


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**FUTURE EUROPEAN
SECURITY FRAMEWORK**

BY

**COLONEL GERM D.Th. KEUNING
Royal Netherlands Army**

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Root Hall, Building 122 Carlisle, PA 17013-5050		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Future European Security Framework - Uncl			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) COL Germ D.Th. Keuning			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 93 March 06	15. PAGE COUNT 28
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The issue of European security has undergone a radical change. The threat of a large-scale military confrontation has faded; in its place are a combination of opportunities and risks. The opportunities arise if Central and Eastern Europe make the transition to democratic politics and economic renewal. The risks concern the instability that accompanies this transformation process. The author examines which possible future security framework could best deal with these risks and attempts to answer these questions: What is security? What is Europe and what are its interests? Which existing European institutions fit in such a framework? The author adapts Maslow's theory of human behavior to nations. This allows for a better understanding of what nations strive for and which interests they want to protect. The author concludes that the EC and NATO will play the most important role in the security of Europe for the near future. In the distant future a framework might exist that is similar to the CSCE organization. Its members might be: the U.S., the EC (or maybe at that time, the United States of Europe) and other non-European nations, such as the Russian Federation or Turkey.			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL DR MICHAEL ROSKIN		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717/245-3207	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL DNSS

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Germ D.Th. Keuning
Royal Netherlands Army

Dr. M.G. Roskin
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Germ D.Th. Keuning, COL, RNLA
TITLE: Future European Security Framework
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 6 March 1993 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The issue of European security has undergone a radical change. The threat of a large-scale military confrontation has faded; in its place are a combination of opportunities and risks. The opportunities arise if Central and Eastern Europe make the transition to democratic politics and economic renewal. The risks concern the instability that accompanies this transformation process. The author examines which possible future security framework could best deal with these risks and attempts to answer these questions: What is security? What is Europe and what are its interests? Which existing European institutions fit in such a framework? The author adapts Maslow's theory of human behavior to nations. This allows for a better understanding of what nations strive for and which interests they want to protect. The author concludes that the EC and NATO will play the most important role in the security of Europe for the near future. In the distant future a framework might exist that is similar to the CSCE organization. Its members might be: the U.S., the EC (or maybe at that time, the United States of Europe) and other non-European nations, such as the Russian Federation or Turkey.

No one can replace Europe with its vast possibilities and experience either in world politics or in world development. Europe can and must play a constructive, innovative and positive role.

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union is gone. Fifteen republics have taken its place. They try to grapple with the immense political, economic and military legacy of seventy years of communism and hundreds of years as an empire. The process of disintegration may not yet be completed. Nagorno Karabakh and Tajikistan reflect the potential for conflicts which are also latent in many other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. These conflicts stem from historically contested territories and borders, ethnically dispersed groups, insufficiently integrated populations, and mutually exclusive claims to national control.

The issue of European security has also undergone a radical change. The threat of a large-scale military confrontation has faded into the background and in its place are a combination of opportunities and risks. The opportunities arise if Central and Eastern Europe succeed in making the transition to democratic politics and economic renewal. The risks concern the instability that accompanies this transformation process.

This study will try to answer which possible future European security framework could best deal with these risks? Such a complex issue immediately evokes a number of subsidiary

questions, such as:

1. What is security?
2. Which countries belong to Europe?
3. Do the European nations have common interests and which risks challenge these interests?
4. How do the existing "European security organizations" fit in such a framework?

WHAT IS SECURITY?

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (second edition) gives the following definition for security:

1. freedom from danger, risk, etc.; safety.
2. freedom from care, anxiety, or doubt; well-founded confidence.
3. something that secures or make safe; protection; defense.

Two considerations arise from this definition: a physical one and a psychological one. An example of the physical consideration is the threat that someone wants to harm you, or wants to take away something which belongs to you. These physical forms of security are quite concrete and give little reason for debate. The psychological aspect, however, is less obvious. One can feel free from fear when someone else in the same circumstances does not. Most fears exist because of the unknown, the unexpected, or a sudden change in the environment. For example, one can be afraid of lightning when another is not. Knowing what lightning is and how to protect oneself from it by use of a lightning rod eliminates fear. This psychological

aspect is subjective and based on one's perceptions, thus causing possible debate.

Analogous to an individual's behavior in regards to security, one can look at the behavior of nations and their perception of security. Traditionally more emphasis has been placed upon the physical aspect of security, like the protection of boundaries by military force. But the psychological side of national security also plays an important role. For example, the Netherlands and Denmark can have totally different perceptions of the rising power of a united Germany. Although Denmark may fear it, the Netherlands probably does not care. Similar to the example of the lightning rod, a country sensitive to the degree of danger can take adequate security precautions to protect itself.

How do nations or governments deal with security? What motivates them to act or react when they feel threatened? In order to answer these questions, one might again look at the behavior and motivation of individuals and then draw a parallel to the behavior and motivations of nations. One of the best known thinkers on human behavior was Abraham H. Maslow. Maslow's theory of human behavior posits a hierarchy of basic needs. The lower needs, he theorized, must be met for the greater part, before individuals can turn their attention to higher needs.

First, and most basic, are physiological needs. These needs are essential for the physical survival of a human being. For a

nation one might translate this into the most elementary terms: the need to survive. Every threat or risk against this basic need will cause a nation to react with all its means to counter such a threat.

Second are safety needs: security, stability, dependency, protection, freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos, need for structure, order, law, limits, etc. A nation will strive for security and stability to protect its people from fear, anxiety and chaos. They will act not only internally, but also externally. Some new developing nations of the former Warsaw Pact are good examples of this.

Third comes the need to be loved and to belong. If the physiological and safety needs of a nation are gratified, it will seek the respect and support of the world community, and in this sense seek to belong to and have the "affection" of other nations.

Fourth are esteem needs. Maslow classifies these needs into two subsets:

a. The desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery and competence, confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom.

b. The desire for reputation or prestige, status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity, or appreciation.

Although not all of these elements fit the behavior of nations, it is obvious that, especially for the developed

nations, many of these elements are valid.

Fifth is the need for self-actualization. The desire to become everything that one is capable of becoming. Perhaps, among today's nations, only the United States as a super power, some major powers and some other well developed nations, are closest to this level.

Adopting Maslow's theory to nations allows us to better understand what nations strive for and which interests they want to protect.² The focus of this paper centers on the European continent. Identifying the interests of the European nations first requires a clear explanation of what nations compose Europe.

WHAT IS EUROPE?

For many centuries much has been written on the question: What is Europe?³ Restated, now the real question is: What is the eastern border of Europe? Some would argue that it is the western border of the Russian Federation, others the Ural Mountains or even the Pacific border of the Russian Federation (Vladivostok). To define Europe for the purpose of this study we will first look at its history and then try to draw a line into the future.

The origin of Europe begins in the Greek-Hellenic era. Europe grew with the expansion of the Roman-Christian world to the west and the north. The following centuries gave rise to another term "Asia," created primarily from the development of

trade and with the growing knowledge of geography. Although the notion of Europe did not always have the same importance during past centuries, it was mostly connected with empires (e.g., Imperium Romano-Germanicum) and christianity.⁴ At the same time, however, Greece and the territories occupied by Arabs and Turks, east from Constantinople, were also considered as part of Europe. During these centuries the Don River was generally considered the eastern border of Europe.

In the period 1000-1700, Russia developed independently from the rest of Europe. First it developed as Kievan Russia and after the Mongol-Tartar domination (1240-1480) as the Moscovite state. During this era the Russian Orthodox Church was founded (1448) as a heritage of Constantinople. Russia not only developed separately, but it was largely excluded by Catholic and later Protestant Europe.

The most important Russian expansion to the West was under Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century. It was then that the West began to look at Russia as a part of Europe. With this new concept of Russia included in the notion of Europe, the eastern border of Europe began shifting, step by step, from the Don River to the east. In 1730, for the first time, the Swedish officer Strahlenberg, and later Peter Simon Pallas called the Ural Mountains the eastern border of Europe.⁵ However, others argued, during the 18th century, that the eastern border was the Yenissei River, or the Ob, Irtysch and Tobol Rivers.

Debates over whether Western Europeans accepted Russia as

part of Europe, or whether Russians saw themselves as Europeans, started in the 18th century and went on until 1917.

After the October Revolution of 1917, the Russian Empire became a multinational socialist state, first as the bi-continental Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and later as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

From 1917-1987 few debated whether the Ural Mountains were the political, administrative or cultural border of Europe, because of the communist regime covered the entire land. The Ural Mountains were only a geographical notion.

Since the spring of 1987, there is a new tendency to include Russia as part of Europe. Gorbachev even stated: "Europe is our common home."⁶ There is also a strong movement in the Western European countries to accept the Russian Federation as belonging to Europe. Still, the question of whether the Russian Federation belongs to Europe remains. Historically, geographically and culturally it belongs partly to Europe and partly to Asia, thus a true Eurasian state.

Many of the other former states of the USSR, the Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) belong historically and ethnologically to Asia.⁷ The three Transcaucasus Republics (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) geographically belong to Asia. Although the origin of the Georgians is not quite clear, it can be said that, ethnologically these states also belong to Asia. However, these three republics declare themselves as "European".⁸ The rest of

the former Soviet Union republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) are European and are defining themselves in "European" and "pro market" terms.⁵

Another Eurasian state is Turkey. Although ethnologically, geographically and religiously much more Asian than European, it has strong ties with Europe and is very western oriented, especially in its values, security, and economic relations.

In conclusion, all states west of the Russian Federation clearly belong to Europe. The Russian Federation and Turkey, each in its own way, also have a claim to membership in the European family of nations. Having answered the question of what nations belong to Europe, it is now possible to identify and discuss their common interests.

COMMON EUROPEAN INTERESTS AND THEIR CHALLENGES

The need for a future European security framework depends on what the common interests of the European nations are and what might challenge these interests. The problem stated simply, is: There is no European community with clearly defined interests. Europe consists of many different nations. They have their own national interests that reflect different stages of development and have ethnocentric problems that generate different priorities. In Maslow's terms, some well-developed European nations could be classified on the level of the "esteem needs," while others are still struggling on the level of "survival" or "safety needs." In Maslow's hierarchy the first need is to

survive. In most European nations, except former Yugoslavia, this need is basically fulfilled. Most European nations can be grouped at the next level up, the security and stability level of needs, or even the higher levels. Most Western European countries have satisfied their esteem needs or their need for self-actualization. They have economic well-being and prosperity. Most Central and Eastern European countries are struggling with a transformation process at the level of safety needs and trying to reach these higher levels of needs through economic reforms.

Stability, however, is the one virtually universal interest for the nations of Europe.

The most important challenges to this stability in Europe are: economic instability, minorities, refugees and migration, rebirth of nationalism and adverse developments in the Russian Federation and the United States.

1. Economic Instability:

a. External economic challenges. In the next century, the world might shift to a tripolar political and economic configuration, with the United States as a superpower, perhaps challenged only by a united European Community.¹² As Henry Kissinger predicted, economic power will play the major role in the new world order.¹³ This does not mean there will be an immediate threat of economic wars, but the relatively peaceful economic competition of the past years might be challenged by this new order which could cause world instability. However, one

should keep in mind the interdependency of the world economy. The economies of the industrialized and service-oriented countries and those countries economically dependent on them have one common interest: economic growth and therefore stability. The most likely future challenge is a disruption in the access of any country to raw materials, strategic resources and/or markets. If this access is vital to an economy, then it is also a vital national interest.¹² The only challenge that could force Europe to enter armed conflicts outside the European continent is probably access to resources vital for its economy. A good example was the Gulf War.

b. Internal economic challenges. Economic relations in Europe are characterized by the "haves" and "have nots." The "haves" are, according to their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the countries with more than \$ 10,000 GDP per capita: Norway, Sweden, Finland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland.¹³ Almost all of the "haves" are on Maslow's level of esteem needs or self-actualization. Their interests are mainly to protect their economic well-being and prosperity. Germany, with its powerful economy, now seeks self-actualization in accordance with its perceived rightful role in the world order.

The "have nots" are the countries with less than \$ 6,000 GDP per capita: Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, Albania, Turkey and the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Most of these countries are on Maslow's level of the safety needs. Their interest is mainly to survive and to win their battle for economic reform.

The challenge, however, is not the economic disparity itself, but the consequences involving this disparity. It might lead to dissension and conflict or large-scale migration which could jeopardize European stability.

2. Minorities, Refugees and Migration. Refugees and migration problems already exist in Europe. The conflict in former Yugoslavia has caused the flight of more than 1.5 million people to Hungary, Austria, Germany and Sweden. Italy is already coping with Albanian migrants. Armenians and Azeris are fleeing each other in Nagorno-Karabakh, while South Ossetians in Georgia are fleeing northwards and North Ossetians in Russia flee south. Hungary has become a transit country for Arabs, Africans, Romanians and former Soviet citizens. There are already an estimated 100,000 illegal immigrants in Hungary, and well over 100,000 Romanians have fled to Germany and Austria.¹⁴

Europe has 41 minority groups, which indicates the potential for future ethnic problems.¹⁵ For example, according to public opinion surveys conducted in the former USSR, between 10 to 16% of the population want to emigrate.¹⁶ Although the flow of migrants will depend on the evolution of the political situation, in the Central and Eastern European countries. The emigration potential is enormous and if not addressed adequately can endanger social and economic stability. This is true

particularly in countries with ethnic rivalries, weak governments and limited resources. In such situations, migrants and refugees compete with host country nationals for the scarce jobs and services available. However, even the absorptive power of the more stable "rich" nations in Western Europe is also limited. In either an economic or social-political way; the population of a receiving state can perceive immigration as a threat against its prosperity or even its cultural identity. This could lead to a resurgence of nationalism and ethnic strife.

3. Nationalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a super power and the possible diminishing role of the United States as the other superpower creates more room for the political maneuvering of European nations. These nations are unequal in terms of power, capabilities and needs. Germany's rising star on the European and world sky is beyond dispute. France makes clear its wish to be the dominant player in Europe. The United Kingdom, despite its special relationship with the United States, watches with envious eyes as its role diminishes.

However, France, the United Kingdom, and many other states, have one thing in common: the fear of a growing, more independent role for Germany in a future Europe. This could endanger European cohesion and thereby jeopardize its stability. Germany, sensitive to these historically rooted fears, stresses at every opportunity, its wish for an integrated role in Europe, and:

- to pursue its policy in a framework of multilateral political action, in cooperation and consensus with the old allies and new partners, in order to forestall any new tendency of re-nationalization especially in the

field of security and defense policy;
- to be an active promoter of the European integration process;
- to contribute to ensuring that the interests of the United States permanently remain anchored in Europe;
- to consolidate the political, economic and social reform process in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe integral to making them part of a free European order."

Thus for Germany, its role in Europe's future is clear. However, some European countries who perceive Germany's growing importance as a threat against their national interests, might react by becoming more nationalistic themselves. In this indirect way Germany could cause the rebirth of nationalism: a serious challenge to Europe's stability and integration.

The rise of nationalism is perhaps a greater threat in Central and Eastern Europe. Here it takes on the form of ethno-nationalism. After the breakdown of communism, ethnic nationalism has provided for an alternative vision of community. Democracy is viewed as the chance for separation into ethnically based homelands. Former Yugoslavia's civil war illustrates this tendency all too well.

Not only do ethnic problems play a major role in the future of the former Warsaw Pact countries, there are other challenges. They are looking for their identity, possibly even new boundaries, and new political and economic systems. They will endure a process of transformation that may last for decades. This process, like every change, will heighten tensions. If these tensions flame into larger confrontations, involving a number of states, European stability is at stake.

4. Adverse Developments:

a. The Russian Federation. After the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower, there is still a major power left: the Russian Federation. On March 31, 1992, all its republics, except Tatarstan and Chechen-Ingushetia, agreed to its formation.¹³ The Russian Federation has a total land area of approximately 17 million sqkm, one of the world's largest economies, a wealth of natural resources, a diverse industrial base, and vast conventional and nuclear capabilities.

The Russian Federation will play a major role in the politics of the world, and in Europe. Developments in the direction of a democratic federation might lead to common economic interests, a positive role in ethnic and migration problems, or even a role in the balance of power in Europe. A totalitarian state, however, might lead to a new threat to Europe and even to a second Cold War. Present developments give hope, but there is no guarantee that a turn of events might lead to future instabilities threatening all of Europe, if not the world.

b. The United States. The intensity of American commitment to European security has fluctuated in this century. The United States' commitment to European security was strong after World War II. The fall of the Berlin Wall now challenges the commitment the United States will have to Europe's future. This commitment, however, is of utmost importance for the stability in Europe. The United States is the only country willing and capable to take the lead in international crises. It has the

only nuclear capabilities to deter a nuclear threat from the Russian Federation. Finally, it is, as a superpower, the best stabilizer in the balance of power in Europe.

As pointed out earlier, stability is not only a common European interest but also benefits the rest of the world, especially the United States and Japan.

Also identified earlier were challenges to future stability. These are not only military in nature but also economic, political, social and cultural.

The inequalities among the European countries, in terms of needs, capabilities and power, have also been previously discussed. The Central and Eastern European countries are passing through a difficult period of transition and for the foreseeable future they will be highly dependent on the benevolence of the Western nations.

Instability in one or more European nations could ultimately threaten the interests of all. For these nations to continue the progress upward through Maslow's hierarchy, they must protect their collective interests of stability by developing a common security framework. This does not necessarily have to be a single European structure separated from a broader Atlantic structure or even a global security framework. What that future framework might look like is presented below.

A EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE

Any future European security system is likely to be built on existing security structures and arrangements, which will continue to play an important role during the transition.¹³

The East European revolutions of 1989 brought a wave of major diplomatic events: the unification of Germany, the major arms control agreements, the new strategic concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the establishment of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC); and the negotiations concerning the Treaty on European Political Union. In any future European security framework, three institutions will likely play a crucial role: NATO, including the NACC; the European Community (EC), including the Western European Union (WEU); and the CSCE.

NATO

In the past forty years, NATO has proven to be a reliable alliance. It has all the ingredients necessary to meet the challenges of the remaining military power of Russian Federation: a unified command structure, logistic resources, a tradition of internal conflict resolution and a history of shared experiences in training and management.

U.S. membership gives NATO surveillance and intelligence capabilities that provide early warning (transparency) and the ability to deter any large-scale conventional or nuclear threat.

NATO has adjusted to the developments in Central and Eastern Europe through a series of meetings in London, Copenhagen, Rome and Brussels.²² It has drafted and approved a more flexible and political strategic concept;²³ and is developing the force structure to go with that concept. The NATO members have delivered the arms control policies on which the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty was based and have agreed on positions for the emergence of a European defense identity which would strengthen the Alliance. Most importantly, it established the NACC on 20 December 1991.²⁴ Currently, the NACC comprises the NATO members states and the member states of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. The purpose of the NACC is:

- to work toward a new, lasting order of peace in Europe;
- to contribute to the enhancement of European security by promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁵

NATO's establishment of the NACC was a significant step toward their evolving into Europe's future security organization.

The major weakness in this structure is the relationship between NATO and the Central and Eastern European countries. It is not likely that NATO can provide viable solutions to security problems of a former Warsaw Pact country or group of countries. Any perceived or actual preferential treatment of one country or group of countries can jeopardize good relations with others, creating the very instability it is intended to prevent.

Ultimately the best solution may be the full membership of the Russian Federation. Initially, however, these countries should

be given only liaison and associate memberships.

Another disadvantage for NATO is its regionally oriented commitment. Although it has arrangements for consultation under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty "to act beyond its borders if there is agreement of the member nations,"²⁴ it is not the appropriate institution to solve out-of-NATO area conflicts.

The most important challenge to NATO may well be the internal relationship within the Alliance. After London and Rome it has become clear that there is a more important role for the European nations. As reflected in the Rome Summit:

The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.²⁵

Although this clearly indicates that the European nations in the Alliance want greater equality in their relations with the United States, this poses a danger. Turmoil caused by a partial withdrawal of the United States, the rising power of Germany, France's view of the developments in Europe,²⁶ and the strongly pro-American position of the United Kingdom could fracture NATO's current unity. In conclusion, NATO as a political-military organization provides elements for the stability of Europe that are not being provided by any other organization. It will likely play an important role in the near future of Europe. Whether NATO is to play a major role in the long run depends on subsequent developments, especially in the NACC and on the capabilities and developments of the other emerging institutions.

such as the EC/WEU.

EC/WEU

At present, the EC has no ability to respond to any conflict that requires the use of military force. The EC was designed as an economic institution and not organized for military action. European integration, however, is an ongoing process which hardly can be stopped. As Maastricht (9-10 December 1991) showed, the EC is trying to develop a European foreign and security policy, "including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."²⁷ The EC has requested the WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications."²⁸ In answer thereto, the WEU member states declared: "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."²⁹

The major strengths of the EC/WEU are:

- The EC's economic potential and the experience to deal with political-economic problems and thus its ability to assist in the development of the Central and Eastern European nations. It can provide assistance in their efforts to democratize their societies and to liberalize their economies. This entails both political and economic initiatives, especially for the long term. It is likely that the EC will continue to grow and will eventually include in its membership the nations of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Already the EC and EFTA have

formed the European Economic Area (EEA) on 2 May 1992, to ensure integration of EFTA countries in the domestic EC market. The stronger the EC becomes, the greater its capacity to absorb the membership of other nations.

- The WEU is not recognized as a typical "Cold War product." This could mean a higher acceptability in former Warsaw Pact countries, particularly in peacekeeping operations.

- Although NATO is able to operate beyond the borders of its member states only with member approval, the WEU has the advantage of doing so without the approval of all its members.²² This makes the WEU more suitable for out-of-European area operations.

Its major weaknesses are:

- The lack of a consolidated EC foreign and defense policy. Maastricht decided that issues relating to the environment, education, consumer protection and health could be dealt with by majority vote. Foreign and defense policy were not acceptable topics for discussion and the membership could only agree that the cooperation in these issues should be improved.

- A difference in opinion about the EC's future plans: should there be more member states (U.K.'s position) or should more solid ties between its members be formed first (France's position).²³

- The capacity of the EC to absorb new members. Many nations have already applied for full membership, but the capacity of the EC is limited. A sudden increase of poor, new

members could become destabilizing.

- The lack of an integrated military structure in the WEU. There is a WEU planning cell and there is closer cooperation in the fields of logistics, training and transportation. However, the lack of command, control and intelligence assets and airlift capabilities will limit the use of military means in the near future.

In conclusion, one might say that, if the WEU becomes the military component of the EC and if the Community is able to agree upon the foreign and defense policy, then the EC/WEU will play a major role in a future security framework in Europe. However, the overriding condition is whether the members of the Community are willing to pay the price for such a military component. Simultaneously, WEU developments will be closely related to the developments in other institutions, like for example the CSCE.

CSCE

The signing of the CFE treaty³² at the Paris Summit (19-21 November 1990), the Charter of Paris³³ and the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council³⁴ (19-20 June 1991) may be the best proof of the end of the Cold War. The CSCE is the first post-Cold War security institution in Europe and the only security organization which encompasses all European nations as well as the United States and the Russian Federation. The Charter of Paris lists the following important issues:

- Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law;
- Economic Liberty, Responsibility and Co-operation;
- Friendly Relations among Participating States;
- Security; Unity; Environment; Culture and Migrant Workers.³⁵

With this impressive list and its guide lines for the future: "to give a new impetus to a balanced and comprehensive development of our cooperation in order to address the needs and aspirations of our peoples,"³⁶ the CSCE is the only institution which deals with all elements of security, now and in the future. However, a closer examination of its strengths and weaknesses shows something else.

The major strong points of the CSCE are:

- As already stated, it has all European nations as members as well as the United States and the republics of the ex-Soviet Union. In this way the Russian Federation is not isolated, and the CSCE encompasses the most important stabilizing factor for Europe, the United States.

- It gives Germany the opportunity to act as the bridge between the East and the West, which justifies its geopolitical position³⁷ and contribute to its need for self-actualization.

- The CSCE is the most important forum for arms control negotiations; it covers all elements of power and all future destabilizing factors in Europe.

Its most important weaknesses are:

- It lacks the organizational experience and effectiveness

of other organizations, like NATO and the EC.

- It is a political organization, but not founded by a treaty.

- The decision-making process consumes too much time as it lacks an adequate decision-making body and processes.

- The CSCE has no enforcement mechanism, other than diplomatic or economic sanctions. It has no military forces, other than the individual contributions of the member states and, like the WEU, it has no integrated military structure to use those forces.

In conclusion, the CSCE may be the most visionary institution for the security of Europe in the distant future. At present it is only the best forum for consultation. Its primary problem is enforcing its decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

As previous paragraphs showed, no single institution is presently adequate to meet the challenges of European stability. The protection of out-of-European area interests demands (assuming a common American-European interest) a U.S.-led coalition. Depending on developments, NATO might evolve to become the most appropriate institution in the near future to deal with these challenges. Further developments in NATO, and especially in the NACC, might lead to an amalgamation of the NACC and the CSCE.

The social-economic differences between the Western and

Central/Eastern European nations requires social-economic solutions. The EC, slowly expanding through full and associate memberships, is the most suitable institution to deal with these problems. In the long run this expansion might lead to an admission of the EC in the CSCE, although the membership of the United States, Canada, the Russian Federation and some other non-European states do not make this likely.

Migration problems will concern all European nations. The CSCE is therefore the most proper organization to manage this challenge.

The balance of power is a principal condition for the stability of Europe. The involvement of the United States, and/or eventually the Russian Federation will play a crucial role in this balance. NATO in the near term and the CSCE in the long run are likely to "guarantee" this involvement.

The transformation process of the former Warsaw Pact countries and their attendant tensions are primarily a national affair. When these tensions grow into conflicts with violations against humanity, all existing institutions can play a role. Depending on the situation --history, other nations' interests, etc.-- either the CSCE, the EC, the WEU or NATO, may be the most appropriate. If military means are required, NATO or the WEU might be the right organizations in the near future. In the long run, this might become a task for the CSCE.

The diminishing threat of the Russian Federation is best countered by NATO. Its full membership in any future security

organization may be the best "assurance" that this now diminishing threat does not raise its head again.

In conclusion, it seems likely, that the EC and NATO will play the most important role in the security of Europe for the near future. During this period the EC will grow with its "own" military component, the WEU. In the meantime, NATO through the NACC, will expand its interests to areas other than its traditionally political and military concerns. In time NATO/NACC might combine with the CSCE. A future European security framework might then exist, similar to the CSCE organization. Its members might be: the United States of America, the EC (or maybe by that time, the United States of Europe) and other non-European nations, like the Russian Federation or Turkey, if it is not already a member of the EC.

One thing is clear, the three institutions discussed in this paper form a viable framework on which to build. A future security organization, however, must protect Europe's common interest of stability and must allow each member state to reach its full potential --Maslow's highest level, that of self-actualization.

ENDNOTES

1. Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970), 35-58.
2. One has to keep in mind that Maslow describes further on in Chapter 4, "A theory of Human Motivation" (35-58) additional characteristics of the basic needs and the rigidity of the hierarchy of basic needs. Some of the exceptions he makes are also valid for the behavior of nations.
3. For a more detailed historical overview, see: Egbert Jahn, "Wo befindet sich Osteuropa?" Osteuropa Archiv, (Mai 1990): 418-440.
4. Jahn, 422.
5. Pallas was a German zoologist and geologist, a graduated of the university of Leiden (NL), and professor in St. Petersburg. See also Jahn, 423.
6. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Perestroika, New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 194.
7. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Post Empire Politics," Orbis, (Spring 1992): 257.
8. Roman Szporluk, "The National Question," After the Soviet Union by Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 107.
9. Ibid., 106-107.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S. - Decline or Renewal?" Foreign Affairs, no. 67 (Winter 1988/89), 76-96.
11. Catherine Long, "Kissinger warns against U.S. Military Base in the Middle East," Memphis Daily News, (28 March 1991), 1.
12. Vital interests are those that motivate a state to intervene with vigorous diplomacy, economic sanctions and even military forces to influence the course of events. Phillip Zelikov, "The New Concert of Europe," Survival, no. 34 (Summer 1992), 18.
13. Alasdair Stewart, "Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe," Conflict Studies, no. 252 (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1992), 10.
14. Gil Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security," Adelphi Papers, no. 268 (Summer 1992), 23-25.

15. Stewart, 5.
16. Loescher, 22-23.
17. Hans-Henning von Sandtart, "European Security a German view," International Defense Review, no. 3 (1992), 226-229.
18. Robert D. Hormats, "The Roots of American Power," Foreign Affairs no. 70 (Summer 1991), 86.
19. Bob R.A. van den Bos, Can Atlantism Survive? The Netherlands and the new role of security institutions (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, July 1992), 7-10.
20. The Netherlands Atlantic Commission, in cooperation with NATO's Office of Information and Press (NATIP) has taken the initiative of publishing all substantive documents signed or adopted from May 1989 till December 1991 at meetings of NATO, the CSCE and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as well as summaries of the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Agreement. See Auke P. Venema and Henriette Romijn, Documents on International Security Policy (The Hague; Netherlands Atlantic Commission, February 1992).
21. Venema, 60-68.
22. Sir Michael Alexander, "NATO's Future Challenges," RUSI Journal (April 1992), 13.
23. Venema, 74.
24. Paul Beaver, "The JDW Interview," (with NATO Secretary General Dr Manfred Woerner), Jane's Defence Weekly (11 July 1992).
25. Venema, 60.
26. Richard N. Perle, "An American View: NATO's Future Threats," The Officer (January 1993), 31.
27. Article D, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, agreed upon the European Council. See Venema, 70.
28. Ibid.
29. Declaration of the member states of the Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. See Venema, 72-73.

30. WEU decisions require majority vote of the organization's members, not unanimity.

31. Pascal Privat, "Europe, In the Year 2000," Newsweek (Special Report, 26 November 1990), 20.

32. Venema, 22-25.

33. Ibid., 26-35.

34. Ibid., 53-56.

35. Ibid., 26-31.

36. Ibid., 28.

37. Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios in the Year 2010 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishers, 1991), 220.

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