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
THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN DRUG INTERDICTION
IS HEADED FOR FAILURE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT W. WADE, JR.

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN DRUG INTERDICTION IS HEADED FOR FAILURE

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
Robert W. Wade Jr.
Lt Colonel, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Doctor Jim Winkates

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1989



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Military's Role in Drug Interdiction Is Headed for Failure

AUTHOR: Robert W. Wade Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

This study takes on both the tasks of analyzing the drug war on the grand scale and the military's role in interdiction. The study begins with the nature of the drug problem and the history of military involvement in the drug war. On the grand scale, the pros and cons of various drug-war strategies are discussed. A strategy which would target the user and potential user seems to offer the most hope for success. However, such a strategy would require much time, patience, and money to win. In regard to military involvement, four potential problems are discussed: the problems with interdiction, the lack of training, organizational problems, and the lack of a meaningful measurement of merit. The author believes that these problems will not be sufficiently solved; therefore, the military's role in the drug war will not succeed. The last chapter offers recommendations for a grand strategy and for the military's role in the drug war. Among those recommendations is the wild-card strategy, which is a search for a cocaine substitute to be used for drug-abuse treatment.

(KR) ←

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Wade Jr (M.B.A., University of Arkansas) has been interested in the Drug War since he committed to write this paper... in September 1988. Actually, he has been interested in this subject--in a casual way--for several years. However, before this paper, his only involvement with the drug war had been preventing illicit drugs intrusion from his family and his squadron. He served as a missile maintenance squadron commander in 1985-1987. Before that job, he had held several position in missile operations and maintenance. More recently he served as the Assistant Resource Manager for Minot Air Force Base. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College. Lieutenant Colonel Wade is also a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1989.

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CHAPTER I

WHAT IS THE DRUG PROBLEM?

Scope

There is a mammoth drug problem in this country that is steadily growing. In the last several years, our government has waged a war on drugs. America is losing that drug war. The enemy is your neighbor, the bus driver, your doctor, the college student, the soldier, the housewife across the street, and several million others. They consume the drugs and thus enrich the local pushers and Colombian drug smugglers. They pay the money that corrupts young kids in the ghetto, businessmen, and bankers. They make the huge profits possible that motivate addicts and drug dealers to steal and kill. The drug villain has another ally... everyone in America who passively accepts this terrible situation. The illegal drug problem exists in the United States because of an insatiable demand for drugs. Without that demand, there would not be the current flood of drugs into this country and the associated violence, crime, and corruption. The National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that 23,000,000 Americans currently use narcotics or other drugs obtained illegally at least once a month. (29:46)

Over the last six years cocaine abuse has grown three fold in America; it now eclipses all other drug abuse. (63:20) U.S.

consumption of cocaine is currently estimated between 70 and 150 tons each year. (1:96; 63:20) That is enough for over 140 doses of four dollar crack for every man, woman, and child in the United States.* Overall, it is estimated that 12 percent of the U.S. population has tried cocaine or crack. (40:78) An estimated six million Americans are regular cocaine users.

(37:25) Even more frightening, the number of cocaine users is now increasing at a rate of 10 percent annually. (1:97) As the preference for cocaine has grown, the price has steadily dropped--encouraging even more demand. The supplies of cocaine in the U.S. have more than kept pace with the demand. (63:20)

So what is this fatal attraction to cocaine? Cocaine has the unequalled power to stimulate the pleasure centers of the human brain. Americans snort, smoke, and inject it. They get an indescribable pleasure and a surge of apparently endless energy--at least for several minutes. Later, they often get misery and sometimes death. (66:10)

Like any commodity in a free enterprise system, drugs are largely governed by supply and demand. As the short-term pleasure and addiction aspects of drugs have increased demand, the prospects of huge profit from illegal drugs have increased supplies and competition. The drug problem is energized by enormous profits. The Colombian Medellin drug cartel alone is reputed to earn between two and four billion dollars a year in

* 70 tons of cocaine = 2,240,000 ounces (1:96); 1 oz = (about 1500 crack doses) (68:34-35); a population figure of 240,000,000 was used.

smuggling drugs to the U.S. They have even offered to pay Colombia's national debt. (4:71) In FY 1987, one half billion dollars worth of assets were seized from traffickers by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). (43:4) Yet, this amount is just a fraction of the cost of doing a \$70 billion annual business.

Many thousands of Americans are already involved in wholesaling and retailing of illegal drugs. And, drug trafficking is the fastest growing industry in the world. (4:89) The drug distribution system is steadily spreading to middle-sized cities and even rural towns. Today, illegal drugs are readily available in every major U.S. city. (43:5-10) A massive and varied drug importation system supplies the business.

Tons of illegal drugs are carried, flown, shipped, mailed, and trucked into this country every week. They are flown into all international airports by both private planes and commercial airliners. They arrive by plane or boat in the remote Florida Everglades. They are concealed in commercial ships and in imported merchandise. They are even packaged in condoms, swallowed, and smuggled in by their living host. Over one-third of smuggled drugs find their way here over the 2,000 mile Mexican border. However, not all illicit drugs are smuggled into the country. Synthetic drugs are almost all created in make-shift laboratories in the U.S. And, increasingly, marijuana is being grown at home. (60:2) Drugs are turning up in America by every imaginable means. As old

methods of smuggling or producing drugs become too risky, new ways are being explored. There appears to be no simple solution for stopping the flow of drugs. Yet, something must be done--the moral fiber of this country is unraveling.

Effect On the Moral Fiber of the Nation

Our society is having to spend tens of billions of dollars each year because of drugs destroying lives and property. Drug-dealing gangs slaughter each other for drug territories in Los Angeles. Flocks of teenage prostitutes--motivated largely by a drug habit--solicit men and boys for as little as \$12 on Detroit streets. (3:64) Sports stars assault policemen in Miami and New York. "Even the police are outgunned and outmanned," said the Dade County Police Chief. (64:21) Those arrested for drug-related crimes are saturating our courts and prisons. Forty-two state prisons are overfilled. (3:84) In 1987, there were 352,612 arrests for illegal drugs. New York City police, alone, make an average of 64 drug busts each day. (3:67) In the Bronx, so many drug dealers are being arrested and are awaiting trials that normal court proceedings are impossible. Prosecutors are forced to offer suspects lenient plea bargaining so that all cases may be tried. (3:70) Over one-third of all federal prisoners are in jail for drug-related crimes. (4:91) And, crime is only one of the drug-related assaults on our moral fiber.

Drug-related injuries and deaths are in themselves devastating, but they are also taxing our hospitals and drug

treatment centers. The following statistics were collected from 756 emergency rooms throughout the country. They show the growth and magnitude of drug-induced injuries and emergencies:

EMERGENCY DRUG TREATMENTS (Reported through the DAWN System)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Cocaine.....	7,054	8,864	15,952	26,186	*46,331
Heroin.....	8,723	10,013	10,670	11,390	-----
Marijuana.....	2,887	3,213	3,674	5,180	-----
PCP.....	4,705	4,089	4,367	5,641	-----
LSD.....	622	750	722	1,053	-----
Methaqualone...	658	397	228	215	-----
Amphetamine....	912	787	787	866	-----
Methamphetamine	1,093	972	874	1,053	-----
Pentazocine....	490	411	318	397	-----
Hydromorphone..	517	382	332	420	-----
Oxycodone.....	836	836	825	884	-----
Glutethimide...	337	238	211	219	-----

Chart notes:

- * DAWN is the Drug Abuse Warning Network established among most U.S. emergency rooms.
- * Most 1988 data was not yet published.
- * Data based on first 9 months. (43:7,27,40,48; 3:66)

Of special note is the 86 percent increase in cocaine emergency treatment within the last twelve months. (3:66)

All available statistics show more and more misery.

Since 1985, U.S. medical examiners have reported about 3,500 drug overdose deaths per year. However, there are significantly more overdose deaths. New York City death figures are not included in this number due to incomplete data. (43:27,40,55) Most state and locally-funded drug abuse centers are full and have many waiting to get in. The estimated cost to treat current coke addicts ranges from eight to \$30 billion. (40:78)

If all social costs for drug consumption including crime, welfare, decline in housing values, hospital cost, and losses in productivity are added together, the amount has to run into the tens of billions of dollars. In 1984 that total cost was estimated at \$60 billion. (50:130) Current estimates are much higher. Cocaine abuse alone has increased by over 700 percent from 1984 to 1988. (43:27; 3:66) Recent estimates indicate that productivity loss, caused by drug abuse, could be as much as \$100 billion. (50:131; 29:46) If these estimates are accurate, then current social cost must be approaching several hundred billions of dollars.

An External National Security Concern As Well

Besides the billions of dollars bled from our society by drugs, the problems and corruption caused by drug trafficking in Latin America make this issue a national security concern. Drug profits are being used to finance guerrilla groups bent on toppling Latin American governments. Evidence is abundant that drug profits are also corrupting Latin American government heads. Jose Elandon, a former

intelligence aide of General Noriega, testified to Congress that "Castro had implemented an overall system for the management of the drugs-and-arms traffic in Central America and the Andean countries." Blandon went on to describe the joint ventures of General Noriega, Fidel Castro, and Colombian drug dealers, including overseeing and protecting drug shipments, laundering of money and the trade for Marxist arms in exchange for Cuban and Panamanian government illicit drug assistance. (28:56) Recent indictments in Miami implicate Noriega in drug-trafficking with the Colombian drug smugglers. Those indictments also implicate Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega as behind the scene manipulators. (28:57)

Illicit drug money and power is not only assisting communism, but it is dramatically weakening several Latin American governments. If intimidation and corruption fail to influence the government, then the traffickers have murdered government officials. No country better illustrates the drug traffickers' stranglehold on a government than the situation in Colombia.

Colombia's justice system has been virtually paralyzed. The powerful Medellin drug cartel is believed to have killed 50 judges, 12 journalists, and over 400 police and military. The government, army and supreme court are completely intimidated by the powerful drug lords. (4:73,82,87) Dozens of Colombia's Army officials and judges have been bought with drug money. (4:76,80) Colombia's

President Turbay stated, "Colombians are not corrupting Americans. You are corrupting us. If you abandon illegal drugs, the traffic will disappear." (4:81)

As in Colombia, corruption seems to spread with the drug trade. The U.S. Customs Service believes Mexican cooperation in drug interdiction is impossible because of the level of official corruption. Panamanian and Haitian government officials have been indicted for drug trafficking. Even the tiny Cayman Islands is a prime center for drug money-laundering. (60:6; 28:56; 43:4)

Summary

The drug problem is taking a terrible financial and moral toll upon this country. Crime, addiction, overdoses, and corruption are taxing our society's ability to cope. What is worst, the drug problem is growing. Every country involved with drug production and distribution has been weakened and corrupted. America is committed to fight a drug war--even though the main thrust has not yet been defined. Defining the direction and priority of the drug war will be the tough job of President Bush and the newly appointed Drug Czar, William J. Bennett.

Chapter II

LAWS AND POSITIONS FOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Laws Effecting the Military in the Drug War

In 1878, the President signed the Posse Comitatus Act into law prohibiting the military from becoming directly or actively involved with enforcing civil laws. (34:4)

Since 1972, the military services have been providing support to drug interdiction by civilian authorities. However, its assistance prior to 1981 had been limited, sporadic, and uncoordinated due partly to restrictions of the old Posse Comitatus Act, which allowed only "indirect" or "passive" assistance to domestic law enforcement. (50:47) Much has changed in America since Posse Comitatus was enacted. There is no longer the same degree of fear of military abuses of civil law. And more significantly, the rising drug-abuse problem in this country has overwhelmed our civil law enforcement agencies and persuaded our law makers that military involvement was necessary. So in 1981, a change to Title 10, U.S. Code, reduced many restrictions of the old Posse Comitatus Act and authorized military support to drug law enforcement agencies. Five key stipulations were designated:

- (1) The military may loan equipment, facilities, and people.

- (2) Military personnel may operate military equipment used in monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic.
- (3) Military personnel may operate military equipment in support of law enforcement agencies in an interdiction role overseas only if a joint declaration of emergency exists... (as agreed upon by key executive cabinet members).
- (4) The military may not conduct searches or seizures or make arrests. Note, most of these restrictions do not apply to the National Guard or Coast Guard, so they are free to aid local anti-drug efforts.
- (5) Use of the military may not adversely affect readiness. (1:100; 42:10A)

On 30 September 1988, along with the 1989 Defense Authorization Act, our government accepted Congressman Bill Dickinson's (R. AL), the ranking member of the House Armed Service Committee, amendment to increase the role of the military in drug interdiction. The amendment was often paraphrased to say simply... seal the borders in 45 days. Actually, the law requires the President to **order the military (including the National Guard and Reserves) to begin complete night radar coverage of the entire southern border, to seize any planes or boats smuggling drugs and to arrest the crew.** It specifically required the President to **"substantially halt" the flow of drugs across our borders within 45 days!** While being

debated, Senator Sam Nunn mocked this amendment saying that it's "the equivalent of passing a law saying the President shall, by Thanksgiving, devise a cure for the common cold."

(34:4; 15:1)

In late October 1988, Congress cleared a compromise **Comprehensive Anti-Drug Bill**, which President Reagan soon signed into law. The law imposes tough new penalties for both selling and using drugs, and it repeated the requirement for the military to join in the drug interdiction role. It included six other significant anti-drug provisions:

- (1) Permit **the death penalty** for those convicted in federal courts of drug-related killings.
- (2) Establish a **civil fine** of as much as \$10,000 for those caught with even small amounts of drugs--including marijuana and cocaine.
- (3) Allow courts to **deny certain federal benefits to convicted drug offenders**. Benefits include: federal retirement, welfare, health, disability, and veteran's programs.
- (4) **Creates a Drug Czar** with a cabinet level office. This *Drug Czar* would draw up budget requests and be primarily responsible for the war on drugs. The law dismantles Vice Presidents Bush's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). **The law specifically states that the Drug Czar may not hold another administration position.** In March 1989, William Bennett was confirmed by the Senate for this position.

(5) Provide an **additional \$484.8 million** on top of the \$4 billion that has already been appropriated.

(6) **Combat money laundering**, by strengthening record-keeping and creating record-reporting requirements by banks. Banks not cooperating would be blocked from participating in any U.S. dollar-clearing or the wire-transfer system.

(10:A16; 15:1)

Positions of the Legislative and Executive Branches

Recent presidents and Congress have generally passed laws and raised money that would counter drug smugglers. That position of attacking drug smugglers in the interdiction role was reinforced in 1986. The President's Commission on Organized Crime (PCOC) strongly endorsed the "maintenance of persistent pressure on drug traffickers, both as a deterrent and as a symbol of national determination...." Later, in 1986, the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board also asserted that the "primary objective" of drug interdiction is to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the United States. (50:1) Both of these high-level statements, as well as strong drug interdiction legislation, suggest that interdiction works because it limits the availability of drugs.

However, other less publicized reasons for supporting drug interdiction may be the real reason why Congress and President Reagan supported this type legislation. Senator Gramm (R-TX) believes that the U.S. military has to be involved to show our nation the gravity of the problem and the politician's

concern. Although not much success is expected, the very act of getting the DOD further involved sends a commitment message.

(31) There are at least two other reasons for military involvement in the drug war. Interdiction provides an increased risk to drug runners. Thus a degree of deterrence is established. And interdiction also sends a signal to foreign countries that America is serious about drug smuggling.

(50:130)

Position of the American People

The American people are very concerned about the spreading danger of drug-related problems. In the 1988 Presidential campaign, drug problems were always among the top three concerns of the voters polled. Americans are also frustrated by the inability of their local police and federal government to attack these drug problems. They seem convinced that tough new measures are needed to fight the drug war. It is therefore not surprising that public opinion polls now favor the military's involvement in the drug war. In the spring of 1988, one survey found that 65 percent of registered voters strongly favored use of the military. Another 18 percent are "somewhat in favor." (48:17) These survey results in an election year helped convince congressmen to involve the military more in the drug war.

Position of the Department of Defense

Prior to the 1989 budget law mandating military involvement, the DoD position can be summed up in four short

sentences:

- * Any military drug role must not interfere with our defense role.
- * The military is already in the drug war.
- * Drug interdiction cannot win the drug war.
- * And, we really don't want to get more involved!

On 23 July 1987, Lt Gen Stephen Olmstead, USMC, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Enforcement, and the Director of the DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement, testified before Congress on the DOD position of the military's role in drug interdiction:

I believe that in working together, the Congress and the Executive Branch have begun the arduous task of ridding American society of drugs. We are in the infant stage of this battle and at this time, there is no clear cut winner. We in Defense recognize the important role we play in the war on drugs.

To be sure, the defense of this country is and should be the military's number one priority. We must continue to maintain the delicate balance between providing drug interdiction assistance and assuring our national military readiness and national security mission imperatives. The proper role for our military forces in the drug war is to provide support so that civilian law enforcement agencies can make the necessary searches, seizures, and arrests. This will not compromise the traditional separation of the military from civilian activities. We in Defense will continue to do everything we can do legally to support the law enforcement experts as long as it does not have a negative impact on our primary mission.

Mr. Chairman, we are proud of the assistance we have provided thus far. This assistance is primarily in three areas: airborne surveillance, equipment loans, and general support.

.....

Drug interdiction alone, however, will not win the war on drugs. Victory requires the eradication of the source; punitive action against traffickers and habitual users; appropriate treatment centers for the addicted; and a "tough love" education program at home, in our schools and

in the workplace. The drug lords will be put out of business only if we and our children decide we will not be their customers and that we will not pay for our own destruction.

Just prior to Congress passing bills that would force the military into a drug interdiction role, Defense Secretary Carlucci said, "Our military doesn't want to do it. If they had wanted to be law enforcement people, they would have gone into police work." (48:17)

Perhaps Mr. Carlucci is also reluctant to dive head first into the drug war for two other reasons: a real fear of failure, and the apprehension of contributing personnel and equipment to a joint military-civilian operation where the DOD is not in charge. Mr. Carlucci has to be aware of the dismal interdiction results thus far. He must be also aware of the constant bickering and turf battles between civilian drug enforcement agencies. (60:1-5; 63:20-21; 58:1; 50:71-72; 46:22; 48:17; 61:1-9, 114-120)

Review of DoD Involvement

Although the military has been reluctant to commit itself fully to the drug war, the DOD has accumulated quite a lot of experience. Even before the 1988 law dictating military involvement in interdiction, the military interdiction role has steadily grown--as the chart on the next page reflects:

ESTIMATES OF DOD EXPENDITURES FOR DRUG INTERDICTION

(In \$ millions)

Fiscal Year	Direct	Allocated Costs	DoD Equipment
	Operating Costs		Costs Appropriated by Congress
1982	4.8	NA	NA
1983	9.7	NA	NA
1984	14.5	NA	NA
1985	54.8	NA	NA
1986	69.7	126.3	138.6
1987	72.7	131.4	314.0
1988	75.2	136.2	Not available

SOURCE: DoD Drug Enforcement Task Force (50:49)

In September 1988, Congress authorized \$210,000,000 to the DoD for its new drug interdiction role for fiscal year 1989.

(65:16)

Since 1981 the military has contributed to the drug war in the following ways:

- * About four thousand sorties of E-2, E-3, and OV-10 surveillance by the Air Force, Navy and Marines.
- * The Air Force operates three aerostat (balloon) radars around the clock.
- * The Marines have provided ground surveillance and

anti-personnel intrusion detection.

- * The National Guard has flown about 2,000 hours of aerial surveillance.
- * DoD has loaned over \$138 million worth of equipment to drug law enforcement agencies, including Army helicopters and the Mohawk aircraft.
- * In Hat Trick II, the largest interagency drug-sweep to date, DoD contributed with operational planning, a privacy radio net, and expanded intelligence.
- * The Navy provided 1287 ship days, including the PHM hydrofoils.
- * The Air Force provided and operated two helicopters in the "Bahama Operation."
- * In "Operation Blast Furnace" the Army deployed the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 193 Infantry Brigade to Bolivia for six months. The Blackhawk helicopters and the Army ground forces supported Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials and Bolivian counterdrug police forces in locating and destroying cocaine production facilities. The Air Force transported the Army units to and from South America in a C-5 and five C-130s. (59:6-9; 1:--)

In 1986, DOD records show that over 95 percent of the time, when the law enforcement agencies asked for help from the Department of Defense, in a total of 8,000 requests, the DoD supplied that assistance. (59:1)

Summary

The level of military involvement has steadily grown since the early seventies. In 1981, restrictions were removed from the 110-year old Posse Comitatus Act so as to allow support to agencies in the interdiction effort. Three types of assistance were given: surveillance, the loan of equipment, and general support. In the late eighties, as drugs began pouring into this country, the legislative and executive branches seemed convinced that drug interdiction was a prime, if not principal, avenue of pursuit in the drug war. The year 1988 opened with the nation, and its executive and legislative branches, poised to attack the drug problem with very substantial public support.

CHAPTER III

DEMAND FOR DRUGS MUST BE THE MAIN TARGET

Possible Drug War Strategies

The drug chain from production in source country to the user can be divided into four links: source-country production, smuggling, domestic dealers, and the user. Our drug war can target any of these links. And, of course, we may continue to target all four links to some degree. In this chapter, I will review the objective of targeting each link in the drug chain and the advantages and disadvantages for pursuing each strategy. Additionally, I will offer a new and radically different *wild-card* strategy, which also targets the user. This new strategy has the potential not only to win the drug war, but cause far-reaching changes to society.

Source-Country Strategy

The source-country strategy features attacks on the drug production or transshipment capability of and within a country. The objective of this strategy is to destroy the drug production and/or transshipment network within a country. This objective would be achieved by military, diplomatic, and/or economic tools of national policy. Achievement of this objective requires the cooperation and support of the host government.

Because of host government cooperation, the State Department would have to take the lead role in such a strategy. Another principal participant in this strategy would be our military. Other participants could include the Coast Guard and DEA officials.

Pro

Cutting drugs off at the source country is certainly psychologically appealing. The source-country strategy also appears to be relatively efficient, since finding and destroying coca fields and laboratories has to be easier and cheaper than interdicting drugs. "Operation Blast Furnace" in Bolivia has shown that this type of operation can be very disruptive to drug production in a source country--at least while the operation is on-going. (59:9; 1:103) Nevertheless, this strategy has many shortcomings.

Con

A closer examination of this strategy reveals almost insurmountable problems--chief among those is source country cooperation. The government of the source country must be fully cooperative in such an effort. Currently, it is hard to imagine full cooperation of the Mexican or Colombian governments, since both governments are to some degree corrupted or intimidated. (19; 1:6) Even a repeat performance in Bolivia is highly improbable. President Estenssoro received enormous criticism from his own citizens and from other Latin American countries for allowing the U.S. Armed Forces into his country. (1:104)

Even "Operation Blast Furnace" was compromised by someone in the government. A leak to the newspaper allowed all Bolivian drug traffickers several days to clear out. (1:102)

The Bolivian operation revealed that the lasting effects of the operation were not worth the cost. The effects of the source-country strategy only seem to last as long as U.S. enforcing power is present in the country. Within weeks after "Operation Blast Furnace", Bolivian drug production was back to near normal. (1:95) However, the cost for such operations are huge. The Bolivian operation cost many millions of dollars. (1:106)

Besides these major problems, there is the very real problem of a population backlash against the U.S and the host country government. Radical guerrilla groups can gain political support for attacking U.S. anti-drug programs in their country. The Shining Path has gained such support in Peru. (41:50) So many people in the source country profit from illegal drugs that anti-U.S. sentiment would certainly result. Amazing economic growth has occurred for entire cocaine growing regions of Peru and Bolivia. Farmers get several times the amount of a coffee harvest. Even hired pickers get twice as much for picking cocaine leaves as for picking coffee. The results of one harvest per acre is about a pound of cocaine. In a good year the farmer can get ten harvests each year. The drug traffickers hire scores of locals to guard and process the cocaine. That Bolivian one acre harvest of a pound of cocaine

can eventually sell for \$112,000 worth of crack in New York City. And of course a portion of the immense profit is returned to the home country and local area. (66:11,31,35)

Around the world and especially in Latin America, the drug profit motivates farmers to raise drug crops. Cocaine, heroin, and marijuana can and are being grown cheaply and quickly in a variety of countries. (41:49-50)

For a source country strategy to be completely effective, all source countries would have to be targeted continuously. Thousands of U.S. troops would thus be pinned down in many source countries. And, many Americans could be killed in sustained source-country, anti-drug operations. Colombian drug lords, especially, have fought back fiercely when their drug operation was threatened. In 1986, they killed 58 of Colombia's narcotic police. (1:98)

Interdiction Strategy

The interdiction strategy is the attack and seizure of exported drugs after they leave the source country, but before they can be distributed in the United States. The interdiction strategy may also focus on the seizure of money and valuables (payment for the drugs) returned to the source country. The object of the interdiction strategy is to halt the flow of drugs into this country or to make it economically impractical for drug dealers to export drugs to this country. This objective would be achieved by substantial interdiction forces of various law enforcing agencies and the military. The

interdiction strategy could be assisted by obtaining bilateral or international agreement and cooperation. That of course would be a job for our State Department. Perhaps a U.S. military assistance group and military attaches could also have a role in such an agreement. However, the logical principal participants of this strategy would continue to be the Coast Guard, Customs, and the military.

Pro

Despite much criticism for our interdiction strategy, there are two good reasons that support it. First, interdiction raises the cost of doing business for the drug traffickers. Some of that expense is passed on to customers. If the price for drugs is theoretically high enough, the drug trade will dry up. (16:116) Second, recent attacks on money laundering schemes have been profitable for our government and expensive to the drug traffickers. (8:65-66)

Con

When the negative side of interdiction is argued, critics often use adjectives like: "impossible," "ineffective," and "inefficient." Even our officials responsible for interdiction believe that this country cannot afford to seal itself off and inspect every plane, ship and vehicle coming across its borders. The Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Paul A. Yost Jr., recently commented on our efforts to seal our borders from drug smugglers. Citing the fast boats and numerous slow low-flying planes used to smuggle drugs, he commented that all

smugglers have to do is find just one weakness in our blockade. "There isn't enough equipment in the whole American arsenal to seal the borders of the United States." Admiral Yost believes that American law-enforcement agencies are stopping only 5 to 7 percent of cocaine smuggled into this country. (45:23)

Interdiction has also proven to be expensive and inefficient. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) cites a 1,500 percent budget increase for drug interdiction since 1977, which has failed to deter smuggling. (44:17) From October 1986 to October 1987 the Air Force spent \$2.6 million using its sophisticated Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes in an drug interdiction role. This expensive Air Force effort led to only six drug seizures and 10 arrests. That is about \$433,000 per bust. During the last three months of 1987, the Air Force's interdiction missions cost \$678,000 netting two drug busts at about \$339,000 per bust. (48:17)

Besides being inefficient, interdiction has proven to be ineffective. The RAND study on interdiction believes that retail price increases are the best way to measure the positive effects of our drug interdiction. If that is so, our interdiction program thus far has failed. In New York City the cost of 1 ounce of cocaine is now about \$900, down from about \$1,500 two years ago. (58:A1,A12)

Long-term drug storage is another negative for interdiction. Supplies of drugs can be stored for months either in the source country or in this country. During Hat Trick II

(a coordinated effort to shut off Colombian cocaine), the drug smugglers merely waited the drug enforcers out. They increased holdings in Colombia until the pressure dissipated. Both cocaine and marijuana can be stored for six months with only a slight degradation of its quality. (50:27)

The interdiction strategy does not even address the enormous amounts of marijuana grown illegally in this country. In 1987 alone over 7 million domestic plants were discovered and destroyed. (43:10)

Nor does interdiction address synthetic drugs. Even if all incoming illicit drugs were stopped, the drug market would still offer a wide range of non-imported substances: amphetamines, barbiturates, PCP, LSD, many opiates, toxic inhalants, etc. Professor Lloyd D. Johnston of the University of Michigan testified to Congress that should all imported drugs be seized tomorrow, "within months basement chemists would flood the market with synthetic substitutes." (11:27) The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee believes that all phencyclidine (PCP) and most of the methamphetamine pushed by drug dealers is made in clandestine laboratories in the United States. PCP abuse is especially prevalent in Washington D.C. That city alone accounts for over one-third of the total of PCP-related hospital emergencies in 1987. Methamphetamine use is increasing by a rate which will double the number of abusers every four years. In 1987, 561 clandestine methamphetamine laboratories were seized.

(43:38-51)

And finally, with regard to money-laundering, there, too, many are waiting to grab the large profits of the drug trade. Some banks certainly will be corrupted.

Domestic Drug-Dealers Strategy

Domestic drug dealers, besides spreading illegal drugs, cause most of the drug-related violence in this country. The drug-pusher strategy is the arrest and seizure of these drug traffickers in the United States. This strategy includes everyone in this country who makes illegal profits from the drug business: the big wholesalers, the middle men, and the street pushers. The object of this strategy is to disrupt the domestic sales network by arrest, seizures, and intimidation. The principal agencies enforcing this strategy are the FBI and state and local law officers.

Pro

This strategy is popular and visible to Americans. It penalizes those directly involved with spreading drugs and corruption to Americans. It attacks the gang murders and street violence associated with drugs. It also vents our frustrations and mobilizes even more support in the drug war. Drug-pushers and violence is what concerns voters and politicians the most.

(40:78)

Con

However, looking beyond the popularity of this strategy, there are several negatives. No matter how many drug

dealers are arrested, there will be more to take their place. Drug hoodlums will exist as long as the profits outweigh the probable penalties. Local drug dealers can make thousands of dollars in a single day. Their average daily profit ranges from 300 to 500 percent. (43:26)

The probability of arrest and the resulting penalties are only a small deterrent. Gang and drug-turf rivalry offers much more danger to drug dealers than our legal system; yet, new drug dealers are not deterred. In 1988, the Associated Press reported that 366 people were killed in our nation's Capitol. The police blame rival drug dealers for at least 60 percent of those murders. (26:6A)

If police made more arrests and judges gave longer prison sentences, there might be more deterrence to the drug dealers. However, there are two good reason that will not happen. Our judicial system is already swamped with arrests. (56:70) And, our federal and state jails are already filled beyond capacity. (3:84; 4:91)

The User (Demand-Side) Strategy... Pro and Con

The Demand Strategy targets the drug users. The object is to persuade or intimidate drug users to stop. Methods for enacting the demand strategy are prevention (through education and penalties), rehabilitation, punishment and a combination of the three. Thus far our federal, state and local governments (by and large) have used a portion of all three methods. Our educators, social service agencies, and law officers are the

principal actors in this strategy.

Pro

Many in government and law-enforcement agencies believe that the "demand-side" is the solution. (40:76) The Government Accounting Office (GAO) also believes that future efforts should be concentrated on users rather than suppliers. (44:17)

Two recent studies indicate that drug education may be starting to have a positive effect. A University of Michigan study found a decline in all narcotic use among high school seniors in the class of 1988. (56:8) Another study shows that the majority of cocaine users has shifted from the financially sound and college educated to the unemployed and poorly educated. (18:25) Education has another big advantage. It is one of the least expensive tools of a demand-side strategy. An extensive education process might cost only \$5 per child. (40:79)

Turning to the rehabilitation tool, government officials should not overlook the need and humanitarian benefit for assisting addicts. A properly administered drug rehabilitation center can save lives, and in the long run, should save taxpayers' money.

Con

As with all the other strategies, the demand-side strategy has some shortcomings. This strategy will take years of education and rehabilitation to win the drug war. And

although drug education works... it only partially succeeds. Research shows that school prevention programs succeed in only 60 percent of the children. (40:76) And treatment works... but only so well. Treatment is expensive and the success rate is only about 50 percent. Outpatient slots cost \$4,000 a year and residential slots cost \$15,000 a year. It could cost from \$8 to \$30 billion just to treat Americans currently addicted.

(40:76-78)

Rehabilitation depends on the desire of the drug user to quit. There are millions of drug-users already in this country who--given a choice--will not stop using illegal drugs.

And finally, money diverted from the supply side of drugs will weaken our present interdiction campaign.

Wild-Card Strategy

This strategy is a completely new concept--as far as I know. It, too, targets the user--but in a unique way. Even if our drug war can be won, it will consume hundreds of billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of lives, and take many years. Such a price is too high! It assumes also that we are not ready to give up the drug war and decriminalize drugs. A new idea is needed. The object of the "Wild Card" strategy is *to compete with illegal drugs. The object would be to produce a perfect drug!* A drug which would give longer-lasting pleasure, is not habit forming, is not directly harmful to the mind or body, does not impair reasoning or coordination faculties, and it could be produced cheaply and in immense quantities. Such a

drug might be a synthetic duplicate or variant of existing brain-created endorphins. Endorphins are proteins with potent analgesic properties. One group of endorphins, enkephalin, has an affinity for the so-called opiate brain receptors.

Pro

Assuming such a drug is possible, that drug could win the drug war... save lives, prevent crime, and save billions of dollars. Additionally, it could have many unexpected benefits to our over-stressed society.

If such a drug is possible, eventually, it would be produced anyway--why not produce it now? Government cost for developing this drug would be low. Drug and bio-genetic companies would rush to develop such a drug--motivated by vision of staggering profits and knowing there would be government and even FDA cooperation in marketing the drug. Enormous government profits could also be achieved by a tax on such a drug.

Con

The major problem with this strategy is uncertainty. It may not be possible to develop such a perfect drug. Our government may settle for a less than perfect drug, one with just a few side effects. And our government might lose control over the drug industries as they began producing tons of "ideal drugs" and pushing them around the world.

Drug usage of such a government-sanctioned drug would undoubtedly grow. The impact of such a cheap and potent drug on

our society would have far reaching effects. There would be very many beneficial results, but some effects would be subtle and sinister. The entire wild-card strategy will be examined in more detail in Chapter V.

Summary

There are four possible links we can target in our drug war: the source-country, interdiction, domestic dealers, and the user. All four strategies have pro and con points. A source-country campaign is presently improbable for political reasons. Interdiction has thus far proven to be costly and inefficient. An invigorated campaign against domestic drug pushers might prove to be short-lived because our judicial system and our jails are already swamped. On the other hand, a demand-side campaign could prove to be cost effective and worthwhile.

CHAPTER IV

Military Involvement--Four Big Problems?

General

In this chapter I will try to look into the future and predict problems associated with the military's involvement in the Drug War. Predicting the future is a risky venture; it's subjective and possibly quite wrong. Perception of a *problem* is also subjective. The military, our government, and the American people may each have a different view of a problem. For example, the military often expresses concern about drug interdiction detracting from the military's ability to perform its mission of national security. On the other hand, our Government and the American people see the drug war as a matter of national security--certainly an immediate threat to our country. For my purposes, I will analyze potential military-involvement problems as **only those that would detract from the overall drug war**. I have decided upon four categories of potential problems: the practicality of interdiction, insufficient training, improper organization, and the lack of a meaningful measurement of merit.

The first three problem areas are often mentioned by government and DoD officials, while the avoidance of a meaningful measurement of merit, is often cited by a critical

media and the Government Accounting Office.

Interdiction Is Expensive, Inefficient, and Ineffective

The interdiction role now gets 38 percent of the expenditures of the federal drug enforcement program. By January 1988, our government had spent well over \$600 million on drug interdiction. Despite this massive spending, our interdiction efforts have remained relatively ineffective.

(50:v-vi) Beginning in 1987, over a 15-month period there were only eight drug busts credited to the AWACS and each of those bust averaged several hundred thousand dollars in operating expenses. That's bad enough, but the average cost for one drug bust by the Coast Guard and Navy has been about \$2,000,000. In 1987 they spent \$40 million and captured only 20 boats. (48:17) Despite this huge expense, we seem to be only stopping a small percentage of the cocaine coming into our country. (27:23)

During prohibition, it took years before the Coast Guard became successful at reducing the rum-runners. The Coast Guard had to establish a picket line of ships and planes between Canada and the New Jersey coast. (51:53-55) Admiral Yost believes a similar measure would be required to stop drugs, but he hastens to add, "there isn't enough equipment in the whole American arsenal to seal the borders..." (45:23)

Planned Remedies

The U.S. Customs Service believes it has the answer to the high cost and coverage gaps. Huge--near football field size--radar blimps are being manufactured and will be raised to

loiter in static positions along the country's southern border. At a cost of \$18 million each, a total of 14 aerostat balloons are planned. Customs claim these radar systems have an operational range (radius) of 160 miles. By positioning these balloons from California to the Bahamas, the balloons are supposed to detect every plane, boat, and ground vehicle approaching our border. All 14 balloons should be airborne and detecting in their assigned positions by December 1992. Each station will have a ground station that will relay signals to command centers in Miami or Riverside. The ground stations are being manned by 12 to 16 Air Force personnel. (13:1; 25:3)

Congress believes that forcing the military to take a more active role in interdiction will improve our performance. The U.S. military is now required by law to "substantially halt" the flow of drugs. For FY 1989, Congress authorized \$210,000,000 to the DoD for their interdiction cost. (65:16)

Are Remedies Adequate?

I believe that Admiral Yost is correct; we cannot seal our borders. Here are several reasons why the planned solutions are inadequate:

Even if aerostat balloons can spot and monitor tens of thousands of vehicles, planes, and boats, there is certainly no likelihood that drug smugglers can be picked out from all the radar clutter. In the interdiction role, radar operators on board the sophisticated E-3 AWACS saw plenty of "boogies", but only a handful turned out to be drug smugglers. (50:53)

Even if the aerostat radar balloons are as effective as advertised, expensive radar surveillance planes would still probably be used to supplement the system. Only those surveillance planes can move their radar coverage down range to give more warning and tracking time. A Rand study concluded that at least some intermittent AWACS coverage is needed to keep the smugglers off guard. (50:62) However, we could settle for the just the radar balloon coverage, and save the added expense of surveillance planes.

Additionally, successful air interdiction still requires a rapid and effective C³I system and responsive pursuit planes. The two planned command and control stations are as yet unproven. (13:1) And, our experience with pursuit aircraft shows that the pursuit aircraft must be airborne or on alert status in an area close to the surveillance radar. Just a few minutes are available for interception after the boogie has been targeted before it lands or drops its drugs. Such a high state of readiness for our pursuit aircraft is manpower intensive and expensive. (50:60)

While some military roles in drug interdiction may increase, the Navy's role should remain small for two reasons. Large Navy ships do not do much better than a 110-foot Coast Guard cutter in the pursuit of drug smugglers on the high sea. And since Naval ships are deployed around the world and with few in the Caribbean, there would be limited ships for interdiction. Of course, a change in present readiness

priorities could change the Navy's deployment. (50:63)

In general, the more the military becomes involved the higher the interdiction cost will be. That increased cost could divert money from other drug war campaigns.

Besides, there are several methods of drug smuggling that are impossible for the aerostats and military to prevent. They cannot stop drugs from being hidden and shipped in passenger or freight ships and planes. Nor can they stop drugs being smuggled by people fitted with drug body bags.

Training

General Olmstead offered the DoD's concern about the training issue to Congress 23 July 1987. He stated that a soldier is not trained to be a policeman--nothing in their basic training prepares them for arresting drug traffickers. He continued saying that the citizens of America do not want "our soldiers doing police-power type things. It brings to my mind the vestige of Nazi Germany and things like that--when the Army can knock on doors and make arrests. That is, in my own mind, opposite to the American way of civil and military being separated." (59:13)

The new Comprehensive Anti-Drug Law now allows the military to "seize" airplanes, vehicles, and boats carrying illegal drugs and "arrest" the smugglers. But, the question is how will our new President and his Drug Czar use the military to interdict drugs. General Olmstead believes if the military's interdiction role was taken to extremes, ten infantry divisions

might be spread over the southern border with Mexico to stop drugs. (59:14) If such a massive deployment were directed, then training deficiencies would be a problem. That type of law enforcement role would require restraint and an intimate knowledge of Federal and state laws. However, training might be the least of our concerns. Imagine the concern of the Mexican Government or the Governor of Texas. Nevertheless, if such a deployment took place in the near future, there would be inadequately trained soldiers acting as Customs Inspectors.

There is also a possibility of using the military in a source country anti-drug action. Some in Congress have advocated the use of our Special Operations Command, composed of contingents from several services. They could be "turned loose" on foreign drug traffickers in the source country. (38:126) Such a role for our military would require additional training unless the military performed as they did in "Operation Blast Furnace." During that operation, the military worked under the direct supervision of DEA agents and in full cooperation with the source country government. (1:95)

Although there may be hypothetical situations which would require military drug-interdiction training, there have been very few complaints about current military support. Perhaps the reason for the satisfaction with the military is due to the military's current support role. Congress has always seemed to believe that any military training for its support role in drug interdiction is "incidental to normal training."

(12:6) In the military's current support role there has been only one serious area of complaint, aircraft surveillance. Training for the E-3 surveillance aircraft is oriented toward picking up military aircraft which generally are larger and faster aircraft. Also inexperienced AWACS operators often generate many low-probability targets which can drain off the available pursuit planes. They also need training at vectoring in fighters against a variety of fast and slow moving aircraft. (12:6; 50:53)

Planned Remedies

For the most part the military is waiting on the new President, Drug Czar, and Secretary of Defense to define its revised role in the drug-interdiction campaign. However, there is increased activity in the Coast Guard and National Guard. (49:6; 52:1) In January 1989, the DoD decided that the National Guard should have a larger role in the drug war. Many units of the Guard are "well suited to help and stop drug traffic." (52:1) These units will receive additional anti-smuggling training. The National Guard Bureau at the Pentagon is soliciting anti-drug projects for these special units. Texas Guard units may soon be asked to examine commercial trucks coming over the border. The Texas Guard may fly helicopters in search of marijuana farms. The Florida Guard plans to assist Customs agents check ships docking in Florida. Also Florida Guard helicopter units will search for active landing strips. (52:1,11)

In February 1987, the Pentagon announced that it had given the job of overseeing the drug-interdiction effort to the Coast Guard, which is part of the Transportation Department. If this decision is allowed to stand, then the active military would have returned itself to a support role--despite the recent Comprehensive Anti-Drug Law. (49:6)

Are Solutions Adequate?

Solutions for training inadequacies cannot be completely judged, since the DoD is waiting on its anti-drug role to be further defined. However, training thus far has been fragmented and piecemeal. Much of the military's anti-drug training is developing in the National Guard and Coast Guard. In the active forces, there is some ongoing training which requires little or no modification to adapt to the drug interdiction task. The present Army training at Fort Huachuca, which features tracking and pursuit, is ideal for drug interdiction. On the other hand, the AWACS drug role has little correlation with present Air Force training. Additionally, training and participation in drug interdiction by AWACS crews detract from the time available for them to train in their readiness mission. (50:xi)

Organization

President Bush appointed William Bennett to become the new Drug Czar in accordance with the new Comprehensive Anti-Drug Law. Mr. Bennett will have overall responsibility for the drug war. The concept for a drug czar was hammered out the

year before, during the Senate's Hearing on the National Narcotics Leadership Act Of 1987. Three reasons finally persuaded the majority of Congress and the President to accept the concept of a drug czar: the simple logic of a combined, and cooperative organization, the failure of Operation Alliance, and the continuing failure of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to coordinate and direct drug policy. (61:--)

Logic for a Combined and Cooperative Organization

The GAO, in testimony to Congress, noted that "authority and responsibility for federal interdiction efforts were split among three agencies--Customs, the Coast Guard, and DEA--in three separate departments--Treasury, Transportation, and Justice... each agency had a different program, goals, and priorities, and that led to inefficiency and interagency conflicts." (61:117)

Effective drug interdiction requires a combination of air, ground, and sea *nets*. If only one or two facets are successful, the drug smugglers will turn to another transportation means until the interdiction threat diminishes. Enforcement agencies must tighten all entry avenues to produce a noticeable effect. This combined interdiction effort seems to require strong centralized control.

Another problem with drug interdiction is that often several agencies are required to work together to produce a single drug bust. The FBI may get the *tip-off* on a smuggler.

The Customs Air Branch (with Navy E-3 AWACS) has the best means to track that smuggler's plane. The Army has the Blackhawk helicopter, which is essential to fly the arresting officers to the landing site. And, the Air Force owns the sophisticated communication equipment needed to coordinate the action of all enforcement agents. This group of agents and equipment must be brought together under some priority requirements and control and standard operating procedures. Efficiency demands some centralized control. That need for centralized control was also clearly demonstrated by the failure of Operation Alliance.

Failure of Operation Alliance

In August 1986, under Vice President Bush's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) initiative, Operation Alliance was set in motion. The project's objective was to "choke off the flow of drugs, weapons, illicit currency and other contraband being smuggled across the United States-Mexico border." The program was highly ambitious with numerous agencies and the Mexican Government pledging massive resources. American agencies participating were the Department of the Treasury, the Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Internal Revenue System, the Secret Service, the Department of Justice, the five U.S. attorneys with jurisdiction over border areas, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and its uniformed U.S. Border Patrol, the Marshals

Service, the Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

(60:3-18)

The operation appeared to have enough resources, but it nevertheless failed to stop a significant portion of drugs into this country. Although more cocaine was confiscated, the number of cocaine drug seizures actually dropped by 51 percent during the Operation Alliance's year of activity in 1987. In 1986, 246 cocaine seizures occurred while Operation Alliance only netted 120 seizures. (60:22-24)

Congressional findings listed the following reasons for the project's failure:

1. The Mexican Government did not cooperate.
2. Operation Alliance organization was unstructured.
3. Officials in charge of the Alliance did not have command authority over agents participating in the project.
4. The project failed to enlist the full and total cooperation of many of the participating Federal agencies. (60:2,4)

Not surprisingly, the recommendations of the congressional report called for a clearly defined organization with operational control given to those at the top. Congress also recommended regular audits of the Alliance, a close cooperation--especially with intelligence, and regular reporting within the Alliance and to Congress. (60:4,5)

**Failure of the NNBIS and the National
Drug Enforcement Policy Board**

Until 1988, President Reagan was opposed to the Drug Czar concept. In 1982 and 1984 President Reagan successfully defeated the Drug Czar proposals from Congress. In 1982, in an apparent congressional compromise, Reagan created the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) with the Vice President in command. (63:21) In 1984, in another congressional compromise on the Drug Czar issue, Congress and the President created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board chaired by Attorney General Meese. The board was charged with setting national drug war strategy, determining budget priorities, and implementing the strategy. (61:4)

The Policy Board and the NNBIS both seemed to lack the necessary direction, control, and leadership. A presidential commission called the board's performance "ambiguous" and lacking a "clear leadership role." (61:5) The Washington Post declared that the Coast Guard and the Customs Service had "been engaged in an extended and increasingly vicious turf war for supremacy in the federal assault against Drug Trafficking" (61:5) A GAO study showed that numerous drug law enforcement agencies were taking "credit for the same seizures and arrests. Double and triple counting was commonplace." (61:3) The chief of Operations for the Coast Guard from 1982-1985 stated that, "There was nobody in charge, and not much was achieved." (63:20) He also commented that "We need somebody who's going to kick

rear end and name names." (61:6) Even something as simple as changing a radio call sign could not be agreed upon by the Coast Guard and Customs. (58:A12) Vice President Bush (as head of the NNBIS) seemed to have "limited his focus and avoided confrontation in administration disputes even when he believed existing policy was wrong." (63:20) As late as 1987, Congress's Office of Technology Assessment found "little overall direction of the Reagan-Bush interdiction effort." (63:21)

Planned Remedies

The most important legislative remedy for organization problems has been the creation of the Drug Czar.

Another piece of legislation, the Drug Omnibus Law of 1986, authorized **two communication command centers**. Since 1983 federal agencies have urged such a control center to screen data, coordinate with all agencies, and direct assaults. The Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C³I East) Center will open in April 1989 in Miami. A second (C³I West) Center has already begun operations. Customs and the Coast Guard will jointly operate all of these facilities. (25:3) As a natural consequence of sharing control centers and working for a common boss (the Drug Czar), there should be better **sharing of intelligence** by the enforcing agencies. There could be a division of labor with specialty jobs developing in strategic planning and tactical operations. There may even be some standardization in measurements of merit, operations, and plans.

Are Remedies Adequate?

The keys to solving the organizational problem will be the strength of the new drug czar and the support of the Bush Administration. Parochialism among the Departments of Transportation, Justice, Treasury, and DoD will cause many problems for the new Drug Czar. Because of that parochialism and tradition, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard, the DEA, Customs Service, and portions of the military will be torn from their respective government departments and assigned to the new Drug Czar. Without that detachment, each of these groups working in the interdiction campaign will have two bosses-- their respective department and the Drug Czar. Their loyalty and their efficiency will thus be split. Senator Dennis DeConcini, an Arizona Democrat who turned down the job of Drug Czar, cautioned that Mr. Bennett was "going to have trouble with the Defense Department, trouble with the State Department, and maybe trouble with the Justice Department." (16:10) This situation will make it hard for a centrally-controlled drug war--especially when the Drug Czar will not be attending the President's Cabinet meetings. (16:10)

Mr. William Bennett may be a "tough" Drug Czar, but the questions are will he be tough enough to pull all the agencies together and will he lead the war in the right direction. Education and U.S. Government officials describe Mr. Bennett's approach to problems as "tough," "pugnacious," and using "media-grabbing rhetoric." (19:4) Mr. Bennett, while

-serving as the Secretary of Education, wrote a memorandum to the Justice Department in which he suggested that U.S. Military do to drug traffickers "what our forces in the Persian Gulf did to Iran's Navy." (19:4) However, as of 21 February 1989, Mr. Bennett had not disclosed where he would focus the drug war. (16:10)

Lt Gen William Odom, USA (Ret.), former Director of the National Security Agency believes that our only hope for countering illicit drugs is to detach those enforcing agencies and create a single agency to control our borders. He proposes a Border Control Department, which would be an independent agency, perhaps with cabinet rank. It would include the Coast Guard, the Custom Service, the Border Patrol and the Drug Enforcement Administration. (46:22)

Unified command and control is the most important issue in the organizational problem. Even if there is not a direct assignment of enforcing agencies to the Drug Czar, the addition of the two command centers should improve the command and control process. However, shared intelligence from such an arrangement will, probably not significantly improve interdiction efficiency. The RAND study concluded that no better than a one-in-eight hit rate would be achieved from any consolidated drug smuggling target list. (50:45) Highly specific *tip-offs* from human sources appear to be the only kind of intelligence which could improve the interdiction performance. (50:46)

Meaningful Measurement Of Merit

The most important decision the new Drug Czar can make for our interdiction program is to define our interdiction goal. That goal must have a meaningful quantitative measurement for a specific drug. Just counting arrests or tons of drugs seized doesn't really measure effectiveness or efficiency. By choosing a measurement of merit, the Drug Czar can focus his agents on an important objective and subsequently measure their effectiveness. There are two good effectiveness measurements now used by a critical GAO and media. They are the retail cost of drugs and the government average expense per bust. For the first measurement, the objective would be to drive the retail cost up each year. For the second measurement, the objective would be to drive the average expense of a bust down, by becoming more efficient and making more arrests.

Since the stated purpose of military interdiction is to reduce consumption of some illegal drugs in the United States, then he might choose an effective measurement which is related to consumption. The RAND study concluded that the retail price of drugs was the best measure for interdiction effectiveness. If interdiction effectiveness drastically improved, more and more drugs would be seized. This would raise the cost of smuggling drugs into the United States. That cost would eventually be passed onto the drug user as higher prices. Those higher prices would, in turn, reduce drug abuse. The RAND study acknowledged that there were two faults with using the retail

price of drugs:

(1) The export price of drugs has not been shown to have a direct correlation with the retail price. Increase in the seizure rate of cocaine may have little effect on consumption in the U.S, since import prices are such a small percentage of the final crack dose. Also, any consumption reduction might be overwhelmed by the increased exports to replace the seizures.

(50:26)

(2) Interdiction efforts impact on more than just retail price. The threat of interdiction makes the drug smugglers risk their lives and freedom.

Nevertheless, the K' study concluded that retail drug prices do reflect drug interdiction success. (50:27-30)

On the other hand, the Drug Czar could focus on keeping our interdiction campaign efficient--that is associating the cost of interdiction to the amount or number of drug busts. That would probably result in more frugal spending for interdiction which, in turn, could lead to money being diverted to the *demand-side* or *supply-side* strategy. Either approach would have some very real benefits to the American taxpayers.

Planned Remedies

The two above efficiency measurements are not now being used by any drug enforcement agency to measure its effectiveness. The reason is obvious; both measurements are headed in the wrong directions. If these measurements were used

to gauge our drug-war progress, it would be apparent that we were losing ground. We will have to wait to see how Mr. Bennett will measure his effectiveness.

Are Remedies Adequate?

It will indeed take a brave and farsighted Drug Czar to pick one of the two efficiency measurements. I do not believe that Mr. Bennett is willing to put his political life on the line. Enforcement agencies and the military will continue to chase irrelevant statistics. Every year they will capture more and more drugs--but only because there are more drugs being shipped. The military and other enforcement agencies will continue to brag on their success while we are losing the interdiction campaign.

Summary

This chapter covered several predicted military problems associated with four broader areas of the drug interdiction campaign. These problem areas were the general practicality of drug interdiction, the training deficiencies, organizational problems, and the avoidance of a meaningful measurement of effectiveness. To a large extent the success of dealing with all of these predicted problems will depend on the strength of the new Drug Czar and the support of the Bush Administration. Mr. Bennett will have to take control of his turf from four very strong cabinet heads including the Department of Defense. The Czar will have to possess vision and political adeptness; yet, he or she will have to make many

politically unpopular decisions. I doubt that Mr. Bennett or anyone else can do all that will be required with less authority than other cabinet members. Lastly, I do not believe that any interdiction effort (by the military or another agency) will focus on either effectiveness or efficiency.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL DRUG WAR

Grand Strategy

The grand strategy for our drug war will be determined principally by President Bush and his Drug Czar, William Bennett, within the constraints of public law and public opinion. This section will focus on the apparent direction of the nation's grand strategy and compare it to my recommendations for that strategy.

Executive Branch Direction

President George Bush has outlined his grand strategy in a series of comments and answers given during press conferences. President Bush frequently has repeated the need to concentrate on the demand side of drug abuse. He also believes that education and salesmanship will eventually reduce the drug problem to a manageable size. President Bush made the following comments during his first two months in office:

I think the elimination of drugs is going to stem from vigorous change in the society's approach to narcotics. It's going to be successful only if our education is successful. The answer to the problem of drugs lies more on solving the demand side of the equation than it does on the supply side, than it does on interdiction or sealing the borders or something of that nature. And so, it is going to have to be a major educational effort, and the private sector and the schools are all going to have to be involved in this. (7:111)

We have got to use this office (Presidency) to encourage all elements in our society to participate in the fight against drugs, in the fight to improve education, or working to make the environment better. Because we're dealing with scarce resources in terms of Federal money. (7:111)

We are not going to solve the drug use in this country through interdiction alone, through cutting off the supply alone. And a larger component of this solution lies in education, and in that whole demand side of the equation: law enforcement at home--these things. (7:128)

It's (Education is) not a small part; it's a tremendous part (of solving drug abuse). And the Federal Government can spend some on it, and the private sector has got to spend enormous amounts. The media has done a good job in terms of *pro bono* advertising, and that's got to be enormously stepped up. So, look, it has got to be a tremendous increase not only on the money but the emphasis on the educational side. I do want to find a way to step up the total funding on antinarcotics. (7:128)

Through early March of 1989, the nation's first Drug Czar has avoided public discussion on his plans and strategy. However, Mr. Bennett has vowed to "stimulate discussion of new approaches" for the drug war. (20:A16)

And certainly much discussion is going on behind closed doors. Scores of drug experts are trying to influence Mr. Bennett with their own ideas. Lee Dogoloff, Executive Director of the American Council for Drug Education, has been urging Mr. Bennett to pour 70 percent of Federal money into treatment and education. Herbert Fingartette, an addiction specialist at the University of California, strongly disagrees and believes such treatment expenditures would be wasteful.

Kennington Wall of the Drug Policy Foundation in Washington has been trying to persuade Mr. Bennett to retire his drug-warrior thinking. On the other hand, Mr. Barun, the former adviser to Nancy Reagan, is urging him to hold parents of drug users criminally responsible for their children's actions. Meanwhile, the Justice Department has told him that the Pentagon's role should be limited to logistical support and training. From this and much more advice, Mr. Bennett must distill his own drug-war strategy within 180 days of his confirmation and set goals for the 30 agencies which support and fight the drug war. (20:A16) However, regardless which strategy Mr. Bennett decides upon, it almost certainly will fall into the framework of guidance and comments previously mentioned by his President.

Recommended Grand Strategy

My recommended strategy differs little from President Bush's comments found in the beginning of this chapter. The keys to winning the drug war, as with winning the anti-smoking campaign, are **education** and **social pressure**. Although all fronts of the drug war should be pursued, the main target must be the **user and the potential user**. Our citizens should be immersed in the factual horrors of drug problems. We should run a continuous and intense multi-media campaign. We should even hire a Madison Avenue advertising agency to manage that campaign. Those professional advertising agencies have proven their ability to change ideas, desires, and behavior. Every available role model and authority figure should be solicited

to speak at schools and social gatherings. For the demand-side campaign, we should judge our effectiveness with tough questions: Are there fewer drug overdoses being reported? Are there fewer drug-related crimes? Has the price for crack gone up?

In the **interdiction campaign**, we should force the agencies assigned to use an efficiency criteria for judging their success: What did it cost to make an arrest? That criteria would highlight inefficiency for management to correct. Overall, we must reduce the cost of interdiction by at least 25 percent so that money can be invested in other more effective campaigns.

For the **campaign against domestic drug dealers**, we must increase the punishment. First the government must spend millions of dollars for new prison facilities, more federal judges, and more DEA agents. Then we can and should apply pressure by locking the drug dealers up for longer sentences. The criteria for judging success in this campaign should be a simple body count: How many drug-related convictions this month?

For the **source-country strategy**, we should take a broader and more indirect role. Since the drug problem has become an international problem, let's lead the way with an international campaign. With the cooperation of our allies and all interested countries, we should work to establish a drug-reduction incentive fund to be managed by the World Bank.

The Bank could then make incentive payments to the source countries, directly proportional to their reduction of drug production. We should also work through the U.N. to establish a joint anti-drug task force to assist any requesting source country. The criteria for judging success should be set by the World Bank and the U.N.

Although there is one more element in my grand strategy, the *wild-card* (competing drug) project, I would like to wait and cover that initiative later in this chapter. Now, I'd like to focus on the military's role in my recommended grand strategy.

Recommendations for the Military's Role

I basically agree with the Justice Department that the Pentagon's role should be limited to logistical support and training. (20:A16) However, the Comprehensive Anti-Drug Law calls on the President to direct the military to participate actively in the interdiction campaign. (65:16) I believe that a compromise position can be evolved that will involve the military much more in an **active support role** to civil authorities. Such a role could work well if two conditions exist:

(1) Selected active military units and selected National Guard units should be assigned under a drug-enforcing agency as decided by William Bennett. The DoD must understand that the primary mission of these units (unless there is a national or state emergency) will be to work drug issues as directed by the

Drug Czar. Such a position will both show Defense support, and show that DoD can act responsibly without overriding parochial interests.

(2) The Drug Czar must establish and impose a meaningful measure of merit on the military and other agencies assigned to the interdiction campaign. That measurement must be efficiency rather than the current arrest and seizure count or even effectiveness. An effectiveness criteria will not work for the military for the simple reason that it would cost too much. It has been estimated that even a doubling of interdiction success would only lead to a 10 percent rise in the price of street crack. (66:41) To achieve a price-prohibitive increase in crack would probably consume more than the total drug-war budget. On the other hand, the efficiency criteria would force cost consciousness.

I believe that there is one more important role for the military in the drug war. The military members should take the lead in speaking out against illegal drugs at public schools and civic meetings. Why should we stand by and watch as sports heroes, entertainers, educators, and policemen preach against drugs? We should offer both volunteer speakers and professional anti-drug military speakers. Our generals and commanders at all levels should support this education campaign. The benefits to the education and salesmanship process could be significant. However, the benefits to our military image could be even more significant.

Wild-Card Strategy

The education and anti-drug sales campaigns can work but it will take leadership, innovation, money and, most of all, patience. The wild-card strategy offers a quick and decisive end to the war--much as the A-bomb ended World War II. The wild-card is a perfect drug to give pleasure, relieve stress and anxiety, while having no serious side-effects. This drug would go far beyond a drug substitute for cocaine, beyond a comparison to Methadone, the heroin substitute. It would succeed so well as to effectively end the drug war.

Congress apparently believes that more drug treatment is required. Traditionally, about 85 percent of federal drug money has gone to the law-enforcement side. Last year Congress mandated a 50-50 split in that money, with half going towards education and treatment. Congress now believes that the drug problem is to a large extent a health problem. (20:A16)

The Scientific Basis for an Ideal Drug

Psychiatrists and researchers are now searching for an effective drug to curb the abuses of cocaine. They are exploring three different avenues, each based on different chemical functions of drugs. One type drug will enhance the uptake of a neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain, which may reduce the addict's craving for cocaine. A second drug type is the antidepressant. The idea is to make the addict and user less depressed and thus less in need for the cocaine

pick-me-up. The third type drug is lithium, a drug that blocks the euphoria of cocaine. Of the three, the antidepressant drug treatment seems to be the most promising. However, Dr. Kleber of Yale University is not optimistic in even this approach, because the available antidepressants are just not powerful enough. (27:21,K1)

On the other hand, the human body produces chemicals which are extremely powerful. The body is capable of producing its own morphine-like substances called endorphins. In fact, one endorphin is approximately 30 times more powerful than morphine. Endorphins are believed to be the chemicals which allow Indian yogis to endure astonishing acts such as walking on hot coals or sitting on a bed of razor sharp spikes without any apparent pain. Endorphins have also been shown to completely relieve or prevent anxiety and stress. Another line of research has shown that endorphins are responsible for the sensation of pleasure. Indeed, studies have shown that endorphins are directly or indirectly responsible for much of the pleasure during orgasm. (14:47-49; 36:715-718)

Endorphins and other protein chemicals have been evolving for millions of years. Now biochemists can duplicate and redesign many in months; however, some still take several years to produce. In a related field, genetic scientists can find the portion of a chromosome responsible for producing a certain protein and splice that portion into a chromosome of a rapidly reproducing bacterium. Then the genetic scientist feeds

and cares for that bacteria strain, while the bacteria produces the desired protein as a by-product of its existence.

(62:38-43)

How to Package It for Acceptance by the American People

The wild-card strategy is probably too radical for instant and total understanding (or acceptance) by our citizens. Nevertheless, our approach should be completely open and honest. The drug would be a substitute for cocaine and probably most other illegal drugs. The concept would be similar to the Methadone substitute--except with wider applications and implications. The American people should be informed of these facts and the need for such a drug, and that a search is underway for it.

How to Develop and Test It

Research would be expensive, but it could cost the Government comparatively little to develop. I propose that the Drug Czar outline the wild-card project to the huge international drug companies and genetic bio-tech laboratories. Our government would promise these companies federal cooperation and the possibility of large profits in developing such a drug. Federal prisoners (especial drug pushers) would be made available to volunteer to test the drugs. The Federal Drug Administration would hire scores of scientists and technicians to speed up the acceptance and selection process. Field tests of any candidate drugs would be mandatory. Those field tests would have to be closely and scientifically controlled among

test groups of addicts and drug users.

How to Implement

If a candidate drug successfully passed the FDA field tests, then widespread distribution to drug users would begin as quickly as possible. The cost of the drug for drug users and addicts would be largely subsidized by the Federal Government. A network of drug distribution and registration centers would have to be created initially. If all went well after one year, the drug distribution would be turned over to public health clinics and commercial drug stores. Only registered drug users could get the drug without a doctor's prescription. And only registered drug users would benefit from the subsidized price. That subsidy would gradually be eliminated over a three year period.

The Risk

No one can guess all of the repercussions of such a perfect drug on our society. The *genie* would be out of its *bottle* and no one could force the *genie* back. After the A-bomb ended World War II, it, too, couldn't be undone. We had to learn to live with its immense power, its immense threat, and its promise for greater things. So, too, we would have to live with the consequence of such a perfect drug. The benefits surely would be great: elimination of the drug war, instant and cheap pleasure, and freedom from pain and anxiety. However, the "*Don't worry... be happy*" philosophy could have a sinister side effect. The worst imaginable effect on man might be his

contentment with his position in life and the universe. Such contentment could slow or stop progress in society, science, and evolution.

So why risk it? I believe we would eventually discover such a drug anyway. Surely, few could doubt that the secrets of the atom would have been discovered even without the Manhattan Project. Why not try to discover that wild-card weapon now to win the Drug War?

Summary

In this final chapter, I have outlined the apparent strategy of the Bush Administration. A strategy that targets the drug users and potential drug users with the weapons of education and salesmanship. This apparent strategy also includes the need for interdiction and law enforcement--but with limited resources. I have recommended a grand strategy which closely matches the direction in which the Bush Administration is headed. However, my strategy is more definitive, and--more importantly--it designates criteria for evaluating the success of each campaign.

In regard to the military's role in the drug war, I believe two conditions are necessary for successful involvement: selected units must be detached and assigned under the Drug Czar and the selection criterion of efficiency as its measurement of merit. Finally, I discussed my wild-card strategy. A strategy which could win the drug war would have far reaching effects on our society.

After much research and thought, I believe that the drug war is indeed winnable. However, the military cannot win that war; it can only make a modest contribution. Victory will be achieved when the hearts and minds of Americans are committed to end their drug demand. And that victory will probably require the investment of thousands of lives, billions of dollars, gallons of tears, and many years.

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