung's "unique policy of national self-reliance called **chuche**."⁹ This chuche philosophy dictates an independent, self-reliant, political, economic, social and military North Korean state. Obviously, North Korea is a military state armed and ready to fight for or defend their national survival interest. A recent Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) comparison of military forces reveals the following disparities:¹⁰

	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>South Korea</u>
TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE	1,206,000	655,000
INFANTRY DIVISIONS	30 active 26 reserve	21 active 23 reserve
SPECIAL FORCES BRIGADES	22	7
FIELD ARTILLERY	8,400	4,500
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER	2,400	114
TANKS (LIGHT/MEDIUM)	3,500	1,800
JET FIGHTERS	748	480
BOMBERS	82	0
AIR TRANSPORTS	310	40
ATTACK SUBMARINES	24	1
MISSILE ATTACK BOATS	39	11
COASTAL PATROL CRAFT	388	140
AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT	194	34

This comparison supports North Korea's intent to have a "military which provides for national defense with a strong offensive option."¹¹ This military power mindset, coupled with the potential of a nuclear weapons capability, serves only to promote distrust and destabilize the region.

A nuclear weapon system would dramatically increase Kim Il-Sung's political bargaining power but not his military "first strike" power. After observing the decisive results of Operation Desert Storm, Kim Il-Sung fully realizes the consequences if he decides to strike South Korea with a nuclear weapon. A U.S./ROK conventional military retaliation that would devastate his political system and destroy his country's national will. However, even a small atomic bomb would provide regional prestige to North Korea as a member of the international nuclear club. North Korea cannot compete on the "high-tech" battlefield with U.S. or South Korean airpower, but possession of a nuclear weapon would provide North Korean leaders with a powerful, coercive deterrent. A political deterrent against U.S./ROK military use of strategic weapons and airstrikes. Additionally, North Korea has several other reasons to develop nuclear weapons:¹²

1. Current superiority over South Korea in conventional forces appears to be countered by the South's superior economic base and improvement of military forces. Nuclear weapons would again tilt the balance of military power in North Korea's favor.
2. Nuclear weapons would give Kim Il-Sung a bargaining chip in North-South talks.
3. Nuclear weapons would serve as a political leverage to ensure the smooth transition of his son to power and thereby perpetuate the North Korean regime.
4. Nuclear weapons are more cost-effective than conventional arms: They provide more political bang for the buck.

According to Ko Yong Ilwan, a former North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea, "the North Korean leadership apparently view a nuclear capability as a last resort for preserving the

system."¹³A nuclear capability would provide greater political leverage to support the communist regime's **chuche** policy and the transition of national leadership. North Korea views the arms race with South Korea and the presence of American combat forces on the Korean peninsula as a direct threat to their national survival. Hence, a nuclear weapon has become a strategic "last stand" in the minds of the North Korean leadership. These leaders believe such a capability will create a stronger military security strategy and preserve independence.

In order to promote a more peaceful climate for reunification in the region, the U.S. has withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea as part of President Bush's arms control initiatives. "President Roh Tae-woo declared on 28 December 1991, that all U.S. nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Korea."¹⁴Until his announcement, North Korea's nuclear issue was tied directly to the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula. This credible political action should have sent a clear message to North Korea that both the U.S. and South Korea are sincere by seeking a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. Additionally, South Korea and the U.S. canceled their annual "Team Spirit-92" training exercise. Despite these positive actions for promoting peaceful agreements, international concern that Communist North Korea will continue to stall mutual intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities and military installations has been increasing. This delaying technique could provide North Korea additional time to either hide their current nuclear weapon development process or move the research

facilities underground to avoid an untimely compromise of critical nuclear weapon's technology. As a delaying tactic, "North Korea is demanding a pullout of the 39,000 American troops still in the South before inspections can begin."¹⁵ The two Koreas have not agreed to a mutual nuclear inspection procedure because of North Korea's objections to the presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea and ROK/U.S. plans to restart the "Team Spirit 93" military training exercise in March 1993. The mutual nuclear inspection agreement will take time for each government to process. It will be implemented sequentially:¹⁶

Step 1: Domestic ratification

Step 2: Submission of first draft on the nuclear facilities and materials for inspection within 30 days following ratification

Step 3: Conclusion of a supplementary agreement regarding objects, facilities and procedures of nuclear inspection.

Step 4: Entrance procedures of inspection teams into the country

Critics of U.S. policy have argued that the current security policy of a military "Forward Presence" only perpetuates traditional Cold War problems and delays meaningful dialogue between the two Koreas on the nuclear issue and national reunification. But traditional strategic thinkers argue that the presence of U.S. combat forces deters a North Korean attack and maintains regional stability. The unconventional thinker may counter that the presence of foreign troops on the Korean peninsula merely sustains instability in North-South negotiations towards a peaceful reunification. Thus, the unresolved nuclear

issue, intrusive inspection procedures, and the presence of U.S. combat forces remain the most destabilizing factors and impediments to the progressive resolution of Korea's divided states.

ADDITIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

In December 1991, the two Koreas signed a historical document worthy of a close examination--a 25-point nonaggression accord, Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange, and Cooperation:¹⁷

SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION

- Article 1:** The South and North shall respect each others political and social system.
- Article 2:** Both parties shall not interfere in each others internal affairs.
- Article 3:** Both parties shall not slander and vilify each other.
- Article 4:** Both parties shall not attempt in any manner to sabotage and subvert the other.
- Article 5:** Both parties shall endeavor together to transform the present Armistice regime into a firm state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (July 1953) until such time as a state of peace has taken hold.
- Article 6:** Both parties shall cease confrontation on the international stage and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national interest and esteem.
- Article 7:** To ensure close consultations and liaison between both parties, a South-North liaison office shall be established at Panmunjom within three months of the effective date of this agreement.
- Article 8:** A South-North Political Subcommittee shall be established within the framework of the inter-Korean high level talks within one month of the effective date of this agreement with

a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords.

SOUTH-NORTH NON-AGGRESSION

- Article 9:** Both parties shall not use armed aggression against each other and shall not make armed aggression against each other.
- Article 10:** Differences of opinion and disputes arising between the two parties shall be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations.
- Article 11:** The South-North demarcation line and areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the military demarcation line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each party respectively.
- Article 12:** To abide by and guarantee nonaggression, the two parties shall create a South-North Joint Military Committee within three months of the effective date of this agreement. The said committee shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reductions, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the demilitarized zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities, and verification thereof.
- Article 13:** A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of both sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and avoid their escalation.
- Article 14:** A North-South Military subcommittee shall be established within the framework of the inter-Korean high level talks within one month of the this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on nonaggression and to resolve military confrontation.

SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

- Article 15:** To promote an integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, both parties shall conduct economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, trade in goods as a kind of domestic commerce and joint investment in industrial projects.
- Article 16:** Both parties shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in diverse fields, including science, technology, education, literature, the arts, health, sports, the environment and publishing and journalism, including newspapers, radio, television, and publications in general.
- Article 17:** Both parties shall guarantee residents of their respective areas free inter-Korean travel and contacts.
- Article 18:** Both parties shall permit free correspondence, reunions and visits between family members and other relatives dispersed south and north, shall promote the reconstitution of divided families on their own and shall take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.
- Article 19:** Both sides shall reconstruct railroads and highways that have been cut off and shall open north-south land, sea, and air transportation routes.
- Article 20:** Both parties shall establish and link facilities needed for south-north postal and telecommunications services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of inter-Korean mail and telecommunications.
- Article 21:** Both parties shall cooperate on the international stage in the economic, cultural and various other fields and carry out joint business undertakings abroad.
- Article 22:** To implement accords on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural and various other fields, both parties shall establish joint committees for specific sectors, including a south-north economic exchanges and cooperation committee, within three months of the effective date of this agreement.
- Article 23:** A south-north Exchanges and Cooperation

Subcommittee shall be established within the framework of the inter-Korean high level talks with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords.

AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 24: This agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between both parties.

Article 25: This agreement shall enter into force as of the day both parties exchange instruments of ratification following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

This historical agreement initiated a new start in peace talks for the design of a peaceful peninsula reunification. But it did not end the war. Thus a long-standing armistice remains in effect. However, it did set the stage for a new cooperative attitude in North-South dialogue and exchange. Future actions by both Koreas will reveal the true credibility of the agreement.

DMZ INCIDENT

This new surge of political cooperation was interrupted 5 months after the agreement by an irrational DMZ incident on 22 May 1992. Several North Korean soldiers attempted to infiltrate South Korea by crossing the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), which divides the DMZ between North and South Korea guardposts. Three North Korean soldiers dressed in South Korean Army uniforms and carrying U.S.-type weapons were detected and ambushed by South Korean soldiers.¹⁸ This was the first reported North Korean infiltration attempt since April 1986. At the time of this incident, the North and South Koreans had entered into peaceful negotiations. They had agreed to a non-aggression

pact, and their foreign ministers were meeting to iron out the details for implementation. They had signed an agreement banning nuclear weapons from the peninsula, and the U.S. had supported this by removing its tactical nuclear weapons from the South. While all of these potentially productive activities were taking place, an apparently irrational outbreak of military hostilities at the DMZ brought this peacemaking momentum to an abrupt halt. The two critical issues on the table then were mutual inspections of nuclear facilities and national reunification. The incident disturbed a calm political climate, renewed military tensions and reversed improving relations between the two countries.

South Korea sent a sharp message to North Korea warning that DMZ incidents of this nature would only increase tension, disturb cooperation, and disrupt planning for a peaceful reunification. North Korea in turn blamed an unknown third party for instigating the incident to increase tension and avert peaceful reconciliation.¹⁹ But was this "irrational" act initiated by North Korea to divert attention from the nuclear issue and disrupt the talks? According to Major General Kim Moo Woong, Deputy Commanding General of the Combined Field Army (ROK/US), "the incident was either confidence training for their Special Operation Forces (SOF) or a deliberate infiltration attempt to test DMZ security."²⁰ However, North Korea's true intent and role in initiating the DMZ incident, at a time of much progress in negotiations, is known only by the North Korean leadership. One week after the incident Kim Il-Sung publicly praised the three dead North Korean infiltrators as military heroes of the

Nation. The incident was soon dismissed by South Korea as a military training accident by the North Korean Army and North-South negotiations were quickly resumed.

SCUD INCIDENT

The Defense Intelligence Agency reported in a recent unclassified publication, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, that "North Korea's capability to produce a SCUD-type missile not only affects the balance of power on the peninsula but also affects other regions."²¹ Additionally, in March 1992, North Korea attempted to export SCUD-type missiles to Iran in return for either hard currency or oil. This North Korean action created an international uproar and presented the world with another security threat in Southwest Asia.

The U.S. said the North Korean ship (Dae Hung Ho) carried SCUD-C missiles believed destined for Iran and Syria. The missiles have a range of 360 miles, which would allow Iran to target nearly all of Iraq and the eastern side of the Arabian peninsula. Fired from Syria, the missile could hit any part of Israel.²²

North Korea's poor economy and its loss of economic support from the dismantled Soviet Union has forced it to probe the international arms trade market for buyers of its SCUD technology. North Korea's increased production of SCUD missiles reveals another attempt to imbalance military power on the Korean peninsula and increase its export sales of arms to obtain much needed financial opportunities. The "hot-ticket" item still in development is the NoDong 1 missile which has been reported to have a range of 620-miles. That would make it capable of hitting psychological targets in Japan and all of South Korea.

Additionally, a recent report released by Senator John Glenn claims that North Korea has a biological weapons program. The report was translated from a Russian Foreign Service (successor to the KGB) document which states:

North Korea is performing applied military biological research in a whole number of universities, medical institutes and specialized research institutes. Work is being performed in these research centers with inducers of malignant anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague and smallpox. Biological weapons are being tested on the island territories belonging to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.²³

Unquestionably, North Korean leaders seek to win the arms race with South Korea and to neutralize the presence of U.S. combat forces by producing weapons of mass destruction. Further,

what worries the CIA is that North Korea needs cash and is likely to sell nuclear weapons technology to countries like Iran, Iraq and Libya.²⁴

North Korea has in fact placed an "ARMS FOR SALE" advertisement in the Third World newspaper: contact anxious world exporter of military hardware, SCUD missiles, and technical assistance in trade for oil and hard currency. North Korea is emerging as a key supplier for missile programs to those countries and possible terrorist groups who pay cash. Without hard currency, North Korea will lose much of its trade capabilities with other financially troubled countries. The oil is needed to replenish the nation's critical POL shortage—a shortage which jeopardizes internal transportation and sustained military operations. These security concerns, compounded by the unresolved nuclear issue, have delayed all measures to implement the accords that were signed in December 1991.

KOREAN REUNIFICATION

The rapid achievement of German unification and the decline of the Cold War Era has pressed the two Koreas to analyze and evaluate the possibilities of reunification. Until the nuclear issue raised its ugly head, the prospects of a unified Korea appeared better than ever before. Formal agreements between the two Koreas provided a foundation for structuring a peaceful coexistence and reunification. Kim Gye Dong of the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis predicts that once unified, "Korea will be the 10th most powerful nation in the world economically and militarily."²⁵ South Korea has carefully studied the "lessons learned" from the German experience and estimates a cost of \$300 billion over a 10 year period to bring North Korea out of the Cold War era.²⁶ North Korea's decaying economic condition-failed harvests, fuel and food shortages, and lack of financial support from previous communist allies-will require South Korea to inherit the financial burden of reunification. Both Koreas see reunification as a slow process that will progress through gradual political and economic phases. In his acceptance speech, President Kim Young Sam declared that he will lead South Korea for the next five years with the following unification policy:²⁷

1. To exert efforts so that a Peace Structure without the threat of war can be established.
2. Realizing denuclearization and arms reduction on the Korean peninsula.
3. Promptly adopting the peace agreement.
4. To place priority in solving problems surrounding the division of the peninsula including pains of division like the dispersed family issue.
5. Promptly realizing the reunification of families dispersed throught Korea and their exchanges as well as correspondence between the two sides.

6. To steadily expand the grounds for cooperation and exchanges between the South and North.
7. Re-examine and complete a system in preparation for a period of cooperation and exchanges.
8. Expand the basis for cooperation and exchanges in political, economic, cultural areas.
9. To augment democratic values alluring the opening of North Korea.
10. Providing support for the improvement of relations between North Korea, the U.S. and Japan.
11. Pursuing cooperation between North and South in international settings.
12. Exert efforts in unfolding a national community sharing a common sense of nationality.
13. To provide a plan in preparation for reunification to be reflected in all policies.
14. Establish an overall land development plan and investing in social overhead capital in preparation for unification.
15. Pursuing conversion of the educational system into one emphasizing peace in preparation for reunification.
16. Establishing a peace structure in Southeast Asian
17. To consolidate economic diplomacy.
18. Create an international reunification environment and forwardly pursuing diplomacy for the formation of a Korean community.
19. Consolidate cooperation and exchange among countries in the technological areas.
20. To expand a balanced Pluralized diplomacy.

Additionally to improve North-South relations, he celebrated his inauguration by granting amnesty to over 40,000 people who had committed public security-related crimes. This included individuals who had made unauthorized visits to North Korea and the aging Li In-mo, a North Korean soldier who was captured during the Korean War.²⁸

North and South Korea have advanced very different proposals for national reunification. Each proposal eliminates the total absorption concept of reunification. The South sees total absorption as too expensive, and the North sees it as a threat to their political ideology of *chuche*. The North advocates unification by the **Confederation Plan**, which Kim Il-Sung

introduced as the

Democratic Confederation Republic of Koryo (DCRK); a joint inter-Korean organizational structure...the two Koreas would cooperate in solving mutual problems without giving up such sovereign powers as taxation and control over individual rights.²⁹

In fact, for the first time, President Kim has reversed his traditional hard-line position and often stubborn advocacy of a "one Korea". He has conceded

that the one nation-one state-two systems-two governments is realistic, and that it is not only unwise but dangerous to promote unification by absorption. Kim's de facto acceptance of the coexistence of two sovereign Koreas can be regarded as a significant departure from the North's demand for the liberation of South Korea.³⁰

However, Kim's proposal would not unite Korea as a single country with a single government. It fails to integrate the two social systems or the powers of a nation (political, economic and military) into one country with a shared national purpose.


On the other hand, the South advocates reunification by the **Commonwealth Plan**, which President Roh introduced as the "Korean National Community Unification Formula." His formula would serve as an interim plan, not

based on an assumption to build one house but a programmatic way to construct a condominium for coexistence of two political systems in Korea. The Commonwealth Plan assumes the ROK and DPRK as equal but separated sub-entities, each maintaining its own autonomous powers...with areas of consultation in trade preferences, economic cooperation, and military fields.³¹

To further clarify South Korea's Unification formula, the National Unification Board of South Korea published a chart (Chart 1) to graphically display the implementing procedures

of the Commonwealth plan:³²

CHART 1



This plan would establish a transitional alliance between the two Koreas and perhaps serve as a provisional testing-ground for a future unified Korea.

A comparison of the unification proposals reveals the following differences in criteria:³³

CHART 2
COMPARISON OF NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN UNIFICATION PROPOSALS

<u>CRITERIA</u>	<u>SOUTH KOREA</u>	<u>NORTH KOREA</u>
Principles of Unification	Independence, Peace, Democracy	Independence, Peace, Grand National Unity
Preconditions	None	Withdrawal of U.S. Forces/Abolition of the South's National Security Law
Transitional System	Commonwealth	None
Transitional Bodies	Council of Presidents Council of Ministers Council of Representatives	None
Inaugural procedures of the Unified State	General elections in accordance with a unified constitution	A nationwide united front to discuss determine ways to confederal system
Organizations of the Unified State	Bicameral Parliament	Supreme National Confederal Assembly Standing Committee
Basic Policies	A democratic republican system seeking: welfare of the entire nation, permanent national security, friendly relations with all nations.	Ten Major policy directions: Independent Policy; Development of National Economy; National Culture & Education; National Confederal Armed Forces
Form of Unified State	A single nation-state guaranteeing freedom, individual human rights and the right to pursue happiness.	Neutral confederation of two governments under two different systems.

Neither of the two proposals presents a clear, mutually agreed upon step-by-step approach (ends, ways, means) to national

reunification. The comparison chart (Chart 2) provides a snapshot of the two Korea's disagreements in certain criteria: preconditions, forms of government, and disposition of U.S. Forces on the peninsula are significant stumbling blocks to resolve. Hence, a great deal of national distrust, political misunderstanding and lack of confidence in the other government's true intentions still remains. North Korea argues that South Korea is only a "puppet regime" under the influence of the U.S. imperialists. Kim Il-Sung continues to create political friction by demanding a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula, charging the U.S. with plotting to perpetuate the division of Korea. Kim sees no need for stationing foreign soldiers in Korea since both nations have agreed to a pact of nonaggression. Former President Roh responded that "for the maintenance of peace in the Asian region, I believe the presence and role of the U.S. military is invaluable."³⁴ Note that President Roh stipulated the **Asian region**, instead of specifying only the Korean peninsula.

South Korean leaders have historically distrusted Kim Il-Sung and the Japanese. After all, both Kim Il-Sung and Japan have initiated unprovoked military attacks to violently take possession of the Korean peninsula. South Korea is concerned that Japan may attempt to reestablish itself as a military power in Asia. Additionally, Kim Il-Sung has waged an ongoing terrorist infiltration campaign against South Korea:

he sent assassination teams to Seoul in the 1960s and to Rangoon, Burma, in 1983. In 1987, North Korean agents planted bombs that blew up a South Korean airliner in midair. His generally barbaric behavior is well-detailed.³⁵

This long-standing distrust of North Korea's leader may be a difficult stumbling block in the process of North-South negotiations. However, the death of the aging, 81-year-old Kim Il-Sung could present a long awaited breakthrough and timely opportunity for national reunification. He has been enshrined as the living father of the nation and is commonly referred to as "The Great Leader" by the North Korean people. He sees himself as the divine master of his own version of a Marxist-Leninist state of nation. Kim Il-Sung believes this autocratic system (chuche) must be preserved:

The essence of Kim Il-Sung's political thought is chuche, which is loosely translated into a doctrine of self-reliance...trusting in one's strength, relying on one's revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and rejecting dependence on others... Kim Il-Sung has been able to develop a society that obeys his every whim and serves to glorify his every endeavor.³⁶

Political changes in North Korea have been nonexistent since the 38th parallel was established as a dividing line of political systems, ideology, and mistrust. Kim Il-Sung has taken measures to preserve his chuche system by promoting his son Kim Chong-il as his rightful successor. He has prepared the Nation for the transition of power by calling his son "The Dear Leader" of the country:

Groomed for the succession since at least 1973, the world's only communist dauphin looked poised to come into his inheritance when his father turned 80 in April 1992. On a day-to-day basis the son is now the effective head of the party, the government and the military.³⁷

The father-to-son transition of power is underway. The son was recently appointed to be the Head of the Armed Forces-Supreme

Commander, a position previously held by Kim Il-Sung. This appointment surely indicates that Kim Il-Sung's communist dynasty has been structured to remain in power.

Nonetheless, the DIA reports that "if succession takes place, it is not known how long Kim Chong-il might maintain power or how it will impact on the North's political, economic, and military situation."³⁸ The Asian Defense Journal reported a recent assassination attempt on Kim Chong-il:

North Korea has executed more than ten people for a plot against Kim Chong-il, who took over North Korea's Military command as the Supreme Commander of the People's Armed Forces on December 24, 1991. Japanese intelligence sources said that among those executed were three middle-ranking military officers, including a regimental commander, and an unspecified number of Public Security officials.³⁹

Additionally, many foreign observers in North Korea have reported that a powerful political faction led by Defense Minister, O Jin U and Army Chief of Staff, General Choe Gang, is forming to oppose the succession of power by Kim Chong-il.⁴⁰ So the differences in reunification proposals, the nuclear issue and the transition of leadership in North Korea remain as political "wild-cards" and strategic "centers of gravity" in the national reunification process.

U.S./ROK SECURITY POLICY-TIME TO REVIEW

American policy-makers have not totally reassessed our national security strategy and foreign policy for Korea since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concurrent admittance of both Koreas as new members of the United Nations (U.N.). Understandably, Operations DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE HOPE and the situations in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Cambodia have taken priority. Additionally, the announcement of President Roh's "Northern Policy-Nordpolitik" was not widely publicized by the news media due to global attention to the Gulf War:

Through this policy, the ROK has sought to exploit the opportunities emanating from the end of the Cold War and develop close relations with those nations with influence on North Korea. Designed not to isolate the North, the ROK wooed those states that had previously been aligned with North Korea in an effort to alter their partisan attitude toward the peninsula struggle.

- USSR established formal relations with ROK**
- USSR restructured economic relations with North Korea (trade based on hard currency)**
- ROK and China trade relations increased⁴¹**

The South Korean president summarized his country's "Nordpolitik" policy toward the communist state by asking

for an end to confrontation and competition between North and South Korea; greater dialogue, trade, and exchanges of family visits between the two halves of the divided peninsula; and the improvement of relations between each of the two Koreas and the allies of the other.⁴²

The South Korean President's initiative of imaginative diplomacy opened previously closed political and economic doors with China and the Soviet Union. Additionally, in the long term, it will pressure North Korea to come out of its Cold War isolation and reveal to the world the true failure of its outdated chuche system. North Korean leadership now must pay the price for 43 years of near-total isolation. North Korea now faces a critical dilemma: its traditional hard-line military posture and chuche philosophy is in direct conflict with its economic survival needs and the momentum of change fostered by the evolving New World Order.

Further, North Korea's near-acquisition of a nuclear weapon and its sale of SCUD missiles to international buyers has not been taken lightly by the United States. For example, the recent Joint Chief of Staff's publication The National Military Strategy of the United States-1992 advises that

the North Korean threat remains and still requires reinforcing U.S. forces for the Korean peninsula. As South Korea continues to improve its military capabilities, we expect to be able to reduce our ground and air presence...the pace of reductions is gauged to shifting to a supporting role in Korea and modulated by North Korea's actions and nuclear cooperation. 43

Nonetheless, the uncooperative attitude of the North Korean leadership towards a mutual nuclear inspection program and the recent U.S. policy decision to "suspend the East Asian Security Initiative Phase II American Force reductions in Korea"⁴⁴ have served to renew tension in Korea. U.S. forces in Korea had been following the withdrawal timetable of the Nunn-Warner Report: A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century until the North Korea nuclear issue posed a non-negotiable gridlock for the two Koreas. The report stipulates a "leading to supporting" military transition between the U.S. and ROK forces. Additionally, it outlined a gradual time-phased reduction of U.S. forces:⁴⁵

NUNN-WARNER REPORT

PHASE I: 7,000 noncombat personnel (2,000 Air Force and 5,000 U.S. Army)-1990 to 1992. Appointment of a ROK General Officer to head the Combined Forces Command's Ground Component Command (GCC). The disestablishment of the U.S./ROK Combined Field Army (CFA).

PHASE II: Manpower reduction and readjustment of force

structure in the 8th Army's Second Infantry Division (1993-1995).

PHASE III: Transition to a system of common defense in which South Korean forces take the primary responsibility and the American forces a secondary role (1996 to 2000).

By the year 2000, South Korea would lead the country militarily, aided only by a small American military contingent of advisors.

However, the halt in scheduled U.S. military reductions and the restart of "TEAMSPIRIT-93" has frozen North-South talks concerning mutual nuclear inspection procedures, ignited sporadic anti-American student riots in Seoul, and disrupted the current reunification process of the Korean peninsula. The military standoff is and will always be a major negotiating issue in the reunification process. The suspension of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Korea and the restart of "TEAMSPIRIT-93" may well provide North Korea with yet additional reasons to refuse an agreement on mutual nuclear inspections of military facilities to ensure compliance with the multinational Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The presence of U.S. combat ground and air forces on the Korean peninsula will be used repeatedly by North Korea to add legitimacy to their political "carrot-and-stick" actions; thus continued U.S. presence will delay any agreement for mutual inspections of nuclear and military facilities. The total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korean soil has been "chisled-in-stone" as a North Korean precondition before serious talks on the nuclear issue and reunification can take place. The continued Cold War presence of foreign troops on Korean soil remains an obstacle in the

path of a meaningful, trusting agreement between the two Koreas. Now is the time for top planners of national military strategy to seriously review the current reasons for maintaining U.S. combat forces in South Korea.

SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS

The U.S. faces today one of its most difficult and pressing challenges of the post-war era; coming to accept the reality and ramifications of the simple fact that many of its traditional security policies are anachronistic.⁴⁶

The traditional presence of American military forces in Korea is a Cold War carry-over that requires thoughtful reconsideration. Older rationale for maintaining a credible military force are hard to justify in the light of current world events, termination of the traditional Russia-North Korea military alliance, newly formed ROK diplomatic relations with China and Russia, South Korea's improved military self-reliance (ROK defense budget was \$12.6 billion, roughly 4.5% of ROK GNP⁴⁷) and changes in the ROK economic status as one of the world's largest trading nations with a growing GNP:

South Korea's per capita Gross National Product was over five times that of North Korea's (\$5,569 versus \$1,064 in 1990), which meant South Korea's GNP was 10 times greater (\$238 billion versus \$23 billion in 1990). In view of the high economic growth rate in South Korea (approximately 9% annually) and the shrinking of North Korea's economy (-3.7% in 1990 and -5.2% in 1991), it became apparent that North Korea would not economically catch up with South Korea.⁴⁸

The U.S. and South Korea should reconsider their security alliance in view of many new circumstances: the New World Order, U.S. budget cuts and downsizing of military forces, U.N. peacekeeping initiatives, South Korea's economic status and

military self-reliance. Several security policy options are available:

OPTION 1-STATUS QUO: Continue the 1954 U.S./ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and maintain a strong "Forward Presence" military strategy by positioning U.S. combat forces (1 Infantry Division and 2 Tactical Fighter Wings) on the Korean peninsula to act as a military deterrent against a North Korean ground attack. This is the traditional Cold War security policy option.

OPTION 2-STATUS QUO (+): Reduce U.S. forces in three stages (1993 to 2000) as directed in the Nunn-Warner Report; transition increasingly to a supporting role; recognize South Korea's independent economic and military capabilities. This option has been suspended pending the outcome of the North Korean nuclear issue. This post-Cold War U.S./ROK security policy option cost U.S. taxpayers \$2.417 billion in FY 91. Additionally, the ROK Minister of Defense reported that ROK indirect cost sharing support for U.S. forces exceeded \$2.2 billion annually.⁴⁹

OPTION 3-U.N. SANCTION WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES: Develop a new U.N. peace-keeping/building agreement and conduct an accelerated unilateral withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by 1997; establish a new U.N. multinational collective security alliance for Northeast Asia that would replace the antiquated Cold War conditions set forth in the 1954 U.S./ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. At this point, it is important to understand the

difference in operational concepts between peacekeeping and peace-building operations as defined in the recently published U.N. document, An Agenda for Peace and Joint Pub 3 (Draft):⁵⁰

Peacekeeping: Deployment of a U.N. presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving U.N. military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well to help supervise a cease-fire agreement. To be truly successful, it must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.

Peace-building: Concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace.

Joint Pub-3 describes peace-building as a post-conflict diplomatic and military action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. These definitions reveal that North and South Korea currently have neither a U.N. peacekeeping or peace-building operation. There is no North-South agreement concerning the presence of American military forces in Korea as peacekeeping forces. American combat forces are not stationed in the ROK as a U.N. peacekeeping force but as a deterrent force based on the ROK/U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. There are no U.N. peacekeeping forces monitoring the DMZ guardposts. As new members of the U.N., the two Koreas should develop a new peacekeeping security policy that will build confidence and promote stability on the peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region.

This New World Order collective security policy option would

develop cooperative procedures for the orderly transfer and realignment of current U.N. operations to a formalized U.N. peacekeeping-building function. It would require a U.N. chartered, multi-national, collective security agreement between the two Koreas and surrounding Asian-Pacific countries. Such a peace-building agreement formulated under the auspices of the United Nations should include Japan, Russia, China, the two Koreas, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States as signatories. The agreement would establish a denuclearized, anti-aggression, U.N. collective security pact within the region. Additionally, it would redesignate the DMZ as the UNZ (United Nation's Zone)-a peace zone monitored by neutral forces. The UNZ would serve as a provisional boundary with checkpoint procedures to facilitate traffic entering and leaving the UNZ. The newly established UNZ would require both Koreas to remove their military forces from the DMZ and to reduce the strength of their armed forces while maintaining military parity. The initial withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by the year 1995 would be politically and historically acceptable for both Koreas, especially since it marks the 50th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule. However, U.S. forces would not totally disengage. A U.S./ROK "crisis response" military agreement would leave no doubt in Asian leaders minds that the U.S. remains committed to the security of South Korea. And if South Korea is threatened, the U.S. would not hesitate to project overwhelming strategic combat power on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. can continue to demonstrate this policy

commitment by operating from military bases in Japan and maintaining aircraft carriers afloat in the Sea of Japan. The U.S./ROK military security commitment will always remain solid. However, it will be shaped differently as the political times and economic circumstances dictate.

DISCUSSION OF OPTIONS

The traditional **STATUS QUO OPTIONS** continue to place both Koreas in a tense security policy dilemma which, in turn, creates a political stalemate forestalling the inter-Korean resolution of the nuclear issue and the peninsula reunification process. As long as the two Koreas have opposing military forces facing each other in the DMZ, friction and potential conflict resulting from military incidents remain. Also, the presence of U.S. combat forces and continuation of "TEAMSPIRIT" combined training exercises offers no compromise to the long-standing military security paradigms of both North and South Korea. The North demands a complete withdrawal of all American forces, yet the South's traditional distrust of Kim Il-Sung requires the presence of U.S. combat-ready forces to provide a military security umbrella. Since 1954, South Korea and other nations in the Northeast Asian region have relied heavily on the "Forward Presence" strategy of U.S. forces to prevent another Korean War. But the world that the two Koreas must now enter has changed dramatically since 1954: the Soviet threat of a potential global war has declined, the Cold War is over, popular demand

for a peaceful national reunification has increased, and economic trade agreements between Russia, China, and the two Koreas has altered the traditional ways of thinking and doing business in the region. Logic dictates that neither China nor Russia would support a North Korean attack. In fact, during a Russian presidential envoy's visit to Pyongyang in February 1993, Russia served notice to North Korean leaders that they would no longer honor their traditional military alliance.⁵¹ A military alliance that has been maintained between Russia and North Korea for 32 years. This pronouncement by the Russian government was made a few months after President Boris Yeltsin's first official visit to Seoul. This leaves North Korea with one ally-China.

This New World Order has prompted both Koreas to apply for membership in the United Nations. Both were quickly admitted and granted the membership rights of the U.N. General Assembly. The recent entry of both Koreas into the United Nations creates a new prospect for security and stability in the Northeast Asian region. Their membership in the U.N. will promote diplomatic recognition and improve their relations with other nations. Apparently, both Koreas see the U.N. as the "honest broker" and peacemaker of regional conflicts in the New World Order. So the two Koreas have now joined other Asian countries as followers of the United Nation's Charter. They are thereby obliged to handle any disputes based on the recommendations and decisions of the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council. The unresolved Korean issues of nuclear proliferation and national reunification are now subject to the U.N. governing

process. U.N. membership by both Koreas provides additional justification for disestablishing the 1954 ROK/U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. should no longer bear all the political, military, and economic burden of promoting peace in Korea. The burden of peacekeeping and peace-building operations has become a U.N. function, which unfortunately is a growing business in many post-Cold War conflicts. The U.N. has the authority and international support to influence both Koreas to settle their disputes and to arbitrate the peace-building reunification process.

The **U.N. SANCTION WITHDRAWAL OPTION** would reduce the Cold War political distrust and relieve DMZ military tension in Korea by transferring peacekeeping responsibilities to the United Nations by 1995. The peacekeeping-building burden would be shared by U.N. countries designated by the U.N. Security Council and supported by those countries that join the newly established Asian-Pacific Collective Security Treaty. Upon verification of North Korea's non-military nuclear intentions, the treaty would direct a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in conjunction with a time-phased transfer of all DMZ guardposts and tunnels to U.N. peacekeeping-building forces. The treaty would also direct both Koreas to denuclearize and redeploy all military forces a specified distance away from the newly established UNZ. The North Korean deployment will be greater due to the close proximity of Seoul, South Korea's capital, to the UNZ. North and South Korean military forces within five miles of the UNZ would be reduced equally in numbers of units,

manning, weapons, artillery, aircraft and equipment. Limitations on certain types of military equipment, training and manuevers would also be enforced. The growth of Korean nationalism demands and justifies a U.N. controlled withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the Korean peninsula. The demands for reunification require an interim U.N. peacekeeping force to replace the Cold War presence of U.S. combat forces. The U.N. force will secure the newly established UNZ and protect the hopes and nationalistic desires of the Korean people, who have seen their nation divided for too many years. This U.N. peace-building force would remain intact until both Koreas negotiate a final resolution to North-South national reunification. The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces could be a final compromise, providing persuasive bottom-line leverage to open the doors to meaningful North-South negotiations. A formalized plan would present a concrete message to North Korea that upon verification that North Korea does not have a nuclear weapons program, U.S. combat forces would withdraw from South Korea and be replaced by a U.N. peace-building contingency. This action will encourage a quick resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and hasten the process of national reunification.

RECOMMENDATION

The **U.N. SANCTION WITHDRAWAL OPTION**, supported by a newly established U.N. sanctioned multinational Asian security treaty, would provide a realistic framework of a "ways" and "means" to meet a very desirable "end"-the peaceful reunification of Korea. The following phased recommendations will offer a plan

for a successful reunification of Korea-a proposal:

UNITED NATIONS
CONFIDENCE BUILDING REUNIFICATION PLAN

PHASE I: FORMALIZE A U.N. SANCTIONED ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ALLIANCE AND TREATY (1994-1996)

- Treaty is chartered upon resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue by mutual inspections
- Bilateral intrusive inspections have been conducted of military facilities
- Terminate "TEAMSPIRIT" combined exercise
- Treaty will specify a timeframe for withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and DMZ transformation
- Conduct collective exchanges and develop construction plans for housing projects, industrial plants and manufacturing.

PHASE II: DMZ REALIGNMENT TO UNZ (1996-1998)

- Time-phased withdrawal of North and South Korean forces from DMZ
- Insert U.N. peacekeeping-building forces into the UNZ
- Simultaneous transfer of all DMZ guardposts and tunnels to U.N. Forces. UNZ checkpoints established to handle North-South traffic
- Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. combat forces. Forces repositioned within PACOM Theater.
- North-South Korean forces repositioned equal distance from the DMZ in proximity to Pyongyang and Seoul (U.N. verification)
- Reduction of North and South Korean Armed Forces and conversion to civilian labor force to build housing, industrial complexes and manufacturing facilities in North Korea (U.N. verification)
- North-South U.N. Arms Control ceilings established
- Continue U.S./ROK Ulchi Focus Lens Combined Simulation Exercise (invite North Korean observers). ROK observe North Korean military exercises
- Develop a North-South Joint Economic and Land Development Plan
- Select site for Korea's new capital and begin necessary construction. Maintain Seoul and Pyongyang as commercial trade centers

PHASE III: U.N. PEACE-BUILDING (1998-2000)

- North and South Korea negotiate and implement confidence building unification procedures (U.N. Security Council oversight)
- Conduct cooperative exchange programs
- Terminate 1953 Military Armistice Agreement

- Clear UNZ of all guardposts and military obstacles
- Continue to build joint textile manufacturing, automobile plants (industrial conglomerates), and agricultural areas in North Korea
- Formalize Economic Trade Agreements with Russia, China, U.S., Japan and surrounding Asia-Pacific countries

PHASE IV : UNIFICATION (2000-2005)

- Publish a North-South Peace Constitution
- Disestablish UNZ and withdraw all U.N. peace-building forces
- Complete construction of new capital and occupy with joint political staff
- Designate portions of the UNZ as national reunification parks named in honor of historic Korean political, military and cultural leaders. Park construction begins.
- Conduct free elections for political leadership
- Korea reunified as a National Community of coexistence, exchange and cooperation.
- Consolidate and merge Korean armed forces
- Korea supports U.N. peacekeeping operations by providing military personnel and equipment

The reduction in military spending by both countries would release billions of dollars to partially offset the burden sharing funds needed to support reunification. This U.N. building-block process would also fulfill the goal set forth in the National Security Strategy of the United States:

On the Korean peninsula, we and the Republic of Korea seek to persuade North Korea of the benefit of confidence-building measures as a first step to lasting peace and reunification.⁵²

Eventually, the DMZ will fall, just as the Berlin Wall did to end the Cold War Era. The reunification of Korea will occur to complete the final act. We may not yet know how this will occur, precisely when it will occur, or under what specific conditions it will occur. But the growth of Korean nationalism clearly signals that America is no longer a required political

player on the Korean field of reunification. The entire matter is now in Korean hands.

From the Korean point of view, the division of the country is yet another of the many indignities suffered at the hands of foreigners over the centuries.⁵³

The continued presence of American military forces on Korean soil only reminds the Korean people that their country still remains divided. Now is the time for the two Koreas to get serious about reunification, to free themselves of international competition, to develop formal peace-building agreements to facilitate the smooth transition to national unity, and to quit using the presence of American forces on the Korean peninsula as the biggest bone of contention obstructing successful resolutions. Many Koreans see American military presence as a foreign interference to the long-enduring goal of national unity. It has been repeatedly used as a political excuse and cop-out that continues to perpetuate mistrust, offends nationalism, and aggravates meaningful North-South dialogue.

CONCLUSION

The idea of reunification is therefore in part a Korean nationalistic assertion against foreign interference, and it is bound up with Korean national pride.⁵⁴

This analysis reveals that the present tensions on the Korean peninsula are exacerbated by a number of obstacles: one of which is the Cold War presence of American "combat-ready" military forces. It is imperative that these Cold War obstacles be removed and action be taken to reduce North-South military and

political tensions and promote regional stability. The U.N. **SANCTION WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES OPTION** provides for a credible U.N. initiative and a positive framework of confidence-building procedures (ways, means) to reduce political mistrust, military tensions, Asian-Pacific regional uncertainty, and thereby to stimulate the peaceful reunification process of Korea. It will bring the two Koreas out of Cold War political instability, end a costly military arms race, lessen the possibility of DMZ military conflicts, and provide for their entry into the New World Order of regional stability and economic growth. On the other hand, if the two Koreas remain adamantly opposed to the U.N. sanctioned Asian collective security treaty and withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, such reluctance could indicate a hidden agenda and reveal a deeper distrust. That is, the Koreas could no longer use the presence of American forces as a political scapegoat to perpetuate Cold War animosities between both the two Koreas and with Japan. Indeed, they may not want to reunify the Korean peninsula as one nation until it has had time to become both a nuclear and economic power that overtakes Japan as an Asian regional leader. Neither North or South Korea want to see a dominant Japanese power in the region. Unification of the two Koreas will certainly change the economic and security posture of Northeast Asia and make Japan feel uneasy about its position. Some analysts predict that a unified Korea will eventually trigger Japan to rearm itself. For certain, American forces should not be caught in the middle of Korea's nationalistic surge for unity and emergence as a regional power

in Northeast Asia. Time will tell the true story of Korean reunification. However, now is the time for the United States to pack its rucksacks, redeploy its aircraft, reposition its ships and move out: Job well done! Mission accomplished!

Wait a minute, what's this in the news? Today's headlines has revealed:

//////////////////////////////////WIRE SERVICE//////////////////////////////////

[Text] Beijing, (YONHAP)-North Korea recently dispatched four of President Kim Il-Sung's personal physicians to China on an urgent mission to buy pharmaceutical materials, a reliable Chinese source says. Kim's doctors are reported to have gone to the Guangxi Zhuang Region in western China, where it is thought they bought some medicine, the source said Monday, requesting anonymity. "Judging by the North Korean action, there is a strong possibility that President Kim's health suddenly deteriorated," the source said.

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
EAST ASIA 55

//////////////////////////////////

NOTES

- 1 National Military Strategy of the United States-1992, p. 3.
- 2 Defense Issues, Vol. 7, No. 20, "The Changing Face of Forces on the Korean Peninsula," prepared testimony by General Robert W. RisCassi, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, to the House Armed Services Committee, 2 April 1992, p. 4.
- 3 David Key, "Don't Wait for a Change of Heart in North Korea," Wall Street Journal, 18 March 1993, p. A12.
- 4 North Korea: The Foundations For Military Strength, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Washington, D.C., October 1991, p. 60.
- 5 Jon Wolfsthal, "CIA Says North Korea Nearing Bomb," Arms Control Today, March 1992, p. 26.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 The Korean Herald, "North Korea May Have N-device Next Year: RisCassi," 6 March 1992, p. 1.
- 8 Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea Rebuffs Nuclear Inspections," New York Times, 1 February 1993, p. A9.
- 9 North Korea: The Foundations For Military Strength, p. iii.
- 10 Ibid, p. 42.
- 11 Ibid, p. iii.
- 12 Young Sun Song, "North Korea's Nuclear Issue," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Fall 1991, pp. 63-64.
- 13 Takayoshi Sogo, "U.S. Plans to Act on North Nuclear Threat," Asian Defence Journal, December 1991, p. 127.
- 14 Hong Yung Lee, "South Korea in 1991," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January 1992, p. 72.
- 15 James Walsh, "The Kim's Country," TIME, 4 May 1992, p. 22.
- 16 Young Sun Song, p. 75.
- 17 Unification Policy, "An Era of Reconciliation and Cooperation Begins," National Unification Board-Republic of Korea, February 1992, pp. 36-41.
- 18 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Fight Threatens Korean Peace Moves," 27 May 1992, p. 6.

19 Ibid.

20 C2 Intelligence Briefing between MG Moo Woong Kim, Deputy Commanding General, and COL Glenn Blackburn, DC2, Combined Field Army (US/ROK), Camp Red Cloud, Korea, 25 May 1992.

21 North Korea: The Foundations For Military Strength, p. 62.

22 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "North Korea Denies Ship Carried SCUDS to Iran," 14 March 1992, p. 6.

23 John J. Fialka, "CIA says North Korea appears active in Biological, Nuclear Arms," Wall Street Journal, 25 February 1993, p. A10.

24 Parade Magazine, "Progress in North Korea," Washington Post, 6 September 1992, p. 28.

25 Richard Hornik, "The Costs of Togetherness," TIME, 4 May 1992, p. 26.

26 Ibid.

27 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), "Kim Young Sam's Policy Program Summarized," 26 February 1993, p. 17.

28 T. R. Reid, "Overtures made to North Korea," Washington Post, 17 March 1993, p. A1.

29 Kim Young-Jeh, "Korean Unification In A Changing World," Journal Of East Asian Affairs, Summer/Fall 1991, p. 405.

30 Rhee Sang-Woo, "North Korea in 1991," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January 1992, p. 57.

31 Kim Young-Jeh, p. 408.

32 Unification Policy, "To Build a National Community through the Korean Commonwealth," National Unification Board-Republic of Korea, November 1991, p. 21.

33 Ibid, p. 48.

34 Takayoshi Sogo, "Seoul wants U.S. Troops to Stay Put," Asian Defence Journal, May 1992, p. 93.

35 Kim Dae Jung, "The Once and Future Korea," Foreign Policy, No. 86, Spring 1992, p. 46.

36 Robert K. Crumplar, LCDR, USN, "Kim Il-Sung (North Korea), Another Saddam Hussein (Iraq)?: Countering and Deterring Aggression in the Northern Pacific," Naval War College, 13 February 1992, p. 5.

- 37 Walsh, p. 22.
- 38 North Korea: The Foundations For Military Strength, p. 65.
- 39 Takayoshi Sogo, "Army Officers Executed For Plotting Against Kim," Asian Defence Journal, March 1992, p. 94.
- 40 Bogdan Krzyk, "The Mysterious Heir in the North," World Press Review, July 1992, p. 20.
- 41 Defense Issues, Vol. 7, No. 20, 2 April 1992, pp. 1-2.
- 42 Charles K. Armstrong, "South Korea's Northern Policy," Pacific Review, Vol III, Issue I, 1990, p. 35.
- 43 National Military Strategy of the United States, p. 22.
- 44 Charles R. Larson, ADM, USN, "Uncertainties, Turbulence, Head Concerns," Defense 92-Special Report on DOD and the Environment, July/August 1992, p. 36.
- 45 Tong Whan Park, "Issues of Arms Control between the Two Koreas," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, April 1992, p. 362.
- 46 William J. Taylor, "Strategic Opportunities in Northeast Asia," Korean Journal of Defense Analysts, Winter 1989, p. 105.
- 47 The World Factbook 1992, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Public and Agency Information, Washington, D.C., January 1992, p. 188.
- 48 Hong Nack Kim, "The Koreas: In Search of Reunification," Current History, December 1992, p. 432.
- 49 Annual Report To Congress-Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula (unclassified), November 1992, p. IV-1.
- 50 An Agenda For Peace, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, 31 January 1992, p. 11, 32.
- 51 Adi Ignatius, "Russia turns away from North Korea," Wall Street Journal, 12 February 1993, p. A10.
- 52 National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, p. 9.
- 53 Donald S. MacDonald, "The Role of the Major Powers in the Reunification of Korea," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 135.
- 54 Ibid, p.136.
- 55 Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS), "Kim Il-Sung's Doctors said to visit PRC for Medicine," 2 March 1993, p. 23.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES

- Armstrong, "South Korea's Northern Policy," Pacific Review, Vol. III, Issue I, 1990: 35.
- Crumplar, Robert K. , LCDR, USN, "Kim Il-Sung (North Korea), Another Saddam Hussein (Iraq)?: Countering and Deterring Aggression in the Northern Pacific, " Naval War College, 13 February 1992: 5.
- Hornik, Richard, "The Costs of Togetherness," TIME, 4 May 1992: 6.
- Jung, Dae Kim, "The Once and Future Korea," Foreign Policy, No. 86, Spring 1992: 46.
- Kim, Hong Nack, "The Koreas: In Search of Reunification," Current History, December 1992: 11, 32.
- Krzyk, Bogdan, "The Mysterious Heir in the North, " World Press Review, July 1992: 20.
- Larson, Charles R., ADM, USN, "Uncertainties, Turbulence, Head Concerns," Defense 92-Special Report on DOD and the Environment, July/August 1992: 36.
- Lee, Hong Yung, "South Korea in 1991," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January 1992: 72.
- MacDonald, Donald S., "The Role of the Major Powers in the Reunification of Korea," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992: 135.
- Park, Tong Whan, "Issues of Arms Control between the Two Koreas," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, April 1992: 362.
- Sang-woo, Rhee, "North Korea in 1991," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January 1992: 57.
- Sogo, Takayoshi, "Army Officers Executed For Plotting Against Kim," Asian Defense Journal, March 1992: 94.
- Sogo, Takayoshi, "Seoul Wants U.S. Troops To Stay Put," Asian Defense Journal, May 1992: 93.
- Sogo, Takayoshi, "U.S. Plans to Act on North Nuclear Threat," Asian Defense Journal, December 1991: 127.
- Song, Young Sun, "North Korea's Nuclear Issue," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Fall 1991: 63-64.

Taylor, William J., "Strategic Opportunities in Northeast Asia," Korean Journal of Defense Analysts, Winter 1989: 105.

Walsh, James, "The Kim's Country," TIME, 4 May 1992: 22.

Wolfsthal, Jon, "CIA Says North Korea Nearing Bomb," Arms Control Today, March 1992: 26.

Young-Jeh, Kim, "Korean Unification In A Changing World," Journal of East Asian Affairs, Summer/Fall 1991: 405.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Fight Threatens Korean Peace Moves," 27 May 1992: 6.

Pacific Stars and Stripes, "North Korea Denies Ship Carried SCUDS to Iran," 14 March 1992: 6.

Korean Herald, "North Korea May Have N-device Next Year: RisCassi," 6 March 1992: 1.

New York Times, "North Korea Rebuffs Nuclear Inspections," Michael R. Gordon, 1 February 1993: A9.

Wall Street Journal, "Don't Wait For a Change of Heart in North Korea," 18 March 1993: A12

Wall Street Journal, "CIA Says North Korea Appears Active in Biological, Nuclear Arms," 25 February 1993: A10

Wall Street Journal, "Russia Turns Away from North Korea," 12 February 1993: A10.

Washington Post, "Overtures made to North Korea," 17 March 1993: A1.

Washington Post-Parade, "Progress in North Korea," 6 September 1992: 28.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

National Military Strategy of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 1992: 3, 22.

National Security Strategy of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August 1991: 9.

North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Washington, D.C., October 1991: iii, 60, 62.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-East Asia Daily Reports), Washington, D.C., 26 February 1993: 17. 2 March 1993:

23.

The World Factbook 1992, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of Public and Agency Information, Washington, D.C., January 1992: 188.

SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Unification Policy, "An Era of Reconciliation and Cooperation Begins," National Unification Board-Republic of Korea, Seoul, Korea, February 1992: 36-41.

Unification Policy, "To Build a National Community through the Korean Commonwealth," National Unification Board-Republic of Korea, Seoul, Korea, November 1991: 21.

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

RisCassi, Robert W., Prepared testimony to the House Armed Service Committee, Defense Issues, Vol 7, No. 20, 2 April 1992.

Annual Report to Congress-Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula (USFK), November 1992.

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

An Agenda For Peace, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, 31 January 1992.

MAPS

Time, 4 May 1992.

Current History-A World Affairs Journal East Asia, December 1992.

