PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine to coordinate military operations with other US Government departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational
doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08
DATED 24 JUNE 2011

• Changes the title to Interorganizational Cooperation.

• Updates appendices to focus more on what military commanders should know about relevant civilian organizations.

• Deconflicts the labeling of civilian-led organizations, to include the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

• Removes the term intergovernmental organization and its acronym IGO.

• Modifies civilian-led organizations into three categories: international organizations, governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

• Updates language regarding the role and mission of the United Nations.

• Clarifies the role of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives and its relationship with the Department of Defense (DOD).


• Adds description of the mission and activities of the Food and Drug Administration and better describes its relationship with DOD.

• Better explains the complexity of various US Government departments and agencies due to a lack of organic authorities and lack of appropriations to support certain activities.


• Emphasizes the benefits of a task-organized joint task force.

• Notes the placement of USAID senior development advisors and their role supporting development issues for the combatant commander.
• Clarifies the roles and missions of Customs and Border Protection.

• Identifies certain US Coast Guard maritime counterterrorism units.

• Adds language on the roles of the Federal Aviation Administration, and clarifies a statement on air traffic management security.
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• Addresses Key Considerations for Interagency Cooperation

• Covers Conducting Interorganizational Cooperation

• Presents Domestic Considerations for Interorganizational Cooperation

• Presents Foreign Considerations for Interorganizational Cooperation

Foundations of Interorganizational Cooperation

Commitment to interorganizational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of common interest, promote a common operational picture, and enable sharing of critical information and resources.

Interorganizational cooperation may enable:

Unity of effort. The translation of national objectives into unified action is essential to unity of effort and ultimately mission success.

Common objectives. Joint and multinational operations are integrated at the strategic level and coordinated at the operational and tactical level with the activities of participating United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, relevant international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nation (HN) agencies, and elements of the private sector to achieve common objectives.

Common understanding. Common understanding can enable the joint force commander (JFC) to identify opportunities for cooperation, assist in mitigating unnecessary conflict or unintended consequences, and operate effectively in the same space as external organizations.

Unity of Effort

Interorganizational cooperation can build mutual understanding of respective goals to enable unity of effort. While unity of command and the exercise of command and control (C2) apply strictly to military forces and operations, unified action among all stakeholders is necessary to achieve unity of effort in military operations involving civilian organizations and
foreign military forces, or military participation in civilian-led operations.

**Whole-of-Government**

For domestic operations, USG departments and agencies aspire to a whole-of-government approach. This approach involves the integration of USG efforts through interagency planning that set forth detailed concepts of operations. For international operations, there is no similarly robust interagency framework with equivalent statutory authorities or designated interagency roles and responsibilities.

**Coordinating Efforts**

**Strategic Direction.** Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, combat support agencies, and other USG departments and agencies.

**Applying the Military Component.** JFCs have long coordinated with USG departments and agencies such as Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the intelligence community. JFCs preparing for domestic operations maintain relationships with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies.

**Capitalizing on Organizational Diversity.** Each stakeholder brings its own culture, authorities, missions, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the mission. This diversity is an asset when viewed as an opportunity to see the problem from multiple perspectives, for generating innovative solutions, and for bringing various capabilities to the fight.

**Identifying Authorities.** Each USG department and agency derives authorities from the US Constitution, federal law, federal charters, Presidential directives, congressional mandates, and strategic direction. These authorities should be identified and documented early in the joint planning process.

**Enabling Unity of Effort.** JFCs integrate and synchronize joint operations, as much as possible, in time, space, and purpose with the actions of supporting or supported multinational forces and civilian partners.
Executive Summary

Working Relationships and Practices

In an interagency sense, the concept of supported/supporting is less about command relationships and more about the methods used to obtain and provide support. Civilian departments and agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures.

The most common technique for collaboration is the identification or formation of boards, centers, cells, working groups, offices, elements, planning teams, and other enduring or temporary cross-functional staff organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment.

Considerations for Effective Cooperation

While many NGOs might not be hostile to Department of Defense (DOD) goals, they may choose to not cooperate with DOD or USG efforts to maintain their neutrality. Private sector entities are largely motivated by business or other institutional interests. USG contractors are legally constrained by the language of their contract and generally report to, and are accountable to, only the contracting officer of the contracting agency. Cooperation between international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement.

Key Considerations for Interagency Cooperation

United States Government (USG) Department and Agency Cooperation

One difficulty of coordinating operations among USG departments and agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established. The CCMDs, Services, National Guard Bureau, JS, and other DOD organizations provide a number of liaison officers to other USG departments and agencies, or organizations, principally in the National Capital Region, to assist USG departments and agencies in accomplishing mutually assigned tasks.

Organizational Environments

Sharing information among department and agency participants is critical to ensure no participant is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, uncertainties are reduced as much as possible, and interagency decision making is empowered by a common operational picture. Common unifying goals should be clarified with a discussion on the way to achieve them.
**Executive Summary**

Based upon the roles and responsibilities of each organization with their assigned resources.

**Commander’s Communication Synchronization**

The USG uses strategic guidance and direction to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. Commander’s communication guidance is a fundamental component of national security direction. It is essential to our ability to achieve unity of effort through unified action with our interagency partners and the broader interorganizational community.

**Cyberspace Considerations**

Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures/key resources in direct and indirect ways. Threats to all interorganizational networks present a significant risk to national security and global military missions.

**Interorganizational Cooperation**

**USG organizations working to achieve national security objectives require increased and improved communications and cooperation.**

Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues.

**National Security Council System**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) regularly attends National Security Council (NSC) meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity.

**Whole-of-Government Approach**

Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC-sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address challenges to national interests.

**Joint Planning and Interorganizational Cooperation**

Once approval has been provided within the proper chains of command, the combatant commanders coordinate with affected USG entities throughout the Adaptive Planning and Execution enterprise to align the instruments of national power. When developing joint plans, planners should identify opportunities to support and promote a unified USG approach to achieve national security objectives.
### Interorganizational Cooperation

The crux of interorganizational cooperation is understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive. While the military normally focuses on achieving clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a C2 structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling shifting political, economic, social, and humanitarian interests using negotiation, dialogue, bargaining, and consensus building. Civilian organizations may have a better appreciation of the political-social-cultural situation, and have better relief, development, and public administration experience, thus potentially acting as agents of change within that society.

### International Organizations

International organizations may be established for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union (AU). NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the European Union, the AU, and the OAS are general regional organizations. However, some general regional organizations and sub-regional organizations conduct security related activities.

### Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and may have an established presence in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed.

### The Private Sector

The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. The private sector can help the USG obtain information, identify risks, conduct vulnerability assessments, and provide other assistance.

### Joint Task Force Considerations

Unlike the military, most USG departments and agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Therefore, JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level.
Organizing the Joint Force Headquarters for Interorganizational Cooperation

Joint force HQ organization structure should support interorganizational cooperation. The JFC’s mission analysis should identify each staff functional area’s requirements to coordinate with external stakeholders. The JFC should synchronize its interorganizational cooperation with adjacent DOD commands, particularly those who support or are supported by the JFC.

Information Management and Sharing

Commanders at all levels should provide guidance on information sharing outside of the USG. DOD information should be secured and made available to mission partners to the maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. Commanders, joint task forces (CJTFs) and their staffs should communicate with non-USG stakeholders from the outset of complex operations, and not as an afterthought.

Key Roles of USG Stakeholders

DHS leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters. Within DOD, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has overall authority and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning use of federal forces in homeland defense (HD) and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). Chief, National Guard Bureau is SecDef’s principal advisor, through the CJCS, for non-federalized National Guard forces. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) serves as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to manage and coordinate HD and DSCA functions at the SecDef level. The two CCMDs with major HD and DSCA missions are United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), as their AORs include the US and its territories. CJCS ensures HD and DSCA plans and operations are compatible with other military plans.

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

The use of the Armed Forces inside the US and its territories, though limited in some respects, falls into two mission areas: HD—for which DOD is lead agency and employs military forces to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and DSCA—for which DOD
supports other USG departments and agencies by providing military resources in support of civil authorities. While the HD and DSCA missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap, and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies.

**Joint Force Considerations**

When the President or SecDef directs DSCA, Commander, USNORTHCOM or Commander, USPACOM will generally be designated as the supported commander.

**State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Considerations**

When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If DOD support is required and approved as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may execute mission assignments in support of the primary federal agency that often result in a wide range of assistance to local, tribal, territorial, and state authorities. Significant incidents require a coordinated response across organizations and jurisdictions, political boundaries, sectors of society, and multiple organizations.

**NGOs**

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) (http://www.nvoad.org) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that provides a forum for organizations to share knowledge and resources to help communities prepare for and recover from disasters. NVOAD is the primary point of contact for voluntary organizations in the National Response Coordination Center (at Federal Emergency Management Agency HQ).

**The Private Sector**

The private sector owns or operates approximately 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector are partners in critical infrastructure protection.

**Interorganizational Cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas**

**Canada.** North American Aerospace Defense Command, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Joint Operations Command share the task of defending North America and building cooperative approaches to ensure its security.

**Mexico.** USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military and civil response partners to increase mutual long-term capacity to counter common security threats and build consequence management capability.
Executive Summary

The Bahamas. USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and their National Emergency Management Agency civil response partners to increase long-term capacity to counter security threats to both the Bahamas and the US and build cooperative consequence management capabilities.

Critical Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis

DHS leads the evaluation of vulnerabilities and coordinates with other federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private entities to plan responses.

Foreign Considerations

USG Structure in Foreign Countries

The Diplomatic Mission. The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with almost all of the world’s independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a party.

The Ambassador. The ambassador is the President’s personal representative to the government of the foreign country or to the international organization to which accredited.

The Embassy. The HQ of the mission is the US embassy, usually located in the capital city of the HN.

Consulates. Consulates—branch offices of the mission located in key cities—may be established in large cities or commercial centers. Consulates are often far from the US embassy. A consulate is headed by a consul general.

The Country Team. The country team, headed by the chief of mission (COM), is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body.

CCMDs. USG departments and agencies augment CCMDs to help integrate the instruments of national power in plans.

International Organizations

The UN. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the US Permanent Representative.
**NATO.** NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty.

**NGOs**
NGOs typically operate under approval of the HN and provide humanitarian or other assistance in many of the world’s trouble spots. In a hostile or uncertain environment, the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces. NGOs normally seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to military missions, which they had no part in determining.

**Military Support of NGOs**
SecDef may task US military forces with missions that bring them into contact with international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities. In such circumstances, it can be mutually beneficial to coordinate the activities of all entities in the operational area.

**Foreign Operations**
Within the executive branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external political-military relationships with overall US foreign policy. USAID is the lead agency for overseas development and disaster response and carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance.

**Joint Task Force Considerations**

**JTF Assessment Team.** A JTF assessment team may deploy to the JOA to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, multinational members, UN representatives, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector representatives.

**Organizational Tools for the JTF.** The CJTF should establish structures to coordinate all activities in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements, as well as international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and the media.

**Civil-Military Operations Center**
The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a mechanism to coordinate civil-military operations that can also provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The CMOC
generally does not set policy or direct operations, but rather coordinates and facilitates. The CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or humanitarian operations center, JTF liaison teams work to increase understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, convey information, enhance mutual trust, and improve teamwork.

**Civil-Military Teams**

A civil-military team combines diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government.

**Aligning Words and Deeds**

All USG departments and agencies share responsibility to use information as an instrument of national power. This includes developing processes to access and analyze communication and to deliver information to key audiences, both US and foreign. DOD synchronizes, aligns, and coordinates communication to facilitate understanding by key audiences.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides joint doctrine to coordinate military operations with other USG departments and agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of United States Government departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved.”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Introduction

This publication describes the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) coordination with various external organizations that may be involved with, or operate simultaneously with, joint operations. This coordination includes the Armed Forces of the United States; United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. Interagency coordination describes the interaction between USG departments and agencies and is a subset of interorganizational cooperation. Figure I-1 illustrates this point. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational cooperation across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interest, structures, and authorities. The terms “interagency” and “interorganizational” do not define structures or organizations, but rather describe processes occurring among various separate entities.

SECTION A. FOUNDATIONS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

2. Purpose

Commitment to interorganizational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of common interest, promote a common operational picture (COP), and enable sharing of critical information and resources. This commitment is based on recognition that external organizations will affect the JFC’s mission, and vice versa. Interorganizational cooperation may enable:

a. Unity of Effort. The translation of national objectives into unified action is essential to unity of effort and ultimately mission success. DOD agencies interact with interorganizational stakeholders to gain a mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions and to identify ways in which military and civilian capabilities best complement each other. The National Security Council (NSC) integrates these capabilities by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation at the national level.
b. **Common Objectives.** A number of civilian agencies and organizations—each with their own mandates, capabilities, authorities, and objectives—interact with the Armed Forces of the United States and its multinational counterparts. Joint and multinational operations are integrated at the strategic level and coordinated at the operational and tactical level with the activities of participating USG departments and agencies, relevant international organizations, NGOs, host nation (HN) agencies, and elements of the private sector to achieve common objectives. Interagency coordination is conducted between elements of DOD and relevant USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. Interagency coordination links the US military and the other instruments of national power. Interorganizational cooperation refers to broader interaction among elements of DOD; relevant USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; the private sector; and other mission partners.
c. Common Understanding

(1) JFCs can draw on the capabilities of external organizations, provide additional capabilities or capacity to those organizations, or deconflict military activities with them. External organizations may be present only during some phases of an operation or campaign. It is imperative JFCs and their staffs coordinate with the relevant interorganizational entities in the shared operational environment in order to increase situational awareness and address their respective interests, equities, and challenges. Interorganizational cooperation enables understanding between military commands and external stakeholders concerning respective interests, equities, and challenges. Common
understanding can enable the JFC to identify opportunities for cooperation, assist in mitigating unnecessary conflict or unintended consequences, and operate effectively in the same space as external organizations.

(2) DOD should provide participating external stakeholders with consistent and coherent information to synchronize efforts and minimize confusion at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. DOD elements—including Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DOD agencies and field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands (CCMDs)—should work with USG partners to develop objectives, which identify DOD’s role. DOD’s organizational culture, procedures, and hierarchical structure may facilitate consensus building and development of an internal DOD position prior to conducting interorganizational cooperation, especially at the strategic level. However, this DOD internal consensus may require compromise to tailor DOD capabilities to enable unity of effort to attain the USG end state. OSD and the Joint Staff (JS) coordinate with the NSC staff; JFC’s staffs work with, and through, their OSD and JS counterparts to facilitate interagency coordination and establish and maintain dialogue on national objectives. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]) and JS involvement helps ensure interagency coordination is synchronized and cohesive at all levels. Greater visibility of DOD-wide coordination with other USG departments and agencies enables the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to balance competing global requirements and present a unified DOD position.

(3) Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other JFCs should assign personnel to facilitate interorganizational cooperation to better prepare for smooth transition activities from shaping to crisis response or major operations and campaigns.

3. Unity of Effort

a. Within the USG, unity of effort can be diminished by organizational stovepiping, crisis-driven planning, different core missions, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. When USG departments and agencies do not coordinate sufficiently, they may interpret national policy guidance differently, develop different objectives and strategies, and set different priorities, and therefore, not act in concert toward national objectives. In a coalition, the interests and practices of participating foreign governments and military forces, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities are distinct from, and at times can compete with, USG interests, further exacerbating these issues. Interorganizational cooperation can build mutual understanding of respective goals to enable unity of effort.

b. Interorganizational cooperation seeks to find commons goals, objectives, or principles between different organizations; set the conditions for unified action through planning and preparation; and leverage cross-organizational capabilities for unity of effort during execution.

c. In military operations, unity of effort is facilitated by first establishing unity of command. Unity of command is based on the designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned and attached forces in
Introduction

pursuit of a common objective. Commanders exercise military command and control (C2) to ensure military operations are planned and conducted in accordance with (IAW) the guidance and direction received from the President and SecDef in coordination with other authorities (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] or United Nations [UN]). In operations involving interagency partners and other stakeholders where the commander may not control all elements, commanders should seek cooperation and build consensus to achieve unity of effort toward mission objectives.

For more information on unity of effort, see Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

d. While unity of command and the exercise of C2 apply strictly to military forces and operations, unified action among all stakeholders is necessary to achieve unity of effort in military operations involving civilian organizations and foreign military forces or military participation in civilian-led operations. Unified action is the DOD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach. Unified action is promoted through close, continuous coordination and cooperation, which seeks to minimize confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic or personnel limitations.

e. A rigid military, C2-focused approach may be counterproductive to building interorganizational relationships and may impede unified action. Achieving unity of effort is a continuous process, requiring constant effort to sustain interorganizational relationships. If at all possible, these relationships are best established prior to the operation or crisis. This lays the groundwork for trust, which facilitates communication and quicker actions.

f. Even where an overall USG strategy for a particular operational area has been agreed to by all USG departments and agencies involved, individuals are likely to interpret that mission through the lens (or perspective) of their particular agency’s core mission. The goal of improving unity of effort is to achieve a broad consensus approach in applying instruments of national power toward common objectives. The Department of State’s (DOS’s) 3D Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense states, “…to achieve unity of effort, it is not necessary for all organizations to be controlled under the same command structure, but it is necessary for each agency’s efforts to be in harmony with the short- and long-term goals of the mission.” The Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide: Improving Unity of Effort is a planning and synchronization aid to improve intergovernmental unified action. The framework is especially useful in planning before operations begin and is most effective when applied at the beginning of the planning process. It can serve as an interagency operational template for those missions in which DOD is not the lead agency. Four attributes can guide a framework that can improve unity of effort:

(1) Common vision or goals for the mission.

(2) Common understanding of the operational environment.

(3) Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency.
(4) Compatible measures of progress and ability to change course, if necessary.

For more information on unified action and unity of effort, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. For more information on the challenges associated with unified action and interorganizational cooperation, refer to Decade of War, Volume 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA570341).

4. Whole-of-Government

a. For domestic operations, USG departments and agencies aspire to a whole-of-government approach. This approach involves the integration of USG efforts through interagency planning that set forth detailed concepts of operations; descriptions of critical tasks and responsibilities; detailed resource, personnel, and sourcing requirements; and specific provisions for the rapid integration of resources and personnel directed in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, National Preparedness. The National Preparedness System contains five national planning frameworks (NPFs) (https://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks) that spell out USG departments and agencies’ responsibilities to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk, as called for in PPD-8, National Preparedness—National Prevention Framework, National Protection Framework, National Mitigation Framework, National Response Framework (NRF), National Disaster Recovery Framework.

b. For international operations, there is no similarly robust interagency framework with equivalent statutory authorities or designated interagency roles and responsibilities. Some policies, processes, and organizations facilitate whole-of-government efforts (for example, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization; Department of Defense Instruction [DODI] 3000.05, Stability Operations; DOS’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations [CSO]; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI] to coordinate the activities of all USG intelligence agencies). Security cooperation programs under Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 2282 authority are developed through a process of joint formulation between DOD and DOS.

5. Coordinating Efforts

a. Strategic Direction. The President, assisted by the NSC, provides strategic direction to guide USG departments and agencies. Strategic direction is provided in national level documents such as the national security strategy (NSS), Defense Strategy Review (DSR), National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, NPFs (the NRF is one of five NPFs), National Strategy for Maritime Security, National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Unified Command Plan. Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the JS, CCMDs, Services, combat support agencies, and other USG departments and agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by
which the President, SecDef, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide policy and strategic guidance to DOD.

(1) Within the USG, the NSS guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national security objectives. The President signs the NSS, and the NSC is the principal forum to coordinate its strategic-level implementation. With respect to DOD, this effort informs the development of strategic direction that is used by the CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for operational and tactical-level guidance.

(2) In the context of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), systematic and deliberate interorganizational cooperation is mandated at the strategic level to enable an enhanced response. The Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction states, “DOD must be prepared for complex WMD crises with global implications, such as the transfer of WMD or material of concern, the creation of WMD safe havens, or the threatened or actual use of WMD. DOD must also be prepared to respond to the theft or loss of control of WMD or material of concern in states that are weakly governed or under internal or external pressures. These risks present unique challenges to DOD that require adaptive or innovative operational concepts, the flexible application of military force, and the effective integration of interagency and international capabilities.” The strategy also states that “existing relationships with partners must be maintained and deepened, and new partnerships must be sought out and created. Additionally, DOD must coordinate with NGOs that can provide enhanced capabilities and capacities.”

*For more information, refer to JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

(3) The NRF presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for, and provide a unified national response to, domestic disasters and emergencies. The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response and describes the roles and responsibilities of USG departments and agencies, including DOD, for delivering the core capabilities required.

*For more information, refer to the NSS; JP 3-27, Homeland Defense; and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.*

b. **Applying the Military Component.** JFCs have long coordinated with USG departments and agencies such as DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the intelligence community (IC). JFCs preparing for domestic operations maintain relationships with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies; DOJ, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), which provides coordination with the adjutants general (TAGs) of the 50 states, District of Columbia (through its commanding general), and the three territories. Other JFCs preparing for foreign operations coordinate selectively with multinational partners, international organizations (e.g., the UN and NATO), NGOs, and HN agencies.
(1) Solutions to complex problems seldom reside exclusively in one department or agency. Joint campaign and operation plans should be developed to optimize the core authorities, competencies, and operational capabilities of other departments and agencies, particularly when DOD provides support to those departments and agencies. Planning for department or agency expertise should also occur within a commander’s estimate (Level 1) and/or within a base plan (Level 2), depending on requirements. Annex V (Interagency Coordination) of specific joint concept plans (CONPLANs) and/or operation plans (OPLANs) should capture much of this information. Additionally, other sections (e.g., annex A [Task Organization], annex B [Intelligence], annex C [Operations], annex G [Civil Affairs], annex W [Operational Contract Support], and annex Y [Commanders’ Communication Synchronization]) should also contain pertinent interagency information.

For more information and sample formats, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.

(2) In many situations, DOD serves in a supporting role. Thus, commanders and their staffs may need to adjust or adopt procedures, especially planning and reporting, to coordinate military operations with the activities of other organizations. DOD interaction with international organizations; NGOs; state, local, and tribal authorities; and the private sector is conducted with the knowledge, approval, assistance, and cooperation of the chief of mission (COM) in foreign countries and DHS (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]) in the US. USAID and DHS may also facilitate DOD interaction with these entities. DOD may also develop direct relations with these organizations to prepare for potential coordinated response operations.

c. Capitalizing on Organizational Diversity. Each stakeholder brings its own culture, authorities, core missions, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the mission. This diversity is an asset when viewed as an opportunity to see the problem set from multiple perspectives, for generating innovative solutions, and for bringing various capabilities to the fight. It can also present challenges in achieving unified action and a common understanding of the operational environment and mission goals. The core missions of different agencies and organizations may not coincide with the JFC’s mission.

d. Gathering the Right Resources. Commanders should identify available resources and capabilities, and determine how to work with mission partners to apply them. Despite potential philosophical, cultural, and operational differences, JFCs should foster an atmosphere of cooperation that contributes to unity of effort.

e. Identifying Authorities. Each USG department and agency derives authorities from the US Constitution, federal law, federal charters, Presidential directives, congressional mandates, and strategic direction. These authorities should be identified and documented early in the joint planning process (JPP). International organization authorities are based on their formal agreements with member governments and rely
largely on consensus among their members. NGOs are independent of the USG, although they may have certain contractual obligations when they receive USG funding. Private sector organizations are bound by the laws of various jurisdictions, including their home jurisdiction and any location where they do business.

f. **Enabling Unity of Effort.** JFCs integrate and synchronize joint operations, as much as possible, in time, space, and purpose with the actions of supporting or supported multinational forces (MNFs) and civilian partners. The extent of cooperation and coordination between various organizations with the joint force will vary based on the nature of the operation (e.g., offensive/defensive, peacekeeping, or humanitarian) and the organization’s capabilities, mission, and role.

6. **Working Relationships and Practices**

a. **Supported and Supporting Roles.** Relationships between military and civilian departments and agencies cannot be equated to military command authorities (e.g., operational control [OPCON], tactical control [TACON], support) as described in JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. In an interagency sense, the concept of supported/supporting is less about command relationships and more about the methods used to obtain and provide support. During combat operations, such as Operation DESERT STORM, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG departments and agencies. In foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, such as the Haiti earthquake, DOD provided support to USAID’s Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). When civil authorities receive military support (approved by the President or SecDef), the CCMDs typically support another civilian department or agency (e.g., Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] as part of NRF Emergency Support Function [ESF] #8, Public Health and Medical Services). Members of the National Guard (NG) may be activated in a Title 10, USC, status; in a Title 32, USC, status; or in a state active duty status to support domestic operations.

b. **Coordination.** Civilian departments and agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures. However, when the incident command system (ICS) is used, it is typically under a unified command structure used when more than one department or agency has incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. The ICS is a standardized, on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide an integrated organizational structure that can accommodate complexity and the demands of multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or international organization hierarchies. However, they often occupy the same operational space, and efforts must be made for coordination.

*For more information, refer to Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guidelines_handout.pdf).*

c. **Collaboration.** The most common technique for collaboration is the identification or formation of boards, centers, cells, working groups, offices, elements,
planning teams, and other enduring or temporary cross-functional staff organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These cross-functional staff organizations generally fall under the principal oversight of the joint force staff directorates. This arrangement strengthens the staff’s support to mission execution. Inclusion of participating civilian department and agency representatives in the various cross-functional staff organizations enhances collaboration. JFCs should consider selective integration of participating civilian departments and agencies into their day-to-day operations.

d. **Liaison.** Direct, early liaison can facilitate the flow of accurate and timely information about the crisis area, especially when civilian department, agency, and organizational activities precede military operations. Early liaison can also build working relationships based upon trust and open communications among all organizations.

*For more information on collaborative techniques and employment of liaison officers (LNOs), refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

**7. Considerations for Effective Cooperation**

a. Military policies, processes, and procedures can be different from those of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to interorganizational cooperation. The various USG departments and agencies often have different, and sometimes conflicting, legal authority, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which make unified action a challenge. In addition, some international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities may have policies that are antithetical to those of the USG, particularly the US military. US membership in an international organization does not guarantee that the international organization will act in a manner that supports or is consistent with US policy or objectives. While many NGOs might not be hostile to DOD goals, they may choose to not cooperate with DOD or USG efforts to maintain their neutrality. Private sector entities are largely motivated by business or other institutional interests. USG contractors are legally constrained by the language of their contract and generally report to, and are accountable to, only the contracting officer of the contracting agency. Activities outside the scope of the contract require a new contract or modifications to the existing contract.

b. The military relies on structured and hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed planning; the use of standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures; and sophisticated C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian departments and agencies may employ similar principles, but may not have the same degree of structural process, and their organizational structure is often more horizontal. Decision processes may be more ad hoc, collaborative, and collegial. Cooperation between international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement. Many NGOs are signatories to various codes of conduct, which include the responsibility to share information for effectiveness, safety, and other reasons. An understanding of the differences in decision-making processes is essential to avoid confusion during
It is essential that all stakeholders understand the definitions of the terms used in interorganizational cooperation. A continuous information exchange among stakeholders can mitigate confusion.

c. US military forces provide unique capabilities to USG efforts. These include military-to-military relationships, extensive resources (e.g., logistics), and people ready to rapidly respond to multiple global crises. Additional unique military capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructures; robust organizational and planning processes; civil affairs (CA) personnel and their civilian-acquired skills; and air, land, and sea mobility support for intertheater or intratheater requirements.

### NOTIONAL RANGE OF INTERACTION TERMS

The following terms are a range of interactions that occur among stakeholders. There is no common interorganizational agreement on these terms, and other stakeholders may use them interchangeably or with varying definitions. The following descriptions provide a baseline for common understanding.

**Collaboration** is a process where organizations work together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus.

**Compromise** is a settlement of differences by mutual concessions without violation of core values; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing positions, by reciprocal modification of an original position. Compromise should not be regarded in the context of win/lose.

**Consensus** is a general or collective agreement, accord, or position reached by a group as a whole. It implies a serious consideration of every group member’s position and results in a mutually acceptable outcome even if there are differences among parties.

**Cooperation** is the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other departments and agencies does not require giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.

**Coordination** is the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved, and bringing their contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole.

**Synchronization** is the process of planning when and how—across time and space—stakeholders will apply their resources in a sequenced fashion.
d. Operations involving extensive USG and multinational involvement present significant coordination challenges. Mutual understanding of mission objectives and clear lines of authority enable successful execution. Normally, existing authorities dictate the primary or lead agency. In cases where the USG lead is unclear, a department or agency may be designated by the President or NSC.

e. Joint force operations can reinforce USG diplomatic, development, and law enforcement initiatives and other activities. As an example, DOS regional and/or integrated country strategies and geographic combatant commander (GCC) theater campaign plans (TCPs) are coordinated and synchronized.

f. Successful interagency cooperation depends on the ability of JFCs, the COM or the ambassador, the CJCS, and the secretaries or directors of USG departments and agencies to personally work together. Interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, persuasion, compromise, and consensus building contribute to achieving unified action. Successful JFCs and their staffs work continuously to build personal relationships that inspire trust and confidence. The challenges of gaining consensus and creating synergy among the USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and nongovernmental entities are greater, as they are significant because of the constant rotation of DOD personnel and other staffs, and there are generally no clear authorities directing these relationships. JFCs and their staffs can address these challenges by developing personal relationships, using liaison elements, and making conscious decisions on the degree of reliance on those external stakeholders for critical tasks. It is not necessary to “own” every asset to ensure access. The long-term institutionalization of personal relationships should be a goal. When personal relationships do not exist (e.g., with the arrival of a new commander or key staff member), then the command’s positive reputation, built over time, can enable coordination.

SECTION B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

8. United States Government Department and Agency Coordination

a. One difficulty of coordinating operations among USG departments and agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established. Organizational differences exist between the US military and USG departments’ and agencies’ hierarchies, particularly at the operational level. In defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), military forces may not be familiar with existing structures for disaster response. In foreign operations, existing structures may be limited or not exist at all. Further, overall lead authority in a crisis response and limited contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador, COM (usually, but not always, the ambassador), or other senior civilian who will provide policy and goals for all USG departments and agencies. When a disaster is declared, the DOS geographic bureau of the affected area becomes the key participating bureau.
b. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent organizations. Physical or virtual interagency teaming initiatives, such as joint interagency task forces (JIATFs), joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs), or routine interagency video teleconferences, improve reachback and expedite decision making. Figure I-2 depicts comparative organizational structures in the context of four levels of decision making.

c. CCMDs coordinate with civilian department and agency representatives in two primary ways. The first is through an LNO, where the individual retains parent agency identity and a direct reporting relationship (e.g., a member of one of the CCDR’s cross-functional staff organizations such as the JIACG). The second is through direct assignment (i.e., civilian agency detail) to the command in the same capacity as a DOD employee. USG departments and agencies may deploy relatively junior personnel compared to their military counterparts. This difference in age, seniority, experience, or

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<th>Levels of Decision Making</th>
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<td>National Strategic</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Secretaries of State, Homeland Security, etc.</td>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development administrator</td>
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<td>Theater Strategic</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>Ambassador</td>
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<td>Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)</td>
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<td>administrator</td>
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<td>Operational</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>Defense Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>Embassy Country Team staffs</td>
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<td>FEMA region directors</td>
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<td>Federal coordinating officers</td>
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<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Task Force or Service Component Commander</td>
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<td>Agency Field Representatives (e.g., Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance disaster assistance response team)</td>
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<td>Domestic response teams</td>
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Figure I-2. Relevant United States Agency Organizational Structures Levels of Armed Forces of United States Executive Departments and Agencies
status should not cause unnecessary friction. Carefully crafted memorandums of agreement (MOAs) can specify detailees’ rating and reviewing chains, tasking authority, and other clauses that are explicitly designed to overcome this potential source of friction.

d. The CCMDs, Services, NGB, JS, and other DOD organizations provide a number of LNOs to other USG departments and agencies, or organizations, principally in the National Capital Region, to assist USG departments and agencies in accomplishing mutually assigned tasks.

e. Pursuant to the Interagency Partnership Program, senior-grade United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) officers serve as special operations support team (SOST) members. The SOST assists in accomplishing mutually assigned tasks in the President’s National Implementation Plan. SOST members work within the IC, leverage requirements in the IC, facilitate reporting, and process information requests.

9. Organizational Environments

a. The Nature of Interagency Coordination. The executive branch of the USG is organized by function with each department performing certain core tasks. Each department and agency of the executive branch of the USG is established by its enabling or organic legislation. Congress appropriates department and agency funds based on the missions set forth in that legislation, and the ability of an agency to execute specific missions is therefore constrained by both its general authority under its enabling legislation (i.e., whether the enabling legislation allows it to perform certain functions) and the availability of funding to perform those the activities permitted under the enabling legislation. Congress assigns resources based on an agency’s core tasks rather than on the execution of specific missions. Individual department and agency interests, reinforced by congressional funding for specific programs or projects, frequently impede interagency cooperation. In executing national security policy, the NSC plays a critical role in unifying the efforts of the interagency community through a strategic collaborative process. NSC principals and deputies are supported in their policy functions by the NSC staff. CCMDs should be proactive in seeking OSD and JS assistance to access the NSC staff to understand individual departmental interests to enable interagency coordination. CCMDs should establish permanent direct lines of communications with partner agencies through periodic video teleconferences, teleconferences, and visits.

b. Building a COP. Organizations such as DHS/FEMA and USAID/OFDA remain continuously focused on crisis response, while crisis response is not the primary mission of other USG departments and agencies. Crisis response may not be among the other departments’ and agencies’ missions defined in their enabling legislation and, consequently, they may not have the staff or funding needed to perform such missions. Participating departments and agencies divert attention, resources, and personnel away from other priorities and their principal missions to accommodate other USG departments and agencies in achieving overall USG goals. Differing department and agency perspectives, capabilities, culture, and interests can cause conflicts on how best to execute a mission and carry out policy in a crisis. Sharing information among department and agency participants is critical to ensure no participant is handicapped by a
lack of situational awareness, uncertainties are reduced as much as possible, and interagency decision making is empowered by a COP.

c. **Unified DOD Position.** Close coordination among the OSD, JS, and the CCMDs is required to ensure a unified DOD position is developed that supports the overarching US policy and strategy.

d. **Establishing Unifying Goals.** Reaching consensus on unifying goals is important for success. At the national level, consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and usually results in an NSC committee meeting summary of conclusions, a PPD, or a political-military (POLMIL) USG strategic-level plan that establishes the goals of an operation and interagency responsibilities. The objective is to ensure all USG departments and agencies clearly understand national policy objectives and responsibilities. To the extent authorized by law, compromise that limits the freedom of individual departments and agencies may be required to gain consensus. Persistent efforts to reach consensus should not undermine the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual departments and agencies. The greater the number of organizations and the more diverse the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. The JFC recognizes that even when specific goals are agreed upon, they still may be interpreted differently by the various interagency partners. Goals alone are not sufficient. They must be accompanied by an interagency plan, aligned with national objectives. Common unifying goals should be clarified with a discussion on the way to achieve them based upon the roles and responsibilities of each organization with their assigned resources.

e. **Mutual Needs and Interdependence.** Organizations’ interests, policies, and core values are considered to facilitate cooperation. Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to employ its resources to achieve the objective. Interdependence can facilitate strong working relationships among departments, agencies, and organizations. For example, DOS facilitates DOD overseas deployment by negotiating some transit and basing agreements. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes resources such as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, security, and money. It establishes a framework for cooperation. Resource allocation among USG departments and agencies is governed by numerous laws, policy, and regulation. The staff judge advocate (SJA) and comptroller should plan and review joint force funding and resource strategy. The appendices describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these departments and agencies and organizations.

f. **Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives.** When discussing objectives between agencies, it is important to understand that the definition of long-term and short-term objectives can vary widely between government agencies. A short-term objective for one agency may be measured in weeks, while in years for another. Long-term objectives from the national level shape short-term objectives at the tactical level. At the national level, OSD and JS work with the NSC interagency policy committees (IPCs) to set policy goals. The GCC and subordinate JFCs identify short-term operational and tactical
objectives supporting the long-term objectives, through operations coordinated with interagency partners (e.g., ambassadors, country teams, multinational and agency staffs, and task forces).

g. When military and civilian agencies share the same operational environment, tension may exist due to different interpretations of strategy and objectives. Military commanders often emphasize immediate action to reduce the risk of violence. Development specialists often focus on structural faults related to HN government legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy can cause instability and further conflict. These approaches generate tension and lead to disjointed programming and disparate results.

(1) During stabilization efforts, the dynamic tension between near-term military imperatives and longer-term development objectives can be managed through interorganizational cooperation. The JFC may consider creating an integrated planning team or other temporary entity to address how military activities may be better synchronized and complement the work of the development community.

(2) USG developmental resources are investments to repair underlying structural faults and may be essential for enabling longer-term stability. Longer-term development efforts should often begin at the same time as joint force operations; when this is necessary, they must be well synchronized and sequenced.

10. Commander’s Communication Synchronization

The USG uses strategic guidance and direction to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. Commander’s communication guidance is a fundamental component of national security direction. It is essential to our ability to achieve unity of effort through unified action with our interagency partners and the broader interorganizational community. Fundamental to this effort is the premise that key audience beliefs, perceptions, and behavior are crucial to the success of any strategy, plan, or operation. For its part, DOD must be a full participant in developing a
government-wide approach that implements a more robust, synchronized communication effort. This is accomplished by aligning words and deeds. Military pronouncements and actions should be coordinated with efforts conducted across the USG.

For more information on commander’s communication synchronization, refer to Chapter IV, “Foreign Considerations,” and JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

11. Cyberspace Considerations

Most aspects of joint operations rely on being able to operate effectively in cyberspace, the global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Developments in cyberspace provide the means for the US military and other stakeholders to gain and maintain a strategic, continuing advantage in the operational environment and can be leveraged to ensure the nation’s economic and physical security.

a. Cyberspace reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries. It is integrated with the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce, governance, and national security. Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures/key resources in direct and indirect ways. Military missions taking place in cyberspace are growing both in number and importance; similarly, operations in cyberspace increasingly impact commercial, energy, financial, and business sectors as well. These characteristics and conditions present a paradox within cyberspace: the prosperity and security of our nation have been significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace, yet these same developments have led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace—for the US in general and the joint force in particular.

b. Threats to all interorganizational networks present a significant risk to national security and global military missions. Transformational changes to DOD’s cyberspace culture, workforce, technology, policy, and processes are required to meet the challenges expected by the rapidly evolving operational environment. These changes must be taken into account by all entities when planning joint operations. All organizations with which DOD interacts are likely to heavily leverage cyberspace and cyberspace capabilities.

c. To expedite interoperability, there is often the temptation to bypass cyberspace security procedures and best practices in favor of mission accomplishment. JFCs should keep the risks to DOD information networks at the forefront of planning priorities. Moreover, these factors necessitate close coordination in leveraging existing capabilities and aligning policies, standards, and systems of relevant stakeholders while maintaining separate and distinct authorities, roles, and responsibilities to operate effectively in cyberspace and mitigate the risk posed by our adversaries, both state and non-state actors. For example, DOD, DHS, DOJ, and the private sector provide unique capabilities and venues for increasing cybersecurity to secure cyberspace IAW the National Strategy for

For more information on cybersecurity, refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
CHAPTER II
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

“The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of US national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail.”

Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
January 2012

1. General

a. USG organizations working to achieve national security objectives require increased and improved communications and coordination. This chapter provides a frame of reference that reflects all levels of interorganizational involvement.

b. Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Where direct participation is not feasible, joint planners should consider the activities and interests of external stakeholders that affect the command’s mission. The CCDR, through the campaign plan, works with civilian organizations to build annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the joint plan. Emphasis should be placed on operationalizing the theater TCP or functional campaign plan (FCP) to facilitate cooperation among all partners, awareness of non-partners, and collective problem framing and synchronization of the CCDR’s campaign plan with other interagency planning products. Subordinate JFCs leverage the planning efforts of the CCMD while also building civilian organization participation into their plan and participate in integrated planning with the embassies. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter identifies tools for the commander to facilitate interorganizational cooperation in domestic or foreign operations.

2. The National Security Council

a. The NSC is the President’s principal forum to consider and decide national security policy. The NSC is the President’s principal arm to coordinate these policies among various USG departments and agencies.

b. DOD Role in the National Security Council System (NSCS)

(1) Key DOD players in the NSCS come from the OSD and JS. SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the National Security Council/Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). If appointed, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair a National Security Council/interagency policy committee (NSC/IPC).
(2) A primary statutory responsibility assigned to the CJCS in Title 10, USC, is to act as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. The CJCS does this through the NSCS. CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. The other members of the JCS may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice provided by the CJCS.

(3) The Military Departments implement, but do not participate directly in, national security policy-making activities of the interagency process. They are represented by the CJCS.

c. The JS Role in the NSCS

(1) The CJCS acts as spokesperson for CCDRs operational requirements and represents CCMD interests in the NSCS through direct communication with the CCDRs and their staffs.

(2) The JS provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or designee) for policy decisions made by the OSD. It coordinates with the CCMDs, Services, and other USG departments and agencies, and prepares directives (e.g., warning, alert, and execute orders) for SecDef approval. These orders include definitions of command and interagency relationships.

(3) Within the JS, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the JS, Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence Directorate], Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Directorate], Joint Staff J-5 [Plans Directorate], and Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development Directorate] are focal points for NSC-related actions. The JS J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the JS J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the JS J-5 often focuses on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each JS directorate solicits Service input through the Military Departments. SecDef may also designate one of the Service Chiefs or functional CCDRs as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities for specific mission areas.

For more information on the NSC and its membership, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

d. The CCDRs’ Role in the NSCS. Although the CJCS presents the views of the CCDRs at the NSC, the CJS may request and leverage CCMD participation at key NSC forums, including IPCs, NSC/DCs, NSC/PCs, and other events (e.g., Cabinet-level exercises). Execution of CCMD campaign plans by CCDRs is enhanced by robust interaction with interagency partners based on standing authorities. JS and OSD will coordinate authorizations through the NSCS.

3. Whole-of-Government Approach

a. A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-
government approach identifies combinations of USG capabilities and resources that could be directed toward the strategic objectives in support of US regional goals as they align with global security priorities. Commanders integrate the expertise and capabilities of participating USG departments and agencies, within the context of their authorities, to accomplish their missions.

b. Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC-sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address challenges to national interests. Whole-of-government planning is distinct from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DOD planning, which remains a DOD responsibility.

c. Planning and consulting with stakeholders optimizes the instruments of national power to achieve operational objectives and attain strategic end states in support of US regional goals in support of global security priorities.

d. USG civilian departments and agencies have different cultures and capacities, and understand planning differently. Many organizations do not conduct operational planning. To compensate for these differences, commanders should ensure joint force organization initiatives and broader interagency processes help sustain civilian presence in military planning.

e. Hallmarks of successful whole-of-government planning and operations include:

   (1) A designated lead or primary agency.

   (2) All USG instruments of national power are integrated into the process.

   (3) Agency core missions are related to mission goals.

   (4) Participants forge a common understanding of the operational environment and the problem USG activities are intended to solve.

   (5) Active lines of communications and pre-established relationships to allow for the ease of information sharing.

   (6) A shared USG goal and clearly stated objectives to achieve results through comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementation level.

   (7) A common determination of what resources and capabilities are to be aligned to achieve the planning objectives.

   (8) A defined strategic objective.

f. Guidelines to operationalize a whole-of-government approach require that:

   (1) Commanders and civilian decision makers consider all USG capabilities to achieve objectives.
(2) Planning groups include personnel from all sectors and organizations.

(3) Ongoing or existing policies and programs are reassessed, modified where necessary, and integrated into the objectives and desired outcomes defined for the mission and strategic end state.

(4) Planners consider and incorporate interagency capabilities, resources, activities, and comparative advantages in the application of the instruments of national power.

4. Joint Planning and Interorganizational Cooperation

   a. CCMD campaign plans, also known as TCPs and FCPs, implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy as identified in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) or other issuances, and implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy. Designated CCMD campaign plans direct the activities the command will do to shape the operational environment and deter crises on a daily basis. The commander identifies the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMD, prioritizes objectives (to include the contingencies the command is directed to prepare for), and commits those resources to shape the operational environment and support the national strategic objectives. The commander assesses the commitment of resources and makes recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts in the region. CCMD campaign plans direct military activities (including ongoing operations, security cooperation activities, intelligence collection, exercises, and other shaping or preventive activities) that shape the operational environment to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies.

   (1) Strategic Guidance. CCDRs develop objectives based on strategic guidance provided by the President, SecDef, and CJCS. CCDRs coordinate planning for
operations, actions, and activities at the theater, strategic, and operational levels to achieve strategic objectives.

(2) Once approval has been provided within the proper chains of command, the CCDRs coordinate with affected USG entities throughout the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise to align the instruments of national power. The CCDR is guided by USG strategic guidance and planning, with respect to USG departments and agencies, and disseminates that guidance to the joint force in annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the CCMD’s campaign plans. Considering how best to integrate civilian and military efforts in a mutually supportive way is essential throughout the JPP. Developing a well-crafted and articulated annex V to joint plans is the primary method within POLMIL planning, from the strategic through operational levels, for explaining the linkages and tasks necessary for mission success across all phases of integrated civil-military efforts. Interagency partners should participate at the earliest phases of the operation or campaign. Linking agency actions to phases of the operation enables scheduling and coordination. The development of annex V should enhance early operational coordination with planners from the other USG departments and agencies that will be involved in the operation’s planning and execution.

(a) When developing joint plans, planners should identify opportunities to support and promote a unified USG approach to achieve national security objectives.

(b) CCMD campaign plans direct military activities (including ongoing operations, security cooperation activities, intelligence collection, exercises, and other shaping or preventive activities) that shape the operational environment to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies.

(c) During plan development, planners should identify decision points and desired preparatory activities to be performed by external stakeholders that enable transition from a DOD-supported to DOD-supporting role. Concurrently, planners should analyze and plan for reverting back to a DOD-supported role in the operation.

(d) CCMD campaign and contingency plans should establish a framework to estimate interorganizational and interagency support to DOD activities and DOD support to civilian activities, and then validate, by stakeholder, projected support required.

(3) Flexible deterrent options (FDOs) are pre-planned, deterrence-oriented, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions that are carefully tailored to send a signal to influence an adversary’s actions. The basic purpose of FDOs is to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power—but they are most effective when used to combine the influence across instruments of national power and should include interagency partner participation. The intent of FDOs is to facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out the perception of a wide range of interrelated response paths.
For more information on FDOs, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

b. Plan Development and Coordination. Although planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there may be crisis situations that call for an immediate US military response (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation or FHA). CCDRs frequently develop courses of action (COAs) based on recommendations and considerations originating in DOS joint/regional bureaus or in one or more US embassies. The country team provides resident agency experience and links through the CCMD and by extension to agency HQ in Washington, DC. Emergency action plans at every US embassy cover a wide range of contingencies and crises and can assist the commanders in identifying COAs, options, and constraints to military actions and support activities. The GCC’s staff also consults with JS and other organizations to coordinate military operations and synchronize actions at the national strategic and theater strategic levels. Under the promote cooperation program, the JS J-5 facilitates periodic interagency working groups that include CCMD planning staffs, other DOD offices, and agency partners for collaboration on planning (e.g., campaign and other contingency plans). Promote cooperation events enable interagency partners’ insights on environmental changes to be shared with the CCMDs.

(1) Initial concept of operations (CONOPS) may require revision based on feasibility analysis and consideration of related activities (particularly regarding logistics) by USG departments and agencies and other stakeholders. For example, primitive or damaged seaport and airport facilities may constrain operations by limiting the throughput of personnel and supplies. Such information is frequently provided by the country team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in country. Directly or indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities to identify the capabilities to achieve unity of effort.

(2) Planning conducted by the CCMD should be coordinated, through the OSD and the JS, with all stakeholders and USG departments and agencies. Joint planning will align with wider USG policy and, in coordination with US diplomatic missions, complement or synchronize with parallel interagency activities. Plans will identify assumed contributions and requested support of interagency partners and comply with the guidance issued in the GEF and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) related to incorporating interagency input into CCMD planning. Planning will focus on identifying:

(a) Requests for additional policy direction.

(b) Operational capabilities, security cooperation activities, and development and diplomacy efforts of interagency partners and other stakeholders.

(c) Legal and administrative agreements with interagency partners that should precede joint operations.
(d) Requirements (e.g., resources, people, and authorities) to improve interagency contributions or effectiveness (done in consultation with OSD, JS, and interagency partners).

(e) Criteria for DOD to transition between supported and supporting roles.

(3) Interagency and Interorganizational Stakeholder Involvement in CCMD Plan Development. The quality of CCMD plans will improve with the early and regular participation of other USG departments and agencies and other stakeholders during planning. However, USG departments and agencies only have the capacity to support development of a limited number of DOD plans. During planning, CCDRs and their staffs:

(a) Develop options, tasks, and coordination requirements for specific operations and activities directly with affected COMs and state and local authorities.

(b) Share information with, and rely on the subject matter expertise of, LNOs and representatives from other USG departments and agencies detailed to the CCMD.

(c) Conduct internal planning with LNOs and representatives from other USG departments and agencies detailed to the CCMD.

(d) Identify and disseminate communications plans IAW established laws and policy to facilitate ongoing and future coordination and information sharing.

(4) CCDRs should, in coordination with the CJCS, seek SecDef intent and guidance before developing campaign plans, contingency plans, or CONPLANs/OPLANs with other USG departments and agencies.

(5) OUSD(P) and JS J-5’s Joint Operational War Plans Division support CCMD planning conferences and workshops involving multiple USG departments and agencies. OUSD(P), via JS J-5, may authorize direct liaison between CCMD planners and their HQ-level counterparts in other USG departments and agencies for planning. The promote cooperation program ensures DOD speaks with one voice and information shared with other USG departments and agencies is fully vetted and authorized. CCMDs work through OUSD(P) and the JS to organize and coordinate these conferences and meetings. Efforts to integrate other organizations into DOD planning efforts are complementary to whole-of-government planning, which is directed by the NSC or a designated lead agency.

c. The GEF translates national security objectives and high-level strategy into DOD priorities and comprehensive planning direction. The GEF identifies SecDef’s strategic priorities and policy, and conveys his guidance for near-term plans and defense posture. The JSCP is promulgated by the CJCS. It implements the strategic policy guidance provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the development of plans. Together, the GEF and JSCP provide guidance and task CCDRs and staffs to develop TCPs and FCPs that integrate security cooperation (shaping and other military
engagement activities) planning, contingency plans as campaign plan branches, and subordinate campaign plans as CCDRs consider necessary. Posture plans seek to align and synchronize access and needs across CCDR TCPs, global campaign plans, and contingency plans. In developing CCMD campaign plans, coordination with other stakeholders can facilitate collective problem framing and planning at the outset to achieve unity of effort. The linking of posture and security cooperation planning, and military engagement and deterrence activities, along with contingency planning, allows CCDRs to efficiently employ resources and direct operations in alignment with strategic objectives. The APEX enterprise is the compilation of joint policies, processes, procedures, tools, training, education, and stakeholders used to develop and implement joint plans and orders to achieve national security objectives.

d. The efficiency and effectiveness of USG departments and agencies is diminished if they are excluded from joint planning. The quality of military planning and the subsequent effectiveness of operations and achievement of US strategic objectives can be enhanced by early and sustained participation of relevant USG stakeholders during strategic assessment, policy formulation, and planning.

(1) Annex V (Interagency Coordination) should be consistent with the planning guidance contained in CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*. A CCDR is responsible for developing annex V for TCPs, FCPs, OPLANs, and usually for Level 3 CONPLANs. A supported JFC, not a CCDR, is responsible for developing annex V for OPLANs and usually for Level 3 CONPLANs. Annex V should specify, for participating USG departments and agencies, the following: the capabilities desired by the military, the shared understanding of the situation, and the common objectives required to accomplish the mission. Annex V also provides a single location in a plan to capture potential contributions of USG departments and agencies; identify potential DOD supporting roles to other USG departments and agencies; and frame mutually agreeable, integrating relationships (coordination and collaboration processes), linkages, and methods. This enables agency planners to plan in concert with the military, to better determine their support requirements, and to suggest other USG activities or organizations that could contribute to the operation.

(2) DOD plans are approved by SecDef (or designee). While they are not “cosigned” by other USG departments and agencies, DOD typically seeks input from them to gain broad USG consensus.

(3) The military plan may be in support of a wider USG effort. In this case, annex V may approach the same level of effort and importance as annex C (Operations).

(4) The following considerations should guide annex V development:

(a) Leverage habitual relationships developed during shaping to coordinate with interagency partners early in the process.

(b) Develop collaboratively and integrate all instruments of national power.
(c) Identify DOD and interagency cooperative activities toward mutual goals and objectives.

(d) Synchronize the development and content of annex V with the development and content of other portions of the plan dealing with interorganizational cooperation (e.g., annex G, [Civil-Military Operations]).

(e) Develop and share an unclassified and releasable Annex V with agency and multinational partners.

e. In concert with the NSC staff, OSD, other USG departments and agencies, JS, and CCDRs should:

(1) Identify USG departments and agencies that are involved in the operation, or could contribute to it. In most cases, these USG departments and agencies will, in turn, ascertain which international organizations, NGOs, and elements of the private sector should be involved in the operation. Early engagement could ensure support of operational requirements and support unified action.

(2) Understand interagency, international organization, NGO, and private sector relationships and core missions, to include the lead or primary agency identified at the national level. Understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of OSD, the CJCS, JS, CCMDs, and the Services, as well as the different command arrangements, in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the political, business, and personal relationships that affect dealings with international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities.

(3) Define the objectives of the response. These should be broadly outlined in the summary of conclusions from the relevant NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorize USG participation. Within the military chain of command, objectives are further elaborated in tasking orders that include the commander’s intent. Civilian agencies generally have no equivalent to statements of commander’s intent. Joint planners should identify orders or directives that guide their USG counterparts.

“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN [United Nations] and NGO [nongovernmental organization] community in-theater literally ‘met on the dance floor.’ Given that a JTF [joint task force] commander’s concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US Government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support…”

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, US Army
Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE
(4) Develop COAs for the specified and implied military tasks based on mission analysis. Identify potential stakeholder roles and capabilities that can be leveraged in support of those tasks to enhance unity of effort. Interorganizational capabilities should be leveraged, when it is practical, to reduce costs and military footprint.

(5) Communicate with each participating USG department and agency or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays. In many situations, participating departments and agencies, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or colocated with the CCMD’s staff. The CCDR should request temporary assignment of representatives or LNOs, or otherwise open up reachback and dialogue. OSD and JS can facilitate communication at the national strategic level, while the country team can facilitate communication at the operational level. Considering the relative size of agency staffs, it may be necessary for the military to send LNOs to other organizations.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities or authorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence for possible solutions is the first step toward resolution. These obstacles often are assumed to have been addressed by another department or agency, or organization. If the obstacles cannot be resolved, they should be forwarded up the military chain of command immediately for resolution.

(7) Identify resources relevant to the situation. Military and civilian planners should determine which departments and agencies, or organizations (to include HN) are committed to providing resources to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify additional resource requirements.

(8) Define the desired end states, plan for transition between phases, and recommend termination criteria. The CCDR should confirm and synchronize anticipated roles, capabilities, and commitments of non-military actors during transition.

(9) Maximize joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, state, national, or international response to a crisis. Interorganizational capabilities should be leveraged, where possible, to best utilize joint force assets.

(10) In the absence of formal embassy structures or designated lead agencies (e.g., USAID/OFDA) for overseas disaster response, coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams or teams organized under the auspices of an international organization (e.g., the UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

(11) Develop and implement an information sharing strategy. Use methods and tools that enable interorganizational cooperation to occur. Planners should ensure proper operations security (OPSEC) procedures are in place to prevent the disclosure of critical
information. Identify and resolve interoperability issues to assure seamless sharing of information.

(12) Incorporate, support, and participate in interagency planning processes. Various civil-military analyses may be available to inform military planning (e.g., USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework [CAF], DOS’s Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework [ICAF], and public-private assessments facilitated by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Regardless of the specific methodology, the kinds of analysis conducted by these organizations provide critically important insights for military planners. Along with other open-source resources available about a given country or operational area, assessments such as CAF and ICAF are essential for military planners to build their understanding of the operational environment and accurately define the problem to be solved.

(a) The CAF provides users with an approach to analyze and respond to violent conflicts. Since its release, the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation has conducted over 60 conflict assessments in every region where USAID operates, informing agency policy, strategic planning, programming, and implementation. The CAF provides guidance to conduct assessments and generate recommendations that mitigate conflict drivers and bolster social and institutional resilience, effectiveness, and legitimacy. The CAF embodies USAID’s unique methodological approach to help USAID missions and operating units evaluate the risks of armed conflict, the peace and security goals that are most important in a given context, how existing development programs interact with these factors, how the programs may (inadvertently) be doing harm, and where and how development assistance and humanitarian assistance (HA) can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and to build peace.

(b) The ICAF uses a conceptual framework very similar to the CAF. It seeks to understand the underlying causes of conflict, and identify resources and strategies to prevent and mitigate conflict. Based on insights from social science research, the ICAF examines key actors who currently are, or likely could, either drive or mitigate conflict; their motives, means, and strategies for doing so; and upcoming windows in time that provide strategic opportunities for these actors to begin or change such efforts. The ICAF also examines the social groups with whom they have influence, the grievances or key interests that key actors may use to motivate these groups for conflict, and underlying social and institutional properties. Importantly, it also examines social and institutional resiliencies that mitigate grievances and enable society to function normally and peacefully (e.g., peaceful religious teachings or economic interests that link people across conflict lines) that key actors may utilize to mobilize people and resources against conflict or leverage to transform conflict. Each element of this framework can be used to design conflict interventions. The ICAF differs from the CAF in that it is applied to informing a broader range of interventions, including diplomatic, military, and developmental, and can be used to guide and coordinate actions by a range of USG, international, and local actors, as appropriate. The original form of the ICAF emphasized collaborative workshops and field research by interagency teams, and in this mode was used to inform interagency planning and projects for conflict prevention and mitigation. The DOS’s CSO subsequently revised the ICAF to draw on a broader range of
methodologies that can more flexibly access non-permissive environments, produce more timely analysis, take advantage of new data collection and analysis technology, by using multiple methods in a complementary fashion. The revised ICAF methodology also emphasizes targeted key questions, accessible products tailored to audience and purpose, an iterative approach, participation of local partners as appropriate and translating findings into targeted realistic recommendations that are mindful of existing efforts and policies.

For more information on the CAF and ICAF, refer to https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTk xNjkiZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MzIxNDI3&pID=NTYw&attchmnt=VHJ1ZQ==&rdp =ZmFsc2U= and http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf, respectively.

f. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet a supported CCDR’s requirements, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian departments and agencies. JIACGs (or equivalent organizations) complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the national strategic level through the DOD and the NSC. Members participate in planning and provide links back to their parent civilian departments and agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with their efforts.

(1) JIACG is a common DOD term across CCMDs. Each CCMD has formed unique organizations (e.g., interagency partnering directorate, interagency group, interagency board of directors), with similar functions to respond to a wide range of missions across operational environments.

(2) If augmented with other partners, such as international organizations, NGOs, and multinational representatives, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) enhances the capability to conduct interorganizational cooperation.

For more information on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

5. Interorganizational Cooperation

a. The Civil-Military Relationship. The crux of interorganizational cooperation is understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive. The most productive way to look at this relationship is seeing the comparative advantages of each of the two communities. While the military normally focuses on achieving clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a C2 structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling shifting political, economic, social, and humanitarian interests using negotiation, dialogue, bargaining, and consensus building. Civilian organizations may have a better appreciation of the political-social-cultural situation, and have better relief, development, and public administration experience, thus potentially acting as agents of change within that society. They work at the local and national, government level, focusing on state-to-state and ministry-to-
Interorganizational Cooperation

ministry relations, and in community development activities where they have substantial insight into local conditions and local operational requirements. At the same time, civilian agencies generally work in permissive environments and may not understand military goals and operations. While the ways and means between military and civilian organizations may differ, they share many purposes and risks, and the ultimate overall goal may be shared. Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with different priorities and procedures is a daunting task. The following steps support an orderly and systematic approach to build and maintain coordination and collaboration:

(1) **Develop a Shared Understanding of the Operational Environment.** Civil-military efforts should seek to first establish a shared view of the operational environment upon which future discussions and decision making will be based.

(2) Forge a Collective Definition of the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem. Forging shared understanding is difficult because operational environments can be complex, ambiguous, confusing, and dynamic. Appropriate representatives from relevant departments and agencies, and organizations, to include field offices, should be involved at the onset of the planning process and share their perspectives. This may include the deployment of an interagency assessment team to the affected area. Stakeholders should be included during planning, execution, and assessment.

(3) Understand the Objectives, Priorities, and Desired Conditions for Success for Each Involved Organization. Commanders and the counterpart decision makers should establish agreed upon objectives that will become the focus of all interorganizational cooperation. Additionally, civilian and military organizations should develop a mutual understanding of planning processes and terminology that enable staffs to exchange information effectively. For example, military end states and transition criteria might be understood by other stakeholders as desired conditions for success that partner agencies view as accomplishing strategic guidance. Being able to effectively communicate across military and civilian terms that are clearly understood by all members of a combined planning effort is a key part of effective collaboration and coordination contributing to unity of effort. Commonly proposed are suggestions to standardize various terms and concepts across the interagency partners with intentions of improving communication effectiveness and efficiency. This temptation should generally be avoided, as an agency’s lexicon is often derived from specific legal authorities or formal policy guidance, and attempted standardization may unintentionally obscure the meaning or alienate the term or concept from its own specific policy/doctrine. Accordingly, the importance of recognizing differences in lexicon used by the stakeholders and working through them is paramount.

(4) **Develop Common, Agreed Upon Assumptions to Drive Planning Among the Supported and Supporting Departments and Agencies.** Collectively validate the assumptions throughout the planning and execution of operations. Commanders understand that the assumptions underlying some of the plans and programs developed by agencies for permissive environments, or for operations where the US does
not have a large footprint, may not be appropriate for uncertain or hostile environments or operations with a large military presence.

(5) Understand Differences

(a) Understand the differences between US national objectives; military end state and transition criteria; and the objectives of other governments, international organizations, NGOs, the private sector, and the parties to the conflict. Although international organizations and NGOs may participate at some level in defining the problem, their goals and objectives may not align with those of the USG. International organizations, including those in which the US is a member, may not necessarily support JFC objectives. NGOs are normally influenced heavily by their principal donor organizations and their priorities may well constrain collaboration with US forces. Some NGOs may depend on grants and contracts from the USG for their activities in the area of operations, thereby underscoring the importance of collaborative planning with USG civilian agencies.

(b) When US military forces perform homeland defense (HD) or DSCA missions on US territory, they must understand and appreciate the differences between federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and NGO objectives and desired CCMD objectives and supporting military end states. After a major disaster, there may be dozens of federal, state, tribal, and local governments, departments, agencies, and NGOs responding, as well as many private sector organizations. The majority of the US critical infrastructure is owned and/or operated by the private sector. The disparate jurisdictions, objectives, viewpoints, and cultures can present immense challenges to coordination and collaboration in support of missions and efforts. DOD is in support of a lead federal agency, usually DHS/FEMA. The federal coordinating officer (FCO) prioritizes support based on the local, state, tribal, and national priorities, and evaluates and provides resources to meet the needs of the community and the leadership (see Figure II-1).

For more information on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

(6) Establish a Common Frame of Reference. Differences in terminology and, in the case of foreign organizations, the lack of a common language, complicate coordination. The meaning of terms such as “safe zone,” “impartial,” or “neutral” to a JFC may have completely different connotations to another organization’s representative. The operational implication of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. The lexicon differences commonly experienced among the Services increases when working with other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. Terms such as “shaping,” “pre-conflict,” and “irregular warfare” can have negative effects on relationships. To mitigate this problem, JFCs and their staffs must anticipate misunderstandings and establish clearly understood common terms. They should reduce the use of military-specific terms and acronyms, and define these when necessary. See DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and the Services’ supplements. Joint force staffs should also strive to learn terminology used by other organizations. See, for example, USAID Primer (http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html) and the US DOS and USAID Strategic Plan (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf).
For more information, see DOS and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan, FY 2014–2017, and USAID’s Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense.

(7) **Capitalize on Experience.** Review after action reports and lessons learned (e.g., the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, Services’ lessons learned systems, and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute Lessons Learned Information Management System [https://www.pksoi.org]) to develop proposed COAs. Although sometimes less formal, organizations outside DOD frequently have their own processes or systems (e.g., the DHS’s Lessons Learned Information System).

(8) **Develop COAs or Options.** A good COA is a potential method of accomplishing an assigned mission. Each COA may contain embedded options that describe alternatives to accomplish designated objectives as conditions change. Resource-sensitive problems require flexibility and unified planning that considers the capabilities of all stakeholders. A robust information exchange among USG departments
and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector facilitates the formulation of viable options.

(9) **Support a Comprehensive Approach.** In broad terms, develop unified action by building a strategy to integrate all relevant instruments of national power with multinational partners, HNs, and other participants. Identify the key objectives to attain the strategic end state. Multiple organizations need a coherent plan to guide simultaneous military and civilian department and agency efforts.

(10) **Establish Responsibility.** Participants can forge a common sense of ownership and commitment when they understand what needs to be done and agree on how to do it. The resources for a mission must be clearly identified, with specific and agreed responsibilities assigned to the supporting departments and agencies. To receive reimbursement from USG departments and agencies or international organizations for materiel support, JFCs must identify and establish lines of authority and accounting procedures.

*For more information, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, and DODI 4000.19, Support Agreements.*

(11) **Establish an Interorganizational Element.** Establish an interorganizational cooperation office, staff element, or process tailored to the mission and situation. Organizations such as JIACGs (or equivalent organizations), interorganizational cooperation directorates, special staff offices, civil-military operations centers (CMOCs), JIATFs, boards of directors, and other structures and processes are focused on interorganizational cooperation and increased shared situational awareness. Continuously operating centers, forums, or processes provide a “focal point” for all stakeholders and enhance planning and execution. These focal points can take many forms and are not necessarily run by the military. If properly organized and supported, they can help overcome bureaucratic impediments to typical coordination tasks. Early integration of stakeholder capabilities into the planning process may identify gaps that can be mitigated by stakeholder capabilities and resourced to assist the CCMD in achieving desired objectives and promote unity of effort.

(12) **Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions.** In most stabilization efforts, civilian organizations and other stakeholders remain after the military has departed the operational area. USG departments and agencies should plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military commanders to civilian authorities prior to deploying military forces. This process starts at the national level, but is sustained at the CCMD level. When interagency partners, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector do not participate in transition planning, military operations may be withdrawn prematurely or protracted to compensate for activities normally conducted by those entities. As plans and orders are developed, transition planning should identify trigger points to initiate or resume interagency, international organization, NGO, and private sector activities. JFCs and their staffs should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations.
Interorganizational Cooperation

(a) Transitions should be carefully planned in detail with a clear articulation of responsibilities (who, what, where, when, and how), be it military or civilian led. Eliminate as much ambiguity as possible while retaining a degree of flexibility, as conditions will undoubtedly change during execution. As the lead transitions from the military to the civil authorities, significant military resources may be required to support civil operations, and there may be a requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian organizations as they assume responsibility.

(b) Unity of effort is particularly important in the latter phases of a campaign, but is very difficult to achieve as more and more organizations get involved in the transition process. Continuity on the military side is important to success during transitions.

(13) **Direct All Actions Toward Unity of Effort.** Unity of effort focuses all actions toward USG objectives. Because DOD will often be in a supporting role, it might not determine the mission or specify the participating organizations. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization and is the product of successful unified action. DOS takes a more diplomatic approach: “In order to achieve unity of effort, it is not necessary for all organizations to be controlled under the same command structure, but it is necessary for each agency’s efforts to be in harmony with the short- and long-term goals of the mission.” There is a subtle distinction. One mission area may be a combat operation that will require intergovernmental support for shaping actions; the other may be a mission in which the joint force is supporting DOJ or DHS and must harmonize actions with the lead agency (e.g., the President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime). Interagency planning and preparation should improve unity of effort by facilitating all government agencies to use their capabilities in a mutually supportive fashion through common understanding.

(14) **Develop an Information Sharing Strategy.** Information sharing is making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems). Information sharing includes the cultural, managerial, and technical behavior by which one participant uses information held or created by another participant. Improving DOD’s ability to share information helps to realize the power of information as a strategic asset:

(a) Facilitate unity of effort across mission and domestic or multinational operations.

(b) Improve the speed and execution of decisions.

(c) Facilitate rapid adaptability across mission and domestic or multinational operations.

(d) Improve situational advantage and set the conditions for success.

b. The following are key focus areas for interorganizational cooperation to foster an integrated approach:
(1) Dialogue. Continual dialogue with national leadership helps CCDRs identify national objectives, desired end states, DOD priorities, and how those will be supported by CCMD objectives. The relevant risks and policies must also be assessed. The JFC translates this strategic national guidance into military objectives. This translation is ongoing because national and international positions and objectives are fluid. Dialogue enables CCDRs to keep joint operations and desired military end states aligned with national and international objectives.

(2) Analysis. JFCs should analyze the operational environment with non-DOD partners to identify complexities, interconnected people and systems, and other variables.

(3) Actions. JFCs should align military actions with those of the other stakeholders. JFCs should use mission-type orders, coupled with guidance and intent, to empower decentralized military operations that are synergized with those of our partners. Establish a command and organizational climate that facilitates inclusion of all stakeholders. A structured integrated approach should provide a method to evaluate and integrate stakeholder contributions across all phases to meet mission needs.

(4) Accountability. The JFC is accountable for military operations regardless of limited resources or absence of support by others.

6. International Organizations

An international organization is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. International organizations may be established for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the UN, NATO, Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union (AU). NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the European Union (EU), the AU, and the OAS are general regional organizations. However, some general regional organizations and sub-regional organizations conduct security-related activities. For example, the AU conducted peacekeeping operations in the Sudan through the AU Mission in Sudan and operations in Somalia via the AU Mission in Somalia. The Economic Community of West African States, a sub-regional organization, formed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and supported peacekeeping operations in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interorganizational cooperation.

7. Nongovernmental Organizations

a. NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Where long-
term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and may have an established presence in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed.

b. Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, NGOs can lessen the civil-military resources that a JFC would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although NGOs may have philosophical differences and divergent agendas from military forces, short-term objectives are frequently similar. Identifying common ground with NGOs can be mutually beneficial, although NGOs often object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian or development nature and in very few cases related to assisting the military. For US forces, there are legal restrictions on the provision of support to NGOs. NGO activities and capabilities are factors the JFC assesses when selecting a COA.

c. Civil society and civil society organizations are nongovernmental, voluntary groups that organize themselves on behalf of individual citizens and local communities. An active civil society partners with government to fill public services and holds government accountable, by pressing for transparent and fair governance, with equal access to government services for all people. Traditional civil society and civil society organizations include religious, tribal, cultural, and informal organizations. Modern civil society and civil society organizations include universities, community-based organizations, professional and trade associations, media, charities, artists, and NGOs financed with national funds.

For more information on civil society and civil society organizations, see the UN website (http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do).

8. The Private Sector

a. The private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. Private sector organizations range from large and multinational to small with limited resources and focused on one country. The private sector also includes contractors. There may be a plethora of small private sector entities and NGOs in a country. The private sector can help the USG obtain information, identify risks, conduct vulnerability assessments, and provide other assistance. Private organizations’ assistance to the USG is most prominent during security cooperation, combat support, and reconstruction.

For additional information on DOD policies and procedures concerning contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force, see DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).
Chapter II

b. **Multinational Corporations (MNCs).** MNCs, as business entities, are distinct from the “not-for-profit” NGOs. MNCs may have local insight, in-country equipment and resources, pre-established organization, and means to reconstruct devastated areas. MNCs operating in country prior to US intervention are often knowledgeable concerning local government, culture, terrain, and logistics needs. The Department of Commerce (DOC) and DOS in countries where the US embassy is resident can provide advice and contacts for MNCs. In addition, MNCs will likely be motivated to protect their investments and revive their own business operations. US strategic interest may overlap with MNCs’ agendas, particularly in relation to crisis resolution, regional recovery, and building social and economic security. Coordinating operations with MNCs is complex and different in scope and objective than the typical NGO interaction. While NGOs generally have a limited mission and a small footprint, MNCs are often integrated with national, regional, and local governments, with widespread investments, holdings, and large and diverse work forces. MNCs may provide the joint forces with contracted services or may be brought into the area of operations as contracted entities.

c. **Academia.** Universities, think tanks, and research organizations can provide important resources to DOD. In the US, academic organizations and consortiums (e.g., the Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institute for Defense and Business, and the University of Colorado Natural Hazards Center) provide research, knowledge, and ideas, and establish dialogue between DOD and academia.

d. **Operational Contract Support.** Contracting is commonly used to augment organic military capabilities with other sources of support (e.g., multinational logistic support and HN support) and to provide support where no organic capability exists. Contracting should be planned for and integrated into the joint force logistic support effort. Operational contracts may also support stabilization efforts through local awards, which strengthen the local economy. If time permits, operational contracts should be coordinated among relevant USG departments and agencies (e.g., DOD, DOS, and USAID), international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector to minimize risk, inefficiencies, duplication, and excessive competition between consumers. Normally, the JFC establishes operational contract support-related boards. All partner organizations in the operational area with contract support interests should be encouraged to participate in these boards.

*For more information, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.*

e. The Department of Labor (DOL) provides the government interface with the workforce. DOL can provide advice on how to increase effectiveness of organizations to meet the needs of the indigenous population and any foreign workers in the operational area.

*For more information on the DOL, refer to Annex L, “Department of Labor,” to Appendix A, “United States Government Departments and Agencies.”*
9. Joint Task Force Considerations

a. When it is necessary to establish a JTF, the establishing authority is normally a CCDR (see Figure II-2). The CCDR develops the mission statement and CONOPS based upon direction from SecDef, as communicated through the CJCS. The CCDR appoints a commander, joint task force (CJTF), and, in conjunction with the CJTF, determines the capabilities required to achieve military objectives. The CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ, to accomplish the objectives.

b. **JTF Attributes.** The JTF organization has a commander, command element, and forces to execute the mission. The JTF construct is flexible and JTFs are task-organized to fit mission requirements. They often blend Service capabilities to form functional components. A task-organized approach can provide for the phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. A JTF is normally designated when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more military departments but, increasingly, the mutual support of numerous USG departments and agencies, and collaboration with international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF HQ commands and controls the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities of other USG departments and agencies, MNFs, international organizations, NGOs, the private sector, and HN forces and agencies. A principal distinction between a JTF and a Service command is the JTF’s greater emphasis on interorganizational cooperation to achieve unity of effort.

c. **JTFs in the Interagency Process.** Unlike the military, most USG departments and agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Therefore, JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level. The USG interagency process requires the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of USG departments and agencies, international organizations, HN forces and agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. The JTF HQ provides an important basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Depending on the type of operation; the extent of military operations; and the degree of agency, international organization, NGO, and private sector involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian departments and agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the country team, the joint field office (JFO), the CMOC, or the humanitarian operations center (HOC). JTF personnel may also participate actively, or as observers, in a civilian-led functional coordinating group concentrating on a specific issue or project.

(1) Upon activation of a JTF outside the US, the CCDR determinates whether the JTF has direct liaison authority with the affected COM and with the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to provide consistent, efficient communication with the COM and the country team.
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(2) JTFs should channel most communications through the LNO team to avoid overwhelming interagency partners with JTF coordination and planning requests.

(3) JTFs should designate the staff office responsible for interorganizational cooperation. Many JTFs designate their plans directorate of a joint staff or CMOC, while others may form a separate directorate.

(4) When a large country team or JFO and a military JTF exist side-by-side, detailed procedures should be developed for staff coordination.
(5) For DSCA operations, the JTF HQ is ideally collocated with the JFO per NRF guidance. All ESFs are represented in the JFO.

(6) JTFs should consider how to integrate military elements that may not be part of the core JTF (e.g., special operations forces, to include those conducting train and advise missions).

For more information on the forming and composition of a JTF, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

d. A JIATF may be formed when the mission requires close integration of two or more USG departments and agencies. Formation of a JIATF requires significant coordination among the participating organizations. Refer to Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.”

e. A joint support force may be formed when the mission is a DSCA operation and DOD is operating in support of one or more USG departments and agencies. Although organized similar to a JTF (i.e., with a commander, command element, and forces), the title indicates a more cooperation-focused organization to the interorganizational community.

f. Intelligence and Information Collection and Dissemination. The primary function of joint intelligence is to provide the JFC with as timely, complete, and accurate understanding of the operational environment as possible, particularly with regard to the adversary’s forces, capabilities, and intentions. The architecture to receive and disseminate intelligence and information must accommodate joint, multinational, and interagency consumers.

(1) The CCDR may request national intelligence support for the JTF during a crisis or contingency operation. CCMD liaison offices provide reach-through for intelligence expertise from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other IC agencies. Combat support agency LNOs provide commanders access to national-level databases and agency-unique information and analysis. Intelligence support for domestic operations must be IAW US laws; executive orders; and DOD policies and regulation, including DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense; and Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) Manual 2000.01, National Guard Intelligence Activities.

For more information on the CIA, refer to Annex R, “Central Intelligence Agency,” to Appendix A, “United States Government Departments and Agencies.”

(2) Collection of intelligence during military operations is conducted IAW JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. JTF intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination may be complicated by the presence
of non-USG civilians, especially members of international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities. These individuals may be sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. Intelligence gathering may be regarded as an act of direct participation in hostilities under the law of war. NGO involvement, or even the perception of involvement, causes NGOs to lose protection from attack. If captured, they may also be prosecuted for their belligerent acts under the domestic law of the captor. However, general information provided by personnel from international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities may corroborate intelligence gained from other sources. Generally, the best approach to information sharing with NGOs and the international civilian community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to accomplish the mission.

(3) Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information, as practiced by DOD and other USG departments and agencies, normally do not exist with international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities. Under the USC, it is unlawful to disclose classified information and controlled unclassified information to foreign governments without proper authorization. Classified military information and controlled unclassified information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals until the appropriate designated foreign disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the recipient foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information. Open-source information is normally sufficient to share with organizations that cannot receive classified intelligence. Specific guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments is contained in DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. Guidance for the identification and protection of controlled unclassified information is contained in DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, DOD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

(a) In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate the receipt of intelligence from those forces. Release procedures should be established in advance, and the JFC participating in the MNF should tailor the policies and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance. To share intelligence information with multinational partners efficiently, US intelligence information should be written for release at the lowest possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination restrictions within foreign disclosure guidelines.

(b) Consideration must also be given to the control of sensitive or classified information in forums (e.g., the CMOC) that include representatives from non-USG departments and agencies. In most cases, the best method to provide necessary information to NGOs, international organizations, the UN, and similar organizations is through liaison personnel from USAID, DOS, and other USG departments and agencies, who hold security clearances and can read such information in its original form and advise JTF personnel on what specific material they would like cleared for release to non-USG organizations.
(c) The joint force foreign disclosure officer and intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) should obtain all the necessary foreign disclosure authorization from DIA, national agencies, and other originators of classified military information and controlled unclassified information, through the supported CCMD, as soon as possible to affect the seamless transfer of intelligence and information to foreign partners conducting joint operations. All JTF-affected personnel should be aware of the specific foreign disclosure policies, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The efficient flow of classified and sensitive information will be enhanced by the assignment of trained personnel who are experienced in foreign disclosure procedures. The foreign disclosure officer may also be required to train all newly assigned personnel on techniques and procedures for disclosure of classified, unclassified, and for official use only information.

g. Force Protection (FP). FP planning considerations are developed during the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process and are based on the multinational nature of the operation and the nonmilitary organizations operating in an operational area. Other aspects of FP the CJTF considers include:

(1) JTF FP measures are derived from CCDR guidance. Country team personnel FP standards are established by the COM’s regional security office.

(2) Other nations do not necessarily execute FP in the same manner as the US military. If a joint force is under the OPCON of an MNF commander, the JFC implements the appropriate FP measures IAW CCDR directives.

(3) Special measures may be required for joint force personnel who must interact with local populations and NGOs. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference increase the risk to these joint force personnel.

(4) Because US forces often assume the leadership role in multinational operations, joint force personnel can potentially be a greater target.

(5) In addition to actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against the joint force, the JFC may provide security for other personnel and assets. These requirements should be clearly stated in the mission. A MOA may be required to document joint FP provided to:

(a) Personnel and equipment belonging to USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities.

(b) HN or multinational personnel and assets.

(c) Non-USG relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes.

(d) Non-USG relief distribution centers.

(e) Non-USG stocks of supplies.
(f) HN or partner nation ports and airfields.


(6) Employment of nonlethal capabilities. Well-developed response measures, to include the use of nonlethal weapons such as vehicle/vessel stoppers, acoustic/optical hail and warning devices, and blunt impact munitions, provide joint forces additional escalation-of-force options short of lethal force. Designed to minimize civilian casualties and limit collateral damage, nonlethal weapons may assist in gaining the trust of the population and should be fully considered in any joint operation.

h. **Logistic Support.** JFCs identify logistic requirements and resource availability, and then determine financial authorities to sustain a joint force operation.

(1) USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and MNFs provide for their own logistics support. However, US military logistic capabilities are frequently requested and provided to these organizations. Pursuant to the Economy Act of 1932 or other applicable authorities (e.g., Section 632 of the Foreign Assistance Act; Title 22, USC, Section 2392; and Chapter 138, Cooperative Agreements with NATO Allies and other Countries, Title 10, USC, Sections 2341-2350), the JTF may be able to provide all or part of the logistics for these organizations. This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift; ground transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies; and management of air, land, or sea transportation nodes. Where there is limited or denied access and civilian transportation infrastructure is degraded or otherwise limited, DOD-provided transportation may be the only viable mode. A MOA should be established between two organizations whenever resources are changing hands and should comply with relevant DOD instructions, the Economy Act of 1932, and other statutory authorities. NGOs and international organizations should request logistics support directly from US military forces only in extremely rare circumstances. There is a well-developed request process by which these organizations first request support from USG departments and agencies (mainly DOS, USAID, and DHS/FEMA), which will attempt to provide such support through contracted or other means. If such means are not available, the USG civilian agency could request support, on behalf of these organizations, from US forces (using, for example, the USAID/OFDA mission tasking matrix [MITAM] or other similar tools).

*For more information on intertheater and intratheater movement processes, refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*

(2) Unity of effort in joint and multinational operations requires coordination of logistics operations not only between Services and USG departments and agencies, but also among relief and humanitarian organizations in theater. Authority for logistics matters should be clearly stated in the TCP and applicable plans. The JFC should validate logistics requirements throughout the operation and adjust to efficiently allocate resources. If the plan designates the JTF as the primary source of movement support, the CJTF establishes movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of USG
departments and agencies, the country team, multinational or UN forces, NGOs, and any international joint logistic center (e.g., UN Joint Logistic Center) that may be established. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for global synchronization of distribution support. The GCC’s joint deployment and distribution operations center or equivalent logistics management organization integrates, synchronizes, and optimizes strategic and theater deployment and distribution operations in a GCC’s AOR. The joint deployment and distribution operations center controls the theater segment, and coordinates and synchronizes distribution responsive to the tactical segment of intratheater movement. All elements (e.g., USG department or agency, international organization, NGO) articulate their movement requirements to the JTF to enable prioritization and effective planning and security for materiel movement.

(3) Normally, joint forces are supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, operational contract support, HN support, domestic support operations, and UN logistic support.

(4) When joint forces participate in a UN operation, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the supported UN agency.

(5) In multinational operations not sponsored by the UN, a single nation may plan and coordinate logistic support for all forces on a reimbursable basis.

(6) Operational contract support is commonly used to augment organic logistic military and other sources of support (e.g., multinational logistic support and HN support), and when joint forces have limited or no organic deployed logistic capability

For more information, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(7) Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements are negotiated on a bilateral basis with multinational partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support (e.g., food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment).

For more information on acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, refer to DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements; CJCSI 2120.01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements; and JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.

(8) Economy Act of 1932. The Economy Act of 1932 provides agencies the authority to provide services to, or secure the services of, another executive agency for in-house performance or performance by contract where there is no other statutory authority. The head of an agency or major organizational unit within an agency may place an order for goods or services with a major organizational unit within the same agency or another agency if the agency has available funds; the order is in the best interests of the USG; the agency filling the order can provide, or acquire by contract, the ordered goods or services; and the head of the agency decides that the ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise (see Title 31, USC, Section 1535[a]).
i. **Legal Issues.** The SJA provides legal services to the JFC and staff. The SJA should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and laws applicable to military forces, as well as be familiar with regulations and laws applicable to other governmental and nongovernmental entities, both domestic and international. In addition, the SJA can advise/assist with communications with international organizations/NGOs; negotiations with foreign officials; and drafting command policies, orders, and international agreements. The SJA participates in interorganizational cooperation to identify and resolve interagency and multinational legal issues including:

1. US legal authorities.
   - (a) Roles, missions, and authorities for USG departments and agencies.
   - (b) Direction and constraints of USG interaction with NGOs and multinational partners.

2. International law.
   - (a) Dislocated civilians, immunity and asylum, arrests, interrogations, and detentions.
   - (b) War crimes, status-of-forces agreements, law of war, counter-piracy, counternarcotics, weapons proliferation, and trafficking in persons.

3. Military justice system.

4. Environmental law.

5. In concert with J-2, assist with intelligence oversight concerns.

6. Disaster relief (DR) and claims.

7. Contract/fiscal law and authorities.

8. Rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the use of force.

9. Authorization for, and limitations on, use of military forces to support civilian authorities.

10. State, local, and tribal laws and jurisdictional issues.

11. Cooperative military agreements and other authorizations for, and limitations on, assistance to foreign militaries and vice versa.

12. Information-related capabilities (IRCs) and authorities (e.g., cyberspace operations and military information support operations).

13. Laws and policies on civilian and contractor personnel authorized to accompany US forces.
(14) Investigations and evidence-based operations.

(15) Arming contractor personnel (includes arming for self-defense and for security support).

(16) Integration and employment of nonlethal capabilities/weapons.

*For more information on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.*

10. Organizing the Joint Force Headquarters for Interorganizational Cooperation

a. Joint force HQ organization structure should support interorganizational cooperation. This applies to CCMD HQ, standing JTFs, and JTFs stood up for a specific mission.

(1) The JFC’s mission will determine the number of participants and amount of interorganizational cooperation. CCMDs plan and execute security cooperation in collaboration with country teams, foreign governments, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities. JTFs engaged in combat may have limited requirements for interorganizational cooperation. Conversely, JTFs focused on foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, or FHA missions will have extensive interface with external stakeholders. Nearly all JTFs will have a multinational aspect to their missions. Mission analysis should identify external stakeholders that impact on the command’s mission, either positively or negatively. Such impact can be based on capabilities, authorities, or political influence.

(2) The JFC’s mission analysis should identify each staff functional area’s requirements to coordinate with external stakeholders. Mission analysis should also evaluate the activities, perspectives, and interests of external stakeholders.

(3) The JFC should synchronize interorganizational cooperation with higher HQ and subordinates. The JFC should define interorganizational cooperation roles, responsibilities, and authorities between its level and its subordinates. The JFC’s interorganizational cooperation should enable the subordinates’ coordination. The JFC should anticipate that civilian actors (e.g., NGOs) may only have a tactical presence and may lack operational-level planners or representatives.

(4) The JFC should synchronize its interorganizational cooperation with adjacent DOD commands, particularly those who support or are supported by the JFC. This enables joint forces to speak with one voice and act consistently with external stakeholders.

(5) Interorganizational cooperation is similar to staff processes such as operations, sustainment, or intelligence. It requires ownership and defined responsibilities within the staff to function. Interorganizational cooperation often occurs at multiple points across a joint force staff. A lack of discipline in coordinating with external entities can result in inefficient, stovepiped efforts prone to gaps and needless
duplication. Internal synchronization of the external coordination enables accurate and consistent messages to other organizations; improved internal situational awareness; and the more accurate consideration of the perspectives and equities of external stakeholders in planning, assessment, and decision making.

b. A joint force HQ should be able to accomplish certain continuous functions, across the range of military operations, with respect to interorganizational cooperation. The key is to support the commander’s decision cycle by successfully performing these functions:

1. Synchronize joint force military actions with the actions of external stakeholders.
2. Conduct appropriate information sharing with external stakeholders.
3. Bring perspectives, interests, and equities of external stakeholders into the planning and assessment processes.
4. Understand the capabilities and limitations of external stakeholders.
5. Assess and maintain awareness of a potential request for assistance (RFA) from external stakeholders in the accomplishment of their objectives.
6. Establish and maintain relationships with external stakeholders during military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities.
7. Use reachback and collaborative networking to augment the resident and temporary organizational representatives available at the HQ.
8. Conduct key leader engagement with external stakeholders in a manner consistent with the overall DOD and USG engagement objectives.
9. Effectively tie in with CMOCs and humanitarian assistance coordination centers (HACCs), when established, as a forward extension of the staff.
10. Support and remain consistent with, and cognizant of, the nation’s whole-of-government effort.

c. The JFC enables interorganizational cooperation by establishing clear processes and assigning responsibilities within the staff. The JFC has many options available to focus interorganizational cooperation. The JFC can:

1. Centralize interorganizational cooperation within the command group. Under this model, the chief of staff or a special staff officer within the command group synchronizes the staff’s interorganizational cooperation. This is feasible if the level of effort is manageable within the command group’s span of control.
(2) Assign lead responsibilities to a directorate (e.g., operations directorate of a joint staff [J-3] or plans directorate of a joint staff). This is an appropriate COA when the level of effort required to synchronize the staff’s interorganizational cooperation actions can be managed within one of these directorates or when the nature of the staff’s interorganizational cooperation is focused on a specific function. If necessary, a separate organization can be established in the directorate for interorganizational cooperation.

(3) Establish a separate directorate for interorganizational cooperation. CCMDs and other joint forces establish separate directorates when interorganizational cooperation rises to the level of a principal staff function. A separate directorate centralizes effort and focus, and provides a clear entry point for outside organizations. However, this option expands the staff horizontally and requires additional resources.

(4) Decentralize interorganizational cooperation. This option leaves coordination with external stakeholders to individual directors and special staff officers. This approach obviates the requirement for additional staff structure and makes the individual staff leaders responsible for interorganizational cooperation for their respective functional area. This decentralized approach makes internal synchronization of the staff’s activity more difficult. It incurs the highest risk of functional stovepiping and a disjointed or duplicative effort with external entities.

(5) Establish a JIACG. A JIACG is an interagency staff group composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR. It is designed to be a forum for joint force commands to collaborate with USG departments and agencies, and potentially other external organizations as well. The term JIACG can also describe a network of contacts among agencies and other external stakeholders that can plan and share information by several means. A JIACG can be a standing, recurring, or temporary organization, and is always tailored to meet the JFC’s requirements. JIACGs can support any of the options for HQ organization discussed in this section.

(6) Staff integrating elements can be key staff activities to support interorganizational cooperation under any of the above options. A periodic executive-level steering group or decision board may aide in understanding, promote adherence to established processes, and reinforce responsibilities to prevent gaps and duplication of effort. Such a steering group should be supported by a working group meeting on a regular basis to monitor interorganizational cooperation occurring throughout the staff and identify issues for the steering group or decision board.

(7) The position of advisors and organization representatives in the HQ, whether they are assigned on a permanent or temporary basis, correlates to their effectiveness. At the CCMD level, and occasionally at the JTF level, DOS assigns foreign policy advisors (POLADs) to the commander for diplomatic and political issues. The POLAD should always be located in the command group, with direct access to the commander. While it is inappropriate to use the POLAD to synchronize or oversee staff activity, they should be encouraged to observe and participate in staff planning events. USG department and agency representatives bring their expertise and facilitate reachback to their parent agencies. Whether they are centrally positioned and supported under one
staff directorate, or dispersed among multiple directorates, they should be available to advise the JFC directly, as well as to bring their perspectives to various staff activities (e.g., operational planning teams and appropriate staff integrating elements). For example, during HA operations for which a JTF has been deployed, one or more HA advisors from USAID/OFDA may be assigned to the JTF to advise the commander and their staff on humanitarian issues and to prioritize requests from NGOs and other civilian organizations for JTF support. USG department and agency personnel assigned to the JFC to bring specific functional expertise normally should be positioned in the directorate they support (e.g., intelligence analysts in the J-2).

11. Information Management and Sharing

a. Joint operations collect and disseminate large volumes of information. Other on-scene stakeholders can provide information that may contribute to USG objectives. Non-USG organizations may maintain a distance from military activities. CJTFs can sometimes accommodate the concerns of these organizations and share information and resources to encourage international organization and NGO cooperation. International organization and NGO personnel often understand local culture, practices, and the needs of the people. Commanders at all levels should provide guidance on information sharing outside of the USG. DOD information should be secured and made available to mission partners to the maximum extent allowed by US laws and DOD policy. CJTFs and their staffs should communicate with non-USG stakeholders from the outset of complex operations, and not as an afterthought. Civilian entities (e.g., local authorities, emergency responders, and NGOs) can provide information regarding:

   1. Historical perspective and insight.
   2. Local cultural practices.
   3. Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders, to corroborate information provided by Service intelligence and non-intelligence organizations.
   5. Role and capabilities of the HN government.

b. International organizations and NGOs may have information not available through military channels. To preserve international organization and NGO access to local information, JFCs should avoid the perception that international organization and NGO workers are intelligence-gathering. International organizations and NGOs can be alienated when they believe that, contrary to their philosophical ideals, military forces are using them to gather intelligence.

c. A collaborative environment is one in which participants are encouraged to solve problems and share information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts in a spirit of mutual cooperation that extends beyond the requirement to coordinate with others.
d. The components of civil-military coordination are information and task sharing, and collaborative planning. Both components depend on communications and data and information management. The following shortcomings can degrade civil-military coordination:

(1) Lack of understanding about the information culture of the affected nation(s).

(2) Suspicion regarding the balance between information sharing and intelligence gathering.

(3) Tensions between military needs for classification (secrecy) of data, need to know, and OPSEC versus the civilian needs for transparency.

(4) Differences in the C2 style of military operations versus civilian activities.

(5) Compatibility and interoperability of planning tools, processes, and civil-military organization cultures.

e. No single entity—whether it is an NGO, international organization, national government, or HN—can provide, store, and analyze all mission-essential data and information. JFCs should make critical information widely available to multiple civilian and military elements to reduce duplication of effort and enhance coordination and collaboration. Civil-military collaboration networks can be designed to build a common knowledge base so critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. In most humanitarian crises and areas of conflict, there will be information sharing platforms already being used, generally managed by UN agencies. The JTF should use these systems for information exchange wherever possible, rather than creating new platforms that will be duplicative, and are often viewed with suspicion by NGOs. Also, it is difficult for most USG departments and agencies, and impossible for NGOs and international organizations, to communicate through classified systems, so it is crucial to keep communications on unclassified systems when possible.

f. The JFC should be equipped to collaborate with external mission participants (e.g., international organizations, NGOs). The JFC establishes interoperable communications by using available commercial telecommunications networks, military satellite channels, C2 coverage, and conventional military communications systems to exchange orders, directions, and information among all participants. Direct communications between commanders, interagency partners, NGOs, international organizations, indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), and the private sector facilitates coordination and decision making. Nonsecure communications must be protected. Additionally, communications systems planners should plan for the termination or transition of US involvement and the transfer of responsibility to the HN, UN, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations.

g. The Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy provides the common vision, goals, and approaches that guide the many information sharing initiatives and investments for DOD. The Department of Defense Information Sharing Strategy guides
DOD’s exchange of information within DOD and with federal, state, local, and tribal governments; multinational partners; foreign governments and security forces; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector.

h. The information sharing environment (ISE) (http://www.ise.gov) network supports five communities (i.e., intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security [HS], and foreign affairs). The ISE focuses on sharing information related to terrorism and HS. The need for collaboration and sharing of information extends beyond terrorism-related issues to all information relevant to US national security and the safety of the American people. The Homeland Security Information Network (https://hsin.dhs.gov) also supports these communities with specific focus on critical infrastructure, emergency management, emergency services, health and public health, intelligence, and law enforcement with real-time with collaboration tools, situation rooms, chat, bulletins, and regional assessments.


i. Information Sharing Enablers. Interorganizational cooperation necessitates the ability to plan, collaborate, and execute mission-related activities throughout an operation. Planning and collaboration is enhanced when all mission partners exchange critical information in a mutually understood language at a mission-specific classification and releasability level throughout an operation.

(1) When the US leads multinational operations, DOD will establish a communication network, built on a federation of networks contributed by the CCMD/JTF and willing mission partners.

(2) As the operation matures with interorganizational entities participation, DOD may establish a communications network to provide trusted and protected information sharing among peers.

For more information on communications, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

j. OPSEC. The OPSEC process is an inherent part of the whole-of-government approach to operations. National Security Decision Directive 298, National Operations Security Program, mandates the establishment of formal OPSEC programs for all executive departments or agencies that support national security missions. The current operational environment may require coordination of OPSEC efforts with other government departments and agencies, such as the CIA, DHS, the Department of Energy (DOE), or FBI.

(1) When formed at a CCMD, the JIACG provides a venue to integrate other USG departments and agencies into joint planning. The information operations (IO) cell within the joint staff coordinates OPSEC planning efforts with the JIACG throughout the JPP.
(2) Military planners should include interagency partners when developing the critical information list and pay particular attention to avoid creating additional OPSEC vulnerabilities while coordinating with other USG departments and agencies that are not controlled by the JFC. Military planners also need to include other USG department and agency activities in the assessment process, along with those of the component forces.

(3) Military planners consider and assess potential OPSEC vulnerabilities and threats whenever international organizations and NGOs are present in the operational area. Joint force representatives in the CMOC or joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) must be vigilant in protecting critical information when coordinating with various international organizations and NGOs. While international organizations and NGOs provide unique capabilities, they may also create a large vulnerability for the loss of critical information. In many cases, international organizations and NGOs will have established relationships with USG departments and agencies, such as the DOS. Another significant vulnerability of many NGOs is their reliance on nonsecure communications, such as free e-mail accounts and social networking sites, for the conduct of routine operations. Military planners ensure all of these relationships are included in developing the critical information list, identifying OPSEC indicators, and applying OPSEC countermeasures.

(4) It is vital to integrate any and all willing mission partners, which may include international organizations and NGOs, interagency, and military partners operating in the operational area, into joint planning as early as possible so an integrated comprehensive and achievable OPSEC plan can be developed. Initial requirements for integration include clarification of objectives, understanding how partners intend to conduct activities, establishment of liaison and deconfliction procedures, and identification of vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures to adversary exploitation.

*For more information, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.*

12. Training and Readiness

a. USG departments and agencies conduct continuous and integrated interagency, international organization, NGO, and public and private sector planning and training to synchronize all aspects of a US response to humanitarian and complex crises. Interagency training and training with non-USG stakeholders should provide for individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in a formal joint program.

b. CCDRs should, in coordination with other USG departments and agencies, encourage international organization, NGO, and private sector involvement in routine training and exercises, as well as train for specific operations. Ideally, interorganizational cooperation training audiences should include members of the HACC, CMOC, joint logistics operations center (JLOC), the liaison section, NGOs, the UN, and USG departments and agencies. Predeployment training can enhance operational capability. Other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and the FHA community also offer training. For example, staff members who could deploy to support
a FHA mission, or participate in planning for such a mission, would benefit from attending the USAID/OFDA Joint Humanitarian Operations Course, which is offered to civilian-military audiences by mobile training teams multiple times every year. Because OFDA is the lead USG agency for international disaster response, civil-military coordination in such operations is substantially improved by understanding OFDA capabilities and authorities. Agency, international organization, and NGO training should focus on identifying and assessing organizational capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural gaps. Rotations and visits to a command improve mutual awareness of missions, objectives, cultures, corresponding activities, and programs. Even short rotations enhance reachback capability and facilitate common understanding.

c. The JS J-7 chairs a DOD interagency working group to coordinate DOD interagency participation requirements and opportunities. JS J-7 presents the working group results to the Interagency Training Coordinator Working Group. This working group facilitates interagency participation in the CJCS’s Exercise Program and oversees requirements for DOD participation in the National Exercise Program.

For more information, see DODI 3020.47, DOD Participation in the National Exercise Program (NEP).

d. USAID is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs, some of which may receive USAID funding to implement activities in support of USAID’s development assistance programs. USAID maintains an advisory committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid—established after World War II by presidential directive—to serve as a link between the USG and NGOs conducting economic development or relief efforts. Also, with some exceptions, most NGOs must register to receive USAID funding to ensure they meet certain standards. USAID advisors at CCMDS, as well as USAID mission and country team members, can establish contacts with, and gain situational awareness of, NGO and private sector activity and capability.

e. Many US NGOs participate in a consortium called InterAction, which helps represent NGO interests at the national level. InterAction coordinates with various USG departments and agencies to gain NGOs’ participation in realistic peace operations (PO) simulations conducted by the Joint Readiness Training Center. The military and participating NGOs gain a better understanding of each organization’s culture, capabilities, and procedures. InterAction has briefed CA units and US military schools to improve their understanding of NGO activities and promote the use of NGO members as role players in military exercises. Joint exercise planners should coordinate with NGOs to make optimal use of their time and expertise during exercises. NGO personnel should be invited to participate in after action reviews. This would allow feedback in an open forum and contribute to developing ways to avoid polarization of positions.

f. USG department and agency, international organization, and NGO training is also available through the senior Service schools (including the DOS’s Foreign Service Institute) and other civilian institutions. For example, the US Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides courses on interagency and
whole-of-government planning. Interagency training is also provided on the job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG departments and agencies.

(1) The Foreign Service Institute is the USG primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the US foreign affairs community, preparing American diplomats and other professionals to advance US foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington, DC. At the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the Foreign Service Institute provides several courses with an interagency focus to enrollees from DOS and more than 40 USG departments and agencies, including the military.

(2) The Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, provides USG department and agency, international organization, and NGO training to civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to a CCMD. National Defense University also provides policy simulations and exercises to members of the executive branch strategic decision-making community in the National Capital Region and at the CCMD JIACGs (or equivalent organizations). The Institute for National Strategic Studies uses simulations that stress regional and functional crisis management and conflict resolution, as well as after action review, to provide participants a non-threatening environment to discuss and test innovative approaches to complex crises and encourage interagency cooperation. The Center for Complex Operations (http://cco.ndu.edu/) fosters unity of effort among DOD and other USG departments and agencies during complex operations; collects and analyzes lessons from military and civilian personnel; and incorporates those lessons into policy, doctrine, education, training, and exercises. National Intelligence University provides policy-level academics, including bachelor and master degree programs in intelligence studies, to all branches of the DOD and interagency partners.

(3) USIP (http://www.usip.org) is a nonpartisan, independent agency created by the US Congress, with a bipartisan board appointed by the President. This status allows USIP to play a distinctive role in addressing violent conflicts. The Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding is the education and training leader of the USIP. USIP Academy courses—designed for practitioners in governments, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector—build and strengthen the skills required to manage conflict in all its phases, from preventing conflict to post-conflict peacebuilding.

For more information, refer to the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr).

g. The UN conducts training and education at various levels to improve the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of international humanitarian relief operations. Training is available to leaders of the military, civil defense, and civilian relief organizations, or for personnel of countries and organizations with no prior experience in international emergency and disaster response situations. One example is the UN Civil-Military Cooperation Course—offered by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)—which informs participants of the roles of military and humanitarian actors in international relief response. Another
example is the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Impact course, offered for no charge online at http://www.disasterready.org/.

h. Joint Special Operations University educates special operations executive, senior, and intermediate leaders, and select national and international security leaders, both military and civilian, through teaching, research, and outreach. The Joint Special Operations University’s Interagency Division runs several courses each year.
CHAPTER III
DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

“I believe that the challenges confronting our Nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They instead require whole-of-government approaches…”

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense Senate Testimony, 30 April 2009

1. Key Roles of United States Government Stakeholders

a. DHS leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters. Within DOD, SecDef has overall authority and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning use of federal forces in HD and DSCA. CNGB is SecDef’s principal advisor, through the CJCS, for non-federalized NG forces. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) (ASD(HD&GS)) serves as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to manage and coordinate HD and DSCA functions at the SecDef level. The two CCMDs with major HD and DSCA missions are United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), as their AORs include the US and its territories. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM HD missions include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US, its territories, and interests within the assigned AOR; and, as directed by the President or SecDef, provide DSCA. These geographic CCMDs may also have senior DHS representatives and a NG representative assigned as advisors. The senior DHS representative advises the commander and staff on HS and DSCA issues and requirements, and facilitates information sharing, coordination, and collaboration between the command and the operational agencies of DHS (e.g., FEMA, US Customs and Border Protection [CBP], and United States Coast Guard [USCG]).

b. SecDef. As authorized by the President, authority for the conduct and execution of both the HD and DSCA missions resides with SecDef. For DSCA missions, SecDef retains approval authority for RFAs requesting the use of DOD forces and capabilities in support of another USG department or agency. SecDef provides DOD policy and oversight for DSCA in the event of a domestic incident and considers the impact on HD and other elements of the nation’s defense from committing these resources to DSCA.

c. ASD(HD&GS). The Office of the ASD(HD&GS) within OUSD(P) supervises all DOD HD and DSCA operations. Responsibilities include employment policy, guidance, and oversight; support to civil authorities IAW national frameworks; and assistance to civilian departments and agencies conducting HS missions. ASD(HD&GS) coordinates internal DOD policy direction and assists SecDef in coordinating with DHS and providing guidance, through CJCS, to CCDRs for HD and DSCA missions.
d. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]). ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight for special operations core activities. This includes oversight of policy, program planning, and allocation and use of resources. ASD(SO/LIC) supports planning of US counterterrorism (CT) forces in response to domestic terrorist incidents and also represents SecDef on combating terrorism matters outside the DOD.

e. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD[RA]). ASD(RA) monitors Reserve Component readiness. In coordination with ASD(HD&GS), the JS, the Services, and the NGB, ASD(RA) provides policy regarding integration of reserve and NG forces into HD and DSCA operations.

f. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD[PA]). ASD(PA) coordinates public affairs (PA) planning with ASD(HD&GS) and DHS prior to an HD or DSCA response. In coordination with ASD(HD&GS), the JS, and the Services, ASD(PA) identifies DOD PA capabilities and forces for potential response.

g. CJCS. CJCS responsibilities relating to HD and DSCA are to advise the President and SecDef on policies, responsibilities, and programs; assist SecDef in implementing responses to threats or an act of terrorism abroad with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); assist SecDef in support to the NCTC and DHS during domestic terrorism incidents and some maritime terrorism threats under the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan; and convey presidential and SecDef decisions and direction to the CCDRs through orders to provide assistance to the primary agency. CJCS ensures HD and DSCA plans and operations are compatible with other military plans. CJCS also assists CCDRs in meeting their operational requirements for executing HD missions and for providing DSCA that has been approved by SecDef. In the DSCA area, CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef to prepare for, and respond to, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents; ensures military planning is accomplished to support the primary agency for incident response; and provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for counterdrug operations.

h. Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM). CDRUSNORTHCOM has specific responsibilities for HD and for providing DSCA within the US portion of its AOR. USNORTHCOM is also responsible for security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas; synchronizing DOD global pandemic influenza planning; and supporting countering WMD efforts. The CJCS conveys presidential and SecDef decisions and direction through orders to CDRUSNORTHCOM.

i. Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM). CDRUSPACOM is the supported commander in the designated AOR for providing DSCA. CDRUSPACOM is responsible for security cooperation, support planning for pandemic influenza, and countering WMD in the AOR. USPACOM also combats terrorism and sets FP policy. USPACOM is DOD’s principal planning agent and supported command for HD in Hawaii, Territory of Guam, Territory of American Samoa,
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), US administrative entities, and US territorial waters within their AOR. CDRUSPACOM is responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks against US sovereign territory, and employing appropriate force if deterrence fails. The CJCS conveys presidential and SecDef decisions and direction through orders to CDRUSPACOM.

j. Other CCMDs. While CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM are responsible for the homeland within their AORs, other CCMDs could support these two GCCs during HD and DSCA operations. Commander, USTRANSCOM, has specific missions during DSCA. For example, it provides common-user air, land, and sea transportation to the supported CCMD and civil authorities during DSCA IAW an approved RFA. It is also the authority to concur or non-concur with Maritime Administration (MARAD) requests for the temporary use of Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force (MARAD RRF) vessels for storage of non-defense related cargo; provides air refueling to the supported CCMDs; and, when local needs exceed transportation capabilities, provides necessary aeromedical evacuation in support of DHHS as part of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).

k. CNGB. CNGB is a principal advisor to SecDef through the CJCS on matters involving non-federalized NG forces and through other DOD officials as determined by SecDef. CNGB is the DOD’s official communication channel to the governors and TAGs on all matters pertaining to the NG. The governors and TAGs ensure Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) personnel are accessible, capable, and ready to provide combat resources to the US Army and United States Air Force (USAF). CNGB serves as an advisor to the CCDRs on NG matters pertaining to the CCMD missions, and supports planning and coordination for DSCA activities as requested by the CJCS or the CCDRs. The National Guard Coordination Center (NGCC) provides shared situational awareness among the National Guard joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State), the NGB, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM during events ranging from a CBRN incident or other catastrophic incident, including major storms, to providing situational awareness of NG support to local events and minor incidents and routine reporting. It enables the NGB to coordinate NG assistance to the supported state on a national level. It also provides coordination for support to law enforcement and community-based organizations for domestic counterdrug missions. Sourcing solutions are coordinated through the ARNG and ANG. For more information, see Appendix G, “National Guard Organizations and Relationships.”

1. Additional Civilian Stakeholders

(1) Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, DHHS leads USG efforts to research, develop, evaluate, and acquire public health emergency medical countermeasures to prevent or mitigate the health effects of CBRN threats facing the US civilian population.
(2) Per NSPD-47/HSPD-16, *Aviation Security Policy*, DOT responsibilities are to protect the nation and US interests in the air domain by conducting a broad range of HD, law enforcement, and crisis response-related activities.

(3) PPD-21, *Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience*, provides policy for critical infrastructure protection (CIP). This endeavor is a shared responsibility among the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial entities, and public and private owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

2. Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities

   a. **Mission Areas.** The use of the Armed Forces inside the US and its territories, though limited in some respects, falls into two mission areas: HD—for which DOD is lead agency and employs military forces to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and DSCA—for which DOD supports other USG departments and agencies by providing military resources in support of civil authorities. DSCA is consistent with the national frameworks in that it supplements the efforts and resources of other USG departments and agencies in support of state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, as well as NGOs and volunteer organizations. In most cases, the President and SecDef determine when DOD will be involved in HD and DSCA missions. Interorganizational cooperation for HD and DSCA is particularly sensitive when joint forces conduct operations in proximity to our domestic population and critical infrastructure. While the HD and DSCA missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap, and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies. HD and DSCA operations may occur concurrently and require extensive integration and synchronization. DOD may conduct HD operations in a lead agency role, while at the same time providing DSCA in response to the consequences of an attack or natural disaster. In addition, operations may also transition from HD to DSCA to HS or vice versa (e.g., the USCG in maritime security) with the lead shifting depending on the situation and USG’s desired outcome. While the lead may transition, a single department or agency has the lead at any given time for a particular activity (e.g., DSCA includes HS operations during which DHS is the lead). However, the designation of the federal department or agency with lead responsibility is not always predetermined. In certain time-critical situations, on-scene leaders are empowered to conduct operations in response to a particular threat. The interrelationship between HD, HS, and DSCA operations, and the potential for transition between the missions, creates a dynamic where interorganizational cooperation is a focal point.

   b. **HD.** HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats, as directed by the President. DOD is responsible for the HD mission and leads HD responses, with other USG departments and agencies in support. DOD’s capability to respond quickly to multiple threats in a variety of situations can strain limited resources. For example, the same force constituted to deploy on a contingency operation overseas may also be the most qualified force for a HD mission. For HD missions, the President authorizes military action to counter threats to and within the US. An example of an ongoing HD operation is Operation NOBLE EAGLE, which provides enhanced air defense of the US.
Domestic Considerations

(1) HD operations may be conducted in a complex operational environment characterized by numerous and varied threats, multiple jurisdictions (i.e., federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local), nontraditional partners (e.g., international organizations, NGOs, and private sector), and international partnerships. The NG may provide support to HD operations in a Title 32, USC, status or in a state active duty status IAW DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard. The operational environment makes coordination imperative to ensure synchronized and integrated operations. DOD should be prepared to operate in concert with other USG personnel conducting HS or other law enforcement activities. The overlap in departmental roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities among USG organizations, other governmental authorities, and nontraditional partners requires an approach that promotes early identification of desired results. Early identification of objectives should drive collaboration between operational partners.

(2) Within the US, HD operations must comply with domestic legal and policy guidelines designed to mitigate adverse impacts on the US domestic population and critical infrastructure. Domestic military operations are subject to continuous media scrutiny. Joint forces conducting HD must be sensitive to the jurisdiction of state and local governments, and respect individual civil rights and civil liberties. Interagency processes and programs should enable joint forces to conduct HD seamlessly with federal, state, tribal, and local government partners.

(3) DOD Requests for Interorganizational Assistance in Support of the HD Mission. DOD may request assistance or support from other USG departments and agencies for HD missions. These requests are made under the Economy Act of 1932, which provides for USG support between USG departments and agencies. Training and exercises can help joint forces efficiently activate the requirements process for interorganizational assistance and expedite a collaborative USG response to HD threats.

For more information on HD, refer to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

c. DSCA

(1) DOD DSCA activities must be specifically authorized and are generally conducted in support of a primary civilian agency. The exceptions are those noted in the NRF (ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering, and ESF # 9, Search and Rescue) where DOD/US Army Corps of Engineers and DOD have primary or shared primary responsibilities. RFAs from another department or agency may be predicated on mutual agreements between organizations or stem from a presidential designation of a federal disaster area or a federal state of emergency. DOD support is typically requested only when the resources of state, local, and tribal governments or other USG departments and agencies prove insufficient to provide critical support in a timely manner, or when specialized military assets are required.

(2) The USG evaluates all requests from civil authorities and qualifying entities for DOD assistance for legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and impact on readiness. This is true even if leaders are considering providing assistance under their
immediate response authority or emergency authority. When military forces in Title 10, USC, status are authorized to support state and local civil authorities, command of those forces will remain with SecDef. Typically, supporting DOD entities remain under the C2 of the supported CCDR. In the absence of delegated control, DOD elements in the incident area of operations and NG forces under the command of a governor will coordinate closely with response organizations at all levels.

For further guidance on DSCA, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); and DODI 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

d. Planning Considerations for Interorganizational Cooperation. DOD works closely with other USG departments and agencies when planning. The supported GCCs are DOD principal planning agents and provide joint planning directives for peacetime assistance rendered by DOD within their assigned AORs. Upon issuance of an execute order by the CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, to initiate or conduct military operations, the supported commander implements and relays the authority of the order with their own orders directing action to subordinate commanders, supporting commanders, and directors of supporting agencies. Thorough joint planning requires that a GCC’s operations and activities align with national security objectives contained in strategic guidance. The GEF prioritizes these objectives and DOD priorities for each CCMD, which then develop a FCP or TCP, as required. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD has responsibilities under the NRF. The salient frameworks and directives that will guide DSCA operations are the following:

(1) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provides the authority for the USG to assist with state and local government response to a major disaster or emergency. The act gives the President the authority to declare an area a major disaster, declare an area an emergency, exercise 10-day emergency authority, and send in federal assets when an emergency occurs in an area over which the federal government exercises primary responsibility.

(2) The NRF is a guide that details how the nation conducts all-hazards response—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The NRF identifies the response principles, to include DOD, as well as the roles and structures that organize national response. It describes how communities, states, the USG, private sector, and US NGO partners apply these principles to coordinate a national response. In addition, it describes special circumstances where the USG exercises a larger role, including incidents where exclusive, preeminent, or similarly weighty federal interests are involved and catastrophic incidents where a state would require significant support. It lays the groundwork for first responders, decision makers, and supporting entities to provide a unified national response. In addition to the NRF base document, the ESF annexes and support annexes are available online at the NRF Resource Center (http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework). The annexes provide CONOPS, procedures, and structures to achieve response directives for all partners to fulfill their roles under the NRF.
(3) The NIMS, and its associated ICS, provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS is integrated with the NRF. The NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. The NIMS is a tested system that interagency partners utilize and practice regularly. Leaders with NRF responsibilities should have an understanding of its principles, structures, and techniques.

(4) To align DOD planning with the needs of those requiring DSCA, DOD coordinates with interagency partners and with the NGB. Coordination should align national frameworks, NIMS, and interagency guidelines provided in the JSCP. The standing CJCS DSCA Execute Order delegates limited approval authority to supported CCDRs to respond to domestic emergencies and/or disasters and aligns with the NRF to provide a unified national response.

(5) The domestic operating environment for DSCA presents unique challenges to the JFC. When executing DSCA, the US military is normally in support of another USG department or agency that is coordinating the federal response. The President can direct DOD to be the lead for the federal response; however, this would only happen in extraordinary situations and would involve other DOD core mission areas. US federal and NG forces may also support state, territorial, local, or tribal activities. Commanders and staffs at all levels must understand the relationships, both statutory and operational, among all USG departments and agencies involved in the operation. It is equally important to understand DOD’s role in supporting other USG departments and agencies. DOD can provide assistance to the primary agency as authorized by SecDef or the President. The NRF and associated CONPLANs and OPLANs, specified by the National Preparedness System, detail the roles and missions of USG departments and agencies in the event of a domestic crisis. There are also USNORTHCOM and USPACOM domestic plans (e.g., DSCA, and civil disturbance operations) that describe the responsibilities of USG entities in detail.

(6) Examples of plans associated with DSCA include:

(a) Operation Plan Vigilant Sentry is a comprehensive DHS contingency plan for a unified response to a mass migration event in the Caribbean. This plan integrates the USG response with assistance from the state of Florida and local agencies.

(b) National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations [CFR], Part 300), more commonly referred to as the National Contingency Plan, is authorized by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The National Contingency Plan provides an organizational structure and procedures for preparing for, and responding to, discharges and substantial
threats of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The National Contingency Plan designates the:

1. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the lead federal agency for directing the removal and mitigation of oils spills and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminates into, or threatening, the inland zone.

2. USCG as the lead federal agency for directing the removal and mitigation of oils spills and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminates into, or threatening, the waters and adjoining shorelines of the coastal zone.

3. DOD as the lead federal agency in the case of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminates on, or the sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the DOD.

4. DOD as the removal authority with respect to incidents involving DOD military weapons and munitions or weapons and munitions under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the DOD.

5. DOE as the lead federal agency in the case of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminates on, or the sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the DOE.

(c) The National Search and Rescue Plan ensures the coordination for, and effective use of, available resources for all types of civil search and rescue (SAR) missions in compliance with US humanitarian and national and international legal obligations. These resources include aircraft, vessels, pararescue and ground rescue teams, and monitoring emergency locator transmitter signals. Under the plan, the USCG is the SAR coordinator for the US aeronautical and maritime SAR regions, and CDRUSNORTHCOM is the SAR coordinator for both the continental US and Alaska. To carry out these responsibilities, the USCG and USNORTHCOM have established rescue coordination centers to coordinate SAR operations within their respective SAR regions.

(d) The MOTR Plan provides a coordinated USG response to threats against the US and its interests in the maritime domain. The MOTR agencies use their designated network of integrated national-level maritime command centers to coordinate information flow in support of MOTR execution, including interdiction and disposition. Threats include terrorism, piracy, and other criminal or hostile acts committed by foreign states and non-state groups or individuals. DHS is the lead MOTR agency for the interdiction of maritime threats to the homeland. DOJ, through FBI, is the lead MOTR agency for investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside of the US, or directed at US citizens or institutions abroad, when such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the US. DOD is the lead for nation-state maritime threats to US territories and US interests overseas.

(7) Per the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the
United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security, SecDef has authorized CDROSOUTHCOM, CDROSOUTHCOM, and the JS to transfer forces to operate under TACON of Commandant, USCG; USCG Atlantic Area; and USCG Pacific Area for maritime HS operations in the USNORTHCOM and USPACOM AORs, as described in the annexes attached to the MOA. This authority may be further delegated to appropriate flag officer/general officer commanders subordinate to CDROSOUTHCOM and CDROSOUTHCOM.

e. Military commanders are authorized to take action under immediate response authority in certain circumstances. In response to a RFA from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, DOD officials (i.e., military commanders, heads of DOD components, and responsible DOD civilian officials) may provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control—subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher HQ—to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the US. Such immediate response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory. The DOD official directing a response under immediate response authority should immediately notify the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center, through the chain of command, of the details of the response.

For further information on immediate response authority, refer to DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

f. Military forces may also help DOJ or other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) when requirements are met. This includes military assistance in response to civil disturbances. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, other USG departments and agencies may request DOD assistance as part of HS. Such assistance may be in the form of information and intelligence sharing, mapping, or damage assessment assistance. Other types of military assistance to LEAs include counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and infrastructure protection. Military commanders should review, with legal counsel, each request for domestic aid for statutory compliance, especially for law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. SecDef must personally approve any request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events. Requests for DOD assets in support of law enforcement require careful review during planning to ensure DOD support conforms to law and policy and does not degrade the mission capability of CDRs. The US Constitution, federal laws, and USG policies and regulations restrict domestic military operations. Requests for DOD assistance should be coordinated with the supporting organization’s legal counsel or SJA. Laws and policy that restrict domestic military operations include:

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385); DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies; and additional federal statutory and case law define conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the USCG and members of the NG in state service
(Title 32, USC, or state active duty), military personnel are prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of laws of the US unless specifically authorized by statute or the Constitution. The restrictions in the Posse Comitatus Act do not apply to the USCG when not operating under DOD authorities (Title 14, USC) or the NG operating under state active duty status or Title 32, USC, duty status. The NG, due to local presence, will likely be the first military responder during a domestic emergency. The early employment of the NG usually will be in either a state active duty status or Title 32, USC, status—both are at the direction of the governor and the command of TAG. Absent an applicable exception, the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy prohibit federal military personnel performing DSCA operations within the US from directly participating in certain activities, such as:

(a) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

(b) A search or seizure.

(c) An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

(d) Surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or acting as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

(e) The Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy, however, provide an exception for activities or situations specifically authorized by statute or the Constitution. A number of statutes, for example, authorize DOD to provide specified assistance to civilian law enforcement. These include addressing the restoration of civil order and the enforcement of federal law (Insurrection Act, Title 10, USC, Sections 331-335); the provision of specified types of technical assistance that may be used for, among other things, counterdrug efforts (Title 10, USC, Sections 371-381); and certain emergencies involving WMD (Title 10, USC, Section 382, and Title 18, USC, Section 831[e]). The provision of technical assistance under Title 10, USC, Sections 371-381, is qualified by Title 10, USC, Section 375, which provides: “The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.”

(2) National events may be targeted by adversaries. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the NSC, may designate public events (e.g., the Olympic Games or the presidential inauguration) as national special security events (NSSEs). Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the primary agency may request support from DOD.

For more information, refer to DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies; DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons; DODD 5200.27, Acquisition
of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense; and CJCSI 3710.01, Counterdrug Support.

g. **CBRN Response.** Supporting CBRN missions requires a number of specialized capabilities. These capabilities may be required to support civil authorities as part of efforts ranging from the prevention of an attack to technical nuclear forensics to support attribution. For example, the 2011 Interagency Domestic Radiological/Nuclear Search Plan specifies that DOD maintains an operational radiological/nuclear search capability. Additionally, managing the consequences of a CBRN incident is a USG effort. The US military has experience and expertise in protecting its members from CBRN hazards and in operating in a contaminated area. When requested by domestic civil authorities and approved by the President or SecDef, this experience and expertise will be shared. Governors have the authority to deploy and employ NG forces under their control in response to domestic incidents. NG CBRN response-specific forces such as the WMD-civil support teams; CBRN and high-yield explosive enhanced response force packages; and homeland response forces are deployed and employed under state control, per Title 32, USC, authorities, unless ordered to active duty under the authorities in Title 10, USC.

For more information, refer to CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland; JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response; and Army Techniques Publication 3-11.41/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-37.2C/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-11.24/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations.

h. For domestic missions, DOD may provide information in support of USG communication initiatives, but will not seek to influence US citizens. Additionally, for HD and DSCA missions, DOD will typically support another lead federal agency. DOD communications programs will be coordinated with the lead federal agency, especially if USG communication focuses on US audiences.

3. **Joint Force Considerations**

a. When the President or SecDef directs DSCA, CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM will generally be designated as the supported commander. Events that trigger DSCA generally require the supported GCC to activate and deploy an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2 node for responding Title 10, USC, federal forces. NG forces under Title 32, USC, and state active duty will likely have already been deployed to the incident area.

(1) While DOD response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through SecDef, the military may also respond when an interdepartmental MOA is in effect (e.g., the United States Navy [USN] agrees to rapid deployment of oil containment and recovery equipment to the USCG under an interdepartmental MOA). The MOA bypasses negotiations at the HQ level and sets procedures to deploy and employ equipment and personnel, and for reimbursement of operational costs. When military
assets respond to domestic emergencies, the supported GCC integrates the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The joint force should be organized for optimum response. Frequently, innovative uses of military resources (e.g., land forces fighting wildfires) optimizes the response.

(2) DHS, the FEMA regions, and their associated regional interagency steering committees typically meet on a quarterly or monthly basis. Committee meetings may be conducted virtually or face-to-face. Supporting GCCs can use steering committee meetings to interface with USG departments and agencies, and their regional and state partners. These regional interagency steering committees plan, coordinate, and support preparations for disaster and relief efforts. Regional interagency steering committee meetings are typically attended by the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and defense coordinating element (DCE) personnel assigned to the FEMA region offices.

(3) The USCG and many other federal, state, tribal, and local response agencies and organizations have adopted ICS as their standard response system for nonmilitary incident management. Non-DOD entities, including local civil authorities and first responders, are generally not familiar with US military terms and doctrine. In an emergency, clear, effective, and mutually understandable communication with non-DOD entities and partners can save lives, mitigate suffering, and protect property. DOD elements will work more seamlessly, efficiently, and productively by employing operational concepts and terms that other departments, agencies, and authorities understand. The national frameworks, NIMS, ICS, and other federal and national standards provide common language and concepts. US military forces that might be involved in emergency or major disaster operations should become familiar with these documents, and be prepared to provide DSCA IAW the national frameworks, NIMS, and ICS.

b. USNORTHCOM, through its Army Service component (i.e., US Army North), permanently assigns DCOs at the 10 FEMA region HQ to coordinate DSCA and collaborate with FEMA. DCEs are also identified to support these DCOs. During disaster operations, the supported GCC normally activates a DCO upon receipt of an RFA from the primary agency sent through the CCDR to the DOD Executive Secretary. The DCO is normally the initial DOD representative at a FEMA regional response coordination center. The DCO subsequently serves as DOD’s single point of contact (POC) at the JFO to receive RFAs directed to DOD. Upon federal declaration of a disaster, FEMA normally sets up a JFO in or near the affected area. The JFO is a temporary federal facility that provides a central location for coordination among federal, state, tribal, and local governments; NGOs; and the private sector with primary responsibility for response and recovery. Depending on the size or area of a disaster site, there may be more than one JFO coordinating federal disaster response and support (e.g., there were three JFOs operating in support of Hurricane Katrina response operations—one each in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana). There will normally be a DCO at each JFO to be the primary interface for US military support to the unified coordination group. The DCO works with the FCO and state coordinating officer at the JFO to integrate DOD support to the operation. They serve as the on-scene military POC for the FCO and principal representatives of other organizations. However, the DCO remains the POC
for the FCO, in the JFO, IAW the NRF. Once DOD forces are deployed, requests from civilian departments and agencies are coordinated through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the NRF. Some factors in the provision of DSCA include:

(1) USG departments and agencies or state, tribal, and local governments request DOD support for emergency response through a formal RFA process. DOD evaluates every RFA using the following criteria: cost, appropriateness, legality, lethality, risk, and impact on readiness.

(2) In general, the FCO receives RFAs from civil authorities and submits RFAs/mission assignments approved for funding to the DCO for initial validation. After receiving the RFA from the state/local/tribal authority, FEMA prepares a mission assignment. If FEMA determines DOD has the best sourcing solution, the mission assignment is passed to the DCO to begin DOD validation. Once SecDef approves the request for forces/capabilities that will support the RFA, orders are issued to accomplish the mission.

(3) JFO and JTF relations are a catalyst for DSCA operations. The JFO is the primary federal incident management field structure and is the principal venue for interorganizational cooperation. The JTF is deployed to conduct C2 of federal military forces conducting DSCA. The NRF states that if a JTF is established, its C2 element will be colocated at the JFO—consistent with operational requirements—to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The colocation of the JTF C2 element does not eliminate the requirement for a DCO to coordinate on behalf of the JFO. It also does not change the DCO’s role to coordinate RFAs to DOD. DCOs also liaise with other entities, maintain situational awareness, and report to the JS. The CJTF is normally a member of the unified coordination group at the JFO during DSCA operations. The CJTF should provide robust liaison to the DCO and the DCE to ensure JTF capabilities are understood, help share situational awareness, and analyze future support requirements.

(4) The NIMS framework describes how the incident command posts and area command centers relate to the multiagency coordination centers for operational information sharing and resource coordination (particularly the RFA process).

(5) The JFO is a scalable organization (i.e., the management, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration sections) built around the ESFs defined in the NRF. The CJTF and designated liaisons can optimize DOD integration in the JFO through this structure. Once established, the JFO subsumes the role of the regional FEMA HQ or regional response coordination center as the primary structure for interorganizational cooperation to achieve unity of effort.

(6) Use an existing common, unclassified, information sharing mechanism (or establish one) to collaborate and share information with other stakeholders. DHS uses the Homeland Security Information Network as one of its main information networks. DSCA tasks normally require a variety of information sharing methods and techniques (e.g., web posting, instant messaging, and printed reports or information downloaded onto compact discs delivered by couriers or LNOs). Since many employees of state,
local, and tribal government agencies; private sector firms; and NGOs are not cleared to access classified information, most information provided in support of DSCA should be at the unclassified level.

c. The JTF is the command element that provides personnel, equipment, and supplies to a disaster area for approved missions. With input from the DCO, the JTF identifies tasks; generates forces; prioritizes assets against requirements; assists federal, state, tribal, and local authorities; and provides disaster response support to the local government based on FEMA mission assignments.

d. A dual-status commander (DSC) is an intermediate link in two distinct, separate chains of command flowing from different federal, territorial, and state governments. The DSC is a commissioned officer of the Regular Army or Air Force or a federally recognized ARNG or ANG officer authorized, pursuant to Title 32, USC, Section 315 or 325, appointed by SecDef, with the consent of the applicable governor of a state, to exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a federal chain of command and exercise command on behalf of, and receive separate orders from, a state chain of command. Although empowered to exercise command on behalf of, and able to receive orders from, two separate chains of command, those chains of command must recognize and respect the DSC’s duty to exercise all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner (i.e., giving orders on behalf of or relaying orders from the federal chain of command to federal military forces and giving orders on behalf of or relaying orders from the state chain of command to state military forces, but never relaying federal orders to state military forces or state orders to federal military forces). Title 32, USC, Section 101, also clarifies that DSC-led JTFs are the usual and customary C2 arrangement established in response to an emergency or major disaster within the US when both federal and state military forces are supporting the response.

For more information on a DSC, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

e. Organizational tools that may assist interagency support of civil authorities include:

   (1) Liaison Section. Liaisons provided by the CCDR to the primary agency and other USG departments and agencies are spokespersons for the CCDR, clarify operational concepts and terminology, and help assess military requirements. The LNO can articulate how military units might perform nontraditional roles and the military contribution to the federal response. NGB LNOs colocated with the DCO coordinate federal and state military support to civil authorities. Conversely, liaisons working with the military can articulate core competencies and resources of participating organizations.

   (a) Emergency preparedness LNOs are reserve officers who plan and liaise between DOD components and USG departments and agencies, USG regional HQ, and state or US territory emergency service HQ. These officers are directed by their DOD component through the Service planning agent. They also interface with the private sector. Each Military Department is authorized to assign emergency preparedness LNOs
at FEMA national and regional HQ; military HQ that serve as the DOD, Service, or regional planning agents for domestic emergency support; and state or US territorial HQ.

_For additional information about emergency preparedness LNOs, refer to DODI 3025.16, Defense Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Programs._

(b) Supported commanders (e.g., CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM) are responsible for a liaison structure at the state level within their respective AORs.

(2) **Media Operations Center (MOC).** MOCs provide information to the public. They may be established at each echelon of command, and should be composed of representatives from all organizations involved. MOCs disseminate accurate and timely information to help the public deal with emergencies and disasters or other events. Promoting federal efforts is a secondary goal. DOD media operations should complement and support the primary agency’s or joint information center’s media plan or effort.

4. **State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Considerations**

a. When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If DOD support is required and approved as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may execute mission assignments in support of the primary federal agency that often result in a wide range of assistance to local, tribal, territorial, and state authorities. Incidents can have a mix of public health, economic, social, environmental, criminal, and political implications with potentially serious long-term effects. Significant incidents require a coordinated response across organizations and jurisdictions, political boundaries, sectors of society, and multiple organizations.

b. Federal law, as codified in Title 10 and Title 32, USC, creates distinct mechanisms for local and state authorities to request NG forces or resources. Local and state authorities may also request federal forces (active and reserve) under Title 10, USC, authority for a contingency response. The NG of the US is administered by the NGB, which is a joint activity under DOD and provides communication for NG to DOD to support unified action. The NG active, reserve framework is built on mechanisms that coordinate among federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and natural disasters. NG forces operate under state active duty, Title 32, USC, or federal active duty, Title 10, USC, depending on activation status.

c. **NG JFHQ-State.** NG JFHQ-State gives DOD, through the NGB, a focused communication channel between OSD, the JS, CCDRs (e.g., CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM), and the non-federalized NG; joint C2 for non-federalized NG operations; and a contingent joint C2 capability in each state for Title 10, USC, HD, DSCA, and other related operations. In this respect, NG JFHQ-State is able to link the state and federal levels of government. The Services provide active duty LNOs to the NG JFHQ-State.
d. NG forces have primary responsibility to provide military assistance in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia during civil emergencies. Unless federalized, these forces are under the command of their respective governor (the Secretary of the Army in the case of the District of Columbia), who normally exercise C2 through the state or territory TAG. NG personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training or be called to active duty under the authority of the governor or the President.

e. Each US state and territory has an office of emergency services (OES), or an equivalent office (e.g., the office of emergency management), responsible to plan and assist the governor in response to emergencies. In some states, TAG is also head of this office. The OES coordinates state or territorial assistance to its local governments through authority of the governor or TAG. The OES operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency and coordinates with federal officials for support, if required. The state will usually designate a state coordinating officer, with authorities similar to the FCO, to coordinate and integrate federal and state activities.

f. DOD counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO, and state coordinating officer can be established at lower echelons to facilitate coordination.

g. The emergency management assistance compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement that enables entities to provide mutual assistance during times of need. The EMAC mutual aid agreement and partnership, either between or among member states, enables states to provide and receive aid for disasters ranging from hurricanes to earthquakes, wildfires to toxic waste spills, and terrorist attacks to CBRN incidents. Since its ratification and signing into law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321), 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become EMAC members. EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association, which provides the day-to-day support and technical backbone for EMAC education and operations. DOD has no active role in EMAC. However, DSCA planners at the CCMD level should be aware of the EMAC as it can affect the readiness and availability of non-DOD resources that may be considered for other activities.

h. The US recognizes certain Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations under its protection. These tribes have the right to self-governance, tribal sovereignty, and self-determination. USG departments and agencies should respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other rights, and meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal relationship between the USG and Indian tribal governments. State governors should request a presidential disaster declaration on behalf of a tribe under the Stafford Act for federal assistance for disasters on tribal lands. In the absence of such a declaration, however, USG departments and agencies may have separate authorities to work directly with tribes. US treaties, statutes, and executive orders mandate that the USG deal with Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis, reflecting the federally recognized tribes’ right of self-government as sovereign domestic dependent nations. A tribe may opt, however, to deal directly with state and local officials. USG departments and agencies involved in potential or actual incidents
requiring a coordinated federal response should consult and collaborate with tribal governments on matters affecting the tribes and should be aware of the social, political, and cultural aspects of tribal lands that might affect incident management operations. USG departments and agencies recognize the unique political and geographical issues of tribes whose aboriginal and contemporary territory is on, or near, the current international borders of Canada and Mexico. USG departments and agencies should include tribes in all aspects of incident management operations that affect tribes. For incidents that directly impact tribal jurisdictions, a tribal representative should be included in the unified coordination group. A tribe may appoint a tribal liaison in the JFO.

5. Nongovernmental Organizations

a. Domestic NGOs can play a prominent role in response to disasters. Many of these are charity- and faith-based organizations that provide assistance to disaster victims. NGOs make a significant impact at the local level, and DSCA planners at the CCMD level should consider domestic NGOs capacity and capability as they assess potential critical shortfalls that can lead to RFAs.

b. National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) (http://www.nvoad.org) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that provides a forum for organizations to share knowledge and resources to help communities prepare for and recover from disasters. NVOAD is the primary POC for voluntary organizations in the National Response Coordination Center (at FEMA HQ). Inside the US, NVOAD has a membership of over 50 national organizations (faith-based, community-based, and other NGOs) and more than 50 state and territory equivalents.

6. The Private Sector

a. The private sector owns or operates approximately 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector are partners in CIP. Government departments and agencies have access to critical threat information and both the government and private sector control security programs, participate in research and development, and have other resources that are more effective if discussed and shared in a partnership setting. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides the framework for partnership between government and the private sector to protect critical infrastructure and key resources. Information sharing and analysis centers, sector coordinating councils, and state and local fusion centers enable information sharing and security efforts for the various sectors of our nation’s critical infrastructure. The private sector is integral to DSCA planning and collaboration.

b. Private sector entities provide sector, facility, and installation security for critical infrastructure and telecommunications systems. Critical infrastructure and key resources are owned and operated by the public and private sectors and support the delivery of critical and essential services. DOJ has primary ESF #13, Public Safety and Security Annex, responsibility (i.e., ESF coordinator and primary agency) and, along with DHS, state and local authorities and police, and state NG, assists the private sector in protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure. DOD also supports security at facilities that are part
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of the nation’s defense critical infrastructure. CIP incident response is coordinated through DHS’s Office of Infrastructure Protection. The private sector, under ESF #14, Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation, defines and addresses risk reduction and long-term community recovery priorities, and supports the community recovery planning process.

c. Private sector entities can enhance USG situational awareness and enable DOD DR operations in both foreign and domestic settings. The US Business Executives for National Security is a private association of commercial practitioners who can provide information on disasters and help identify resources to mitigate their impact.

d. The American Red Cross (ARC) (http://www.redcross.org) is a corporation chartered by the US. The ARC supports a number of ESFs, most notably ESF #6, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services. It works with state, territorial, tribal, and local authorities as a direct provider of DR services (e.g., emergency sheltering, feeding, basic first aid support, mental health counseling, and disaster assessment). Under ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services, the ARC supports the DHHS to provide blood products. Due to its stature, the ARC can coordinate among NGOs, as well as the various entities of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

7. Interorganizational Cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas

a. Canada. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), USNORTHCOM, and Canada Joint Operations Command (CJOC) share the task of defending North America and building cooperative approaches to ensure its security. CJOC conducts Canadian Armed Forces operations in North America and around the world; however, it is not directly involved in NORAD operations. North American defense is a collaborative effort among the three commands and other mission partners. USNORTHCOM and CJOC are national commands reporting to their respective governments while NORAD is a binational command reporting to both governments (see Figure III-1). The commands have complementary missions and work closely together to meet their individual and collective responsibilities for the defense and security of North America. Unity of effort, situational awareness, and coordination with a variety of mission partners link and enable all these commands.

(1) Commander, NORAD. By international agreement (i.e., The North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] Agreement and Terms of Reference, and the Canadian/US Basic Security Document 100/35), Commander, NORAD (who also serves as CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander of the US Element to NORAD) leads a binational command composed of Canadian and US forces which conducts persistent aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America. Military actions outside of these three NORAD mission areas are a national responsibility. Bilateral military operations are planned and coordinated by USNORTHCOM and CJOC. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are separate commands with distinct missions and authorities, but a majority of USNORTHCOM’s AOR overlaps with NORAD’s operational area. They share HQ facilities and staffs that work closely together. Canadian and US general officers serve as NORAD and
USNORTHCOM deputies. Separate agreements between the two nations provide for bilateral military actions outside of NORAD.

(2) The commanders, USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOOC, build close relationships with each other, their staffs, and supporting and partner agencies. These relationships enable the commands to provide timely and coordinated response to defense and security challenges to North America while respecting both nation’s sovereignty, but leveraging the capabilities and common cause they share.

(3) The Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan was developed to provide a framework for the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the other nation in the performance of civil support operations (e.g., floods, forest fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, and effects of a terrorist attack). This framework is designed to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate damage to property.

(4) NORAD also provides air defense for NSSEs in the US and similar events in Canada.
b. **Mexico.** USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military and civil response partners to increase mutual long-term capacity to counter common security threats and build consequence management capability. This is accomplished primarily through USNORTHCOM’s TCP, and executed through security cooperation and disaster preparation and response programs. Together these efforts strengthen the Mexican security and response forces’ capacity and improve security and disaster preparation and response in North America. While there is no formal military agreement between the US and Mexico, USNORTHCOM works closely with the Mexican Armed Forces and civil agencies through the embassy country team, military LNOs, and interagency partners. This coordination facilitates a whole-of-government approach to a wide range of programs, events, and activities that strengthen the bilateral relationship and the collective defense of our respective nations. There is broad Mexican law enforcement and intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration for HS and humanitarian support activities.

c. **The Bahamas.** USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force and their National Emergency Management Agency civil response partners to increase long-term capacity to counter security threats to both the Bahamas and the US and build cooperative consequence management capabilities. Goals are accomplished primarily through USNORTHCOM’s TCP; the Building Partnership Capacity Program; the Overseas Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program; and Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos. Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos is a cooperative counterdrug mission supported by Royal Bahamas Defence Force; Royal Bahamas Police Force; USCG; CBP; and US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with USNORTHCOM assistance. It provides equipment, training, and intelligence support to strengthen the Royal Bahamas Defence Force’s capacity, and improve security in the northern Caribbean and southeastern maritime approaches to the US.

8. **Critical Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis**

DHS leads the evaluation of vulnerabilities and coordinates with other federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private entities to plan responses. DHS focuses on critical infrastructure—the physical and virtual assets, systems, and networks so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would debilitate security, the national economy, public health, or safety. To evaluate vulnerabilities, DHS collects, protects, evaluates, and disseminates information to the American public, state and local governments, tribal authorities, international partners, and the private sector.

a. Many of the critical infrastructure sectors have formal processes and structures to support sector-wide information sharing activities.

b. Private sector information sharing and analysis centers enable information sharing in some sectors. These centers collect, distribute, analyze, and share sensitive and sometimes proprietary information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, alerts, and best practices.
c. Some sectors use alternate mechanisms to communicate internally and with government partners and other sectors about threat indications, vulnerabilities, and protective strategies. Many of these information sharing mechanisms are compatible and help leaders identify and account for cross-industry dependencies in emergency response planning.

d. State and regional fusion centers provide geographically relevant information to the critical infrastructure owners and operators in their jurisdictions. Many fusion centers have infrastructure analysts in their centers to produce risk analyses of their regions or local areas.
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN CONSIDERATIONS

“In such circumstances, we should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action. We have to broaden our tools to include diplomacy and development, sanctions and isolation, appeals to international law, and, if just, necessary, and effective, multilateral military action.”

Barack Obama
President of the United States
Address at United States Military Academy
28 May 2014

1. United States Government Structure in Foreign Countries

   a. The Diplomatic Mission. The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with almost all of the world’s independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established IAW the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a party. Missions are organized under DOS regional and functional bureaus. The boundaries for the DOS regions roughly approximate those of the CCMDs and therefore geographic and functional seams must be addressed and managed. DOS provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG departments and agencies in the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times another person designated by the President, or the chargé d’affaires (the chargé) when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM. For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of another country represents US interests and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. In countries where an international organization is headquartered, the US may have a multilateral mission to the international organization in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

   (1) The Ambassador. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the ambassador. The ambassador is the President’s personal representative to the government of the foreign country or to the international organization to which accredited. As such, the ambassador is normally the COM and recommends and implements national policy regarding the foreign country or international organization, and oversees the activities of USG employees in the mission. While the majority of ambassadors are career members of the Foreign Service, many are appointed from outside the Foreign Service. The ambassador, as COM, has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises.

   (a) The COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those under the command of a CCDR, a USG multilateral mission, or an international organization. The COM may be accredited to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS’s strategic-level planners and decision makers. The COM
provides recommendations and considerations for planning directly to the GCC and JTF commander. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the HN. The COM’s political role aligns and links joint operations with USG strategic objectives. Generally, each COM has a formal agreement with the GCC as to which DOD personnel are under the security responsibility of the COM, and which are under the GCC.

(b) All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. The COM has the right to see all communications to, or from, mission elements, however transmitted, except those specifically exempted by law or executive decision. The COM is responsible for the security of the mission and all personnel, whether inside or outside the chancery (the main building of the embassy) gate. The COM reviews programs, personnel, and funding regularly, and ensures all agencies do likewise. Every executive branch agency under COM authority must obtain approval before changing the size, composition, or mandate of its staff. All USG personnel, other than those in country under command of a US CCDR or on the staff of an international organization, must obtain country clearance before entering the country on official business.

(2) The DCM. The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career foreign service officers, through a rigorous selection process, to be the principal deputy to the ambassador. Although not appointed by the President, the DCM wields considerable power, especially when acting as the chargé. The DCM is usually responsible for the day-to-day activities of the embassy.

(3) The Embassy. The HQ of the mission is the US embassy, usually located in the capital city of the HN. Although the various USG departments and agencies that make up the mission may have individual HQ elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal point for interagency coordination within that country. The ambassador’s house is known as the residence. The chancery and residence usually enjoy extraterritorial privileges (i.e., exemption from the jurisdiction of local law). Each embassy has an associated consular section, frequently located in the chancery, to provide services to US citizens and to issue visas to foreigners wishing to travel to the US.

(4) Consulates. Consulates—branch offices of the mission located in key cities—may be established in large cities or commercial centers. Consulates are often far from the US embassy. A consulate is headed by a consul general. In addition to providing consular services, the consulate is usually a mirror of the embassy, albeit on a much smaller scale. It is the focal point of interagency coordination for the assigned consular district. Working with the embassies and consulates provides the JFCs with their best forums to achieve unity of effort at the operational level. They are the entry points for coordination with USG departments and agencies, and potentially with other external stakeholders. Moreover, the embassies and consulates can improve the JFC’s situational awareness of stakeholders who can impact the command’s mission. JFC
coordination with embassies and consulates enables the USG’s comprehensive approach to the operational environment.

b. **DOS Plans.** The overall global plan is the DOS/USAID Joint Strategic Plan. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is a study completed by DOS every four years that analyzes the short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint for the US diplomatic and development efforts abroad. In addition, DOS regional bureaus influence specific geographic areas and functional bureaus focus on specific interests such as terrorism or arms control. US missions prepare an integrated country strategy every three years that sets country-level US foreign policy goals and objectives, and establishes an action plan to achieve those objectives. The integrated country strategy is a concise, streamlined document that facilitates long-term diplomatic and assistance planning. They are coordinated among the departments and agencies represented on the country team, both in their embassy and in the Washington, DC, interagency community. DOS regional bureaus in Washington, DC, and their joint regional strategies cover geographic regions that are not identical to the GCCs’ AORs. In addition, DOS functional bureaus develop functional bureau strategies (e.g., Arms Control Verification and Compliance, Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Counterterrorism, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Political-Military Affairs). USAID missions develop and use country development cooperation strategies (http://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/country-strategies-cdcs). These five-year, country-based strategies are designed to synchronize USAID assistance with other USG departments’ and agencies’ efforts.


c. The differences between geographic CCMD, DOS, and USAID regional boundaries create challenging seams and may pose significant coordination problems. Similar to the distinction between DOD’s functional and geographic CCMDs, DOS has both functional and regional bureaus. The countries included in each region can be viewed at the DOS website (http://www.state.gov/p/). Integrated country strategies and joint regional strategies are available at https://intellipedia.intelink.gov/wiki/Integrated_Country_Strategy and https://intellipedia.intelink.gov/wiki/Joint_Regional_Strategy.


d. **The Country Team.** The country team, headed by the COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. It is composed of the COM, DCM, section heads, the senior member of each USG department or agency in country, and other USG
personnel, as determined by the COM. Each member presents the position of the parent organization to the country team and conveys country team considerations back to the parent organization. The COM confers with the country team to develop and implement foreign policy toward the HN and to disseminate decisions to the members of the mission.

(1) The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US programs and policies. Under the country team construct, USG departments and agencies are required to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities. Country team members who represent USG departments and agencies other than the DOS are routinely in contact with their parent organizations. Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have broader national implications. Prior to providing any DOD logistical support, the reimbursement mechanism and policies should be clearly specified, understood, and coordinated with the supporting comptroller per DODI 4000.19, Support Agreements.

(2) In almost all bilateral missions, the SDO/DATT is the principal DOD official and representative on country teams. In locations with no SDO/DATT, the chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO) may act as the SDO/DATT. The SCO is called by various names (e.g., the Office of Defense Cooperation, the security assistance office/organization, the military group) and is largely determined by the preference of the host country. The SDO/DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues and the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission. All DOD elements assigned to, attached to, or operating from US embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT. Where separate SCO and SDO/DATT offices exist, they remain separate with distinct duties and statutory authorities. SDO/DATT duties include:

(a) Plan, coordinate, support, and/or execute US defense issues and activities in the HN, including oversight of GCC security cooperation programs.

(b) Liaise on behalf of the embassy with HN defense establishments and help develop national security and operational policy.

(c) Represent SecDef and DOD components to HN counterparts and foreign diplomats accredited to the HN, and represent DOD, SecDef, and DOD components in-country.

(d) Present coordinated DOD views on all defense matters to the COM and provide the COM a single POC to assist in carrying out the COM’s responsibilities.

(e) Represent SecDef and the CCDR to coordinate administrative and security matters for all DOD personnel not under the command of a CCDR.

(f) Carry out the duties and instructions in CJCSI 5205.01, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché Offices and Security Cooperation Organizations (U).
(g) Coordinate for DOD elements under the direction and supervision of the COM. This coordination does not preempt the COM’s authority over these elements, the parent DOD component’s mission authority, or the GCC’s command authority under the Unified Command Plan.

(h) Provide information to USG officials on the scope of in-country activities for all DOD component command elements assigned to the mission, to include the missions, locations, organization, and unique security requirements.

(3) The COM has the discretion to accept or reject LNOs from USG departments and agencies, including DOD. The COM may not want additional military in and around the embassy because of HN political concerns (e.g., many nations limit the number of military members allowed in US embassies as a quid pro quo to how many are allowed into their embassies in the US), space and communications limitations, or to avoid confusing new coordination requirements. Sending LNOs to an embassy, whether for a short-term crisis response or for a sustained presence, is a negotiated process and requires close coordination with the COM.

For more information, refer to DODD 5205.75, DOD Operations at US Embassies; DODI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies (U); and CJCSI 5205.01, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché Offices and Security Cooperation Organizations (U).

e. CCMDs. USG departments and agencies augment CCMDs to help integrate the instruments of national power in plans.

(1) GCCs, functional CCDRs, and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a POLAD by DOS. POLADs are senior DOS officers (often flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to senior US military leaders and commanders, and they provide policy analysis and insight regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ duties. The POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR or CJTF. They do not serve as DOS representatives. However, due to their status and contacts, they can enable interorganizational cooperation relationships. The POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes links to US embassies in the AOR or JOA and with DOS. They articulate DOS objectives relevant to GCC’s theater strategy or CJTF’s plans.

(2) USAID also places senior development advisors (SDAs) at most geographic CCMDs, USSOCOM, and Pentagon (JS) to coordinate GCC relations with USAID HQ and field missions. These advisors are senior USAID Foreign Service officers (usually flag-rank equivalents like POLADs). They inform GCC planning and operations concerning USAID programs and processes and serve as the CCDR’s principal advisor on all development matters in the AOR. OFDA places HA advisors at the CCMDs and Pentagon to coordinate responses involving DOD assistance, provide training, and participate in planning. HA advisors are experts in FHA with extensive experience in both civilian and joint HA responses.
(3) United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) have appointed senior non-DOD civilian deputies. Most of these appointed senior officials have previously served as ambassadors. While these civilian deputies cannot exercise Title 10, USC, command authority (necessitating the assignment of a military deputy as well), their foreign service rank and experience enhances those HQ’s interorganizational cooperation.

(4) The JIACG (or equivalent organization), when formed, participates in planning efforts. Each JIACG (or equivalent organization) is a multifunctional, advisory element that facilitates information sharing. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support to plan, coordinate, prepare, and implement agency activities. It may provide products and inputs that feed planning, assessment, and the CCDR’s decision cycle.

(5) Other USG departments and agencies may detail liaison personnel to CCMD staffs to improve interagency coordination. For example, intelligence representatives may be assigned to geographic CCMD staffs to support intelligence and antiterrorism activities.

(6) DOD regional centers (e.g., United States European Command’s [USEUCOM’s] Marshall Center and USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center) (http://www.dsca.mil/programs/DOD-regional-centers) are aligned with the geographic CCMD’s programs and objectives and are DOD’s primary instruments for regional outreach and alumni network-building efforts among US and foreign military, civilian, and non-government actors. GCCs rate regional center directors, provide direction and designate regional priorities and objectives for the regional center mission in support of the security cooperation objectives.

(7) DOS and USAID assess conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization activities with ICAF and CAF, respectively. USAID’s CAF analyzes sources of conflict, events that could exacerbate conflict, opportunities to resolve contention, and sources of resilience. A USAID mission usually initiates the request for a CAF to support the development or revision of a country development cooperation strategy or to inform the design of a new program. Led by USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, the CAF team typically includes members of the mission concerned and may include staff from USAID’s Washington offices and outside consultants. DOS’s CSO’s ICAF can help a country team and participating Washington-based officials reach a shared understanding of a country’s conflict dynamics and identify potential USG responses. An ICAF may originate either from a CSO’s need to inform its operations or a request from an embassy, a CCMD, a DOS regional bureau, the NSC, or other interagency partners. The ICAF may involve participants from USG departments and agencies, external partners, or CSO personnel.

2. International Organizations

a. The UN. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the US Permanent Representative.
The ambassador typically has the status of Cabinet rank and is assisted at the US mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates military interests primarily with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and the UNOCHA. USG coordination with UN PO missions or agencies in-theater is through the US country team, which includes DOS’s refugee coordinators focused on humanitarian response through UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In some countries, US UN military observers attached to some UN PO missions may provide information and advice through the US country team.

(1) The UN normally conducts PO under the provisions of a resolution from the Security Council. Mandates are developed through a political process that generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity. As with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented by US forces through orders issued by SecDef through the CJCS. During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military orders.

(2) As part of a broader UN strategy, the Integrated Mission Planning Process provides guidelines for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach to plan integrated PO (hereafter “integrated missions”). The Integrated Mission Planning Process is the authoritative basis to plan all new integrated missions, as well as revise existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds, and programs.

(a) When UN peacekeeping missions are authorized, UNDPKO provides UN peacekeeping operations policy guidance and strategic direction. In the field, the head of mission (HOM) has authority over the UN peacekeeping operation’s activities, including military, police, and civilian resources. Military personnel provided by member states are placed under the OPCON of the UN force commander or head of military component, but not under UN command. In integrated missions, the special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)/HOM is a civilian who reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at UN HQ. The SRSG/HOM is delegated authority to set the direction of the mission and lead the participation with local political leaders. The SRSG/HOM coordinates the activities of the entire UN system in the field.

(b) The UN generally provides a resident coordinator (RC) prior to initiating a peacekeeping mission. In the initial stages of a complex emergency or natural disaster, the UN RC coordinates the policies, programs, and actions in all countries with a UN presence. The RC is typically the most senior UN representative in-country, unless an SRSG is appointed. The RC is appointed by the Secretary-General, and represents all organizations of the UN unless they have a presence on the ground. As such, the RC often represents UNOCHA in the early warning and initial response phase of an emergency. In many cases, the RC also represents the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The RC is usually in place and familiar with the crisis. In their coordinating role, the RC convenes regular meetings of the UN country team, which is composed of representatives of the operational UN agencies on the ground. In a crisis, the RC also organizes broader coordination forums comprised of NGOs, the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, private donors, and other international organizations, including subcommittees that help coordinate humanitarian relief in a particular sector or region. If a UN peacekeeping mission is authorized, an integrated mission is launched under the leadership of an SRSG. In that case, the RC will be designated the deputy of the SRSG and coordinate both humanitarian operations and UN development operations. The RC will also maintain links with governments and other parties, donors, and the broader humanitarian and development communities.

(c) In certain situations, the Secretary-General may appoint a special representative who reports to them through the Under-Secretary-General, but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ. The special representative may direct day-to-day operations.

(3) US Military Support. The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes, 1951), and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(a) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.


(b) The UN conducts operations employing military forces as contingent units under the OPCON of the head of the military contingent, as staff augmentation to the mission HQ, or as “experts on mission” (i.e., UN military observers). The US has provided military forces and personnel to each of these categories. Additionally, the US can support the UN by conducting parallel missions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. US forces conducting these missions are under US OPCON, in collaboration with UN forces. The US usually uses JTFs to conduct multinational operations. The CJTF will normally conduct operations as part of an MNF. US forces should coordinate operations with a variety of USG departments and agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities.

For more information on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

(c) The chain of command, from the President to tactical commands, remains inviolate. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place US forces participating in multilateral PO under OPCON or TACON of a UN mission, limited by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the US and the UN. The President retains, and will never relinquish, command authority over US forces. OPCON or TACON for UN multilateral PO is given for a specific time or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction to US
forces already deployed by the President. The limits of OPCON or TACON include the following: a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President, and the foreign UN commander may not separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote US personnel, or change their internal organization.

(d) US personnel serving as UN military observers may be able to provide information and advice to both the US country team and JFCs. They represent the commitment of US national interest to PO missions—fostering the missions’ legitimacy and encouraging the participation of other nations. Through a discreet relationship with the US country team, US personnel serving as UN military observers can improve situational awareness and the international intervention. They contribute to the UN mission, and provide advice and coordinate for the US country team. US personnel serving as UN military observers are not under the command of a GCC or the authority of a COM. They are OPCON to the Commander, US Military Observer Group-Washington, a joint command.

(e) Additionally, the US military may provide logistics support to the UN through an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement between the US and the UN.

b. NATO. NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. IAW the treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It provides a forum for member countries to consult on security issues of common concern and take joint action to address them. The Alliance is committed to defending its member states against aggression or coercion, and to the principle that an attack against one or several members is considered an attack against all. NATO remains an international organization in which each member country retains its sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus. NATO’s most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which brings together representatives of all the Allies at the level of ambassadors, ministers, or heads of state and government. NATO has no operational forces of its own other than those assigned to it by member countries or contributed by partner countries to carry out a specific mission. It has a number of mechanisms available for the defense planning and resource planning that form the basis of cooperation within the Alliance. These include the implementation of political commitments to improve capabilities and a military structure that combines the functions of an MNF planning organization with an Alliance-wide system of C2 of the military forces assigned to it.

3. Nongovernmental Organizations

a. The Role of NGOs. NGOs typically operate under approval of the HN and provide humanitarian or other assistance in many of the world’s trouble spots. NGOs range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created, small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development programs, human rights, and conflict resolution. The number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus sometimes enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities. In fact, individual organizations are often funded by both government and private entities, as implementing partners, to carry out specific functions. An NGO’s funding sources can provide insight to their organizational objectives and policies. Similarly, internationally active NGOs often employ indigenous personnel for their expertise in language and culture, as well as their familiarity with local conditions and actors.

b. There are thousands of NGOs worldwide and they possess a significant collective capacity. A JTF or MNF may encounter scores of NGOs in an operational area and must understand how they affect the command’s mission. Over 600 such agencies are registered with USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium of NGOs, has a membership of over 180 private agencies. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds. Globally, over 1,660 NGOs are registered with the UN’s Department of Public Information, while over 3,000 have consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). NGOs often operate independently. They should be assessed individually, without preconceived assumptions as to their motives and policies.

c. Military and NGO Relations. In a hostile or uncertain environment, the military’s initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces. NGOs normally seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to military missions, which they had no part in determining. Many NGOs view their relationship with the military under the UNOCHA Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, commonly referred to as the Oslo Guidelines, (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20[November%202007].pdf) and UNOCHA Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelines%20for%20Complex%20Emergencies.pdf) that define the humanitarian principles and the importance of distinction and last resort. The Oslo Guidelines emphasize and discuss the principle of humanitarian space (humanitarianism, neutrality, and impartiality). Some organizations employ a more strident interpretation of these principles, applying them not just to HA, as referenced in the guidelines, but also to advocacy, development, and civil society work. Therefore, the extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can vary
considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal, essential assistance from the military, and ensure military actions in relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities common to the civilian relief community. In a permissive environment (e.g., responses to natural disasters), military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities may align with NGO objectives.

(1) NGO’s extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations can make them valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes. They are sometimes willing to share such information on the basis of shared interests. The JFC should identify NGOs in the commands’ operational area, and how and where joint forces might interact with them. In austere environments, joint forces and NGOs sometimes use and compete for the same limited resources (e.g., water or fuel). DOD should coordinate and communicate with NGOs. Awareness of NGO activities can influence resource planning and budgeting by allowing the commander to shape resourcing requirements to mitigate shortfalls. Additionally, communication with NGOs can forestall unintended second- and third-order effects of DOD actions within the operational area. For instance, NGOs can utilize their extensive local experience to inform the JFC that a large military footprint may drive up prices in the local economy, undermining progress. Communication between the US military and NGOs can promote US national interests and policy. Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and IPI, by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN.

(2) While some NGOs will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial operations. This is particularly the case if US military forces are involved in a conflict in the operational area. Many NGOs have little, if any, communications equipment or personal security, preferring instead to trust the local populace for their safety; however, many larger NGOs have robust communications capabilities. Some NGOs provide support and assistance in the security arena. Any activity that undermines the perception of an NGO’s impartiality, such as close collaboration with a particular military force, could eliminate that organization’s primary source of security. Therefore, joint forces should respect an NGO’s request for independence to avoid compromising the NGOs security. NGOs may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations, or out of suspicion that the military will use information obtained from the NGO to plan lethal activities. Commanders and their staffs should respect these concerns and consult these organizations, along with the competent national or international authorities, to identify local conditions that impact military-NGO relationships.

(3) During large-scale operations, dealing directly with myriad NGOs may be impractical. Some NGOs may be reluctant to coordinate directly with the military. The USAID mission in country, if one exists, normally tracks USAID-funded NGO activity in
country. Under some circumstances, USAID may act as an intermediary with NGOs in the operational area.

(4) PA planning should identify NGO POCs that operate in the JOA. Military spokespersons may comment on NGO operations based on approved PA guidance and refer media queries to the NGO’s spokesperson.

d. **Military Support of NGOs.** SecDef may task US military forces with missions that bring them into contact with international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities. In such circumstances, it can be mutually beneficial to coordinate the activities of all entities in the operational area. JFCs should look to create a climate of cooperation between international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities willing to work with the military; however, they should equally respect and maintain a good rapport with NGOs and the ICRC that choose to maintain neutrality in a complex emergency. When cooperation is not feasible, JFCs should monitor openly hostile NGOs and develop mitigation strategies. A framework for structured civil-military interaction (e.g., a CMOC, HACC, or HOC) provides a location for military and NGOs to meet and work together to advance common goals. Some NGOs may be reluctant to conduct coordination meetings in a setting managed by the military. The UN humanitarian cluster system may be the primary forum for civil-military interaction. Taskings to support international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities in an HA/DR scenario are normally for a short-term purpose due to urgent requirements to save lives and mitigate suffering and will usually be provided by USAID/OFDA, using the MITAM or similar process. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are those capabilities most needed. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the role of military forces should be to enable, not perform, international organization, NGO, and private sector tasks. Military support should focus on tasks that cannot be performed by civilian entities at that point in time (e.g., helicopter lift and engineering assessments). Commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the military and other organizations may be critical to the success of the campaign plan or OPLAN. While they can be reluctant to engage with DOD, NGOs can affect the achievement of DOD mission objectives.

e. The Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guidelines_pamphlet_0.pdf), agreed to by the DOD, InterAction, and USIP, should facilitate interaction between the US military forces and NGOs. They were developed by InterAction, OSD, JS, DOS, and USAID, and facilitated by USIP. The fundamental principle underlying the guidelines is the importance of maintaining the distinction between civilian and military actors and activities when both are operating in the same area. Examples of how these principles can be put into practice include directing military personnel to wear uniforms when conducting relief activities to avoid being mistaken for NGOs, and NGO representatives should avoid traveling in military vehicles, wearing camouflage or military-style clothing, and being colocated with military units. They provide practical guidelines for interaction between US military forces and NGOs that may be helpful, even though they are not joint doctrine or expressed in doctrinal terms. They also complement the
development of other guidelines such as UNOCHA country- or region-specific guidelines. During operations in a permissive environment, documents such as Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief are more applicable. When developing guidelines for a specific operation, the following considerations apply:

(1) Should the liaison between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted in confidence or transparently?

(2) How will liaison arrangements affect the public’s perception of the impartiality of humanitarian activities?

(3) Can civil-military liaison arrangements be transparent and maintain a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian organizations?

(4) Can misperceptions and misguided conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?

(5) Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to maintain liaison on an ad hoc basis?

(6) What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?

(7) When, if ever, should the LNOs of the humanitarian and military communities be colocated?

For more information, refer to “Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies” and Appendix C, “Nongovernmental Organizations.”

4. Legal Considerations for Private Sector Entities Supporting Operations

The private sector possesses the skills and expertise to contribute to US objectives. These capabilities can be used to reduce operational requirements and maximize use of finite resources. A number of DODIs regulate the conduct of private military and security companies operating with DOD. These include DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS), which establishes and implements policy and guidance, assigns responsibilities, and provides DOD policy and procedures concerning DOD contractor personnel authorized to accompany the Armed Forces of the United States. DODI 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises, regulates the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract during contingency operations. It also assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for incident reporting, use of and accountability for equipment, rules for the use of force, and a process for administrative action or the removal, as appropriate, of private security contractors and private security
contractor personnel. DODI 5525.11, *Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members*, provides policy for exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over civilians employed by, or accompanying, the Armed Forces outside the US. Roles, responsibilities, accountability, and privileges of defense contractors should also be detailed in HN or status-of-forces agreements.

5. Foreign Operations

   a. The POLMIL Dimension. Within the executive branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external POLMIL relationships with overall US foreign policy. USAID is the lead agency for overseas development and disaster response and carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance. USG policy, treaties, and agreements bring DOD into a wide range of external POLMIL relationships that include:

   (1) Bilateral military relationships.

   (2) Multinational military forces.

   (3) Multilateral mutual defense alliances.

   (4) Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests (e.g., armaments cooperation/production, security assistance/foreign military sales, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution).

   (5) Use of US military assets for FHA or PO (including those conducted under UN auspices).

   b. Theater or Regional Focus. CCDRs implement DOD external POLMIL relations within their campaign plans. The geographic and functional CCMD’s operations and activities align with the DSR and the GEF. The GEF prioritizes campaign objectives for each CCMD, which then develops a TCP or FCP. The CCMD campaign plan and nested country plans should complement the current DOS joint regional strategy, the integrated country strategy, and if applicable, USAID’s country development cooperation strategy. The geographic CCMD’s regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS’s regional bureaus; however, the geographic boundaries differ. Most other USG foreign affairs agencies are regionally organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. The CCMDs include security cooperation activities requiring interorganizational cooperation in their campaign plans, which include posture and country-specific security cooperation sections. In contrast, the DOS focal point for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interorganizational cooperation is the regional bureau headed by an assistant secretary at DOS in Washington, DC. USAID has a similar structure, with geographic bureaus headed by assistant administrators in Washington, DC. Although the CCDRs will often find it more expeditious to approach the COMs for approval of an activity in HNs, the political effect of the proposed US military activity usually goes beyond the boundaries
Foreign Considerations

of the individual HN. In such cases, the CCDR should not assume that the position of the COM corresponds to the region-wide position of DOS. The CCDR’s POLAD can assist in ascertaining whether the activity has regional bureau approval.

c. CCMD Campaign Plans, Crisis Response, and Limited Contingency Operations. The CCMD’s campaign plan and nested country plans should complement DOS integrated country strategies and other plans developed by the country teams and USG interagency partners. In a crisis response and limited contingency operation, coordination between DOD and other USG departments and agencies normally occurs within the NSC/IPC and, if directed, during development of the USG strategic plan. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the CCDR’s staff may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President may be involved.

d. The CCDR and staff should establish habitual working relationships with relevant organizations before incidents that trigger planning and requests for military resources. As emergent events requiring planning develop, the normal flow of DOS and other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. This may be amplified by informal contacts between the CCDR’s staff (e.g., POLAD, SDA, JIACG [or equivalent organization]) and appropriate embassies, as well as the relevant bureaus at DOS. Such informal communications can facilitate development of viable COAs, but should not be used in place of established, authoritative planning processes.

e. Crisis Action Organizational Considerations. CCMD crisis action planning commences upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order, or at the direction of the CCDR. Activation of various planning cells to administer the specific requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF (e.g., logistics), but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interorganizational cooperation. Liaison and coordinating mechanisms the CCDR may select to synchronize military and nonmilitary activities to achieve unity of effort include:

(1) Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). Early in crisis response planning, an assessment can help identify resources to immediately mitigate a humanitarian crisis. The supported CCDR may organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information for planning. This assessment should analyze existing conditions and recommend FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should review the current threat assessment; current intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID POCs. The disaster assistance response team (DART) and USAID mission can provide some of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the HN government’s capabilities, identify primary POCs, determine the threat, survey facilities that may be used for FP purposes, and coordinate support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. If dislocated civilians are an element of the crisis, the DOS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), International Organization for Migration (IOM), or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can also be resources. The HAST works closely
with the DART to prevent duplication of effort. Unlike the DART, which assesses overall humanitarian conditions and requirements in the affected country, the HAST focuses its efforts to assess the opportunities and conditions to provide specific military support to civilian agencies.

(2) USAID, through its OFDA DART, is the lead agency for foreign disaster response. USAID/OFDA may deploy a DART into the crisis area to coordinate the FHA effort and activate an on-call, Washington, DC-based response management team. The DART links the geographic CCMD and USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs that participate in FHA operations. The DART team leader represents the USG response and may be supported by DOD. In addition to personnel from OFDA and other parts of USAID, the DART may include liaisons from DOS, parts of DOD (e.g., US Army Corps of Engineers), or other USG departments and agencies (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]), depending on the nature of the response. DARTs provide specialists in a variety of DR skills to help US embassies and USAID missions manage the USG response to foreign disasters. DARTs assess the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions.

For more information on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) HACC. The supported GCC may establish a HACC to plan and coordinate with interagency partners. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions transition to one or both of these organizations. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, a USAID/OFDA advisor or liaison, a PA officer, an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (e.g., preventive medicine physician, veterinarian).

(4) JLOC. The JLOC supports the geographic CCMD’s joint operations center and the operations planning teams. The GCC reviews the requirements and establishes priorities to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. The geographic CCMD may also be responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel. Formed at the discretion of the GCC and operated by the logistics directorate of a joint staff at the geographic CCMD, a JLOC functions as the single POC to coordinate logistic response into the AOR, relieving the JTF of as much of this function as possible. The JLOC may also coordinate with strategic-level providers (e.g., the Defense Logistics Agency, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and the geographic CCMD’s staff) to meet JTF support requirements.

For more information on the JLOC, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

(5) Liaison Section. The liaison section in foreign operations coordinates with USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and private sector entities. A liaison section coordinates military activities among MNFs, other USG departments and agencies, participating international organizations and NGOs, the private sector, HNs, and indigenous populations. Military forces, participating agencies, and HNs should consider exchanging liaison personnel to maximize information flow.
Information should flow between all parties. NGO liaisons should have access to the military. The CMOC can facilitate coordination. Alternatively, the HN may establish a coordination center.

(a) Civilian agencies that associate with uniformed military may be targeted by adversaries. This can deter some organizations from meeting with the military. When open civilian organizational contact with the military causes security concerns, coordination, cooperation, and information sharing can still be attempted through more discrete means of communication.

(b) Establishing liaison relationships. Liaison is contact or communication between elements of military forces or other agencies to build mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Various types of liaison coordination models may be used, depending on the level of commonality between stakeholders (i.e., is relationship cooperative or based on coexistence?). To empower LNOs to establish relationships, the JFC should clearly define the liaisons’ roles and authorities, and what authority they have to speak for their home agencies or organizations. Liaisons should not replace standing DOD processes, especially at the strategic level, but they can help streamline information flows. Liaisons can provide advice and information, translation between organizational cultures, and reachback to a home agency or organization.

(c) Types of liaison structures:

1. Colocation: this enables regular and direct communication.

2. Liaison exchange: temporary or permanent exchange of LNOs.

3. Limited liaison: exchange of officers for a limited time period, normally for meetings or specified hours.

4. Interlocutor: using bridge organization liaison or coordination officers to link or buffer civilian and military members.

(6) The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is a cooperative multinational effort to facilitate establishment and augmentation of a multinational task force HQ. The MPAT provides multinational expertise in planning and integrates other nations’ militaries, international organizations, and NGOs in the planning process. The MPAT uses a trained cadre that has worked with international organizations and NGOs prior to a crisis and deploys to the task force HQ once a crisis occurs. The MPAT program develops techniques and exercises multinational planning activities for operational-level task forces. This includes coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with USG organizations, international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and HN government agencies.

For more information, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and https://community.apan.org/mpat/default.aspx.
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

“The 24th MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] had a unique mission and reporting relationship. We fell under NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and were operating in the Task Force Helmand AO [area of operations]; consequently, “CIMIC” [civil-military cooperation], CA [civil affairs], and PRT [provincial reconstruction team] responsibility for Helmand Province belonged to the British. On the military side, the CA coordination involved ISAF headquarters in Kabul, Regional Command South (RC South) in Kandahar, Task Force Helmand and also the PRT in Lashkar Gah. Outside the military channels were USAID [United States Agency for International Development] (the major redevelopment entity in Afghanistan), the United Nations (UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], WHO [World Health Organization] and UN [United Nations] Assistance Mission to Afghanistan ‘UNAMA’) and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Also operating in Afghanistan are hundreds of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. In addition to all these actors, the Afghan government itself is in the early stages of its redevelopment and its ministries, which control most programs centrally from Kabul, are fledgling enterprises with varying degrees of competency.

We hit the ground in Kandahar somewhat blind of this highly complex mixture of governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations involved in stabilization and reconstruction/redevelopment activities. Only near the end of the deployment did I fully ascertain the depth and breadth of agencies and plans at play in Afghanistan.

The impact to any unit deploying to Afghanistan is that there needs to be awareness of the agencies, organizations, plans, and programs that are or will be in play within an area of operations. This is no small task as there is no entity wholly responsible for all these actors and programs; consequently, activities can occur within an AO without knowledge of the PRT or even the responsible Ministry. Interagency coordination is a constant endeavor and will be essential to ensuring unit efforts are integrated with big-picture plans.”

SOURCE: After Action Review
Detachment 4-3, 4th Civil Affairs Group
2 October 2008

(7) JFCs should not assume an HN has a functioning national government with which to liaise. The lack of a functioning HN national government places more importance on coordinating with international organizations and NGOs operating in the area. Also, HN liaison may be required at multiple levels of government (e.g., national, regional, local) and involve informal structures (e.g., tribes, clans).

f. PA and Media Support The proactive release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences puts joint operations in context; facilitates informed perceptions about military operations; undermines adversarial propaganda; and helps
achieve national, strategic, and operational objectives. By conveying the facts about joint force activities in a proactive manner, PA helps the JFC to impact the information environment, particularly as it relates to public support. The JFC’s PA officer helps inform USG departments and agencies and NGOs concerning joint force operations. The PA officer also coordinates public information activities to align messages.

(1) At the national level, the ASD(PA) interfaces with USG departments and agencies in the NSC/DC and issues PA guidance; advises on public information, command information, and community relations; and provides DOD information to the public, Congress, and the media.

(2) At the theater level, PA planning includes coordination with USG departments and agencies, the ambassador and country team (particularly the embassy PA section), the HN, national and international media, media elements of member forces, and other external stakeholders. It is essential that the overall plan be developed with consideration given to the public communication requirements of the operation and associated capabilities needed for execution. Additionally, a PA and media plan should be developed before the operation begins. JFCs may establish a MOC to disseminate information and media coverage of operations. When a MOC is established, it should include media and PA representatives from the aforementioned organizations.

(3) The JFC’s PA officer plays a major role in keeping USG departments and agencies, as well as other external organizations, informed on the capability and intent of the joint force, and in coordinating public information activities to ensure consistency of USG messages. The PA staff should coordinate all themes, messages, and press releases impacting a HN through the respective US embassy channels. CCMD POLADs can facilitate access to DOS and have reachback to resources for PA officers.

(4) PA Planning with International Organizations. The Office of the ASD(PA) provides PA guidance and, in coordination with DOS’s PA office, coordinates PA actions affecting international organizations. Planning for support to UN missions will normally be with UN press office personnel through the ASD(PA). JTF PA efforts should include the identification of POCs and authorized spokespersons within each international organization.

For more information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

6. Joint Task Force Considerations

   a. Mission Analysis

   (1) **JTF Assessment Team.** A JTF assessment team may deploy to the JOA to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, multinational members, UN representatives, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector representatives. The assessment team may also assist in clarifying the mission, force requirements, and time-phasing of force deployments for the JTF. USAID, because of the extensive contacts at the community level, can provide in-depth local information for JTF assessments. The JTF assessment team is similar to the HAST and may be able to
conduct assessments in association with the HAST. The CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team. It should include subject matter experts and representatives from Service and functional components expected to participate in the operation. USG department and agency representation may include the USAID/OFDA DART for FHA operations. Special operations personnel with cultural, language, regional, and technical skills may be included.

(2) **Coordinated Operations.** Operations by USG departments and agencies, the equivalent agencies of other national governments, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities, in concert with or supplementing those of HN entities, may be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA.

(3) **Priority Task.** This may be a military action, a humanitarian task, or a combination of both. In certain situations, interorganizational cooperation must be a top priority of the CJTF.

(4) **Regional Strategy.** In further analyzing the mission, consider how the theater or functional strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA. The NSC, DOS, COM, and the supported CCDR will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. This may affect COA development, themes and messages, and planning and execution activities. A well-defined regional strategy will delineate the military mission and assist in determining force requirements and defining the theater objectives.

(5) **Political Considerations.** The assessment team should have sufficient expertise to evaluate the political impact of USG activities and programs in the HN and surrounding region. The JFC should establish a relationship with the COM, the country team, the USAID mission director, and USG department and agency representatives in country. The JFC may request that USG departments and agencies augment the assessment team, or establish reachback to those organizations.

(a) The JFC and key staff members should meet with the regional and functional elements of the partner USG departments and agencies, the JS, and the embassies (in Washington, DC) of the nations in the area of operations. The JFC should work with the COM to align joint operations with USG priorities. Each US mission, as well as the various DOS geographic and functional bureaus involved, will likely provide different perspectives and issues to consider.

(b) CJTFs should build relations to enable information sharing with external stakeholders. One important step to develop confidence and facilitate mutually beneficial information exchange with non-USG entities is to clearly inform them of the JTF’s intent to share information. In this regard, the JFC staff should not over-classify information and should allow information to be declassified as early as operational conditions permit. Additionally, commanders may provide the means (e.g., accessible portal, communication equipment, and technical support) to external stakeholders to access and share information. While building a COP with non-DOD entities enables
unity of effort, most JFC COP displays are classified. Commanders should seek technological solutions that offer an unclassified version of the COP to share with participants who do not have security clearances. Another factor affecting information sharing is that some USG departments and agencies cannot easily access classified information. Classified computers may be limited in US embassies and not all staff may have access to them.

(6) **JTF HQ.** The JTF HQ, whether afloat or ashore, should be positioned in a defensible area, with access to HN political and private sectors, relief organizations, the media, and MNFs, if present. Proximity to the US embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance interorganizational cooperation.

b. **Organizational Tools for the JTF.** The CJTF should establish structures to coordinate all activities in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements, as well as international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and the media. The CJTF should consider how joint force actions and those of other organizations contribute to the desired objectives. This consideration requires liaison and routine contact with all parties, as well as reliable communications. An assessment team can develop recommendations for the CJTF concerning formation of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams.

(1) **ESG.** The ESG is composed of senior military representatives from the JTF, principals of the embassy (e.g., ambassador, DCM, political or POLMIL counselor), the HN, international organizations, and possibly NGOs and private sector entities present in the JOA. It is the high-level outlet to exchange information about operational policies and resolve difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG interprets and coordinates strategic policy. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the CJTF and ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to provide information and policy guidance to participating agencies.

(2) **Civil-Military Coordination Board.** This board is the CJTF’s vehicle to coordinate civil-military support. Membership is restricted typically to representatives from JTF staff sections involved in CMO. The board can help commanders refine their intent for CMO. CMO is a commander’s responsibility, not the responsibility of the CA staff/unit assigned to the JTF. The civil-military coordination board may include representatives from key international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities.

c. **JFCs are responsible to conduct CMO.** They may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond the organic CMO capability. The US Army CA command and brigade, or the United States Marine Corps (USMC) CA group, are staffed to provide the operational core of a JCMOTF. NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure. Further, many of these organizations may be in the operational area at the invitation of the HN. As such, they may be structured to conform with HN regulations or restrictions that do not align with military operations.
For more information on the JCMOTF, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

7. Civil-Military Operations Center

a. Military forces should normally develop relations with USG departments and agencies, civilian authorities, international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and the population during contingency operations. The CMOC is a mechanism to coordinate CMO that can also provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations, but rather coordinates and facilitates. The CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. It may be physical or virtual, and conducted collaboratively through online networks, as NGOs may be reluctant to conduct coordination meetings in settings managed by the military. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area and each is task-organized based on the mission. Horizontal and vertical synchronization among multiple CMOCs assists in unity of effort.

(1) A CMOC is formed to:

(a) Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO.

(b) Exchange information. Sharing information is a key function of the CMOC, but military staff must be careful to avoid the impression that stakeholder organizations are being used for intelligence gathering.

(c) Liaise and coordinate between joint forces and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the humanitarian needs of the populace.

(d) Provide a forum for military and other participating organizations. Other organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but choose not to identify themselves as members of the CMOC to better maintain their autonomy and impartiality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC a venue for informal stakeholder discussions, but not as a binding stakeholder coordination forum.

(e) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, international organizations, IPI, the private sector, and regional organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

(2) CMOCs are tailored for each mission. When a CMOC is established, the CJTF should invite representatives of other entities, which may include the following:

(a) USAID.

(b) DOS, country team, and other USG departments and agencies.

(c) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.
(d) HN or local government agencies.

(e) International organizations, NGOs, IPI, regional organizations, and the private sector (as appropriate).

(3) For foreign operations, the CMOC may be the focal point where US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs. However (particularly in FHA), an international organization may have already established coordination centers such as the UN HOC and cluster system. In these cases, the JFC should consider how to leverage such extant structures to perform CMOC functions rather than trying to duplicate coordination structures. A JFC may employ a CMOC, or provide CMOC capabilities, to support HN or civilian partners or otherwise coordinate with civilian partners. NGO LNOs should be identified to work within the CMOC. Often, NGO representatives who are unwilling to come to a military or USG facility are more comfortable communicating at a UN or HN site. As private organizations, NGOs may be reluctant to support the military. They may, however, accept grant funding from international organizations or USG departments and agencies like USAID. This funding may make NGOs, USG departments or agencies, or international organizations implementing partners. As an implementing partner, when NGOs receive a grant from USAID where the principal purpose is the transfer of money, property, services or anything of value to the recipient in order to accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by federal statute, substantial USAID involvement is not anticipated.

For more information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

b. During large-scale FHA operations, US forces may organize using the CMOC. If both are established, the CMOC should colocate with the HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the HOC.

c. In FHA operations, the UN organizes along key clusters. Coordination meetings hosted by UN elements may supplant the need for a US-military run CMOC. Commanders should complement, rather than compete with, the UN cluster meetings. NGOs are far more likely to participate in UN-sponsored meetings than US- (especially US military) sponsored coordination and deconfliction meetings.

(1) The UN cluster approach provides structures to enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability, and partnership. The cluster approach aims to provide a clear system of leadership and accountability for all the key sectors or areas of the humanitarian response. The cluster approach is intended, therefore, to strengthen rather than replace sectoral coordination under the overall leadership of the humanitarian coordinator (HC), with a view to improve humanitarian response in emergency situations. The global clusters include agriculture; camp coordination/management; early recovery; education; emergency shelter; emergency telecommunications; health; logistics; nutrition; protection; and water, sanitation, and hygiene. Some or all clusters may be used or modified based on the situation.
(2) The UN may also form a combination of a UN disaster assessment and coordination team, an on-site operations coordination center, or a humanitarian operations coordination center. These operations centers help the HN’s local emergency management authority coordinate international relief efforts.

(3) In NATO or multinational operations, CMO may be called civil-military cooperation.

For more information, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

d. The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC. Security, FP, and easy access for external stakeholders are all valid considerations. The location should be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, even if geographically colocated, and should be segregated from any nation’s classified information. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC “outside the wire” to maximize participation by organizations that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

e. Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to align operational considerations and concerns with political actions. Additionally, the CMOC provides stakeholders a single point to coordinate with the military, which facilitates the efforts of a joint force and the relief community.

(1) The military should not attempt to dictate USG civilian counterpart or international organization, NGO, and private sector partner activities, but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.

(2) JFCs cannot direct organizations or people not under their command to cooperate. However, a JFC can work with these entities to forge unity of effort on issues like security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items.

f. Periodic meetings can be scheduled in the CMOC to match civil-sector needs to organizations capable of meeting them. USG validated RFAs go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action.

For more information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

g. Liaison Teams. Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or HOC, JTF liaison teams work to increase understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, convey information, enhance mutual trust, and improve teamwork.

(1) Liaison aligns joint operations with USG, HN, and international organization objectives. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. In multinational operations, senior and subordinate commands and lateral or like forces should exchange liaisons.
(2) Liaisons are vital to multinational operations. Future JTFs likely will operate not only with traditional allies, but also with nations with which the US does not have a long history of military cooperation. The CJTF may face increased liaison and advisory requirements.

(3) A JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational operation should know doctrine and force capabilities, be proficient in the language of the receiving organization, and provide regional expertise and cultural awareness. CA or multinational support teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team may be another option.

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**CLUSTER SYSTEM IN HAITI**

Following the devastating earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010, the international humanitarian community has made significant progress in establishing humanitarian coordination structures. The US Agency for International Development Disaster Assistance Response Team staff highlight the critical role of the internationally recognized humanitarian cluster system in coordinating response efforts. Clusters provide a forum for humanitarian organizations to coordinate response efforts by sector and are led by designated agencies with relevant technical expertise. The cluster system seeks to ensure greater predictability and accountability in response efforts, while simultaneously strengthening partnerships between agencies. Application of the cluster system has contributed to significant progress on a range of issues, including broadened partnerships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); agreement on common sector standards, tools, and guidance; development of common training modules; creation of common stockpiles; and development of surge deployment rosters.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs activated twelve sector-specific clusters within the first ten days following the crisis. The active clusters include camp coordination and camp management; education; emergency shelter and non-food items; food aid; logistics; nutrition; protection; water, sanitation, and hygiene; agriculture; early recovery; emergency telecommunications; and health. Ten international humanitarian agencies and the Government of Haiti (GoH) are currently serving as lead agencies managing the twelve clusters.

Early in the operation, many small NGOs (mostly from the United States) did not understand the system and went directly to the joint task force with requests for support, which caused confusion.

Subsequently, most NGOs operating in Haiti are participating in the cluster coordination structure, due in large part to a consistent message from the United Nations, donors, other NGOs, and the GoH that if agencies want to be involved in the response, participation in the coordination and planning structure is critical.

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Various Sources
h. **HOC.** During large-scale FHA operations, when it becomes apparent the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN’s capacity to manage it unilaterally, the UN or the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid.

1. Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference. The CMOC is established by, and works for, the CJTF. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly USAID/OFDA, during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured with no command or control authority; all members are responsible to their own organizations or countries. The COM, or designated representative, will lead USG participation in the HOC. Additionally, the HOC coordinates at the senior, national level to enable strategic and operational unity of effort, while the CMOC coordinates USG actions at subnational and local levels to achieve operational and tactical unity of effort.

2. HOC members should include representatives of the affected country, the US embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), USAID/OFDA, UN, international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and other major organizations.

3. The HOC coordinates relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support. Requests for JTF military support to the HOC may be submitted to the JTF, through the CMOC, by the US lead agency.

4. The HOC should seek to create the conditions in which the HN can provide for its population’s humanitarian needs, and no longer require external assistance.

*For more information on the HOC, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*
i. **CMOC–JIACG (or Equivalent Organization) Relationship.** A CA command can provide theater-level analysis of civil considerations, in coordination with the JIACG (or equivalent organization), and develop civil input to the supported JFC. A CMO staff section plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through coordination with the supported unit’s designated staff directorate (normally the J-3). This staff section’s plans officer fuses civil inputs from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and HN sources (private and public sectors) to the JFC’s COP.

### 8. Civil-Military Teams

A civil-military team combines diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government. A civil-military team can combine military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict, while developing provincial, district, state, or local institutions so they can lead in governance, provide basic services and economic development, and enforce the rule of law. Civil-military teams of interagency experts can be formed to conduct specific missions (e.g., agricultural, economic, and CT). Examples of civil-military teams include JIATFs, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

*For more information on JIATFs and civil-military teams, refer to Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force,” and Appendix F, “Civil-Military Teaming,” respectively.*

### 9. Aligning Words and Deeds

a. The USG builds on coordinated actions and information to maintain credibility and trust with foreign populaces, governments, adversaries, and US citizens alike. This is done through accuracy, consistency, timeliness, and transparency in words and deeds. Credibility is important to build relationships that advance our national interests.

b. All USG departments and agencies share responsibility to use information as an instrument of national power. This includes developing processes to access and analyze communication and to deliver information to key audiences, both US and foreign. DOD synchronizes, aligns, and coordinates communication to facilitate understanding by key audiences. This is done to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to USG objectives. National strategic direction provides the building blocks for the JFC’s communication guidance. It is also essential to DOD initiatives to achieve unity of effort through unified action with our interagency partners and the broader interorganizational community. Key audience beliefs, perceptions, and behavior are essential to develop any strategy, plan, or operation. PA, IO, and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) are supporting capabilities. While CCDRs directly control assigned PA and IRC assets, they do not direct those assets conducting public diplomacy, which are the responsibility of DOS or the local US embassy.
c. The synchronized application of IO enables joint forces freedom of operation across the information environment. While IO is focused against adversaries, a broader set of DOD information activities serve broader USG interests. For example, DOD may collaborate with other agencies for public diplomacy programs that also support DOD’s mission.

d. The JFC should identify a platform to exchange information and collaborate across multiple networks and throughout the operational environment with a broad range of stakeholders (interagency, multinational, and private sector). For example, DOD and, on occasion, USAID used an unclassified platform, All Partners Access Network, during the disaster response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.

e. Media reports influence public attitudes about operations, which in turn can affect policy decisions. Most USG departments and agencies have representatives dedicated to reporting their activities, each with multiple sources in the respective organization. DOD’s primary media representatives are PA personnel. Potential operations draw intense media scrutiny. This scrutiny can influence USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs from the strategic level of the NSC, to the field, as international organizations and NGOs vie for public attention and charitable contributions. Responding to competing or contradictory news reports can divert personnel from planning and execution. Commanders and their staffs evaluate the impact of information on the operation and the interagency coordination process, to integrate PA expertise in crisis planning for operations. The White House Office of Global Communications facilitates USG communication with foreign audiences. The DOS Bureau of International Information Programs is the communications service for the US foreign affairs community. Commanders and their staffs should coordinate PA activities with national-level communication initiatives. Early in the planning process, all agencies and organizations should develop agreed procedures for media access; issuing and verifying credentials; and briefing, escorting, and transporting of media members and their equipment. PA guidance should be published before executing the plan. This guidance provides a common reference for all military and USG organizations. PA guidance helps the USG present a coherent theme. Commanders should identify spokespersons, and where, when, and how they will address media.

f. Whole-of-government themes and an overarching narrative provide a foundation to build unity of effort. Subordinate themes, messages, or stories tailored to specific audiences and built on cultural understanding and knowledge of the key communicators in the operational area can help implement unified action. For example, an appreciation for the values system of the intended audience can enable a better connection with the local population and provide insight to discredit adversary information activities. What works in one environment will not necessarily work in another due to variables such as the sophistication of the local populations, differences in government, value systems, media, and communication systems. More dispersed units conducting decentralized operations rely on junior leaders to conduct key leader engagement in the indigenous population and PA with the media. JFCs synchronize themes, messages, and actions, selecting the delivery vehicle, optimizing types of media, and infusing messages with beliefs and attitudes to influence the audience. Leaders should evaluate the
information environment, the impact of timing and tempo of information released to the media, and how the information will be received by the intended and unintended audiences.

g. CCDRs and staffs should evaluate communication considerations with the interagency partners when planning joint operations. Joint operations can influence and inform key foreign audiences, foster understanding of US policy, and advance US interests. Words, images, and actions can shape the operational environment. CCDRs plan, execute, and assess activities to implement security cooperation plans in support of US embassies’ information programs, public diplomacy, and PA programs directly supporting DOD missions.

h. DSPD are DOD activities and measures to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts.

(1) DSPD helps align DOD activities with a coherent and compelling DOS diplomacy of deeds in concert with other USG departments and agencies. DOS leads public diplomacy, with the DOD in a supporting role. Through DSPD, DOD collaborates with other USG departments and agencies for public diplomacy programs that directly support the DOD mission. All DOD information activities are conducted in concert with the broader USG effort and support the NSS.

(2) DSPD can support USG information activities through security cooperation efforts.

(3) DSPD activities can also support USG information activities through humanitarian and civic assistance, FHA, counterdrug activities, and activities supporting global CT.

(4) DSPD activities should be documented in annex Y of the plan.

(5) DSPD activities include:

(a) Identify target audiences, assign responsibility, and outline specific plans for communicating key public diplomacy programs and policies to target audiences.

(b) Identify partners with whom DOD works.

(c) Identify subject matter experts who can explain and advocate US policy.

(d) Identify workers who speak foreign languages and could translate/participate in interviews.

(e) Recommend envoys to advance public diplomacy efforts.
(f) Outline current activities and programs that can be linked to support
global public diplomacy.

(g) Develop criteria to evaluate effectiveness.

For more information, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
## APPENDIX A
### UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Core Mission

a. The NSC (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc) is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with the President’s senior national security advisors and Cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the NSC’s function has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policy matters. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policy matters among various USG departments and agencies.

b. The NSC advises and assists the President to integrate all aspects of national security policy as it affects the US—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic matters. It develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The NSC staff is the President’s principal staff for national security issues and supports the NSCS.

c. The NSC assists the President in formulating certain presidential documents, establishing national security policies, and directing actions by USG departments and agencies to implement those policies. Each administration typically adopts different names for these documents. For example, the George W. Bush Administration used NSPD and HSPD. The Obama Administration uses PPD and Presidential study directive.

d. The NSC manages an interagency process that is strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable to advance US national security interests. At its core, the purpose of the interagency process is to advance the President’s policy priorities and, more generally, to serve the national interest by ensuring all USG departments and agencies, and perspectives that can contribute to achieving these priorities, participate in making and implementing policy. Those who participate in the interagency process—regardless of position—do so as representatives of their respective USG departments and agencies. They also serve the nation’s greater interests by being participants in a unique process to resolve common problems and advance common policies.

e. NSC Functions. Through its function of advising and assisting the President with unifying elements of national security policy, the NSC helps enable the Services and other USG departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in national security matters. Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC is the President’s principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development of national security policy. The NSC subsequently monitors the implementation of national security policy. The NSC assesses and appraises the objectives, commitments, and risks of the US in relation to our actual and potential military power; considers policies on matters of common interest to USG departments and agencies concerned with national security; and makes recommendations to the President.
f. Figure A-A-1 depicts the three levels of formal interagency committees (the NSC/PC, NSC/DC, and NSC/IPCs) for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues, as well as the participation of USG departments and agencies in the NSC system and these advisory bodies.

g. The NSC/PC is the senior Cabinet-level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC meets at the call of, and is chaired by, the National Security Advisor.

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<th>Participation in National Security Council System Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Participants</strong></td>
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<td>Interagency Policy Committees</td>
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Legend

UN United Nations

Figure A-A-1. Participation in National Security Council System Activities
h. The NSC/DC is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary-level) interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC reviews and monitors the work of the NSC interagency process, including NSC/IPCs. The NSC/DC helps to ensure issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC focuses significant attention on policy implementation. Periodic reviews of the Administration’s major foreign policy initiatives are scheduled to ensure they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner. Such reviews should periodically consider whether existing policy directives should be revamped or rescinded. Finally, the NSC/DC is responsible for day-to-day crisis management and reports to the NSC. Any NSC principal or deputy, as well as the National Security Advisor, may request a meeting of the NSC/DC in its crisis management capacity. The NSC/DC meets at the call of, and is chaired by, the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor.

i. NSC/IPCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. NSC/IPCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple USG departments and agencies, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The NSC/IPCs are established at the direction of the NSC/DC, and chaired by the NSC (or National Economic Council, as appropriate); at its discretion, the NSC/DC may add co-chairs to any NSC/IPC. The NSC/IPCs convene on a regular basis to review and coordinate the implementation of presidential decisions in their policy areas. Strict guidelines are established (e.g., regarding participants, decision-making paths, and time frames) to govern the operation of the IPCs.

2. Interactions

a. Routine: Concerns focus on broader aspects of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives. Policy and strategy documents outline specific national interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the appropriate components of the executive branch.

b. Emergency: The President may request the National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. The NSC reviews the situation and takes appropriate action.
1. Core Mission

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management. USDA’s core mission is sub-categorized into seven mission areas, which include:

a. **Rural Development.** This mission area is to increase the economic opportunities of rural Americans and improve their quality of life.

b. **Marketing and Regulatory Programs.** This mission area facilitates domestic and international marketing of US agricultural products and ensures the health and care of animals and plants.

c. **Food Safety.** This mission area ensures the nation’s commercial supply of meat, poultry, and egg products is safe, wholesome, and properly labeled and packaged.

d. **Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services.** This mission area focuses on reducing hunger and food insecurity, in partnership with cooperating organizations, by providing access to food, a healthful diet, and nutrition education to children and needy people in a manner that supports American agriculture.

e. **Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services.** This mission area delivers commodity, credit, conservation, disaster, and emergency assistance programs that help improve the stability and strength of the agricultural economy, including improving foreign market access for US products.

f. **Research, Education, and Economics.** This mission area is dedicated to the creation of a safe, sustainable, competitive US food and fiber system, as well as strong communities, families, and youth through integrated research, analysis, and education.

g. **Natural Resources and Environment.** This mission area ensures the health of the land through sustainable management by preventing damage to natural resources and the environment, restoring the resource base, and promoting good land management.

*For more information on these USDA mission areas, refer to United States Government Manual (http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov).*

2. Interactions

a. Routine domestic interactions between USDA and DOD tend to focus on military families, community partnerships and commodity procurement, pest management, and land management operations. The most recent routine interaction that will continue into
the future will center on biofuel, biorefineries, and raw biomaterials. Past and present examples of routine interactions include, but are not limited to:

(1) USDA/DOD Military Extension Partnership to support military Service members and their families in their communities.

(2) USDA’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy seek to implement a DOD child care curriculum development that is high quality, research- and evidence-based, comprehensive, developmentally appropriate, and cost-effective for deployment across the DOD’s Child Development System. The curriculum standardizes the delivery of child care education across the Services for children up to five years (center and home-based care) and has the potential to enhance the quality of child care across the nation.

(3) USDA/USSOCOM to Support Military Families MOU.

(4) DOD Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program allows schools to use USDA foods entitlement dollars to buy fresh produce. The program is operated by the Defense Logistics Agency.

(5) For more than 30 years, Agricultural Marketing Service’s Processed Products Division’s operational rations inspection team (http://www.ams.usda.gov/AM Sv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5098085) has been partnering with the DOD to ensure our warfighters have a steady supply of safe, wholesome, and nutritious operational (i.e., combat) rations, including DOD’s flagship meals, ready to eat ration.

(6) Multiple USG departments and agencies share responsibility in addressing various aspects of tick-borne disease problems in the US. Through the coordination of efforts across these stakeholders, the USG has the opportunity to improve efficacy of control and reduce the risk from tick-borne disease. The Tick-borne Diseases Integrated Pest Management Workgroup was created for the purpose of enhancing communication and collaboration among USG departments and agencies involved in tick management as it relates to human health, companion animals, and wildlife that may serve as potential zoonotic reservoirs of human disease (http://www.ars.usda.gov/SP2UserFiles/Program/104/TBD_IPM_WG_Final_White_Paper%2026%20February%202014.pdf).

(7) Through the Sentinel Landscapes partnership (http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2013/07/0142.xml&printable=true), USDA, Department of the Interior (DOI), and DOD work together in overlapping priority areas near military installations to help farmers and ranchers make improvements to the land that benefit their operation, enhance wildlife habitat, and enable DOD’s training missions to continue.

(8) USDA and USN Farm to Fleet program is the program in which the USN adds biofuels into its regular domestic purchases of JP5 [jet propulsion fuel, type 5] and F-76 [marine diesel] each year.
(9) Interagency Agreement for the Provision of Temporary Support During Wildland Firefighting Operations among the DOI, USDA, and DOD (http://www.nifc.gov/nicc/mobguide/CHAPTER40.pdf)


b. Emergency domestic interorganizational cooperation between the USDA and DOD is centered on natural disasters such as wildfires, animal disease outbreaks, and hurricanes. Past and present examples of domestic emergency interactions include, but are not limited to:

(1) The Firefighter Property Program (http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/partners/fepp/) refers to one of the DOD’s special programs where firefighters can get excess DOD property to be used for firefighting and emergency services. Certain property obtained from this program passes ownership after it has been in use for a specified period of time. This program is managed by the USDA Forest Service with cooperation of the state forestry agencies.


(3) USDA provides disaster payments to farmers, ranchers, and others through eight separate programs.

c. Foreign operations that involve coordination efforts with USDA and DOD primarily converge on biological threats, surveillance, protection, and countermeasures, as related to zoonotic diseases. USDA also provided agriculture advisors for PRT in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Examples of foreign emergency interactions include, but are not limited to:

(1) The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization’s Emergency Center for Transboundary Animal Diseases team has developed significant experience in managing and coordinating H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza activities in Eastern Africa. Part of this USDA and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) collaboration is the “Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases in Africa and a Global Alliance to Combat African Swine Fever” project.

(2) The Iraq Agricultural Extension Revitalization project is managed cooperatively by the National Institute of Food and Agriculture and the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), with support from the DOS. Designed to foster strong partnerships between US land grant universities and the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural universities, the Iraq Agricultural Extension Revitalization project is intended to revitalize the Iraqi extension system through short- and long-term training, research, and other activities.
(3) USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service volunteers embed in the US military and work on conservation projects with local farmers in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the nation’s civilian effort in reconstruction.

(4) The Deployed War-Fighter Protection Research Program is an initiative to develop and validate novel methods to protect deployed military personnel from threats posed by disease-carrying insects. The program consists of a noncompetitive funding process for USDA Agricultural Research Service-based research, and a competitive grants process open to non-USDA scientists. The program’s objective is to find industry partners and get useful products into the market/military stock system (http://www.afpmb.org/content/deployed-war-fighter-protection-dwfp-program-overview-0).

3. Lessons

a. US Forest Service Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems and DOD: During the course of a fire season, situations arise in which firefighting resources available within natural resource agencies cannot meet firefighting resource demand. Through an agreement between many resource agencies and the DOD, DOD can deploy resources under its control in support of national firefighting efforts (http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/40958/PDF).

b. Iraq/Afghanistan PRT (Agriculture Advisor). In July 2009, the Center for Complex Operations facilitated a USDA-sponsored workshop to capture the experiences of USDA agricultural advisors deployed to ministries and PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. This article presents a broad overview of the challenges identified by workshop participants and highlights key recommendations generated as a result of suggestions and comments made at the workshop (http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_1-3/Prism_139-150_Carreau.pdf).

4. Other Information for the Joint Force Commander

a. Overseas. For in-country (i.e., “field”) coordination, initial contact should be made through the FAS agricultural counselor or attaché at the respective US embassy. For coordination with USDA’s HQ, or for countries where there is no USDA representation at a US embassy, the FAS Office of Capacity Building and Development is a principle POC. Additionally, USDA also provides ongoing agricultural technical assistance in many overseas areas and can develop coordinated DOD CMO and USDA projects for given countries or regions.

b. Domestic Support. The Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination serves as USDA’s focal point for coordination of HS and preparedness policy. Their National Security Policy staff serves as the primary liaison to coordinate across USDA mission areas and with the Executive Office of the President and other USG departments and agencies on development and implementation of HS and preparedness policy. As with DOD, USDA is assigned to all 14 ESFs within the NRF. USDA is the lead coordinator for ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural Resources, which
includes providing nutrition assistance; responding to animal and agriculture health issues; providing technical expertise; coordinating and supporting animal and agriculture emergency management; ensuring safety and defense of the nation’s supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products; and ensuring the protection of natural and cultural resources and historic properties (NCH). As the designated coordinator of ESF #4, Firefighting, USDA/Forest Service manages and coordinates federal firefighting activities, including the detection and suppression of fires on federal lands, and provides personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of state, tribal, and local agencies involved in wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations. Additionally, USDA is assigned to all six recovery support functions (RSFs) in the National Disaster Recovery Framework.

5. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

   a. MOUs


      (2) Interagency Coordination and Collaboration for the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites.

   b. MOA. Conduct of Forest Insect and Disease Suppression on Lands Administered by DOD.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
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1. Core Mission

a. The mission of DOC (http://www.commerce.gov) is to promote job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved living standards for all Americans by working in partnership with businesses, universities, communities, and our nation’s workers.

b. DOC is the primary USG department for building government-to-government relationships with HN ministry-level representatives from trade, industry, and economic development-related ministries; resolving international trade issues; understanding the economic impact of weather and protecting maritime resources; advising HNs on government economic statistical reporting, census, and measures of standards and weights; developing private sector economic growth and job creation strategies; and developing telecommunications policies to encourage infrastructure development and to leverage e-commerce, e-government, and educational goals.

c. DOC is comprised of 12 agencies, 5 of which interact with DOD overseas.

(1) International Trade Administration (ITA). The ITA mission is to help assure the continued ability of US firms and workers to compete and win in the global marketplace and to create prosperity by strengthening the competitiveness of US industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring fair trade and compliance with trade laws and agreements.

(2) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The NOAA mission is to understand and predict changes in climate, weather, oceans, and coasts; to share that knowledge and information with others; and to conserve and manage coastal and marine ecosystems and resources.

(3) National Institute of Standards and Technology. The National Institute of Standards and Technology promotes US innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life.

(4) National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). NTIA is the executive branch agency that is principally responsible for advising the President on telecommunications and information policy issues. NTIA’s programs and policymaking focus largely on expanding broadband Internet access and adoption in the US, expanding the use of spectrum by all users, and ensuring the Internet remains an engine for continued innovation and economic growth.

(5) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). BIS advances US national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and promoting continued US strategic technology
leadership. BIS administers the Defense Priorities and Allocations System that is used by DOD to prioritize contracts and orders for industrial resources needed to support US and foreign military requirements.


d. As the designated coordinator of RSF Economic, to the National Disaster Recovery Framework, DOC leads the nation’s efforts to integrate the expertise of the USG to help local, state, and tribal governments and the private sector sustain and/or rebuild businesses and employment, and develop economic opportunities that result in sustainable and economically resilient communities after large-scale and catastrophic incidents.

2. Interactions

a. Routine interactions between DOC and DOD primarily focus on ongoing technical assistance in foreign countries, as well as developing coordinated DOD and DOC projects for various countries or regions. DOC has significant capacity building capabilities that have been used when working with HNs in the pursuit of national security objectives. DOC has a number of intelligence and national security functions to include overseeing the export of sensitive technology, and reviewing the Coastal Zone Management Act.

   (1) DOC has an international presence through several different bureaus.

   (a) The ITA has Foreign Commercial Service officers in most embassies and has resident country desk expertise.

   (b) NOAA has worldwide weather monitoring capability and participates in a wide variety of international, scientific, technical, policy, and political forums. Internationally, NOAA supports and promotes national policies and interests in ecosystem-based management, climate change, earth observation, and weather forecasting and will seek to maximize the mutual benefits of international exchange with its global partners. NOAA participates with the USN in the Global Fleet Station pilot program; with the USAF to provide space weather monitoring and forecasting, and in the management and operation of the US Satellite Aided Search and Rescue program; and with the USCG and USN (by providing scientific support) on oil spill cleanup and recovery for both inland and coastal areas. NOAA also has Uniformed Services personnel who can provide liaison support to DOD.

   (c) The NTIA routinely participates in US delegations globally and works directly with foreign colleagues around the world, particularly with respect to information sharing and technical assistance.
(d) BIS routinely participates in US delegations globally and works directly with foreign colleagues around the world as part of the multilateral export control regimes. BIS also has seven export control officers stationed in six countries that conduct end-use checks and represent BIS interests.

b. Emergency: DOC is the designated coordinator for RSF Economic to the National Disaster Recovery Framework.

c. Foreign operations that involve coordination efforts with DOC and DOD primarily focus on stabilization and DR. Foreign emergency interaction highlights include:

(1) Support to interagency reconstruction efforts in Haiti (1994, 2004).

(2) Support to stabilization in Bosnia and Kosovo.

(3) Operation of the Afghanistan and Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (2002-present).

(4) Support of reconstruction efforts after the 2006 southeast Asia tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

For more information, refer to the NRF on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense


b. MOAs

(1) United States Satellite-Aided Search and Rescue System.

(2) Interagency Operations of the Weather Surveillance Radar.

(3) Reimbursable Detail.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
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ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1. Core Mission
   a. The mission of DOD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.
   b. The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the nation’s wars.
   c. As prescribed by higher authority, DOD will maintain and employ Armed Forces to fulfill the following aims: support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the US, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests; and uphold and advance US national policies and interests.
   d. Key Personnel in the DOD Command Structure
      (1) The President of the United States. The President exercises authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through SecDef, to the commanders of CCMDs for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the CCMDs, runs from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
      (2) SecDef. SecDef is the principal assistant to the President for all DOD matters, with authority, direction, and control over the entire DOD.
      (3) CJCS. CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and SecDef. CJCS functions under the authority, direction, and control of SecDef, transmits communications between SecDef and CCDRs, and oversees activities of CCDRs, as directed by SecDef.
      (4) Secretaries of the Military Departments. The authority vested in the Secretaries of the Military Departments in the performance of their role to organize, train, equip, and provide forces runs from the President through SecDef to the Secretaries. Then, to the degree established by the Secretaries or specified in law, this authority runs through the Service Chiefs to the Service component commanders assigned to the CCMDs and to the commanders of forces not assigned to the CCMDs.
      (5) CCDRs. CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.

2. Interactions

a. Routine: DOD has a major role in the foreign and domestic interagency arenas. It interacts with almost every USG department and agency and is involved in interagency coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. SecDef is a member of the NSC, and CJCS serves as an advisor to the NSC. DOD is significantly involved in the entire NSC interagency process, with representatives (e.g., OUSD[P] and JS) assigned to all NSC subgroups (e.g., NSC/PC and NSC/DC) and most NSC/IPCs.

b. Emergency: DOD is the coordinator for ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering, under US Army Corps of Engineers and a primary agency for ESF #3 and ESF #9, Urban Search and Rescue, of the NRF. DOD is also the coordinating agency for RSF Infrastructure Systems.

For more information, refer to the NRF on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
1. Core Mission

   a. The Department of Education was created by the Department of Education Organization Act (Title 20, USC, Section 3411) and is administered under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of Education. The Secretary of Education advises the President on education plans, policies, and programs of the USG and serves as the chief executive officer of the Department of Education, supervising all Department of Education activities, providing support to states and localities, and focusing resources to ensure equal access to educational excellence throughout the nation.

   b. The Department of Education is a supporting agency for two missions in the NRF, a primary agency in the health and social services mission and supporting agency for two other missions in the National Disaster Recovery Framework.


2. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

   a. MOUs

      (1) Quality of Education.

      (2) Transition Assistance Program for Separating Service Members.

   b. MOAs

      (1) Troops to Teachers.

      (2) Native Languages.

   For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
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ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

1. Core Mission

   a. DOE’s (http://www.energy.gov) mission is to ensure America’s security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions.

   b. Pursuant to Section 504, of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the entities within the DOE that perform nuclear or radiological ESFs, radiological assistance functions, and related functions will constitute part of the nuclear incident response teams. DOE has senior energy advisors at some geographic CCMDs and these individuals support and advise CCDRs on energy, defense, DOE capabilities, and radiological/nuclear issues.

   c. Under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Executive Order 12580, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, DOE is responsible for hazardous substance responses to releases on, or from, DOE facilities or vessels under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of DOE, including transportation-related incidents. For responses under these circumstances, DOE provides a federal on-scene coordinator responsible for taking all Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act response actions, which includes on-site and off-site response actions.

   d. As the designated coordinator of ESF #12, Energy, to the NRF, DOE leads the nation’s efforts in securing the US energy infrastructure against all hazards, reducing the impact of disruptive events, and responding to and facilitating recovery from energy disruptions, in collaboration with all levels of industry and state, local, and foreign governments.

   e. As prescribed in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the NRF, DOE is the coordinating agency for the federal response to a nuclear/radiological release at a DOE facility or involving DOE materials (e.g., during the use, storage, and shipment of a variety of radioactive materials; the shipment of spent reactor fuel; the production, assembly, and shipment of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials; the production and shipment of radioactive sources for space ventures; and the storage and shipment of radioactive and mixed waste). The DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration responds with scientific and technical expertise to radiological and nuclear emergency events and provides such support to the nation’s CT, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation capabilities.

      (1) For incidents at nuclear/radiological facilities that DOE owns or operates, or incidents involving transportation of DOE nuclear/radiological materials, DOE is responsible for mitigating the consequences of an incident; providing notification and appropriate protective action recommendations to state, tribal, and/or local government officials; and minimizing the radiological hazard to the public.
(2) For radiological incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, and/or classified components that are in DOE custody, DOE may establish a national security area. DOE will coordinate with state and local officials to ensure appropriate public health and safety actions are taken outside the national security area. DOE will lead the overall response to safeguard national security information and/or restricted data, or equipment and material. DOE may also include lands normally not under DOE control as part of the established national security area for the duration of the incident.


2. Interactions

a. Routine domestic interactions between DOE and DOD are to:

   (1) Create partnerships to provide an effective nuclear deterrent for the nation (http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/maintainingthestockpile).

   (2) Provide the design, development, and operational support required to provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants (http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/powernavy2/aboutnr).

   (3) Maintain a working relationship with the DOD as defined by the MOU between DOE and DOD concerning cooperation in strategic partnership to enhance energy security (July 22, 2010) covering, but not limited to, efforts in the areas of energy efficiency; renewable energy; water efficiency; fossil fuels; alternative fuels; efficient transportation technologies; and fueling infrastructure, grid security, smart grid, storage, waste-to-energy, basic science research, mobile/deployable power, small modular reactor nuclear energy, and related areas (http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Enhance-Energy-Security-MOU.pdf).

   (4) Collaborate with DOD on development of threat information and establish consistent physical security measures.

b. Emergency: DOE coordinates with DOD, DOJ/FBI, and other interagency partners in the event of a nuclear terrorist incident or radiological accident (http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/emergencyresponse).

c. Foreign operations that involve coordination efforts with DOE and DOD to prevent the proliferation of WMD include several programs managed by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Their capabilities include on-site verification; processing, packaging, and removal of nuclear/radiological materials and equipment; and the prevention of the unauthorized spread of weapons-usable materials, technology and expertise (http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation-0).
For more information, refer to the NRF on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

d. Within the Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation, the nuclear CT program focuses on nuclear incident policy and cooperation, nuclear threat science, nuclear forensics, and nuclear incident response. Radiological and nuclear expertise includes:

(1) Countering WMD practical tools, technically informed contingency planning, and policy recommendations required to advance domestic and international US nuclear CT and counterproliferation objectives (to include US and international countering WMD training exercises, and military and energy LNOs supporting various CCMDs and DOD agencies).

(2) Understanding and characterizing nuclear threat devices, including improvised nuclear devices, foreign nuclear weapons (with emphasis on the loss of custody and abnormal environments), and their nuclear and energetic material constituents.

(3) Nuclear forensics.

(4) Nuclear and radiological incident response capabilities (crisis response/radiation assistance programs, domestic and international render safe operations, response operations, nuclear/radiological advisor team operations).

3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

a. MOUs

(1) The National Science Foundation’s Polar Programs.

(2) Cooperation in a Strategic Partnership to Enhance Energy Security.


(4) Interagency Coordination and Collaboration for the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites.

b. MOA. Defense Funded Work at Laboratories and Facilities.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
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1. Core Mission

   a. DHHS (http://www.hhs.gov) is the USG’s principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves, and leads all federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the NRF. Various federal laws (e.g., The Public Health Service Act, as amended, and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), regulations, and policy statements authorize or constrain the provision of DHHS domestic and/or international assistance during a public health or medical emergency. DHHS evaluates RFAs to determine whether there is a legal basis for providing the requested assistance. The application of relevant legal authorities and/or policy guidelines will be determined by relevant DHHS and USG interagency partners in consultation with the DHHS Office of General Counsel.

   b. DHHS comprises staff divisions and operating divisions. Staff divisions are subdivisions of the Office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services that provide direct support to the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ initiatives. Operating divisions are agencies that perform a wide variety of tasks and services (e.g., research, public health, food and drug safety, and health insurance). Offices include, but are not limited to:

   (1) Office of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on policy development and is responsible for major activities in policy coordination, legislation development, strategic planning, policy research, evaluation, and economic analysis.

   (2) Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) (http://www.hhs.gov/aspr and http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/Pages/default.aspx) establishes policy; assigns responsibilities; and, as needed, directs and coordinates DHHS’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from the public health and medical consequences of a disaster or emergency.

   (3) Office of Assistant Secretary for Global Affairs is responsible for overall DHHS policy leadership, development, and coordination with multilateral organizations, as well as responsible for the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ interaction bilaterally with foreign governments.

   (4) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health serves as the primary advisor to the DHHS Secretary on matters involving the nation’s public health and provides executive leadership and policy guidance for the Commissioned Corps of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) (the Corps).

   (5) Office of Intergovernmental and External Affairs serves as DHHS’s liaison to state, local, and tribal governments and NGOs. The Office of Intergovernmental and
External Affairs facilitates communication between DHHS and these stakeholders regarding DHHS initiatives and policies. An Office of Intergovernmental and External Affairs regional office is located in each DHHS region.

(6) CDC (http://www.cdc.gov) is responsible for conducting disease surveillance activities, detecting and investigating disease outbreaks and other health conditions, and developing strategies for dealing with the public health aspects of domestic and international emergencies.

(7) Administration for Community Living.

(8) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is charged with the prevention of exposure to toxic substances and the prevention of the adverse health effects and diminished quality of life associated with exposure to hazardous substances from waste sites, unplanned releases, and other sources of pollution present in the environment.

(9) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

(10) Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

(a) FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.

(b) FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations that make medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable and by helping the public get the accurate, science-based information they need to use medicines and foods to maintain and improve their health. FDA also has responsibility for regulating the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products to protect the public health and to reduce tobacco use by minors.

(c) Finally, FDA plays a significant role in the nation’s CT capability. FDA fulfills this responsibility by ensuring the security of the food supply and by fostering development of medical products to respond to deliberate and naturally emerging public health threats. It may be called upon, during public health emergencies, to conduct emergency management and coordination, assessment, sampling, surveillance, inspection/investigation, epidemiology, public and environmental health, safety of regulated products, guidance, and subject matter expertise.

(11) Health Resources and Services Administration is the primary federal agency for improving access to health care services for people who are uninsured, isolated, or medically vulnerable. It supports DHHS’s emergency response through its National Health Service Corps Ready Responder Program.

(12) National Institutes of Health (NIH) plays a key role in public health emergencies through their research and development of medical countermeasures against potential CBRN agents of terrorism.
(13) Indian Health Service.

(14) Administration for Children and Families.

(15) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.

(16) Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.


2. Interactions

a. Routine domestic interactions between DHHS and DOD primarily focus on preparedness efforts for emergency response, coordination of resources, laboratory capacity, and policy issues. ASPR provides liaisons to many of the CCMDs for support to national and international response planning and coordination. Additional interorganizational cooperation efforts include regional emergency coordinator and joint medical readiness preparedness officer coordination in the US regions, the Senior Leaders Council on Patient Movement, the NDMS, and NIH on biomedical research components that focus on infectious disease and immunology research. The most recent routine interaction that will continue into the future will center on establishing an executive charter for fatality management and on the update of the National Emergency Repatriation Plan. DOD and ASPR have a continuous coordination relationship involving logistics, as ASPR is responsible for coordination of all DHHS response logistics functions and the most active interaction it has with DOD is through the Defense Medical Logistics Supply Chain Council. Additional routine coordination efforts between DHHS and DOD include the periodic 3-D Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense meeting between the Office of Global Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the DOS Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and USAID. These high-level meetings are a forum for overall policy discussion and periodic updating on the international health activities of the respective agencies, and a mechanism to support agencies in the field (including US embassies, geographic combatant commands, and international programs) with a consistent USG voice in international health. In addition, DOD participates in periodic discussions with the World Health Organization (WHO) under the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the World Health Organization Regarding Cooperation on Global Health Security, in which DHHS plays an overall coordinating role.

(1) DHHS has the lead responsibility within the USG to protect the civilian population against the adverse health effects of CBRN, pandemic influenza, and emerging infectious disease threats by providing leadership in research, development, acquisition, and deployment of effective medical countermeasures. For early disease detection and containment, CDC is developing a network of global disease detection
centers in partnership with ministries of health, WHO, DOS, DOD, USAID, and academic institutions. Existing centers are located in China, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, and Thailand. DHHS is the technical lead for international pandemic influenza assessment and containment response support to DOS. DHHS appoints representatives to the USG foreign emergency support team that is led by the DOS Foreign Consequence Management Program. DHHS supports USAID/OFDA by providing technical assistance and support on public health issues (e.g., large disease outbreaks). DOD may request DHHS support during FHA and other operations. USPHS officers work side by side with DOD (e.g., as health attachés, consultants on civil-military teams, or as LNOs within a geographic CCMD). Collectively, DHHS has personnel (from its component staff and operating divisions) permanently assigned, or deployed, to each geographic CCMD.

(2) DHHS participants in interagency working groups that support HA and disaster response operations, and CMO planning and exercises. DHHS supports whole-of-government efforts through the Civilian Reserve Corps Program.

(3) DHHS operating divisions and staff divisions support and interrelate with DOD by providing subject matter expertise during DOD-led disaster preparedness and response training and exercises. DHHS Office of Force Readiness and Deployment, Readiness and Deployment Operations Group, coordinates with DOD and its components (e.g., USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM, USAFRICOM, US Army South, USAF South, and USN 7th Fleet) during exercises, operations, and planning. The US Army Office of the Surgeon General assigns an LNO to ASPR to help facilitate DHHS-DOD coordination and joint planning. The CDC also has DOD liaisons for this same purpose.

(4) NIH plays a key role in public health emergencies through their research and development of medical countermeasures against potential CBRN agents of terrorism. They serve as a source of skilled health care professionals who can augment DHHS response teams, and can serve as a resource to DOD as advisors for how to support tribal communities and cultures, while honoring and protecting the inherent sovereign rights of tribes.

(5) The ASPR Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority provides an integrated, systematic approach to the development and purchase of the necessary vaccines, drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools for public health medical emergencies. It manages Project BioShield, which includes the procurement and advanced development of medical countermeasures for CBRN agents, as well as the advanced development and procurement of medical countermeasures for pandemic influenza and other emerging infectious diseases that fall outside the auspices of Project BioShield. In addition, ASPR manages the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise. The enterprise is responsible for defining and prioritizing requirements for public health emergency medical countermeasures; focusing research, development, and procurement activities on identified requirements; and establishing deployment and use strategies for medical countermeasures in the Strategic National Stockpile. Lastly, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
conducts modeling in partnership with other USG departments and agencies to support preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters.

(6) The FDA plays a vital role in protecting our nation from CBRN threats and emerging infectious disease threats like pandemic influenza. FDA ensures medical products, including medical countermeasures, are safe, effective, and secure. FDA also works closely with federal partners and state and local responders to build and sustain medical countermeasure programs that can meet the needs of US citizens during a public health emergency. One of these ways is through the Medical Countermeasures Initiative, which is an FDA program to coordinate medical countermeasure development, preparedness, and response which is led by the Office of Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats. The Office of Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats also works closely with DOD programs in the development of DOD medical product priorities for the joint force.

(7) To mitigate the risk of importation and spread of communicable diseases to, or within, the US, CDC quarantine stations are located at 20 US ports of entry. Central to the quarantine stations’ mission to protect the US from communicable disease introduction and spread at ports of entry is the development of strong partnerships with state and local health departments and law enforcement to create a public health safety network addressing border health issues. The quarantine program works closely with DHS, particularly CBP, Transportation Security Administration, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and USCG, and partners with the travel industry to plan, prepare, and respond to traveler illnesses.

b. Emergency

(1) DHHS leads all federal public health and medical responses to public health and medical emergencies and incidents covered by the NRF. Under the NRF, DHHS leads ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services, the mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, tribal, and local resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, and/or during a developing potential health and medical emergency. USPHS officers are assigned to DHHS and other USG departments and agencies, to include DOD. During emergencies, USPHS officers are deployed domestically to provide applied public health, mental health, and direct medical support to affected regions, states, and localities. DHHS works alongside DOD during domestic CMO. USPHS officers are involved when there is a Stafford Act declaration with domestic public health DSCA operations. ASPR is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on all matters related to federal public health and medical preparedness, and responses to public health emergencies or biological incidents, whether natural or deliberate. In addition, it has strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities that include, but are not limited to, serving as the Incident Manager for ESF #8 during activation; coordinating preparedness and response planning with DHHS operating divisions, ESF #8-supporting agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector; managing the NDMS; and coordinating with CDC to direct the deployment, employment, and release of any needed Strategic National Stockpile personnel and materiel. Additionally, ASPR mobilizes public health and medical assets at the direction
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in response to a directive from DHS/FEMA IAW the NRF, under a mission assignment issued by FEMA under the Stafford Act, in response to designated NSSEs, or at their own discretion (in the absence of an emergency declaration) when an incident requires coordinated action by two or more DHHS response assets. As the coordinator of ESF #8, domestic interorganizational cooperation between DHHS and DOD is centered on patient movement by transporting seriously ill or injured patients though the NDMS and medical needs populations from casualty collection points in the impacted area to designated reception facilities. Domestic emergency interaction highlights include successful patient movement from the gulf coast during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike.

For more information, refer to the NDMS (http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/ndms/Pages/default.aspx).

(2) In response to an international event, DHHS core public health capabilities that may support the USG response efforts include public health assessment and disease control (emergency environmental health service; disease surveillance, prevention, and control); mass disaster response (direct medical care, patient evacuation support, mass fatality management); protect responder/worker safety and health; CBRN public health and medical consultation, technical assistance, and support; and health/medical equipment and supplies (e.g., medical countermeasures including medical supplies, biologics, pharmaceuticals, blood products, vaccines, and antitoxins).

(3) ASPR is the primary contact for the DHHS Secretary and Deputy Secretary for international preparedness and emergency operations. ASPR uses the most updated information to make key decisions; direct and deploy DHHS resources to support the DOS, USAID, DOD, and the UN; and assist with international and public health and medical emergency responses. ASPR serves as the focal point for international activities related to public health emergency preparedness and response and coordinates international influenza pandemic efforts with the DOS, the USDA, and WHO.

(4) The NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases works closely with DOD biomedical research components that focus on infectious disease and immunology research. In response to public health emergencies, it may be called upon to provide subject matter experts and/or to redirect its research efforts to address important scientific issues related to the emergency. Such response is accomplished in coordination with DHHS and sister agencies.

(5) The US Repatriation Program is committed to helping eligible repatriates, referred from the DOS, by providing them with effective and efficient temporary assistance necessary for their transition and reestablishment in the US (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/repatriation). While DHHS is responsible for the National Emergency Repatriation planning and implementation of the emergency plan, state and local governments have operational responsibility for the reception, temporary care, and onward transportation for the noncombatant evacuee.
(6) CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is the USG agency that conducts research and makes recommendations to prevent worker injury and illness, including during emergencies. Under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health supports federal, state, tribal, and local response and recovery organizations to assure response and recovery worker safety and health during incidents requiring a coordinated federal response. DHHS and DOD are cooperating agencies with specific functions related to worker protection during an emergency.

For more information, refer to the NRF and the National Disaster Recovery Framework on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

(7) Foreign operations that involve coordination efforts with DHHS and DOD primarily focus on notification or response to foreign country potential health threats as required by International Health Regulations. When requested in response to international disease outbreaks, CDC staff, either through relationships established at the national level and/or through established relationships in the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, provide technical assistance to help characterize the outbreak, investigate risk and protective factors, and assist in efforts to control the disease. Under limited, specific conditions and criteria, CDC personnel and supplies, including materiel from the Strategic National Stockpile, may be deployed to assist in an international public health emergency. The CDC has more than 300 permanent staff members assigned to long-term assignments in 50 countries. They also employ approximately 1,400 local staff members (citizens of the HN) to support global programs. The staff is a mix of epidemiologists, clinicians, and health scientists of many types (e.g., laboratory, behavioral, and informatics scientists; operations managers; administrative staff; and others). CDC offices with long-term staff members usually become trusted advisors to local public health officials. This familiarity and resulting long-term trusting relationships are critical assets that help to establish access during emergencies. CDC also manages the Laboratory Response Network, a network of more than 160 laboratories affiliated with USG departments and agencies, military installations, international partners, and state/local public health departments. The Laboratory Response Network provides the laboratory infrastructure and capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism, and other public health emergencies.

(8) DHHS is an active participant in the interagency working groups supporting HA and disaster response operations, and CMO planning and exercises. DHHS supports whole-of-government efforts through the Civilian Reserve Corps Program. DHHS provides an active component and a standby component with expertise in areas such as health care service delivery and system administration, health education, disease prevention and epidemiology, environmental health and safety, infection control, veterinary health, and non-communicable and communicable diseases. DHHS can provide regional and country-specific perspectives on existing health systems’ capabilities and infrastructure. USPHS representatives or DHHS civilians can add valuable perspective in collaboration with the command surgeon and USAID representatives.
3. Lessons

A recent example of successful DOD-DHHS collaboration has been the deployment of 65 USPHS officers to staff the Monrovia Medical Unit, the centerpiece of Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE’s medical efforts to support the international Ebola response in Liberia. This unique arrangement has demonstrated the flexibility and expeditionary capability of both DHHS and DOD in working together to create a DOD-organized, DHHS-staffed operational medical capability in support of a whole-of-government unified response. Another, longer-term effort is the productive and extensive collaboration of the CDC and DTRA to create capacity in partner nations around the globe to prevent, detect, and respond to threats of emerging infectious disease.

4. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

MOAs

a. Reimbursable Detail.

b. Native Languages.

c. National Disaster Medical System.

For more information on MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
1. Core Mission

a. DHS is the USG department charged with HS to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce and administer US immigration laws, protect cyberspace and critical infrastructure, and strengthen national preparedness and resilience to disasters. The Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates the domestic all-hazards preparedness efforts of all USG departments and agencies, in consultation with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, NGOs, the private sector, and the general public. Preparedness efforts are those actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security and resilience of the nation.

b. FEMA (http://www.fema.gov/). FEMA’s mission is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. Throughout its preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, FEMA prepares for the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the nation and emphasizes the actions aimed at achieving an integrated, layered, and all-of-nation preparedness approach that optimizes the use of available resources.

c. The United States Secret Service (http://www.secretservice.gov) safeguards the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy and protects national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and NSSEs.

d. USCG (http://www.uscg.mil). The USCG is the nation’s primary maritime operating agency with resources organized, trained, and equipped to be multi-mission capable. The USCG is unique as it is a branch of the Armed Forces at all times and an agency within DHS. As such, they play an active role in HD and HS missions. The USCG may also operate under the Department of the Navy during time of war or when directed by the President. The USCG protects the public, the environment, natural resources, and US economic interests—in the nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security. They perform 11 missions (http://www.gocostguard.com/about-the-coastguard/discover-our-roles-missions), some of which are HS missions (i.e., ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and other law enforcement) and others are non-HS missions (e.g., marine safety, SAR, aids to navigation, living marine resources, marine environmental protection, and ice operations).

e. CBP’s (http://www.cbp.gov) mission is to safeguard the US borders, thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the nation’s
global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel. CBP secures 
the US borders at and between ports of entry by stopping inadmissible people and illicit 
goods. CBP’s offices of Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Air and Marine Operations 
represent the largest federal LEA. CBP works to secure and facilitate imports arriving in 
the US, accommodating the increasing volume and complexities of international trade. 
CBP protects US agricultural resources through active inspections at ports of entry. With 
the Container Security Initiative, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, and the 
Automated Commercial Environment, CBP has a sturdy base of partnerships and 
technology to safeguard the American public and promote legitimate international 
commerce. Fostering safe and speedy international travel is a key goal of CBP, which 
has been increasing passenger security through effective risk assessment, growing trusted 
traveler programs and better use of technology.

f. ICE (http://www.ice.gov) is the principal criminal investigative arm of the DHS 
and one of the three department components charged with the civil enforcement of the 
nation’s immigration laws.

g. The Transportation Security Administration (http://www.tsa.gov) protects the 
nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and 
commerce.

h. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (http://www.uscis.gov) oversees lawful 
immigration to the US, including asylum and refugee status.

i. The National Protection and Programs Directorate works to advance DHS’s risk-
reduction mission. Reducing risk requires an integrated approach that encompasses both 
physical and virtual threats and their associated human elements. Within the directorate, 
three divisions impact DOD.

(1) The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications has the mission of 
assuring the security, resiliency, and reliability of the nation’s cyberspace and 
communications infrastructure.

(2) The Office of Infrastructure Protection leads the coordinated national effort 
to address all-hazard threats risk to US critical infrastructures and key resources posed by 
acts of terrorism.

(3) The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is a federal LEA that provides 
integrated security and law enforcement services to federally owned and leased buildings, 
facilities, properties, and other assets. The FPS leads the provision of enduring identity 
services to DHS and its mission partners that advance informed decision making by 
producing accurate, timely, and high-assurance biometric and biographic identity 
information and analysis.

j. The Office of Health Affairs provides medical and health expertise supporting the 
DHS mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all incidents, recognizing that 
especially every incident impacting HS will have health consequences. The Office of 
Health Affairs serves as DHS’s primary POC for state, local, territorial, and tribal
governments on medical and health security issues. Their responsibilities include serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator, and advising other DHS officials and components on medical and health issues, both conventional and those involving CBRN incidents.

k. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is a member of the IC. They ensure information related to HS threats is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to HS customers in DHS; at state, local, and tribal levels; in the private sector; and in the IC.

l. The Office of Operations Coordination provides operations coordination, information sharing, situational awareness, the COP, and DHS continuity, enabling execution of the Secretary of Homeland Defense’s responsibilities across the HS enterprise.

m. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office works to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism against the US by continuously improving capabilities to deter, detect, respond to, and attribute attacks, in coordination with domestic and international partners. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is the primary USG entity for implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear terrorism, as well as integration of federal nuclear forensics programs. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is also charged with coordinating the development of the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture, with partners from federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, international governments and the private sector.

n. The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs has the mission of promoting an integrated national approach to HS by ensuring, coordinating, and advancing federal interaction with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.


2. Interactions

a. Routine

(1) DHS has the lead for domestic interagency coordination on HS matters, including, but not limited to, border and maritime security and disaster response at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Through an agreement between DOD and DHS, the USCG’s unique defense capabilities in support of the National Military Strategy include maritime interception operations; deployed port operations, security, and defense; military environmental response operations; rotary-wing air interdiction in the National Capital Region; and peacetime military operations. Commander, USCG Atlantic Area (Portsmouth, Virginia), and Commander, USCG Pacific Area (Alameda, California), are the senior USCG operational commanders to coordinate with the GCCs. The USCG’s maritime CT units, maritime security response teams, are located in Chesapeake, Virginia, and San Diego, California. Additionally, the USCG manages the
National Strike Force Coordination Center in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and the USCG Incident Management Assistance Team in Norfolk, Virginia.

(2) DHS works closely with other federal agencies, in particular DOD and its subordinate organizations. DOD organizations and agencies provide numerous LNOs to DHS and DHS components. DOD LNOs may represent organizations and specialties such as CCMDs, intelligence organizations, or engineers.

(3) NG CIP teams assess industrial sites and critical USG infrastructure for vulnerabilities to attack. These teams support DOD and DHS by conducting vulnerability assessments of prioritized defense industrial base and DHS sites. The NG has three CIP teams located in the states of Colorado, New York, and West Virginia; additionally, DHS has 18 CIP assessment teams.

(4) Protecting the homeland often entails discovering individuals who enter the US homeland to conduct illicit and harmful activities. DHS works closely with DOJ, on a day-to-day basis, to conduct operations that identify these individuals, their activities, locations, networks, and materials. The DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) operates and maintains the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and provides identity services expertise, as a service provider for customers across DHS, at other USG departments and agencies, in state and local law enforcement, and overseas. IDENT is the central DHS-wide system for storage and processing of biometric and associated biographic information for national security; law enforcement; immigration and border management; intelligence; background investigations for national security positions and certain positions of public trust; and associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis, or other administrative uses. OBIM is also focused on improving biometric sharing in support of national security and public safety. By matching, storing, sharing, and analyzing biometric data, OBIM provides partners on the front lines of HS with rapid, accurate, and secure identification.

b. Emergency

(1) FEMA works in partnership with other organizations that are part of the nation’s emergency management system. These partners include state and local emergency management agencies, other USG departments and agencies, and the ARC. FEMA’s functions include:

(a) Service to disaster survivors.
(b) Integrated preparedness.
(c) Operational planning and preparedness.
(d) Incident management.
(e) Incident support.
(f) Disaster logistics.
(g) Hazard mitigation.
(h) Emergency communications.
(i) Public disaster communications.
(j) Continuity programs.

(2) GCCs can expect to be designated as the supported commander for support to DHS in mass migration operations. CDRUSNORTHCOM is normally designated the supported commander for limited support to DHS collection relocation processing centers on DOD installations in the continental US. USSOUTHCOM is normally designated as the supported command for temporary mass migration operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

(3) DHS-led/FEMA-executed NPFs with assigned executive branch agencies include the NRF and the National Disaster Recovery Framework. Other frameworks include the National Prevention Framework, the National Protection Framework, and the National Mitigation Framework (see Figure A-H-1).

For more information, refer to the NRF on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

(4) Overseas DHS contributes to a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk. With personnel in more than 75 countries, DHS has the third-largest civilian footprint abroad. As in other departments, there are some core functions the execution of which requires assignment or temporary duty abroad, supported by direct appropriations. Other activities (e.g., those

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General Petraeus liked the capabilities of US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel in Afghanistan increased from 2 to 75 in 2010-11. When CBP establishes a border management task, it does so using annuitants and contractors who possess appropriate agency backgrounds. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (a DHS entity formerly under the Department of the Treasury) also uses post-retirement recalls for temporary assignments. DHS prefers not to post personnel to Afghanistan for longer than 18 months. The normal tour is one year. Of a contingent of almost 100 in Iraq, 70 were contractors, 20 were government employees. In Afghanistan, the contingent numbered 70-85. Contractors may work for the Department of the Defense (DOD) rather than deploy on chief of mission authority. Funding may be blended (i.e., derived) from multiple sources. In Afghanistan, for example, much of the equipment was funded by DOD, and personnel costs were funded by the Department of State.

Various Sources
### Domestic Coordination—Emergency Support Functions

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**Legend**

- **C**: ESF coordinator
- **DHHS**: Department of Health and Human Services
- **DHS**: Department of Homeland Security
- **DOC**: Department of Commerce
- **DOD**: Department of Defense
- **DOE**: Department of Energy
- **DOI**: Department of the Interior
- **DOL**: Department of Labor
- **DOS**: Department of State
- **DOT**: Department of Transportation
- **ED**: Department of Education
- **EPA**: Environmental Protection Agency
- **ESF**: Emergency support function
- **FEMA**: Federal Emergency Management Agency
- **FS**: Forest Service
- **GSA**: General Services Administration
- **HUD**: Department of Housing and Urban Development
- **NCS**: National Communications System
- **USACE**: United States Army Corps of Engineers
- **USAID**: United States Agency for International Development
- **USCG**: United States Coast Guard
- **USDA**: United States Department of Agriculture
- **VA**: US Department of Veterans Affairs

**Figure A-H-1. Domestic Coordination—Emergency Support Functions**
recommended by DOD or DOS), require external funding. A common security-support task is to set up customs academies, which DHS has done several times.

3. **Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense**

   a. MOUs

      (1) Non-Reimbursable Exchange of Liaisons within the National Capitol Region.

      (2) Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures.

      (3) Transition Assistance Program and Disable Transition Assistance Program.

   b. MOAs

      (1) Military Members of FEMA National IMATS.

      (2) Cybersecurity.

      (3) Establishment of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detail to USSOUTHCOM.

      (4) United States Satellite-Aided Search and Rescue System.

      (5) National Disaster Medical System.

*For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).*
1. Core Mission

   a. The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) creates strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality, affordable homes for all. HUD is working to strengthen the housing market to bolster the economy and protect consumers, meet the need for quality affordable rental homes, utilize housing as a platform for improving quality of life, build inclusive and sustainable communities free from discrimination, and transform the way HUD does business.

   b. As the designated coordinator of the RSF for housing to the National Disaster Recovery Framework, HUD leads the nation’s efforts to address pre- and post-disaster housing issues and coordinate the delivery of federal resources and activities to assist local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments as they rehabilitate and reconstruct destroyed and damaged housing, when feasible, and develop new accessible, permanent housing options.


2. Interaction

   a. Routine: Domestic interactions between HUD and DOD primarily focus on reuse and redevelopment of former military installations.

   b. Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 (the Redevelopment Act). The Redevelopment Act was designed to accommodate the impacted communities’ multiple interests in base reuse and to meet the national priority to assist homeless individuals and families. The law exempted the Base Realignment and Closure Commission installations from the provisions of Title V of the McKinney Act and substituted a community-based process wherein representatives of the homeless and other community groups participate in local reuse planning. The Redevelopment Act places responsibility for base reuse planning in the hands of a local redevelopment authority, which represents all the jurisdictions affected by a closing or realigning installation. The local redevelopment authority is responsible for developing a reuse plan that appropriately balances the needs of the various communities for economic redevelopment, other development, and homeless assistance. HUD then reviews the plan to determine its compliance with the statute. HUD’s Office of Community Planning and Development and DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Security jointly developed and published regulations that implement the Redevelopment Act. The regulations, although identical, are found in two locations. HUD’s regulations are codified in Title 24, CFR, Section 586, and DOD’s version is found at Title 32, CFR, Part 176.
c. Emergency: As the national coordinator of the RSF for housing, the Office of Disaster Coordination is responsible for policy development, direction, coordination, evaluation, and support of departmental programs concerning disaster preparedness, planning, response and recovery, continuity of operations, coordination of interagency emergency response activities, and operation of the HUD Emergency Operations Center. Implementation of response and recovery activities is done by HUD’s Office of Field Policy and Management.

For more information, refer to the NRF and the National Disaster Recovery Framework on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

d. Foreign: HUD does not typically coordinate with DOD on foreign operations. Within HUD, the Office for International and Philanthropic Innovation coordinates the Department’s international exchanges, including diverse bilateral (e.g., Canada and Mexico) and multilateral (e.g., UN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) programs concerning issues in housing policy, housing finance, urban development, and the environment. Many current bilateral projects concern resilient design and development for natural disasters.

3. Lessons

1. Core Mission

a. The mission of DOJ (http://www.justice.gov) is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the US according to the law, ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic, provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime, seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior, and ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.

b. DOJ was established by statute in June 1870, with the Attorney General as its head. The Attorney General, as the chief law enforcement officer of the USG, generally represents the US in legal matters and gives advice and opinions to the President and to the heads of the executive departments of the USG, when requested.

c. DOJ is made up of 42 separate components located in the US and abroad. The components with functions and responsibilities most relevant to the DOD mission are Criminal Division; Civil Division; United States Attorney’s Offices; National Security Division (NSD); DEA; FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); United States National Central Bureau; and the United States Marshals Service.

d. DOJ is the designated coordinator and primary agency for ESF #13, Public Safety and Security. DOJ is also a supporting agency for eight other NRF mission areas as well as a primary or supporting agency for three RSFs in the National Disaster Recovery Framework.

For more information, refer to the United States Government Manual (http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov) and the Department of Justice’s Strategic Plan on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

2. Interactions

a. Routine. DOJ assists DOS in a variety of efforts to promote freedom and security through the rule of law and strategic law enforcement priorities in countries around the world. DOJ officials work with HN counterparts on a variety of tasks, including the establishment a robust judicial infrastructure, providing guidance in the investigation and prosecution of major crimes and acts of terrorism, providing technical assistance to enforcement entities, and training justice personnel on issues ranging from corrections procedures to international human rights laws. This relationship allows DOJ components the ability to establish and maintain liaison with principal law enforcement entities, security services, and foreign governments in their designated foreign country and AOR. DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program works in close partnership with the DOS, the USAID, and with foreign governments to develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human
rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism. Lastly, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training’s mission is to assist prosecutors and judicial personnel in other countries develop and sustain effective criminal justice institutions.

(1) Under PPD-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, the Attorney General serves as one of the members of the NSC. Additionally, DOJ components participate in classified IPCs and other senior-level planning meetings involving terrorism and other national security issues, advise and assist on development of US policies in bilateral and multilateral discussions with foreign governments and international institutions, advise on foreign legal reforms and work to build the CT capacities of foreign governments, and work to enhance international cooperation on national security and CT issues.

(2) The NSD mission is to carry out, in conjunction with other components, DOJ’s highest priority: combatting terrorism and other threats to national security. NSD was established to ensure greater coordination and unity of purpose between prosecutors and LEAs on the one hand, and intelligence attorneys and the IC on the other, thus strengthening the effectiveness of the USG’s national security efforts. NSD supports and supervises investigations and prosecutions of cases involving national security, foreign relations, and the export of military and strategic commodities and technology. In carrying out these responsibilities, NSD conducts in coordinated efforts and close collaboration with DOJ leadership, the FBI, the IC, and the US Attorneys’ Offices. NSD also coordinates national security-related policy and legislation, and represents DOJ on national security-related IPCs, including the Domestic Resilience Group, the Counterterrorism Security Group, and other IPCs that concern WMD.

(3) The FBI (http://www.fbi.gov) is charged with preventing the domestic acquisition of WMD and related technologies and its use against the US or its interests abroad. It has primary responsibility for searching for, finding, and neutralizing WMD within the US and its territories. The FBI also leads and coordinates the domestic operational law enforcement response, on-scene law enforcement, and investigative and intelligence activities related to imminent terrorist threats and/or incidents involving WMD. In addition, the FBI has lead responsibility for the investigation of terrorist acts or terrorist threats, to include those involving WMD, directed at US citizens, interests, or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the US. The FBI maintains the national fingerprint and criminal history repository and is in the forefront in the identification of known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and other threat personnel or persons of interest. The DOJ increased its multi-agency efforts to counter the ever-growing threat posed by the illegal foreign acquisition of controlled US military and strategic technologies. A significant percentage of export control and embargo-related criminal prosecutions involve the transfer of controlled US technology to Iran or China. DOJ combats drug trafficking by those who use the profits to fund terrorist activities, with a particular focus in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The FBI created the CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives] Sub-Directorate within INTERPOL, Lyon, France, providing global law enforcement capability building to detect and neutralize WMD threats by offering access to WMD
subject matter expertise, WMD threat and trend information, operational guidance, and training involving tripwire development to detect WMD threats and the response for their disruption and resolution.

(4) The DEA’s (http://www.justice.gov/dea/index.html) mission is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the US and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the US, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations involved in the growth, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in, or destined for, illicit traffic in the US. The mission features coordination and cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials on mutual drug enforcement efforts, and enhancement of such efforts through exploitation of potential interstate and international investigations beyond local or limited federal jurisdictions and resources.

(5) The Office of Legal Counsel reviews for form and legality all proposed executive orders, certain presidential proclamations, and regulations requiring approval and execution by the President. In times of national emergency or crises, the President may use these mechanisms to provide for necessary or appropriate actions to address the emergency, such as augmenting active Armed Forces by calling up members of the Reserve Component. Through its review, the Office of Legal Counsel ensures the legal intricacies and implications of the proposed actions are understood and legal requirements are followed.

(6) As the designated coordinator and primary agency for ESF #13, domestic interorganizational cooperation between the DOJ and DOD is centered on the integration of public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities. This responsibility has been delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.

For more information, refer to the NRF and the National Disaster Recovery Framework on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

b. Contingency. During the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOJ expanded its capabilities to deploy personnel in unprecedented numbers, making it the third largest civilian contributor behind USAID and DOS. DOJ was on the ground from the beginning in both theaters with FBI agents deploying to Afghanistan in 2001 to support the CT mission and a rule of law assessment team of 32 personnel joining US military forces in Iraq in May 2003. DOJ eventually took overall responsibility for rule of law efforts in Iraq in 2007 and at the height of its operations there maintained more than 200 DOJ employees and contract personnel. To oversee operations at the departmental level, the position of Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Rule of Law, Iraq was established in 2007 and broadened in 2009 to include oversight of DOJ activities in Afghanistan. DOJ’s efforts in Afghanistan peaked in 2011 at over 200 personnel.
3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

   a. MOU. Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures.

   b. MOA. Assignment of Personnel.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
1. Core Mission

a. The DOI protects and manages the nation’s natural resources and cultural heritage; provides scientific and other information about those resources; and honors the nation’s trust responsibilities or special commitments to American Indians, Alaska Natives, and affiliated island communities.

b. The DOI is the steward of 20 percent of the nation’s lands, including national parks, national wildlife refuges, and other public lands; manages resources that supply 23 percent of the nation’s energy; supplies and manages water in the 17 Western states; supplies 17 percent of the nation’s hydropower energy; and upholds federal trust responsibilities to 566 federally recognized Indian tribes and Alaska Natives.

c. The DOI is responsible for migratory bird and wildlife conservation; historic preservation; endangered species conservation; surface-mine lands protection and restoration; mapping, geological, hydrological, and biological science for the nation; and financial and technical assistance for the insular areas.

d. As the primary agency for protection of NCH, one of the five mission areas under ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural Resources, to the NRF, DOI leads the nation’s efforts to protect NCH through appropriate response actions. This includes providing post event assessments of damages and providing technical assistance and resources for assessing impacts of response activities on NCH resources.

e. Office of International Affairs: In 1995, USAID and DOI established the DOI International Technical Assistance Program to provide capacity building in other countries using the diverse expertise of DOI bureaus. DOI expertise is tapped from a wide range of subject areas (http://www.doi.gov/intl/itap/upload/ITAP_General.pdf).

For more information, refer to the United States Government Manual (http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov) and the Department of Interior’s Strategic Plan on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

2. Interaction

a. Routine: Domestic interactions between DOI and DOD primarily focus on land acquisition, land disposal, real property, and other land transactions (e.g., Bureau of Land Management withdrawn lands for military use); cleanup of contamination on military legacy sites including but not limited to formerly used defense sites and former battlefields; and coordination of environmental documentation. Current projects with DOD are primarily related to the impending military build-up in Guam and the CNMI along with other projects affecting the environment and invasive species. The Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) provides administrative and oversight responsibilities for seven US-
affiliated territories and freely associated states (i.e. American Samoa, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, the CNMI, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, hereafter referred to as insular areas). Additionally, OIA coordinates closely with other federal agencies that provide grant funding and services to the insular areas, particularly for critical services such as health, education, public safety, emergency management, and economic development. Coordination with DOD includes:

(1) Planning and USPACOM exercises, as well as US Pacific Fleet-led planning for Pacific Partnership 2013 relative to activities in the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Pacific Partnership 2014, given planned activities in the Federated States of Micronesia.


(3) Participate as a cooperating agency in preparation of its CNMI’s Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement, which will develop and analyze range and training area alternatives to satisfy USPACOM Service components’ unfilled unit-level and combined-level military training requirements in the CNMI.

(4) DOD’s Joint Committee Meeting: OIA has discussions with the DOD Joint Committee Meeting regarding its annual meetings with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

(5) Cultural Repository for Guam: DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment is responsible for the Guam Cultural Repository initiative and other similar Guam investments. One scope of work is Cultural Repository Planning and Programming which, in part, requires the performance-based contract consultant to coordinate meetings with OIA, National Park Service, and design service centers (Denver, Colorado, and Harpers Ferry, West Virginia) to seek or solicit their subject area expertise (curation of artifacts and remains).

(6) Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii (Invasive): The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community are facilitating the Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii. The Regional Biosecurity Plan was developed to evaluate invasive species risks to marine, terrestrial, and freshwater ecosystems in Micronesia and Hawaii (in regard to its linkages with Micronesia) and to make recommendations to remove or minimize and manage these risks.

(7) Brown Treesnake Program. The Brown Treesnake Program is a multi-agency program to prevent the spread of the Brown Treesnake, which infests Guam. OIA funds the interdiction on the commercial ports as well as research, and DOD funds the interdiction on US military bases. Participating USG departments and agencies include the US Geological Survey and USDA.

b. Emergency: The Office of Emergency Management establishes and disseminates policy, and coordinates the development of bureau and office programs for an integrated and comprehensive program that spans the continuum of prevention, planning, response, and recovery. The program encompasses all types of hazards and emergencies that impact federal lands, facilities, infrastructure, and resources; tribal lands and insular areas; the ability of the DOI to execute essential functions; and for which assistance is provided to other units of government under federal laws, executive orders, interagency emergency response plans (e.g., the NRF), and other agreements. Additionally, the Office of Emergency Management operates the Interior Operations Center. The Interior Operations Center serves as the focal point for reporting significant incidents to the Secretary of the Interior; sharing of emergency information with the National Operations Center, DHS, and other USG departments and agencies; and the dissemination of alerts, warnings, and other emergency information to DOI bureaus and offices.

(1) DOI designated duties under the NRF include primary agent for ESF #9, Urban Search and Rescue, primary agent for ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural Resources. Additionally, DOI has further responsibilities as a designated support agency for all other ESFs.

(2) Under the National Disaster Recovery Framework, DOI is designated as coordinator of the RSF for Natural and Cultural Resources, primary agent under Health and Human Services RSF, and as support to the other four RSFs.


c. Foreign: The Office of International Affairs of DOI supports and coordinates the international activities of DOI. As the primary natural resource conservation agency and a leading science agency of the US, DOI conducts international activities that advance its mission and strengthen complementary US foreign policy priorities. The Office of International Affairs supports the work of DOI and its bureaus in over 100 countries on conservation and management of wildlife and other natural resources, protection of cultural resources, cooperation on indigenous affairs, and scientific research and monitoring of natural hazards such as volcanoes and earthquakes. International activities include protected area management, cultural resources management, environmental education, endangered species conservation, visitor services, recreation management, fire management, invasive species control, minerals management, reclamation of mined lands, including abandoned mine lands, ecotourism, wildlife law enforcement, resource

3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

   a. MOUs
      
      (1) Promote the Conservation of Migratory Birds.

      (2) Interagency Coordination and Collaboration for the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites.

   b. MOAs
      
      (1) Acquisition Services.
      
      (2) Native Languages.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
ANNEX LTO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

1. Core Mission

a. DOL (http://www.dol.gov) fosters and promotes the welfare of the job seekers, wage earners, and retirees of the US by improving their working conditions; advancing their opportunities for profitable employment; protecting their retirement and health care benefits; helping employers find workers; strengthening free collective bargaining; and tracking changes in employment, prices, and other national economic measurements. In carrying out this mission, DOL administers a variety of federal labor laws, including those that assure safe and healthful working conditions, a minimum hourly wage and overtime pay, freedom from employment discrimination and equal opportunity through affirmative action, unemployment insurance, and other income support. DOL can provide valuable insight through labor statistics, occupational safety and health, and other agencies that will promote recovery from war or other disasters. DOD contractors at overseas locations are required to comply with DOL regulations. Bringing DOL into the interagency process better ensures quality performance of DOD contractors.

b. The DOL’s authority arose from the Organic Act of the Department of Labor, Public Law 426-62 (1913), which created DOL and the initial group of divisions within DOL. Over the years, numerous statutes (e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act [Title 29, USC, Section 201] and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [Title 29, USC, Section 651]) have added to DOL’s authority.

c. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has jurisdiction over federal contractors and subcontractors for discrimination and affirmative action issues (but not the Age Discrimination and Employment Act) when these employers hire workers in the US to perform work abroad (Title 41, CFR, Parts 60-1,5,1; 60-1.10). In addition, contractors working outside the country on a US military base or under a contract with the USG for public works or national defense may be covered by the Defense Base Act (Title 42, USC, Section 1651). This law extends the benefits of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (Title 33, USC, Section 901) to certain categories of civilian workers employed overseas. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has jurisdiction over federal contractors and subcontractors for the purposes of enforcing nondiscrimination and affirmative action laws. Contractors and subcontractors within Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs’ jurisdiction are prohibited from discriminating in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, and status as a protected veteran. These employers are also prohibited from discriminating or taking adverse employment actions because an employee or job applicant made certain disclosures or inquiries about his or her pay or the pay of a coworker. Finally, these employers are required to take affirmative action to recruit, hire, pay, train, and promote workers for a diverse workforce. Workers hired in the US to perform work abroad are protected by these nondiscrimination and affirmative action laws (Title 41, CFR, Part 60).
d. The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) is one of the few DOL organizations with the authority to operate internationally. ILAB’s mission is to use all available international channels to improve working conditions, raise living standards, protect workers’ ability to exercise their rights, and address the workplace exploitation of children and other vulnerable populations.


2. Interaction

   a. DOD may likely coordinate with the ILAB, which leads the DOL’s efforts to ensure that workers around the world are treated fairly and are able to share in the benefits of the global economy.

   b. DOL is a supporting agency to 10 ESFs and two of the six RSFs.

For more information, refer to the NRF and the National Disaster Recovery Framework on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

   MOUs


   b. Transition Assistance Program and Disable Transition Assistance Program.

For more information on MOUs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
ANNEX M TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Core Missions

   a. DOS (http://www.state.gov/) is responsible for planning and implementing foreign policy. The Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President’s principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad.

   b. Under the US Constitution, the President has the authority to make treaties, to receive foreign emissaries, to appoint diplomatic and consular officials, and to exercise other authorities provided by legislation. DOS’s mission is to advance freedom by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.

   c. DOS manages America’s relationships with foreign governments, international organizations, and the people of other countries. As the lead foreign affairs agency, DOS has the primary role in leading the coordination to develop and implement foreign policy; managing the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources; leading and coordinating US representation abroad; conveying US foreign policy to foreign governments and international organizations through US embassies and consulates; conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties; and coordinating and supporting international activities of other USG departments and agencies and officials. All foreign affairs activities (e.g., US representation abroad, foreign assistance programs, countering international crime, foreign military training programs, the services DOS provides, and more) are paid for by the foreign affairs budget.

   d. The COM coordinates the efforts of the country team to achieve a unified, consistent foreign policy toward the HN. The US has diplomatic relations with most countries and with many international organizations. DOS takes the lead role in maintaining and improving relationships with these countries and organizations. A US mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments overseas. They are headed by a COM, normally an ambassador, who is a presidential appointee and the President’s personal representative. As such, the COM is the senior US official in the country. By law, COMs coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited. COMs do not, however, exercise control of US personnel attached to, and working for, the head of a US mission to an international organization (e.g., US Ambassador to NATO) or US military personnel operating under the command of a CCDR.

   e. A key DOS function is assembling coalitions to provide military forces for US-led multinational operations. In coordination with the NSC and DOD, DOS contacts foreign governments at the highest level to request participation of their forces in planned multinational operations. When forces are offered, DOS formally accepts them from the foreign government and arranges for military-to-military contact.
f. The DOS’s HQ provides policy guidance to DOS and USAID. Subordinate to the Secretary of State are two deputy secretaries and six under secretaries, who manage and coordinate the foreign policy process. There is an under secretary for each of the following: political affairs; economic growth, energy, and environment; arms control and international security; civilian security, democracy, and human rights; management; and public diplomacy and public affairs. The Director of US Foreign Assistance Resources is charged with directing the transformation of the USG approach to foreign assistance.

g. DOS is organized into six regional bureaus, each responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to formulate and implement regional foreign policy and bilateral policy toward each individual country of the world (African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, Western Hemisphere Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs). The other bureau responsible to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which formulates and implements multilateral foreign policy toward international organizations, particularly the agencies of the UN. The other bureaus in DOS are functionally oriented; their assistant secretaries are responsible to other Under Secretaries for specific matters. Bureaus are subdivided into offices headed by directors.

h. DOS relies on the Foreign Service, a corps of career foreign affairs experts, to operate its overseas missions, formulate foreign policy, and perform diplomatic exchanges.

For more information, refer to the United States Government Manual (http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov) and the Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan on the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

2. Interactions

a. DOS’s principal role in its relationship with DOD is to ensure that defense activities support national foreign policy and to facilitate defense activities overseas. In performance of the first role, DOS attends interagency meetings, responds to requests from JS and OSD for foreign policy reviews of DOD proposed activities, and alerts DOD to defense activities of foreign policy concerns that have come to DOS’s attention. In its role as facilitator of defense activities overseas, DOS approaches foreign governments through high-level visits, diplomatic representations by US missions overseas, or contact with foreign government representatives in the US to negotiate agreements or obtain authorization for defense activities in the foreign country. In recognition of the impact that DOD activities have on US foreign affairs, DOS has assigned a single bureau, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), to be its primary interface with DOD. PM manages POLMIL relations throughout the world, including training and assistance for foreign militaries, and works to maintain global access for US military forces. DOS is the coordinator of the process for interagency consideration of proposals to enter into treaties or other formal agreements with foreign governments, known as the Circular 175 process (US Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 11—Political Affairs, chapter 720). DOS also provides the support structure for the representatives of DOD,
b. Several bureaus and offices have frequent interaction with DOD. DOS’s principal link to DOD is PM. PM provides guidance and coordinates policy formulation on national security issues (e.g., regional stability, security assistance to foreign military partners, military operations and arms transfers, and defense trade). It works closely with regional and functional experts from across DOS, CCMD planners, the JS, and OSD to ensure high-level DOD planning is informed by DOS expertise and remains consonant with US foreign policy as articulated by the Secretary of State. PM is the DOS lead for defense trade controls, defense relations, security assistance and cooperation, military operations and exercises, diplomatic clearance approvals for foreign ships and aircraft entering the US and its territories, conventional weapons destruction including humanitarian demining assistance, man-portable air-defense systems threat reduction, and analyzing broad trends in international security affairs to determine their effect on US policies. It serves as principal liaison with the DOD on policy and planning issues. It is responsible for developing, managing, and implementing military security cooperation programs and providing advice on crisis management, military operations, base access and pre-positioning of US materiel. PM provides overall direction for the fulfillment of DOS’s responsibilities for the State-Defense Exchange Program and for POLADs assigned to military commands, the Pentagon, and JIACGs (or equivalent organization) (http://www.state.gov/t/pm/).

c. Other bureaus and offices that frequently interact with DOD include:

(1) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyzes geographical and international boundary issues; it is a member of the IC. The Humanitarian Information Unit inside the bureau serves as a USG interagency center to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate all-source information critical to USG decision makers. Its staff is composed of personnel from DOS, USAID, DOD, NGA, and others (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/).

(2) The Bureau of Counterterrorism interacts with DOD via the US Counterterrorism Team (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/index.htm).


(4) PRM (http://www.state.gov/j/prm/). The bureau is a major source of US HA overseas and manages the admission of refugees to the US. Its mission is to provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting
best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into US foreign and national security policy. The bureau has primary responsibility within the USG for formulating policies on population, refugees, and migration, and administering and evaluating US refugee assistance and admissions programs. PRM leads bilateral and multilateral negotiations to facilitate refugee voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. PRM’s primary international partners are the UNHCR, ICRC, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and IOM. PRM also funds NGOs to fill critical gaps in multilateral programs. The bureau is an active member in the USIP Civil-Military Working Group. Through this cooperative consortium, PRM works with the other USG departments and agencies (e.g., DOD and USAID), international organizations, and NGOs to raise humanitarian issues. Through PRM’s diplomatic engagements, it advocates for military and non-state actor adherence to humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence in order to maximize humanitarian security and access.

(5) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (http://www.state.gov/m/ds/).

(6) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (http://www.state.gov/j/inl/).

(7) CSO (http://www.state.gov/j/cso/).

(8) The DOD State Partnership Program.

(9) Threat Finance Cell. IAW DODD 5205.14, DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy, the DOD works with other USG departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries’ ability to use global financial networks to negatively affect US interests.

d. Domestic: A domestic incident may have international and diplomatic implications that call for coordination and consultation with foreign governments and international organizations. The Secretary of State is responsible for all communication and coordination between the USG and other nations regarding the response to a domestic crisis. DOS also coordinates international offers of assistance and formally accepts or declines these offers on behalf of the USG based on needs conveyed by USG departments and agencies as stated in the International Coordination Support Annex.

3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

a. MOU. Terrorist Watchlist Redress Procedures.

b. MOA. Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Nationals and Designated Other Persons from Threatened Areas Overseas.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
1. Core Mission

   a. The Department of the Treasury (http://www.treasury.gov) serves the American people and strengthens national security by managing the USG’s finances effectively; promoting economic growth and stability; and ensuring the safety, soundness, and security of the US financial system.

   b. The Department of the Treasury is the executive agency responsible for promoting economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the US. They are responsible for a wide range of activities such as advising the President on economic and financial issues, encouraging sustainable economic growth, and fostering improved governance in financial institutions. The Department of the Treasury operates and maintains systems that are critical to the nation’s financial infrastructure (e.g., production of coin and currency, disbursement of payments to the American public, revenue collection, and borrowing of funds necessary to run the USG). The Department of the Treasury works with other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, and international financial institutions to encourage global economic growth, raise standards of living, and, to the extent possible, predict and prevent economic and financial crises. They also perform a critical and far-reaching role in enhancing national security by implementing economic sanctions against foreign threats to the US, identifying and targeting the financial support networks of national security threats, and improving the safeguards of our financial systems.

   c. The Department of the Treasury is organized into two major components: the departmental offices and the operating bureaus. Departmental offices are primarily responsible for the formulation of policy and management for the Department of the Treasury as a whole, while the operating bureaus carry out the specific operations assigned to the Department of the Treasury.

   d. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is the department’s main interlocutor with other USG departments and agencies focused on national security. Its mission is to marshal the department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, WMD proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. Financial networks underlie all of these threats, and are sources of valuable intelligence and present vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Other components within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence include the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Department of the Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture.

For more information, refer to the United States Government Manual (http://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov) and the Department of the Treasury’s Strategic

2. Coordination and the Joint Force Commander

a. Overseas. Economic warfare has always been part of US history and national security. As such, the Department of the Treasury has an inherent international mission beyond its more traditional domestic financial focus. Specifically, the Department of the Treasury’s role in developing and monitoring the nation’s sanction programs and other financial tools has been the purview of the department since the Civil War, and the department has supported national security strategies during both World Wars, the Cold War, and today’s contingencies. In short, the Department of the Treasury’s powers and functions are an ensconced part of the USG’s approach to national security. As the nature of conflict and international relations has changed, the use of these tools and the development of new techniques and capacities have evolved.

(1) Arrangements with bodies like the Group of 20, the Egmont Group, multilateral development banks, the Financial Stability Board, and international financial institutions provide the Department of the Treasury with flexible vehicles to address emerging global challenges and assist strategically important countries. For example, the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes leads the USG delegation to the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that has developed leading global standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. At the bilateral level, the Department of the Treasury has attachés in US embassies throughout the world to collaborate with foreign counterpart agencies to advance US policies in the economic and illicit finance arenas. The Department of the Treasury also conducts targeted outreach with the international financial sector to foreign financial institutions and bankers’ associations to better understand the illicit finance risks in the international financial system.

(2) Office of Technical Assistance (OTA). OTA came into existence based on the perceived national security interest of the US in supporting the development of the newly independent Eastern European states. Founded in the post-Cold war era, OTA was charged with supporting the development of strong financial sectors and sound public financial management in countries where assistance is needed and there is a strong commitment to reform.

(a) OTA in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq and Afghanistan were unique missions for OTA. Both were extraordinary situations involving post-intervention stabilization and state building, rather than the more conventional long-term institution strengthening that OTA advisors support. In 2003, OTA established the Iraq Financial Reconstruction Task Force made up of DOS and OTA officials. In 2008, this became the Iraq and Afghanistan Financial Reconstruction Task Force. Early on, DOD funds were transferred to DOS that were, in turn, transferred to OTA to fund its efforts and personnel. Later in the operations, OTA got its funding directly from DOS and USAID.
(b) Unlike the retrenchment seen in other primarily domestic focused agencies, OTA continues to provide expeditionary capabilities. The Department of the Treasury’s International Affairs Technical Assistance program essentially ensonced the Department of the Treasury’s OTA mission into the overall US national security policy. There is a strong enduring appetite for what OTA’s cadre of advisors brings to developing countries and they are viewed as extremely effective in achieving their goals. Despite the US drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, OTA continues its mission working across five continents in 33 countries.

b. **Domestic Support.** The Department of the Treasury regularly interacts with the US financial sector, including through the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group. This entity consists of representatives from regulatory agencies and LEAs, financial institutions, and trade associations who advise the Department of the Treasury on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing policy. Further, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network administers Section 314 of the USA PATRIOT [Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism] Act, which provides for enhanced information sharing among government, law enforcement, and the financial sector. Within the USG, the Department of the Treasury is also a member of national security-focused interagency working groups like the threat mitigation working group, has representatives posted with law enforcement task forces, and deploys personnel to organizations such as the CIA, FBI, ODNI, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM. These liaisons serve as valuable POCs and provide guidance, advice, and expertise to these organizations regarding the Department of the Treasury-related matters.

3. **Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense**

   a. MOU. Detail Personnel.

   b. MOA. Information Sharing, Coordination, Planning and Joint Actions.

   For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
1. Core Mission

a. DOT (http://www.dot.gov) serves the US by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into the future. The national objectives of general welfare, economic growth and stability, and security of the US require the development of transportation policies and programs that contribute to providing fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost consistent with those and other national objectives, including the efficient use and conservation of the resources of the US.

b. DOT consists of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, the Surface Transportation Board, and 10 operating administrations that are organized generally by mode of travel (e.g., air, rail, and other methods): Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Highway Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, MARAD, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and Research and Innovative Technology Administration.

c. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation oversees the formulation of national transportation policy and promotes intermodal transportation. Other responsibilities include negotiating and implementing international transportation agreements, ensuring the fitness of US airlines, enforcing airline consumer-protection regulations, issuing regulations to prevent alcohol and illegal drug misuse in transportation systems, and preparing transportation legislation.

(1) **NATO Civil Emergency Planning/Transport Group.** The Office of the Secretary of Transportation is the US representative to the NATO Civil Emergency Planning/Transport Group. The NATO Civil Emergency Planning/Transport Group and the related sub-groups, comprised of representatives and civil transportation experts from NATO member and partner nations, are responsible for the civil emergency planning process to acquire and deploy transportation resources to support NATO operations. This emergency planning process is accomplished in coordination with other USG departments and agencies, NATO member and partner nations, and NATO military authorities. The planning process includes relevant crisis management arrangements, training, and exercises for the planners and civil experts. The Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response (within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation) serves as the US direct representative in the NATO Transport Group for Civil Aviation. It coordinates US participation in the other transport subgroups to promote the national interest and provide leadership to resolve relevant issues in the acquisition and deployment of resources and services.
(2) **Civil Reserve Air Fleet.** The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a cooperative, voluntary program involving DOT, DOD, and the US civil air carrier industry in a partnership to augment DOD airlift capability during a national defense-related crisis. Air carriers volunteer their aircraft to the program through contractual agreements with DOD’s Air Mobility Command and, in return, the participating carriers are given preference in carrying commercial peacetime cargo and passenger traffic for DOD. The Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response administers the allocation of specifically requested civil aircraft to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program pursuant to the delegated authority under Section 101 of the Defense Production Act (Title 50, USC, Section 4511). Upon SecDef approval, Commander, USTRANSCOM, is the activation authority for Civil Reserve Air Fleet during national emergencies and defense-oriented situations when expanded civil augmentation of military aircraft is required. Title 10, USC, Section 9511a, gives SecDef authority to establish Civil Reserve Air Fleet rate determination.

d. **FAA.** The mission of the FAA is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. The FAA is the lead agency for aviation safety regulation and oversight and is responsible for the operation and maintenance (to include personnel, physical assets, and cyberspace) of the Air Traffic Control System (Title 49, USC, Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs). Title 49, USC, provides FAA with full authority to operate and maintain air navigation facilities and to provide the facilities and personnel needed to regulate and protect air traffic. The FAA supports national security, law enforcement, and aviation security through provision of air traffic management security services. This includes operation of the United States Domestic Events Network that enables more than 200 interagency partners to immediately react to security threats in the air domain. The FAA also protects US aircraft operations outside the US through advisories and Special Federal Aviation Regulations that simply advise operators of threats or prohibit flight operations in certain high-threat areas. FAA has primary responsibility for its own internal security, including the security of its facilities. Any movement in the navigable airspace of the US can be stopped, redirected, or excluded by the FAA, regardless of the commodity involved (Title 49, USC, Section 40103). Additionally, the FAA can order US-flag air carriers not to enter designated airspace of a foreign country (e.g., to keep airspace clear for rescue operations). If FAA determines that an emergency exists related to safety in air commerce that requires immediate action, FAA may prescribe regulations and issue orders immediately to meet that emergency (Title 49, USC, Section 46105[c]). FAA can also enforce a grant assurance made by all airports receiving FAA airport grant funds (approximately 3,300 airports including all major US airports) that the airport sponsor will not temporarily close the airport for a non-aeronautical purpose without prior DOT approval (Title 49, USC, Section 47107[a][8]).

(1) The safety mission of the FAA is first and foremost and includes the issuance and enforcement of regulations and standards related to the manufacture, operation, certification, and maintenance of aircraft. The agency is responsible for the rating and certification of airmen and for certification of airports serving air carriers. It also regulates a program to protect the security of civil aviation, and enforces regulations under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act for shipments by air. The FAA, which
operates a network of airport towers, air route traffic control centers, and flight service stations, develops air traffic rules, allocates the use of airspace, and provides for the emergency security control of air traffic to meet national defense requirements. Other responsibilities include the construction or installation of visual and electronic aids to air navigation and promotion of aviation safety internationally. The FAA, which regulates and encourages the US commercial space transportation industry, also licenses commercial space launch facilities and private sector launches.

(2) The FAA is responsible for all DOD flight inspection requirements. Through a MOA, the USAF maintains a staff of active and reserve aircrews to perform flight inspection missions worldwide, including missions in support of combat and contingency operations. The DOD Flight Inspection office coordinates flight inspection requirements and develops national policy for the conduct of flight inspection of all navigation aids and air traffic control facilities owned or controlled by the DOD throughout the world.

(3) The FAA leads and supports the development of civil aviation systems worldwide (e.g., Afghanistan). Civil air traffic control systems have numerous military applications and provide significant economic advantages to a partner nation.

e. MARAD. MARAD (http://www.marad.dot.gov/) promotes development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced, US merchant marine, including vessels and well-trained US citizen mariners, sufficient to carry the nation’s domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its waterborne foreign commerce, and capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency. MARAD also seeks to ensure the US enjoys adequate shipbuilding and repair service, efficient ports, effective intermodal water and land transportation systems, and reserve shipping capacity in time of national emergency.

(1) Military Cargoes. MARAD initiates and recommends regulations and procedures for the DOD to follow in administering cargo preference requirements. Program efforts concentrate on meetings and discussions with DOD component commands, contractors, suppliers, freight forwarders, and shipping companies to focus attention on meeting the needs of all constituents within the context of US-flag carriage requirements. Cargo shipping for DOD is subject to the Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904. This law requires that items procured for, intended for use by, or owned by military departments or defense agencies must be carried exclusively on US-flag vessels, if available, at reasonable rates. Most DOD containerized cargo is booked on US-flag vessels by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command for the various DOD shipper services as part of the Defense Transportation System. Shipping via the Defense Transportation System allows DOD shippers access to pre-negotiated ocean shipping contracts providing cost and convenience benefits. By formal agreement, MARAD acts as the determiner of US-flag vessel availability for military cargoes shipping outside the Defense Transportation System.

(2) NATO Transport Group (Ocean Shipping). MARAD is the US representative to NATO’s Transport Group (Ocean Shipping). Additionally, MARAD’s
Office of Operations and Emergency Response provides the Secretariat for Transport Group (Ocean Shipping), and the Associate Administrator for Strategic Sealift serves as the Chairman. Transport Group (Ocean Shipping) provides technical guidance and advice to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe and NATO HQ on maritime security, the commercial maritime industry, war risk insurance and the market for militarily useful vessels. All other sealift activities in peacetime are solely a national responsibility.

(3) **Maritime Security Program (MSP).** The MSP is a fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements. Participating operators are required to make their ships and commercial transportation resources available, upon request by SecDef, during times of war or national emergency. Commander, USTRANSCOM, has been designated as the DOD representative for administration of the MSP and Title IX (of the 1936 Merchant Marine Act) Ship Loan Guarantee Program. The program maintains a modern US-flag fleet providing military access to vessels and vessel capacity, as well as a total global, intermodal transportation network. This network includes not only vessels, but also logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals facilities, and US citizen merchant mariners to crew the commercial fleets. All MSP vessels are required to enroll in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).

(4) **VISA.** The VISA program is a partnership between the USG and the maritime industry. This program provides the DOD with “assured access” to commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support the emergency deployment and sustainment of US military forces. Intermodal capacity includes dry cargo ships and crews, equipment, terminal facilities, and intermodal management services. The VISA program provides for a time-phased activation of state-of-the-art commercial intermodal equipment to coincide with DOD requirements, while minimizing disruption to US commercial operations. The VISA program includes MSP vessels as well as other US flag dry cargo vessels operating in international and domestic trades. The program can be activated in three stages, as determined by DOD, with each stage representing a higher level of capacity commitment. SecDef delegated to Commander, USTRANSCOM, authority to administer and implement DOD’s participation in VISA. All non-MSP vessels participating in Stage III must commit at least 50 percent of their capacity. MSP dry cargo vessels must commit all of their capacity during Stage III.

(5) **Office of Ship Operations.** The Office of Ship Operations formulates national policies and programs for the operation, maintenance, and repair of government-owned or acquired merchant ships, especially the maintenance and readiness of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). It develops and administers programs, policies, and activities for the maintenance and readiness of MARAD RRF ships to ensure these ships can be activated within 5 or 10 days of notification; preservation work plans for each reserve fleet site; and the acquisition, allocation, and operation of merchant ships in time of national emergency. It administers ship preservation programs for the NDRF and conducts fleet service activities and engineering studies for improved methods, techniques, equipment, and materials.
(a) The NDRF serves as a reserve of ships for national defense and national emergency purposes. NDRF vessels are located at the James River, Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and Suisun Bay, California (near San Francisco) anchorages. The program primarily consists of dry cargo ships with some tankers and military auxiliaries. In addition to maintaining ships for USTRANSCOM logistics, the Missile Defense Agency sponsors two ships for missile tracking. There are eight additional ships dedicated for training merchant marine officers to support commercial, military, and HS needs. MARAD provides training ships to the nation’s merchant marine academies. The training ships are also in the NDRF program and are loaned to the US Merchant Marine Academy and the six US state maritime academies. They are used throughout the year as training platforms for the schools’ cadets. Cadets practice seamanship skills on the ships moored at the campuses and take them to sea for training cruises. Because of their large personnel support capacity, these ships are often considered when help is needed for DR. There are 34 vessels in retention status, which are preserved in a way that keeps them in the same condition as when they entered the fleet. In response to hurricane Katrina and Rita landfalls in 2005, FEMA used the MARAD’s vessels to support relief efforts. Nine ships supported the recovery, mostly with messing and berthing for refinery workers, oil spill response teams, and longshoremen. In response to Super Storm Sandy in 2012, FEMA used three ships from the MARAD fleet to house first responders at the location of the worst damage caused by the storm.

(b) The MARAD RRF program, a subset of the MARAD’s NDRF, supports the rapid worldwide deployment of US military forces. As a key element of DOD strategic sealift, the MARAD RRF primarily supports transport of US Army and USMC unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the critical surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled. The MARAD RRF provides nearly one-half of the government-owned surge sealift capability. Management of the MARAD RRF program is defined by a MOA between DOD and DOT. Generally, activation of MARAD RRF vessels has been delegated to Commander, USTRANSCOM.

1. The MARAD RRF consists of ships that include roll-on/roll off vessels, fast sealift ships, heavy lift or barge carrying ships, auxiliary craneships, tankers, aviation repair vessels, and special mission ships. Most MARAD RRF ships are berthed at various US ports. These outported locations are coordinated with military planners and chosen to minimize sailing time to strategic loadout ports. Outported MARAD RRF ships are also used as training platforms for cargo handling by USN, USMC, and US Army units and for HS training by various LEAs.

2. MARAD RRF ships are expected to be fully operational within their assigned 5- and 10-day readiness status and sail to designated loading berths. Commercial US ship managers provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support, activation, manning, and operations management by contract. Ships in priority readiness have reduced operating status maintenance crews of about 10 commercial merchant mariners that are supplemented by additional mariners during activations. Readiness of the MARAD RRF is periodically tested by DOD directed activations of ships for military cargo operations and exercises.

2. Interorganizational Relationships

   a. DOT maintains relationships with many DOD components.

   b. DOT has considerable expertise involving the civilian and military use of the nation’s transportation system. For this reason, DOT can redirect the nation’s transportation assets and change priorities, usually through a presidential executive order or emergency decrees.

   c. The FAA and DOD have significant mutual interests with regard to military aviation, aeronautical charts and publications, notices to airmen, military airport operations and certification, airspace management during national crises, and airspace control and certification of expeditionary aviation facilities overseas during military contingency operations. FAA missions in Afghanistan have been funded by DOS. DOS also funded air traffic control in Iraq. DOT’s capabilities for overseas contingencies typically depend on external funding (DOS or USAID; in Iraq it was Iraq Transitional Assistance Office, in the US Embassy Baghdad; its tasks were mostly capacity building, with funding for infrastructure repair and reconstruction).

   d. DOT tends to deploy senior personnel because their interlocutors are senior.

   e. DOT deployed its personnel under COM authority following National Security Decision Directive-38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas Constituent Posts, the process for deploying interagency personnel under COM authority, providing country clearance, etc. DOT conducted its own pre-deployment training in addition to sending personnel to the Foreign Service Institute for the Afghan Familiarization and Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat courses.

3. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

   MOAs

   a. Establishment of Federal Aviation Administration Senior Representative Position and USSOUTHCOM.

   b. Federal Interaction with Launch Site Operations.


For more information on MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
ANNEX P TO APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

1. Core Mission

a. The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the second largest department in the USG. VA has over 300,000 employees in more than 1,400 locations nationwide, with additional facilities in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. VA is well postured to provide support during an emergency or disaster. The VA’s first priority when an emergency or disaster impacts the VA or the nation is to provide assistance to veterans and their families and restore VA operations as soon as possible. The NRF, with a Stafford Act declaration, provides the vehicles that assist VA in providing support to the nation through the following ESF:

(1) ESF#3, Public Works and Engineering—VA maintains a deployable damage assessment team that primarily focuses on hospital and medical facility damage assessment.

(2) ESF #5, Emergency Management—VA maintains a 24/7 Integrated Operations Center that integrates and analyzes all issues that impact the VA. VA has a liaison that is assigned to the DHS National Operation Center during normal duty hours. Additionally, VA has liaisons that work with DHS, FEMA, DHHS, HUD, and other USG departments and agencies.

(3) ESF #6, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services—VA can provide housing for disaster victims.

(4) ESF #7, Resources Support—VA can procure medical and pharmaceutical equipment and other supplies through VA’s National Acquisition Center.

(5) ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services (through the NDMS)—VA supports the NDMS by:
   (a) Providing personnel to support federal medical stations.
   (b) Operating federal coordinating centers.
   (c) Providing deployable medical and public health personnel.

(6) ESF #13, Public Safety and Security—VA can provide law enforcement officers to provide safety and security during response operations.

(7) ESF #15, External Affairs—VA supports the joint information center when activated.

b. Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team. The VA maintains a medical emergency radiological response team that can provide technical expertise on radiological response.
c. **VA/DOD.** VA can support DOD by providing medical care to members of the military during a war or national emergency that overwhelms the DOD hospital system.

2. **Interaction**

   a. In 1982, the VA-DOD MOU Regarding the Furnishing of Health Care Services to Members of the Armed Forces During a War or National Emergency (and its associated VA-DOD Contingency Plan) was mandated by Title 38, USC, Section 8111A and was designed to support DOD during the Cold War and associated military war plans.

      (1) The VA/DOD Health Resources Sharing Act, Public Law 97-174

          (a) In summary, Public Law 97-174 authorizes VA to provide inpatient medical care to active duty members of the Armed Services during or immediately following their involvement in armed conflicts during wartime and national emergencies. A VA mission, consistent with Section 2(b) of Public Law 97-174, is to serve as a principal health care backup to the DOD in the event of an armed conflict or national emergency as declared by the President or Congress involving the use of US Armed Forces.

          (b) To implement this law, this contingency plan makes full use of available VA health care resources. This includes the use of VA medical centers, outpatient clinics, domiciliary facilities, nursing homes, supply services, communications systems, education, and other medical resources. This will also take into consideration existing national agreements that include VA treatment of spinal cord injuries, traumatic brain injuries, and visually impaired patient rehabilitation, etc. In addition to the contingency mission, this public law amended Title 38, USC, to promote greater peacetime sharing of health care resources between VA and DOD.

      (2) To link VA and DOD medical systems, the two departments designate these centers:

          (a) Primary receiving centers (PRCs) for coordinating and/or providing treatment to sick and wounded military personnel needing immediate care.

          (b) Secondary support centers for accepting transfers from and/or sharing resources with the PRCs so as to maximize health care services support to the DOD.

          (c) VA installation support centers to provide health care resources support for military personnel at military bases in proximity to VA medical facilities.

      (3) These centers represent the foundation for a contingency health care system that will integrate with the NDMS.

          (a) NDMS was conceived in 1981 as an evolution of the Civilian–Military Contingency Hospital System developed by DOD and VA to care for casualties exceeding the capacity of DOD and VA medical centers.
(b) NDMS is an interagency cooperative effort among DHHS, DOD, VA, and DHS. Through the partnership of these USG departments, in conjunction with states, private sector institutions and medical professionals appointed to federal service, NDMS developed the capabilities for medical response, patient evacuation, and hospitalization in times of disasters. DOD maintains medical operations plans that would coordinate the receipt, distribution, and treatment of returning military casualties.

(4) The VA/DOD Contingency Hospital System Plan describes how VA hospital beds would be made available to treat returning military casualties. VA includes in local contingency plans provisions for entering into contracts with private facilities for the furnishing of health care to those eligible veterans displaced from a VA medical care facility or subject to delayed treatment because of the furnishing of care and services to members of the armed forces.

3. System Composition and Description

a. PRCs. Designated areas of the US have been identified as patient reception areas for the treatment of sick and wounded military personnel returning from armed conflict or national emergency. A patient reception area is a geographic region of the US containing a concentration of definitive medical capability (generally this refers to accredited, acute care institutions) and access to ground transportation, airfields and/or seaports. Military or VA medical facilities are designated as PRCs in these areas. PRCs develop plans, train, exercise, and maintain the capability to receive patients from other regions by land, air or sea, distribute them within the patient reception area, and coordinate and/or provide health care services. Further, PRCs may be designated as federal coordinating centers of the NDMS.

b. Secondary Support Centers. Medical facilities not designated as PRCs may be designated as secondary support centers. Secondary support centers accept transfers of patients from PRCs and provide other resource support to the PRCs. This support will be detailed in a local plan developed between the PRC and secondary support center.

4. Formal Arrangement Examples with the Department of Defense

a. MOUs

(1) Meaningful Information to Service Members, Veterans, and their Family Members about Cost and Performance Outcomes for Educational Institutions.

(2) Transition Assistance Program and Disable Transition Assistance Program.

(3) Transition Assistance Program for Separating Service Members.
b. MOAs

(1) Federal Health Information Exchange Governance and Management.

(2) Health Care Resource Sharing Reimbursement Methodology.

(3) National Disaster Medical System.

For more information on MOUs/MOAs, refer to the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).
ANNEX Q TO APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Core Mission

   a. USAID (http://www.usaid.gov) is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Through its assistance programs, USAID plays an active and vital role in promoting US national security and foreign policy interests. The investment made in developing countries has long-term benefits for America and the American people. Development now takes its place alongside defense and diplomacy as the three essential components of American foreign policy. USAID is the principal USG provider of global development and HA.

   b. USAID provides assistance in Africa, Asia, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East. USAID’s strength is its country missions and offices around the world. USAID works in close partnership with several groups, including NGOs, American businesses, fellow USG agencies, universities, and other governments. USAID has working relationships, through cooperative agreements, contracts, and grant agreements, with more than 3,500 companies and over 300 US-based NGOs.

   Refer to other relevant documents at the Joint Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/interorganizationaldocuments.htm).

   c. USAID is the principal US agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide. Through OFDA, USAID administers the President’s authority to provide emergency relief and long-term HA in response to disasters declared by the ambassador within the affected country or higher DOS authority. When a disaster declaration has been made by the ambassador, USAID coordinates the USG response. USAID’s Director of OFDA has primary responsibility for initiating this response. OFDA is organized under USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). OFDA responsibilities include:

      (1) Organize and coordinate the total USG DR response.

      (2) Respond to embassy and/or mission requests for disaster assistance.

      (3) Initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation.

      (4) Coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs.

   d. USAID Humanitarian Sectors. Each year, USAID/OFDA responds to international disasters by providing emergency and early recovery assistance across 11 sectors (see Figure A-Q-1): agriculture and food security; economic recovery and market systems; health; humanitarian coordination and information management; humanitarian studies, analysis, or applications; logistics and relief commodities; nutrition; protection, risk reduction; shelter and settlements; and water, sanitation, and hygiene. These sectors
closely mirror the UN cluster system. However, these sectors operate whether or not UN clusters are providing assistance to the HN ministries.

e. **Operational Principles.** USAID applies a set of operational principles designed to help development practitioners focus on achieving and measuring results. These principles are fully consistent with those articulated in PPD-6, *Global Development*; the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*; and the USG’s *Strategy for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals*. These principles are promote gender equality and female empowerment; apply science, technology, and innovation strategically; apply selectivity and focus; measure and evaluate impact; build in sustainability from the start; apply integrated approaches to development; and leverage “solution holders” and partner strategically.

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**Figure A-Q-1. United States Agency for International Development Humanitarian Sectors**

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<th>Sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Food Security</td>
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<td>Economic Recovery and Market Systems</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Studies, Analysis, or Applications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics and Relief Commodities</td>
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<td>Nutrition</td>
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<td>Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural and Technological Risks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shelter and Settlements</td>
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<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
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</table>

2. Interaction, Coordination and the Joint Force Commander

USAID has established relationships with USG departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and private voluntary organizations. In carrying out its responsibilities, USAID draws on these organizations, as required, to coordinate the USG’s response to foreign disasters. Similarly, these organizations look to USAID for advice and assistance, as appropriate, in handling their assigned responsibilities. Involvement of military forces in civil activity abroad is matched by an increase in situations in which civil agencies face emerging military threats. As such, the JFC facilitates the coordination of all US military forces’ support to USAID. In addition, a JTF may encounter scores of NGOs and international organizations in a JOA. Hundreds of such agencies are registered with USAID.

For more information on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

a. Routine


(a) Housed within DCHA, CMC works to align defense and development policies, plans, and programs to achieve US foreign policy goals and development goals, leveraging the unique capabilities of DOD and USAID. CMC accomplishes this goal by addressing areas of common interests between defense and development through personnel exchange and communication and information exchange at various levels.

(b) CMC manages and facilitates USAID’s day-to-day interface with DOD; interprets and implements USG civilian-military policies; and coordinates joint planning, training, conferences, exercises, and communications.

(c) A key feature of CMC’s staffing is the exchange of senior military and development personnel:

1. USAID’s SDAs and deputy development advisors (DDAs) at USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USSOCOM, USOUTHCOM, and JS ensure collaboration with USAID’s bureaus and offices.

2. Complementing SDAs and DDAs are CCMD LNOs assigned to CMC who ensure access at each level of their commands. In addition, USAID hosts LNOs from the USN, USMC, and US Army Corps of Engineers.

(d) Headed by a Director and Deputy Director, CMC has a Planning and Policy Division and an Operations, Learning, and Outreach Division supported by an administrative support staff.

(2) In countries with a US embassy, formal and routine coordination between USAID and DOD occurs at country team meetings or sub-groups created by the country team. Other coordination mechanisms include:

(a) Some embassies have established formal civilian-military cooperation committees to improve coordination between USAID and DOD. In the event that such a committee does not exist, the optimal place for DOD at a country level to begin coordination with USAID is through USAID’s program office, usually headed by a program officer.

(b) Many times, embassies with a large DOD presence assign LNOs to USAID offices, thereby improving coordination between the two.

(c) Many embassies have found it useful to formalize USAID-DOD cooperation through a MOU.

b. Contingencies

(1) OFDA coordinates and ensures that the needs of disaster victims are met by providing all forms of relief and rehabilitation. OFDA provides technical support to the Administrator, who serves as the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance policy in coordination with other USG departments and agencies. OFDA works with national and international foreign affairs agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector in disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation. OFDA funds and procures relief supplies and administrative support for short- and long-term disaster situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance to foreign disaster victims. OFDA forms DARTs to provide a variety of trained specialists to assist US embassies and USAID missions in managing the USG response to foreign disasters. For disaster-related emergencies, US embassies have an emergency action committee. DOD is on the emergency action committee, as well as the embassy’s mission DR officer, usually a USAID employee.

(2) Office of Transition Initiatives (http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-1) supports local partners in advancing peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. At the request of and in coordination with Congress, DOS, and the appropriate in-country US ambassadors and USAID field missions, they provide on-the-ground, fast, flexible, catalytic short-term assistance that promotes movement toward political and social stability and democracy. Office of Transition Initiatives programs normally continue until reasonable stability is established and an effective hand-off is completed to longer-term institutional development efforts. Coordination with DOD may occur via the
USAID representative in the country team, but can also take place via the Office of Transition Initiatives field officers.

(3) Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation works with USAID missions and partners to address the causes and consequences of violence through strategic and focused development programs in areas such as health, education, economic growth, natural resource management, and democracy and governance. They lead USAID’s efforts to identify and analyze sources of conflict and fragility; support early responses to address the causes and consequences of instability and violent conflict; and seek to integrate conflict mitigation and management into USAID’s analysis, strategies, and programs (http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office).

(4) Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/center) advances democracy, human rights, and governance in support of political freedom overseas. The center also leads USAID efforts to implement USG policies on security sector assistance.

For more information on these and other DCHA organizational units, refer to USAID’s Automated Directives System, chapter 101, Agency Programs and Function (http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/agency-policy/series-100).

(5) Ad hoc arrangements (e.g., various CMOCs or PRTs [for Afghanistan and Iraq]) have seen USAID and DOD officers and contracted subject matter experts share physical space and attend most of the same meetings (e.g., agriculture working group).
ANNEX R TO APPENDIX A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. Overview

a. The CIA (https://www.cia.gov) is an independent agency that provides intelligence relevant to national security and strategic policy interests of the US to senior US policymakers. The CIA’s primary mission is to collect, analyze, and produce timely analysis of foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior USG policymakers in making decisions in support of national interests and goals. The CIA does not make policy; it is an independent source of intelligence information for those who do. The CIA may also conduct covert action at the direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve US policy objectives.

b. As a separate agency, CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern, and also works closely with other IC organizations and Allied organizations to ensure that the intelligence consumer—whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander—receives the best intelligence possible.

c. The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 restructured the IC by abolishing the positions of Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and creating the positions of Director and Deputy Director of the CIA. The act also created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which oversees the IC.

d. **Director, Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA).** The D/CIA serves as the head of the CIA and reports to the DNI. The D/CIA is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The D/CIA manages the operations, personnel, and budget of the CIA and acts as the National Human Source Intelligence Manager.

e. **CIA Responsibilities.** The CIA, under the direction of the President or the NSC:

   1. Collects intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that it shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.

   2. Correlates and evaluates intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence.

   3. Provides overall direction for, and coordination of, the collection of foreign intelligence, through human sources, by elements of the IC authorized to undertake such collection and, in coordination with other USG departments and agencies authorized to undertake such collection, ensuring the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the US and those involved in such collection.

   4. Performs such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the DNI may direct.
f. The CIA is separated into four basic components: the National Clandestine Service, the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Directorate of Support. They carry out the process of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence to top USG officials.

2. Collaboration and the Joint Force Commander

a. The CIA is involved with other USG departments and agencies on a regular basis. The National Intelligence Council, managed by a Chairman and Vice Chairman for Evaluations and a Vice Chairman for Estimates, is comprised of national intelligence officers—senior experts drawn from all elements of the IC and from outside the USG. The national intelligence officers concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas, such as economics and weapons proliferation. They produce national intelligence estimates.

For more information, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

b. The CIA’s reconnaissance and intelligence assessment capabilities are essential ingredients to interagency strategic and operational planning. They provide real-time response in the quest for essential information to form the basis for interagency action.

c. The Associate Director for Military Affairs coordinates, plans, executes, and sustains worldwide activities that support CIA and DOD interaction based on priorities established by the D/CIA to achieve national security objectives. It serves as the bridge for the CIA’s intelligence and operational capabilities to support deployed US forces. The Associate Director for Military Affairs is composed of CIA personnel from all directorates and of military detailees from all the uniformed Services. It is the only CIA component with the exclusive mission of supporting military plans and operations and has the mandate to coordinate CIA support, to include IC capabilities as applicable and military customers. The Command and Coordination Group provides support to CCMDs and other major command HQ.
ANNEX S TO APPENDIX A
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

1. Core Mission

   a. EPA’s mission is to protect human health and the environment. EPA leads the nation’s environmental science, research, education, and assessment efforts. EPA works closely with other USG departments and agencies, state and local governments, and Indian tribes to develop and enforce regulations under existing environmental laws. EPA researches and sets national standards for a variety of environmental programs and delegates to states and tribes responsibility for issuing permits and monitoring and enforcing compliance. Where national standards are not met, EPA can issue sanctions and take other steps to assist the states and tribes in reaching the desired levels of environmental quality.

   b. EPA has 13 main offices at its HQ in Washington, DC; 10 regional offices across the country, each of which is responsible for several states and in some cases, territories or special environmental programs; and labs and research centers around the nation (http://www.epa.gov).

   c. EPA, along with the USCG, also has significant responsibilities under the NRF for ESF #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response, and under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Title 40, CFR, Part 300. EPA, depending upon the location of the incident, is generally the lead for directing the USG’s response to assessing and cleaning up CBRN material, industrial material, and numerous other source contaminate responses.

2. Interactions

   a. Routine

      (1) Domestic installations contact their respective federal facilities program managers in EPA’s regional offices for installation-specific interactions regarding environmental programs/statutes implemented by EPA.

      (2) EPA’s Office of Homeland Security provides EPA-wide leadership and coordination for HS policy, including EPA’s planning, prevention, preparedness, and response for HS-related incidents. This coordinates with numerous members of the USG, including DOD in developing numerous policies related to HS.

      (3) EPA’s Office of Research and Development (ORD) is the scientific research arm of EPA, whose leading-edge, applied research helps provide the solid underpinning of science and technology for EPA. ORD carries out research on air pollution, climate change, watersheds and water infrastructure, site cleanup, sustainability, risk assessment, and HS. ORD has a number of collaborative research projects with DOD in HS (e.g., DTRA, US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center) and in partnership with the Army’s Net Zero program (Ft. Riley).
(4) EPA’s Office of Land and Emergency Management (OLEM) provides policy, guidance, and direction for the EPA’s emergency response and waste programs. It develops regulatory standards for clean-up of contamination, to include underground storage tanks, and the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. OLEM implements EPA’s planning, prevention, preparedness, and response activities and provides technical assistance to all levels of government through its Office of Emergency Management.

(5) EPA’s Office of Emergency Management has an LNO to coordinate with USNORTHCOM. EPA’s Region 8 Office in Denver, Colorado, has an alternate LNO.

b. Emergency

(1) During significant disaster and routine responses, EPA often activates the regional response team, an interagency support team, to support the federal on-scene coordinator. The National Response Team may also be activated. Information on the teams can be found in Title 40, CFR, Part 300 and at http://www.nrt.org. Navy’s Supervisor of Salvage is the DOD’s representative to the National Response Team. The federal on-scene coordinator utilizes the ICS to manage the response. Often, the federal on-scene coordinator establishes a unified command structure under ICS to bring in other parties with a significant interest in the response.

(2) Other USG departments and agencies may be in the command post in planning positions, as liaisons, or in other capacities. In addition, the federal on-scene coordinator may establish a command post where tactical planning takes place. The command post is most often located much closer to the incident than the JFO.
1. Core Mission

   a. The General Services Administration (GSA) (http://www.gsa.gov) leverages the buying power of the USG to acquire the best value for taxpayers and federal customers. GSA exercises responsible asset management; delivers superior workplaces, quality acquisition services, and expert business solutions; and develops innovative and effective management policies. GSA oversees the business of the USG. GSA’s acquisition solutions supply federal purchasers with cost-effective, high-quality products and services from commercial vendors. GSA provides workplaces for federal employees and oversees the preservation of historic federal properties. Its policies covering travel, property, and management practices promote efficient government operations. GSA helps keep the nation safe by providing resources, equipment and non-tactical vehicles to the US military, domestically and overseas. GSA also serves as a source of supply to state and local governments for law enforcement equipment, and disaster recovery products and services. GSA provides direct access to a wide range of government services, as well as consumer protection information, through the official web portal of the USG (http://www.usa.gov).

   b. GSA is organized into services and staff offices that support the programs defined in the Federal Program Inventory (http://www.performance.gov/sites/default/files/files/Federal_Program_Inventory_Fact_Sheet_.pdf).

(1) **Federal Acquisition Service.** The Federal Acquisition Service provides USG departments and agencies over 25 million different products and services, and annually delivers over $54 billion in information technology solutions and telecommunications services, assisted acquisition services, travel and transportation management solutions, motor vehicles and fleet services, and charge cards. The Federal Acquisition Service manages over 205,000 leased vehicles, more than 3.5 million charge cards, and provides personal property disposal services facilitating the reuse of $1 billion in excess/surplus property annually. It leverages the buying power of the USG by negotiating prices on many products and services required by federal agencies for daily operations. By arranging a network of service providers, the Federal Acquisition Service is able to meet the operating and mission requirements of a vast array of USG departments and agencies, and state, local, and tribal governments. Federal Acquisition Service business operations are organized into four portfolios based on the product or service provided to the customer: Integrated Technology Services; Assisted Acquisition Services; General Supplies and Services; and Travel, Motor Vehicles, and Card Services.

(2) **Public Buildings Service.** Public Buildings Service activities fall into two broad areas: workspace acquisition and property management. It acquires space on behalf of the USG through new construction and leasing, and acts as a caretaker for federal properties across the country. The Public Buildings Service is the largest public real estate organization in the US. It provides high-quality facility and workspace solutions to more than 60 federal agencies, disposes of excess or unneeded federal
properties, and promotes the adoption of innovative workplace solutions and technologies. Through lease and purchase transactions, the Public Buildings Service delivers the workspace necessary to meet the respective missions of its customers. It works with its USG customers to design the workplace of the 21st century, seeking to reduce overall workspace needs and associated costs. These services are also coordinated to obtain the best available pricing.

(3) **Office of Citizen Services and Innovative Technologies.** The Office of Citizen Services and Innovative Technologies makes USG information and services more readily available to the public, and makes it easier for the public to conduct transactions with the USG. It identifies tests and deploys innovative technologies for the government to provide shared, transparent, and cost effective means to disseminate information and conduct business. The Office of Citizen Services and Innovative Technologies provides access to a wide range of government services as well as consumer protection information through the official web portal of the USG (http://www.usa.gov). They work closely with other government agencies—federal, state, local, and international—to collect and consolidate information and make it available to the public, sharing experiences that lead to better solutions.

(4) **Office of Government-Wide Policy.** The Office of Government-Wide Policy uses information and ideas to drive efficiency and savings in USG departments and agencies across key administrative areas (e.g., travel and transportation, acquisition, information technology, and green buildings). They help drive agency behavior in these administrative areas through the development of government-wide performance standards, analysis and benchmarking of data, and regular reporting to the USG departments and agencies and key stakeholders.

(5) **Staff Offices.** GSA staff offices ensure GSA is prepared to meet the needs of customers on a day-to-day basis and in crisis situations. GSA has two independent staff offices (the Office of the Inspector General and the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals), as well as the Office of the Chief Administrative Services Officer, Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Office of Human Resources Management, Office of General Counsel, Office of Mission Assurance, Office of Communications and Marketing, Office of Civil Rights, and Office of Small Business Utilization.

2. Interaction

GSA’s key relevant capabilities and core competencies include:

a. **Sources of Supply.** DOD is authorized to use GSA sources of supply, including products and services available through the Federal Acquisition Service, such as GSA’s Global Supply. Also, as provided at Title 41, CFR, Part 101-26.000, military commissaries and non-appropriated fund activities may use GSA sources of supply and services for their own use.
For more information, refer to the Eligibility to Use GSA Sources of Supply and Services GSA order (http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104212).

b. **Emergency Management and Response.** The Office of Mission Assurance is responsible for ensuring GSA maintains a constant state of readiness to perform essential functions in response to natural or man-made disasters or catastrophic emergencies in support of national continuity responsibilities, and to quickly resume normal operations. The Office of Mission Assurance coordinates GSA participation in international, state, and local disaster exercise programs. Office of Mission Assurance responsibilities include:


2. Serving as co-primary agency lead for NRF ESF #7, Resources Support, and support agency to nine other ESFs. This responsibility also includes working with interagency partners on planning, training, and exercise and response activities; having staff assigned in each of the 10 FEMA regions to facilitate acquisitions, transportation, and emergency leasing support; and facilitating the Basic Interagency Logistics Course (EMI S0674) four times per year with FEMA Logistics.

3. Serving as co-lead agency for the Public and Private Services and Resources core capability under PPD-8, *National Preparedness*.

4. Serving as co-lead, with the FPS, for Government Facilities Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The Office of Mission Assurance coordinates with FPS to ensure safety and security of GSA-owned and leased buildings and building occupants.

5. Serving as a member of National Response Team under the National Contingency Plan.

6. Providing situation awareness to GSA staff and leadership through the GSA Emergency Operations Center.

c. To ensure the safety of GSA customers, the security of the GSA portfolio and the business of supplying acquisitions domestically, GSA participates in government-wide disaster preparedness and assistance through the NRF. In emergencies, as in everyday operations, GSA provides support to other USG departments and agencies to complete their missions. GSA goes to the site of the disaster and finds suitable space for FEMA to set up operations by furnishing space, telecommunications, services and supplies, and acquisition assistance.

d. Inside and outside the US, the GSA Global Supply program offers and ships a broad array of items (e.g., office products, housewares, tools, and industrial supplies) to destinations worldwide. GSA Global Supply guarantees compliance with government acquisition policies, simple billing, and global delivery from a reliable government
source. GSA also provides full accountability from order placement through delivery and billing.

e. GSA provides immediate information and assistance to federal employees, vendors, and the public (www.gsa.gov). Emergency response information such as status on closed government facilities, emergency acquisition processes, GSA vendor relief efforts, emergency information for government personnel, damaged GSA fleet vehicles, government charge card authorities, per diem rates, GSA hot lines, and more can be found in various GSA issuances (http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/105086?utm_source=OCM&utm_medium=print-radio&utm_term=emergency&utm_campaign=shortcuts).

f. GSA has customer service directors located throughout the US, in Europe, and around the Pacific Rim to provide an accessible acquisition expert for its customers. In addition, GSA Global Supply (http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104618) has LNOs in Afghanistan and Kuwait to assist the Defense Logistics Agency and other DOD partners, and coordinate logistics support for troops overseas. For all urgent questions, needs, or requirements during joint operations, contact GSA Emergency Operations Center at (202) 219-0338.
ANNEX U TO APPENDIX A
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Core Mission

   a. The mission of the ODNI (http://www.odni.gov/index.php/) is to lead intelligence integration and forge an IC that delivers the most insightful intelligence possible. It integrates foreign, military, and domestic intelligence capabilities through policy, personnel, and technology actions to provide decision advantage to policymakers, warfighters, HS officials, and law enforcement personnel.

   b. As the head of the IC, DNI oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program the NSC, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) for intelligence matters related to national security. ODNI’s goal is to effectively integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense of the homeland and of US interests abroad. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence serves as the principal advisor to the DNI regarding defense intelligence matters and is dual-hatted as the Director for Defense Intelligence within the ODNI.

   c. Congress provided the DNI with a number of authorities and duties, as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004. These charge the DNI to:

      (1) Ensure timely and objective national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies, CJCS and senior military commanders, and Congress.

      (2) Establish objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence.

      (3) Ensure maximum availability of, and access to, intelligence information within the IC.

      (4) Develop and ensure the execution of an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program based on budget proposals provided by IC component organizations.

      (5) Oversee coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of foreign governments and international organizations.

      (6) Ensure the most accurate analysis of intelligence is derived from all sources to support national security needs.

      (7) Develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operations and to facilitate staffing of community management functions.

      (8) Oversee the development and implementation of a program management plan for acquisition of major systems, doing so jointly with SecDef for DOD programs, that includes cost, schedule, and performance goals and program milestone criteria.
d. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the DNI reports directly to the President. The DNI, through the efforts of the Principal Deputy Director, the Director of the Intelligence Staff, and four deputy directors (i.e., Analysis; Collection; Policy, Plans, and Requirements; and Acquisitions and Technology), and assisted by several country-specific, mission-management teams and a number of support activities and centers, coordinates the activities of the 16 US intelligence agencies to achieve critical national objectives.

2. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. The National Intelligence Emergency Management Activity’s mission is to plan and manage the ODNI’s Emergency Management and Continuity programs and build an enduring, collaborative, strategic system to ensure the ODNI can perform its primary mission essential functions and the DNI can reduce the loss of ODNI lives and resources and maintain situational awareness of ODNI and IC personnel, resources, and capabilities.

b. The National Intelligence Council is the IC’s center for mid-term (e.g., 3-5 years) and long-term (e.g., 6-20 years) strategic analysis. Its primary functions are to:

(1) Support the DNI in the role as head of the IC.

(2) Provide a focal point for policymakers to task the IC to answer their questions.

(3) Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the IC’s perspective.

(4) Contribute to the IC’s effort to allocate its resources in response to policymakers’ changing needs.

(5) Lead the IC’s effort to produce national intelligence estimates and other National Intelligence Council products.

c. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive is staffed by senior counterintelligence (CI) and other specialists from across the national intelligence and security communities. The office develops, coordinates, and produces:

(1) Annual foreign intelligence threat assessments and other analytic CI products.

(2) Annual national CI strategy for the USG.

(3) Priorities for CI collection, investigations, and operations.

(4) CI program budgets and evaluations that reflect strategic priorities.

(5) In-depth espionage damage assessments.
(6) CI awareness, outreach, and training standards policies.

d. The NCTC (http://www.nctc.gov/) leads our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.

For more information, refer to Appendix E, “Joint Interagency Task Force.”

e. The ISE is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information. It is a trusted partnership among all levels of government in the US, the private sector, and our foreign partners, to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the US by the effective and efficient sharing of terrorism and HS information. The ISE aligns and leverages existing information sharing policies, business processes, technologies, and systems and promotes a culture of information sharing through increased collaboration.

f. Special Security Center (SSC). The SSC assists the DNI in the dual role as head of the IC and as the Security Executive Agent for USG security clearance programs (pursuant to Executive Order 13467). The SSC assists in the execution of DNI’s responsibility to share and protect national intelligence information throughout the IC, the USG, US contractors, state and local officials, and our foreign partners.

(1) The SSC’s objectives include:

(a) Fostering IC security uniformity and reciprocity.
(b) Performing policy review, coordination, and formulation.
(c) Promoting uniform application of security policy.
(d) Assessing, advising, and reporting to the DNI on the implementation of security policies.
(e) Enabling IC-wide exchange of critical security data.
(f) Providing services of common concern in the areas of security research, training, and database management.

(2) The SSC also executes DNI’s responsibilities as Security Executive Agent for USG security clearance programs to drive efforts to achieve government-wide improvements to clearance process timeliness and effectiveness, reciprocal recognition of security clearances and access approvals, and to modernize security business practices in the USG. The SSC hosts a joint program management activity (joint team) to develop and implement reforms across the executive branch, to include the IC. Joint team reform efforts are responsive to the direction of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council.
g. The National Counterproliferation Center was founded to help counter the threats caused by proliferation of CBRN weapons. It works with the IC to identify critical holes in our WMD knowledge—resulting from shortfalls in collection, analysis, or exploitation—and then develop solutions to reduce or close these gaps. In conjunction with the policy community, the National Counterproliferation Center helps to identify long-term proliferation threats and requirements and develops strategies to ensure that the IC is positioned to address these threats.

h. The Office of Partner Engagement drafts and coordinates national intelligence sharing guidance IAW NSC and DNI policy direction, IC mission needs, and other USG requirements. Partner Engagement serves as the DNI’s focal point for intelligence sharing matters, overseeing and ensuring the integration of IC intelligence sharing efforts. Partner Engagement also manages and oversees the DNI Representative program in key nodes throughout the IC. DNI has representatives at CCMDs to integrate IC efforts, thereby ensuring the CCDR and staff are able to leverage the full capabilities of the US IC in support of the command’s mission.

3. Interaction

The IC is subject to external oversight from the executive and legislative branches. Within the executive branch, the IC works closely with the NSC. The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board is also involved in oversight. The board is an entity within the Executive Office of the President formed “to assess the quality, quantity, and adequacy” of intelligence collection, analysis, CI, and other activities of the IC. It reports directly to the President, and provides recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the performance of intelligence efforts. It also examines issues raised by the President or the DNI and can make recommendations directly to the DNI.
ANNEX V TO APPENDIX A
PEACE CORPS

1. Overview

a. The Peace Corps’ (http://www.peacecorps.gov) mission promotes world peace and friendship by fulfilling three goals: to help the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, to help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served, and to help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.

b. The Peace Corps is an independent federal agency committed to meeting the basic needs of those living in the countries where it operates. President John F. Kennedy created the Peace Corps by executive order in 1961. The Peace Corps is headquartered in Washington, DC. Approximately 7,000 Peace Corps volunteers and trainees serve in over 65 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Europe.

2. Collaboration and the Joint Force Commander

a. The POC for Peace Corps in each country is the Peace Corps country director. The country director oversees Peace Corps volunteers, staff, and operations at each post. Peace Corps volunteers, by nature of their commitment and responsibilities, traditionally work as members of a team. Through collaborative agreements with USG departments and agencies, ongoing cooperation and coordination with NGOs, and with self-help grants to indigenous groups, the Peace Corps strengthens and increases its impact.

b. Although working in a broad sense to further USG foreign policy and development goals, the Peace Corps is an independent federal agency. As such, although its projects are coordinated with the relevant HN organizations and the appropriate elements of the embassy, it works independently with little day-to-day contact with the US mission or other USG organizations. In many countries, the Peace Corps coordinates its efforts with local NGOs.

c. To fulfill its responsibilities successfully and to retain its unique people-to-people character, the Peace Corps must remain substantially separate from the day-to-day conduct and concerns of foreign policy. The Peace Corps’ role and its need for separation from the day-to-day activities of the US mission are not comparable to those of other USG departments and agencies. Peace Corps activities must be completely and absolutely separated from intelligence activities. There should be no contact whatsoever between anyone in the IC and any Peace Corps volunteer or trainee. Peace Corps staff should not be included in meetings where defense or intelligence issues (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation) are discussed, unless volunteer safety is at issue.
APPENDIX B
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This appendix includes the descriptions of key international organizations.

Annex  A  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
        B  United Nations  
        C  European Union  
        D  Organization of American States  
        E  United States Institute of Peace
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

1. Background and Objectives

   a. NATO (http://www.nato.int) is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.

      (1) Political. NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.

      (2) Military. NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, Allies have the military capacity needed to undertake collective defense and crisis-management operations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding treaty, or under a UN mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

   b. NATO Core Tasks and Principles

      (1) NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

      (2) NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

      (3) The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. All members will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose, and fair burden sharing.

      (4) The modern world contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue effectively fulfilling three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members and always IAW international law:

      (a) Collective Defense. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, IAW Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression and against
emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

(b) **Crisis Management.** NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises, before, during, and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

(c) **Cooperative Security.** The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance engages actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by actively contributing to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

(5) NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

(6) In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies engage in a continuous process of reform, modernization and transformation.

c. To fulfill these tasks, member nations:

(1) Provide continuous consultation and cooperation in political, economic, and other nonmilitary fields.

(2) Formulate joint plans for the common defense.

(3) Establish the infrastructure needed to enable military forces to operate.

(4) Arrange joint training programs and exercises.

(5) Coordinate communications needed to facilitate political consultation, C2 of military forces, and their logistic support.

(6) Participate in the NATO Defense Planning Process, which provides a framework for harmonizing national and Alliance defense planning and facilitates the timely identification, development, and delivery of the required forces and capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s full range of missions.
2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organizational Structure

a. NATO HQ. NATO’s HQ in Brussels, Belgium, is the home of the NAC. It houses permanent representatives (PERMREPs) and national delegations, the Secretary General and the International Staff, national military representatives, the Chairman of the Military Committee (MC) and the International Military Staff, and a number of NATO agencies. NATO’s civil and military organizational structure is shown in Figure B-A-1.

For an explanation of NATO command relationships, refer to AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, and AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

b. NAC. The principal political decision-making body in NATO is the NAC, which consists of PERMREPs of the 28 member countries who meet together at least once a week. The NAC also meets at higher levels involving defense ministers, foreign ministers or heads of state and government. It has the same authority and powers of decision making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The Chairman of the NAC, at the heads of state and government, the ministerial
and the PERMREP levels, is the Secretary General. The NAC has an important public profile. It issues declarations and communiques explaining its policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of countries that are not members of the Alliance.

c. **PERMREPs.** Each member nation is represented on the NAC by an ambassador or PERMREP with ambassadorial rank. Each PERMREP is supported by a national delegation composed of advisors and officials who represent their country on different NATO committees. Delegations are similar, in many respects, to small embassies. Their colocation within the same HQ building enables them to maintain formal and informal contacts with each other, as well as with NATO’s international staff.

d. **Nuclear Planning Group.** The Nuclear Planning Group meets at the same level and with the same status as the NAC. It is the principal forum for consultation on all matters relating to the role of nuclear forces in NATO’s security policy. The Nuclear Planning Group follows a similar pattern of meeting at the ambassadorial level and at the level of ministers of defense and has the same functions and authority for decisions on nuclear matters as the NAC has in its own sphere. All member countries, except France, participate. Iceland participates only as an observer.

e. **Secretary General**

   (1) The Secretary General is a senior international statesman nominated by the member nations both as Chairman of the NAC, the Nuclear Planning Group, and of other senior committees and as Secretary General of NATO. The Secretary General also acts as the principal spokesman for NATO, both in its external relations and in communications and contacts between member governments. As such, the Secretary General is responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation and decision making throughout the Alliance.

   (2) The Secretary General has direct control of a Private Office and the Office of the Secretary General. The Private Office supports the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General in all aspects of their work. Its staff includes policy and legal advisors.

f. **International Staff.** The work of the NAC and its many committees and working groups is supported by an international staff. This staff comprises the Private Office of the Secretary General, seven operational divisions, the NATO Office of Resources, the NATO Office of Security, and the Office of the Financial Control. Each division is headed by an Assistant Secretary General, who is normally the chairman of the main committee dealing with subjects in the field of responsibility.

g. **National Military Representatives.** The members of MC are senior military officers from each nation permanently assigned as military representatives, each supported by a national staff varying in size. The military representatives constitute the MC in permanent session.

h. **MC**
(1) The MC is the highest military authority in the Alliance and is responsible to the NAC and the Nuclear Planning Group for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance. It provides for the maximum consultation and cooperation between member nations on military matters relating to the treaty and is the primary source of military advice to the Secretary General, the NAC, and the Nuclear Planning Group.

(2) Similar to the NAC, the MC periodically meets at the level of the Chief of Staff, CJCS, or Chief of Defense Staff of each member country. Iceland has no military forces, but may be represented by a civilian. The Chiefs of Staff meet at least three times a year.

(3) The Chairman of the MC chairs both the Chiefs of Staff and permanent sessions and is elected by the Chiefs of Staff, normally for a three-year term. The Chairman is the spokesperson and representative of the Committee, directs its day-to-day activities, and represents the MC at meetings of the NAC and the Nuclear Planning Group, providing advice on military matters. The Chairman is assisted by the Deputy Chairman and by the Director of the International Military Staff.

i. International Military Staff

(1) The MC is supported by an integrated international military staff made up of military personnel seconded from national military establishments and supporting civilian personnel. Members of the international military staff have a similar status within NATO as the international staff, but come under the administrative authority of the Director of the International Military Staff or the head of the independent NATO agency within which they are employed. The national military status of personnel transferred from national armed forces is not affected by their temporary assignment to NATO.

(2) The international military staff is headed by a director of three-star rank who is nominated by the member nations and is selected by the MC.

(3) As the executive agent of the MC, the international military staff is tasked with ensuring the policies and decisions of the MC are implemented as directed. In addition, the international military staff prepares plans, initiates studies, and recommends policy on matters of a military nature referred to NATO or to the MC by national or NATO authorities, commanders, or agencies.


a. Strategic Level

(1) Allied Command Operations, with its HQ, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, near Mons, Belgium, is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and is responsible for all Alliance operations. The operational level consists of two standing joint force commands—one in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in Naples, Italy—which can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-based combined JTF HQ. Additionally, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe is dual-
hatted as Commander, USEUCOM. The organizational structure of Allied Command Operations is depicted in Figure B-A-2.

(2) Allied Command Transformation, commanded by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, is responsible for promoting and overseeing the continuing transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities. From its HQ in Norfolk, Virginia, Allied Command Transformation oversees the transformation of NATO’s military
capabilities. In doing so, it enhances training, improves capabilities, tests and develops doctrine, and conducts experiments to assess new concepts. It also facilitates the dissemination and introduction of new concepts and promotes interoperability. Allied Command Transformation includes the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway, the Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Lisbon, Portugal. In addition, Allied Command Transformation coordinates with Alliance schools, NATO agencies, and a number of nationally or multinationally sponsored centers of excellence focused on transformation in specific military fields. The organizational structure of Allied Command Transformation is depicted in Figure B-A-2.

b. **Component/Tactical Level**

   (1) The component or tactical level consists of three component commands that provide Service-specific expertise to the operational level: a Land Command in Izmir, Turkey, that can provide a deployable core C2 capability for a major joint operation; a Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom, that can command a maritime-heavy smaller joint operation from its static location; and an Air Command in Ramstein, Germany, that can command an air-heavy smaller joint operation from its static location.

   (2) In addition to the three component commands, there are two static combined air operations centers—in Uedem, Germany, and Torrejon, Spain—and a deployable air C2 center—in Poggio Renatico, Italy.

4. **Combined Joint Task Force Concept**

   a. Should a crisis occur, the NAC might consider the formation of a combined JTF composed of forces drawn from member states. A combined JTF is a multinational JTF, task-organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance’s military missions, which the commander, combined JTF, commands from a multinational and joint HQ. The JTF may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations.

   b. The purpose of creating a combined JTF is to provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable combined JTFs with dedicated C2 capability; facilitate operations in concert with partners and other non-NATO nations in situations not related to collective defense; and enable the Alliance, based on the tenet of “separable but not separate capabilities,” to support the development of European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance for operations under the political control and strategic direction of the EU, or as otherwise agreed.

   *For more information on NATO’s combined JTF concept, refer to AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine.*

5. **Non-Article 5 Operations**

   a. NATO activities falling outside the scope of Article 5 are referred to collectively as non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs). One principal difference between Article 5 operations and NA5CROs is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in a NA5CRO. NATO nations are formally committed to take
the actions they deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area during an Article 5 operation.

b. NA5CROs range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies in support of peace to Alliance combat operations. In the framework of a NATO-led operation, Alliance forces could conduct extraction operations, in addition to tasks in support of DR and humanitarian operations, SAR, or noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations that involve the use of military force, or the threat of force, range from freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement, sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, and counter irregular threat operations. MC 327/2, *NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, establishes guidance for conducting NA5CROs within the Alliance.


a. The NATO Response Force is a joint, trained, and certified force package held at high readiness and tailored for an assigned mission. The NATO Response Force is capable of performing certain missions on its own, participating in an operation as part of a larger force, or serving as an initial-entry force that prepares the JOA for follow-on forces. However, since the NATO Response Force is limited in size, composition, and capabilities, it is not always the solution to emerging crises.

b. To be responsive to rapidly developing crises, the NATO Response Force relies on NATO and national procedures for the political decision-making process and for the preparations for employment. The NATO Response Force, when alerted by the NAC, can start deploying on five-days’ notice and operate as a stand-alone force for up to 30 days using embedded logistic capabilities, or longer if resupplied.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX B
UNITED NATIONS

1. Introduction

a. The UN is an international organization founded in 1945 and comprised of nearly all of the world’s nation-states. The main organizations of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the UN Secretariat. All were established when the UN was founded. Member states are bound together by the principles of the UN Charter, an international treaty that spells out their rights and duties. The purposes of the UN, as set forth by the UN Charter, include:

(1) To maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

(2) To cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(3) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends.

b. The UN has a complex structure with numerous organizations that reflect different communities and perspectives including political, security, humanitarian, human rights, and development. The UN system, also known unofficially as the “UN family,” is made up of the UN itself and many affiliated programs, funds, and specialized agencies, all with their own membership, leadership, and budget. The programs and funds are financed through voluntary rather than assessed contributions. The specialized agencies are independent international organizations funded by both voluntary and assessed contributions. The UN is not a world government, and it does not make laws. It does, however, provide the means to help resolve international conflicts and formulate policies on matters affecting member states. All member states are involved in the following dimensions of the UN.

(1) The UN serves as an interstate forum where states come together to debate issues and call for action. As a founder and permanent member of the Security Council, the US seeks to shape comprehensive international action through UN efforts.

(2) The UN is an international civil service which runs the Secretariat’s departments and offices for the benefit of the international community. The US and other nations must consider how best to work with and through the UN system and its organizational culture.

(3) The UN is a collection of agencies which perform various humanitarian and development tasks. In conflict zones, UN agencies play a major role in addressing
human suffering and disaster response, and the US must often work alongside or with these organizations.

2. Relevance of the United Nations to United States Strategy and Joint Operations

   a. The US pursues many of its strategic objectives through the UN. The UN’s Security Council is the only internationally recognized entity that can legitimize military action throughout the world. Along with the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, the US is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and, as such, holds veto power over UN Security Council resolutions, except those that are procedural in nature. As a key member of the Security Council and the largest monetary contributor to the UN, the US is frequently instrumental in shaping and implementing many UN efforts. The US Mission to the UN is the primary USG organization that coordinates with the UN and the point of entry for all other USG departments and agencies.

   b. US Contributions to the UN. The US participates in and influences UN peace efforts and other operations in numerous ways.

      (1) Budget. The US is by far the largest financial contributor to the UN, providing 22 percent of the overall operating budget. It also provides approximately 28 percent of the UN’s assessed peacekeeping budget.

      (2) Military Observers and Staff Officers. Along with other nations, the US provides individual officers as staff officers to selected UN missions or as “UN military experts on mission,” which include military observers, LNOs, or staff officers. These individuals significantly enhance the effectiveness of UN missions and are assigned to the US Military Observer Group-Washington during their period of duty with the UN. Additionally, the US provides military and civilian personnel who serve in UN HQ in New York.

      (3) Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI is a USG-funded security assistance program intended to build the capacity of partner countries to effectively participate in UN and regional peace support operations. Through training and capacity building projects, GPOI’s role is to wean the partner off GPOI support and eventually train and deploy peacekeepers on its own. GPOI is managed by DOS and implemented by OSD, the geographic CCMDs, and through contractual arrangements. A large portion of GPOI funding is allocated to the DOS’s African Contingency Training and Assistance program. This is implemented by DOS contractors.

      (4) US Support to UN Missions and UN Humanitarian Response. In addition to monetary support, the US may provide logistical support or technical expertise to UN missions and humanitarian responses. Joint forces may be directed to participate in these efforts.

      (5) Troop Contingent Contributions. The US has in the past provided military units to UN missions and may do so again in the future. As during any multinational operation in which US forces are placed under the OPCON or TACON of a non-US commander, the President will retain command of any contributed US forces.
(6) **Other US Contributions to PO.** Additionally, the US has supported or participated in PO outside of the UN, such as the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai. Such missions may be authorized by the UN, even if it does not control the operation, as with the AU mission in Somalia today.

c. **Relevance of the UN to JFCs**

1. The UN and its activities are often significant for JFCs. UN Security Council resolutions provide legitimacy for military operations and other efforts, and many potential multinational partners view a UN Security Council resolution as a prerequisite before contributing.

2. UN peacekeeping and political missions, as well as its humanitarian, human rights, and development organizations, are often present in operational environments and are potential partners for joint forces. In addition to orchestrating its own stabilization efforts, the UN often coordinates the efforts of NGOs as well. Some joint operations may conclude with an operation, transitions of stabilization, or enabling civil authority phase responsibilities to the UN. Additionally, UN peacekeeping missions that are conducted over a longer term than US contingency operations are often a potential option for transitioning US joint operations into sustainable multinational efforts that enable sustained burden sharing for peace building and development, as well as the redeployment of US forces at mission handover.

3. UN peacekeeping and political missions are important activities in AORs. The challenges faced by these missions and their effectiveness, or lack thereof, affect the stability in countries of interest and often the surrounding region.

4. Many nations and their militaries place great emphasis on their participation in UN or other peacekeeping missions as their form of expeditionary operations that contribute to international security. They may be particularly receptive to US theater security cooperation activities that focus on increasing the effectiveness of their ability to participate in PO, and joint forces must understand and appreciate the peacekeeping context to have successful engagements with partnered militaries.

3. **Overview of the United Nations**

a. **Evolution of the UN Role in International Security.** The UN has evolved since its establishment in 1945. Originally consisting of 51 countries, it now includes nearly 200 member states. The UN’s role has progressively expanded, particularly with respect to international peace and security. Peacekeeping became a prominent function for the UN, and such missions have tended to move beyond traditional peacekeeping that simply monitored a ceasefire or peace agreement. Many use the term robust peacekeeping to describe mission activities appropriate for complex settings with significant levels of violence.

b. **UN Charter.** The UN Charter is an international treaty that articulates the purposes of the UN, as well as its organization and obliges adherence by all UN member states. Three chapters of the UN Charter are particularly relevant for PO that are of
interest to joint forces. UN Security Council resolutions that authorize peacekeeping missions are not obliged to cite a chapter, although in recent years it has become common practice to refer to Chapter VII when the use of force beyond self-defense is envisaged.

(1) **Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.”** This chapter is typically associated with “traditional peacekeeping” missions that monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement.

(2) **Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”** In addition to situations in which one country invades another, this chapter applies to robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in which armed actors are likely to obstruct the mission from achieving its objectives. Because intra-national conflicts affect other countries, the UN often addresses them under Chapter VII. The UN Security Council must refer to Chapter VII if it wants to use force for any purpose beyond self-defense. This is sometimes accomplished by authorizing the use of all necessary measures.

(3) **Chapter VIII, “Regional Arrangements.”** This chapter addresses the role of regional organizations such as the EU or AU in regional peace and security. Regional arrangements may deploy peacekeeping operations on their own initiative but require a UN Security Council resolution to conduct peace enforcement activities and to garner international legitimacy.

*For more information, refer to the UN Charter (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml).*

c. **UN Organization.** As an international organization, the UN has a different organization from the USG, and it is important to understand how the UN develops and conducts guidance, programs, and operations in order to advance US efforts and objectives. The UN system consists of five active principal organizations (a sixth, the Trusteeship Council, has been inactive since 1994), along with numerous programs and specialized agencies, as depicted in Figure B-B-1.

(1) **Principal Organizations**

(a) **General Assembly.** The General Assembly includes all member states and is the UN’s main deliberative body. It can provide nonbinding recommendations to member states or to the Security Council.

(b) **Security Council.** This body consists of five permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US) and 10 non-permanent member states that are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. It is focused on international peace and security and may promulgate compulsory resolutions.

(c) **Secretariat.** The Secretariat is chaired by the UN Secretary-General, administratively supports the rest of the UN, implements tasks directed by the other organizations of the UN, and provides studies and reports. The Secretariat includes the Department of Political Affairs, the UNDPKO, the Department of Field Support, the
UNOCHA, the Department of Safety and Security, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, several special advisors, and other agencies.

(d) **ECOSOC.** Composed of 54 member states that are elected by the General Assembly for staggered three-year terms, this body is responsible for coordinating activities of many of the UN’s most important specialized agencies.

(e) **ICJ.** Also known as the World Court, the ICJ is intended to adjudicate legal disputes submitted by member states and to provide legal opinions for other UN organizations. The ICJ is distinct from the International Criminal Court (ICC), an international organization with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The ICC is not part of the UN; however, the UN Security Council occasionally refers cases to the ICC for investigation.

(2) **Other UN Agencies, Funds, and Programs.** The UN includes many subordinate entities. Some of the more prominent are the UNDP, the Office of the UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund, the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Monetary Fund, the WHO, and the World Bank.
For more information on the UN and its subordinate organizations, refer to the UN website (www.un.org).

d. UN Assessment, Planning, and Mission Development Processes

(1) Standing up a Mission. Mission planning begins in anticipation of, or in response, to a UN Security Council resolution that includes a mandate which authorizes the mission and provides strategic guidance. The process includes consultations and a technical assessment mission to determine requirements. After a mission is authorized, its senior officials are appointed and other mission planning and resourcing commences. Key documents for the mission include a mandate implementation plan, integrated strategic framework, military and police CONOPS, ROE for the military component, directive on the use of force for the police component, statements of unit requirements for different types of units, status-of-forces agreement and status of mission agreement, MOUs with troop contributing countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs), and mission-related budgets. TCCs and PCCs deploy their contingents by a variety of means, and the mission will recruit its civilian staff members.

(2) UN Assessment and Planning Processes. In the UN, integrated assessments and planning are conducted at the strategic level (i.e., within the UN HQ in New York) and at the operational level (within the HQ of UN missions). The integrated assessment and planning (IAP) assists UN senior leadership in proposing and implementing UN Security Council resolutions which form the mandate for UN missions. Additionally, the IAP process provides mission direction and planning for UN field missions.


(3) Doctrine. While military doctrine is largely viewed as a national function, UNDPKO has developed capability standards (manuals) on the following topics: infantry battalion, medical, staff officer, aviation, engineers, force HQ support, logistics, maritime, military police, reconnaissance, riverine, signals, special forces, and transport. The UN also produces policy instructions, guidelines, principles, concept notes, and training materials that frequently serve doctrinal purposes.

For more information, refer to the UN website (http://www.un.org).

(4) Training. To support the preparation of national forces that can deploy and conduct UN peacekeeping missions successfully, the UN has three phases of training:

(a) Predeployment training.
(b) Induction training.

(c) Ongoing training while in the mission area. Predeployment training and certification is primarily the responsibility of the contributing member states, but the UN provides core and specialized training materials to support these efforts. Core predeployment training materials provide an overview of UN peacekeeping and address the establishment and functioning of UN peacekeeping operations, effective mandate implementation, and standards, values, and safety. Specialized training materials are tailored for military, police, or civilian components and address a variety of topics such as the protection of civilians, human rights, and civil-military coordination.

For more information, refer to the UN’s core pre-deployment training modules [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&scat=393&menukey=_4_5_2] and the UN’s specialized training modules [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&scat=394&menukey=_4_5_4].

(5) **Global Field Support Strategy.** The UN’s Department of Field Support is responsible for ensuring field missions and deployed personnel are administratively and logistically supported. The global field support strategy focuses on finance, human resources, supply chains, and global and regional service centers. Most of the UN’s actual logistical support is provided via contractual arrangements.

For more information, refer to the UN’s Field Support website [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/fieldsupport.shtml].

(6) **UN Field Operations.** The UN performs most of its work through United Nations country teams (UNCTs) or field missions. UNCTs are comprised of the heads of the UN agencies that are operational in the country. The UNCT is coordinated by the RC accredited to the country. In some countries there may be both a country team and a mission; these are separate organizations although they are often “integrated” by dual-hatting the head of the country team RC as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) who serves as one of the two deputies in deputy head of the UN mission.

(a) **UNCTs.** UNCTs exist in well over a hundred countries and include all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for development, emergency, recovery, and transition. The UNCT ensures interagency coordination and decision making at the country level. The main purpose of the UNCT is for individual agencies to plan and work together to ensure the delivery of tangible results in support of the development agenda of the government.

1. The UNCT is led by the RC, who is the designated representative of the UN Secretary-General. All UNCT members, who are international civil servants, have direct-line accountability to their own organizations (such as WHO, WFP, UNOCHA, UNDP, and up to 30 others), as well as collegial accountability to the RC and the rest of the UNCT. The UNCT will assign various leadership roles to its members on
programmatic and management issues. Country team activities are funded through donor contributions.

2. UNCTs will normally have an HC to guide the efforts of humanitarian organizations. The RC and HC will often be the same individual (RC/HC) and, as previously mentioned, may also serve as a DSRSG in an integrated peacekeeping mission. This is referred to as the triple-hatted RC/HC/DSRSG.

(b) **UN Field Missions.** These include peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and regional missions whose mandates span more than one country. There are currently 16 peacekeeping missions managed by UNDPKO, and their sizes typically range from 5,000 to over 20,000 personnel. Most of these missions include military, police, and civilian components whose personnel are distinct from the UNCT and address issues such as human rights, the protection of civilians, child protection, gender issues, elections, disarmament, and other issues. Special Political Missions are usually managed by the UN Department of Political Affairs and focus on conflict resolution, peace building, and other political objectives. They may include special envoys and expert panels and normally have very few uniformed personnel, if any.

4. **United Nations Peace Operations**

   a. **Types of PO.** The UN categorization of PO, as depicted in Figure B-B-2, is similar to that in US joint doctrine. The conceptual diagram is not always reflective of reality, as some peacekeeping missions operate in the absence of ceasefires in zones of violent conflict. Most UN military forces are involved in peacekeeping, though in this context they are often engaged in peace building and other activities.

   For more information, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

   b. **Principles of UN Peacekeeping.** UN peacekeepers abide by three basic principles:

   (1) Consent of the parties to the conflict.

   (2) Impartiality.

   (3) Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. UN peacekeeping missions will generally avoid alienating the major parties, but a diligent execution of the mandate may make this unavoidable. In many contemporary settings, complete consent to a UN presence may be lacking and peacekeepers may be targeted by spoilers. While a mandate to protect civilians might permit a UN force to use force in situations other than self-defense, many UN peacekeeping units are reluctant to engage in such robust peacekeeping.

   c. **Types of Peacekeeping Operations.** The UN formally recognizes three types of peacekeeping operations, although robust peacekeeping is also discussed.
(1) **Traditional Peacekeeping.** In these missions, UN forces observe, monitor, and report compliance with a ceasefire agreement. They may supervise ceasefire activities, such as troop withdrawals, or support any verification mechanisms and confidence-building measures. They may conduct interposition operations, which essentially establishes a buffer zone between potential belligerents. While this role is frequently associated with Chapter VI mandates, a UN Security Council resolution is not obliged to cite a particular chapter.

(2) **Multidimensional Peacekeeping.** Most contemporary peacekeeping missions are of this type and are deployed during or in the aftermath of internal conflicts. A multidimensional mission has military, police, and civilian components and is frequently mandated to provide civil security, civil control, support to governance and the rule of law to increase population perception of legitimacy.

(3) **Transitional Authority.** This type of mission, which is rarely used, temporarily assumes the legislative and administrative functions of the state. It may be appropriate when there are unresolved sovereignty issues or when state institutions have not existed previously.
d. **Peacekeeping Levels.** The UN recognizes overlapping strategic, operational, and tactical levels of peacekeeping as shown in Figure B-B-3. These differentiations are often reflected in UN policy, training, doctrine, and other documents. “Strategic” is inferred to include the national government of the nation in which the mission is deployed. For example, a mission may have strategic consent to its presence (that is, the consent of the host government), but may lack consent at the local or tactical level.

e. **Example Peacekeeping Mission.** While each UN peacekeeping mission is unique, this section will describe some of the characteristics of recently authorized
multidimensional missions. Each UN mission has a website with relevant information such as composition, deployment maps, and relevant Security Council resolutions.

For more information on specific UN peacekeeping missions, refer to the website (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml).

(1) **Mandate.** A mission’s mandate is derived from at least one UN Security Council resolution. It may address the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, peace consolidation, state capacity building and the extension of host state authority, support and security for HA, and resettlement of dislocated civilians. In rare cases, all or part of the military component may be authorized to take offensive action against armed groups that target civilians. Mandates usually last for one year, after which they are often renewed and modified to account for changing circumstances.

(2) **Organization.** Figure B-B-4 depicts a representative organizational structure for a multidimensional integrated peacekeeping mission, although there are likely to be variations.

(a) The operation is led by a HOM, normally a SRSG. The SRSG is assisted by a chief of staff, a DSRSG for political affairs who coordinates the mission’s civilian component, and an RC/HC/DSRSG who also leads the UNCT. The mission also has a joint operations center to support C2 and a joint mission analysis center that provides situational understanding.

(b) The force commander and police commissioner lead the military and police components, respectively. A civilian-led mission support directorate controls the administrative and logistical assets in the mission, including military logistics units, and maintains the JLOC. Frequently, a mission will have state or province coordinators who also report to the SRSG.

(3) **ROE and Use of Force.** A mission’s ROE are drafted in advance by the UNDPKO’s Office of Military Affairs at the UN HQ in New York and are approved by the Office of Legal Affairs. ROE will emphasize minimum force, control, and proportionality and prescribe advance preparatory measures that should be taken, when possible, before deadly force is used. The UN addresses force employment in the context of a four-stage framework: prevention, preemption, response, and consolidation. This framework is also frequently used in UN strategies, operational concepts, and training scenarios.

(4) **Integrated Peacekeeping Missions.** An integrated peacekeeping mission encourages cooperation among the mission, the UNCT, and NGOs that support UN objectives. In part, this is facilitated by the RC/HCs’ appointment as a DSRSG. It is also supported by the cluster system developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, a forum that coordinates UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.

(a) The cluster system organizes donors, coordinates humanitarian organizations by function, and is used in most countries where there is a UN peacekeeping mission, as well as other situations such as international disaster response.
Cluster participation is voluntary, but supports the efficient delivery of HA. The cluster system’s core functions are to support service delivery, inform decision making, develop plans and strategies, advocate, monitor and report, conduct planning and preparation, and build capacity.

(b) Figure B-B-5 depicts standard clusters and their lead organizations. In some circumstances, other clusters (such as gender, environment, HIV [human immunodeficiency virus]/AIDS [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome], or non-food items) may be formed to address critical requirements.

For more information on the cluster system, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, and humanitarian operations, refer to the websites (http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination), (http://humanitarianinfo.org/IASCpageloder.aspx?page=content-about-default), and (http://reliefweb.int/).
For more information on UN and other humanitarian and development organizations, see the website (http://reliefweb.int/organizations).

f. Peacekeeping Challenges. UN peacekeeping missions are deployed in increasingly complex environments and tasked to achieve ambitious results with
extremely limited resources. While the UN has significantly transformed its peacekeeping missions in recent years, it continues to face many challenges. Joint forces that are involved in theater security cooperation activities with partnered militaries should be aware of these challenges and help mitigate them when possible. They should also be aware of them when a UN mission is a partner during joint operations, particularly when a phase IV or phase V transition includes a UN mission.

(1) The UN has no standing forces, and peacekeeping missions are formed from voluntary national contributions after a specific mandate has been passed. This process is necessarily time-consuming. Consequently, UN forces are slow to deploy and their deployment often follows earlier action by a regional force or coalition in response to a crisis. Moreover, the UN does not have readily available reserve forces to deploy to a mission if it is urgently needed.

(2) Many multidimensional mandates include requirements (such as supporting the extension of state authority, security sector reform, or the protection of civilians) that in effect place a mission in opposition to a belligerent and thus jeopardize its impartiality. Peacekeeping missions are often challenged by the practical implementation of these mandated tasks that extend beyond traditional peacekeeping roles. In complex environments, peacekeepers and other UN workers are often targeted by spoilers who use ambushes, indirect fires, improvised explosive devices, and other means. Missions sometimes have difficult relations with their HN which may be both a necessary partner and the biggest obstacle to an effective peaceful settlement with sufficient respect for human rights.

(3) Missions often lack critical enablers such as helicopters, adequate engineering or medical support, and communications. Females are often vital for engaging with local populations and otherwise supporting the mandate, but are usually scarce in UN units. Intelligence is vital for effective operations, but it is a difficult capability for an impartial actor such as the UN to pursue. UN missions have limited planning capacity at all levels, and their planning is constrained because some potential scenarios are too politically sensitive for realistic planning.

(4) Interoperability is difficult because of different languages, equipment, procedures, and capabilities within peacekeeping missions. Units come to UN missions with differing levels of training, discipline, and maturity of their unit administrative and logistical systems. TCCs and PCCs have varying levels of commitment to a mission’s success, and some have “national caveats” that restrict the effective employment of their contingents. The UN often is not aware of these national caveats when a country deploys its units.
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX B
EUROPEAN UNION

1. Overview

The EU (http://europa.eu/index_en.htm) is a regional international organization currently comprised of 28 European countries. Originally established as an economic union following World War II, it developed into the European Economic Community or “common market” in 1958. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty formed the foundation for a political and economic union that has become the EU.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

a. One of the many facets of the EU is a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established by the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty gives the Common Foreign and Security Policy the aims of promoting both the EU’s own interests and those of the international community as a whole. This includes promoting international cooperation, respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

b. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to coordinate the EU’s foreign policy. The High Representative, in conjunction with the current Presidency, which rotates between member states every six months, speaks on behalf of the EU in foreign policy matters. The Common Foreign and Security Policy requires unanimity among the member states on the appropriate policy to follow on any particular issue. The unanimity and difficult issues treated under the Common Foreign and Security Policy makes disagreements, such as those that occurred over the war in Iraq, not uncommon.

c. Member states are responsible for their own territorial defense. Many EU members are also members of NATO, although some follow policies of neutrality. The Western European Union is a European security organization related to the EU.

d. To enable the EU to fully assume its responsibilities for crisis management, the European Council (Nice, France, December 2000) decided to establish permanent political and military structures:

   (1) The Political and Security Committee meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defense policy (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/). It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

   (2) The EU Military Committee is the highest military body set up within the Council of the EU. It is composed of the chiefs of defense of the member states, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EU Military
Committee provides the Political and Security Committee with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

(3) In parallel with the EU Military Committee, the Political and Security Committee is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the Political and Security Committee on civilian aspects of crisis management.

(4) The EU Military Staff works under direction of the EU Military Committee and under the authority of the High Representative/Vice President. It is the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise. It is led by a three-star general officer and assisted by a two-star (general/rear admiral) Deputy Director General and Chief of Staff. The five directorates are concepts and capabilities, intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications and information systems. It provides staffing for the EU cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to “prepare for EU operations having recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities under Berlin plus arrangements and to support Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s role as a potential operational commander for an EU-led operation. It contributes to full transparency between NATO and the EU embodying their strategic partnership in crisis management.”

(5) The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, which is part of the Council Secretariat, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian European Security and Defense Policy operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian European Security and Defense Policy crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.

e. After the Kosovo War in 1999, the European Council agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” To that end, a number of efforts were made to increase the EU’s military capability. The most concrete result was the EU Battlegroups initiative, each of which is planned to be able to deploy quickly about 1,500 men. EU forces have been deployed on peacekeeping missions from Africa to the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. The EU is currently conducting a military operation protecting humanitarian aid shipments and countering piracy off the coast of Somalia, a military training mission in Somalia, and a civilian mission to strengthen maritime capabilities in the Horn of Africa. EU military operations are supported by a number of bodies (e.g., the European Defense Agency, satellite center, and the military staff).

f. Members of the EU are increasingly involved in peacekeeping (e.g., in Kosovo) and are playing an important role in the full range of development activities. In post-conflict or peacekeeping missions, the EU activities may be coordinated by an EU special representative, whose office would include the various EU elements contributing to the mission. The various offices of the EU special representative would be the primary participants in any intergovernmental coordination efforts.
1. Overview

The OAS (http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp) brings together nations of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen cooperation on democratic values, defend common interests, and debate the major issues facing the region and the world. The OAS is the region’s principal multilateral forum for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights, and confronting shared problems such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs, and corruption. It plays a leading role in carrying out mandates established by the hemisphere’s leaders through the Summits of the Americas. All 35 independent countries of the Americas have ratified the OAS Charter and belong to OAS.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

The member countries set major policies and goals through the General Assembly, which gathers the hemisphere’s ministers of foreign affairs once a year in regular session. Ongoing actions are guided by the Permanent Council, made up of ambassadors appointed by the member states.

3. Organizational Structure

The OAS General Secretariat carries out the programs and policies set by the political bodies. Specialized secretariats coordinate OAS efforts in several broad areas:

a. **Secretariat for Multidimensional Security.** Coordinates OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, and other threats to public security.

b. **Secretariat for Political Affairs.** Directs efforts to promote democracy, strengthen democratic governance, and prevent democratic crises.

c. **Executive Secretariat for Integral Development.** Promotes social development; sustainable development; trade and tourism; and education, culture, science, and technology. Also handles follow-up actions from the region’s ministerial meetings.

d. **Secretariat for Administration and Finance.** Provides support services to the General Secretariat, in areas that include human resources, information and technology, and budgetary affairs.

e. **Department of International Legal Affairs.** Promotes legal cooperation among the member states by helping to develop and implement international treaties.
4. **Inter-American Defense Board**

   a. The Inter-American Defense Board is an international committee of nationally appointed defense officials who develop collaborative approaches on common defense and security issues facing the Americas.

   b. The organization is an international forum consisting of civilian and military representatives appointed by the member states. It provides technical, consultative, and educational advisory services in military and hemispheric defense related matters consistent with the mandates of the OAS General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, and the OAS Permanent Council in their respective areas of jurisdiction.

   c. The Inter-American Defense Board comprises the following entities: the Council of Delegates; the Secretariat, and the Inter-American Defense College.

   d. Current programs include technical consultative support to the Conference of Minister of Defense of the Americas, humanitarian demining in Central America, reporting on confidence and security building measures, and developing educational programs on regional security.
1. Overview

The USIP was created by Congress in 1984 as an independent, nonpartisan organization charged with preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflicts around the world. USIP engages directly in conflict zones and by providing analysis, education, and resources to those working for peace. USIP’s programs are funded by an annual congressional appropriation and supplemented by funds from USG departments and agencies. USIP has more than 300 personnel at their District of Columbia HQ and more on the ground in many of the world’s most dangerous regions.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

USIP is governed by a 15-person board made up of the Secretary of State and SecDef, or their designees; the President of the National Defense University; and 12 others appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the US Senate. No more than eight board members may come from the same political party. USIP’s international HQ on the National Mall stands as a symbol of US commitment to peace.

3. Organizational Structure

USIP conducts its work through both regional and functional centers.

a. The **Center for Applied Conflict Transformation** integrates USIP’s functional capabilities. The Center for Applied Conflict Transformation trains US and international military, civil society leaders, and practitioners in Washington, in the field and online on effective peacekeeping, community building, conflict management, and humanitarian operations necessary for sustained peace. The center also focuses on USIP’s thematic emphases, encompassing economics, gender, rule of law, religion, media, and technology. These programs conduct research, identify best practices, and develop new peacebuilding tools within their areas of expertise. The center collaborates with the other USIP centers to undertake peacebuilding projects in conflict zones around the world.

b. The **Center for South and Central Asia** works to promote peace and stability in this strategically important but conflict-ridden region of the world. With experts based at HQ and working from field offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the center conducts and supports policy-relevant research and analysis on conflict dynamics, provides grants to civil society organizations to test innovative conflict-resolution initiatives, and develops the capacity of government and nongovernmental institutions through education and training activities to peacefully resolve conflicts.

c. The **Center for the Middle East and Africa** manages USIP’s work in these regions, focusing particularly on countries in transition, the Horn of Africa, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. With an eye to both internal and cross-border conflict, the center directs and coordinates analysis, field operations, outreach, and grant making across the
Center for the Middle East and Africa region in support of peaceful dispute resolution, conflict prevention, civic engagement, and good governance.

d. The **Global Peacebuilding Center** focuses mainly on students and educators, and seeks to introduce these audiences to key concepts and skills in conflict management and to the challenges and importance of peacebuilding. Through the onsite experience at USIP and through the virtual Global Peacebuilding Center at buildingpeace.org, the Global Peacebuilding Center is engaging the next generation of peacebuilders.

### 4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

a. USIP accomplishes its mission through its active engagements in the world’s conflict zones, teaching and training, research and analysis, and global grant making. USIP’s independence gives it unique access, credibility, and convening power among a variety of stakeholders, including governments, civil society, militaries, private businesses, and scholars worldwide. Its small size enables flexibility, agility, and a non-bureaucratic approach to conflict management.

b. USIP operates in the world’s most challenging conflict zones and conducts active programs in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Libya, Burma, and elsewhere. The USIP staff mediates among parties in conflict, builds local conflict management skills in fragile states, supports the development of the rule of law in post-conflict environments, and strengthens civil society.

c. USIP also serves as an important convener. USIP welcomes world leaders to present their vision for peace; brings together bipartisan leaders to address difficult issues like genocide prevention; and fosters dialogue and collaboration among USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and the private sector.

### 5. Key United States Institute of Peace Resources


c. Online courses and resources: [http://www.usip.org/online-courses](http://www.usip.org/online-courses).

d. More information about USIP can be found at [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org).
APPENDIX C
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Overview

a. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. It may be local, national, or transnational; employ thousands of individuals or just a handful; and utilize a large management structure or no formal structure at all.

b. DOD uses the term NGO along with USG departments and agencies, and international organizations; however, there is no consistent definition within the USG and among international organizations. As a point of reference, USAID uses the terms private voluntary organization and public international organizations along with NGOs.

c. There are thousands of NGOs that focus on improving local governance conditions in a variety of ways. These organizations develop their goals and action plans to answer their donors and constituents who advocate for change and progress in a particular area; accordingly, NGO leaders and workers may or may not be interested in collaboration or cooperation with military efforts that do not enable or complement their organization’s efforts. Lastly, just like USG and other partner governmental efforts, these organizations conduct operations under the consent and guidelines of the HN government, in a shared space with military forces. As independent organizations, NGOs see their efforts as parallel and independent from military operations, and in order to maintain their neutrality, they will most likely wish to avoid direct contact and collaboration. At the very least, JFCs need to be aware of their presence, recognize they are likely a source of resiliency, and aim to deconflict COAs that could harm the NGOs’ operations. The JFCs, through their legal counsel, must verify that US persons are not prohibited from dealing with a particular organization by virtue of its inclusion on the list of individuals and entities subject to the various economic sanctions programs administered by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protection-index.aspx). Both USAID and DOS apply the Office of Foreign Assets Control criteria to nongovernmental and private organizations they contract with, so JFCs can be assured a USG-funded NGO will have been vetted.

2. Sources of Information

a. JFCs should be aware of all NGOs within their operational area. NGOs operate both inside the US and in most foreign countries. Overseas, the country team should have good situational awareness of all NGOs that are present. In addition, country desk officers at JS, geographic CCMDs, and IC agencies can be a source of information. The USAID mission, if present, may have programs implemented by NGOs or contractors who may have relationships with local NGOs. The UN, if present, will have a UNOCHA, which will have visibility of NGOs working in that country. The HN
Normally has a designated government agency that will register, monitor, and administer the presence and action of NGOs within their country, and it may work with the office of the UN mission’s RC in maintaining visibility, providing situational awareness of security, and coordinating the support and development activities. For further information on the objectives and methods of NGOs/international organizations, there are a number of private associations that represent their member organizations’ interests with DOD and other government efforts. The following organizations can provide useful information on NGO efforts to support military planning and operations.

b. InterAction (http://www.interaction.org/) is the largest alliance of US-based international NGOs. It is focused on the world’s most poor and vulnerable populations. Collectively, InterAction’s more than 180 members work in every developing country. Members assist in developing opportunities in gender equity, education, health, economic opportunity, democracy and government, and other areas.

c. The ICVA (http://www.icvanetwork.org) is a global network that brings together humanitarian and human rights NGOs as an advocacy alliance for humanitarian action. ICVA is a nonprofit global association of NGOs that works as a collective body to promote, and advocate for, human rights and a humanitarian perspective in global debates and responses. The heart of the ICVA mission is to make humanitarian action more principled and effective by working collectively and independently to influence policy and practice. Focusing on humanitarian and refugee policy issues, ICVA draws upon the work of its members at the field level and brings their experiences to international decision-making forums. ICVA provides a means for the collective body of its members to work together to effect change, and also assists members to improve their own work through access to initiatives and tools that help to increase quality and accountability. Through its cooperative and catalytic nature, it gathers and exchanges information and raises awareness on the most vital matters of humanitarian concern before policy-making bodies.

d. The Union of International Associations (http://www.uia.org/) is a research institute and documentation center based in Brussels, Belgium. Nonprofit, apolitical, independent, and nongovernmental in nature, the Union of International Associations has been a pioneer in the research, monitoring, and provision of information on international organizations, international associations, and their global challenges. Its Yearbook of International Organizations provides the most extensive coverage of nonprofit organizations and associations worldwide. Directly reflecting a dynamic international arena, it contains entries on over 66,000 international organizations in 300 countries and territories, in every field of human endeavor.

e. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (http://schr.info/) is an alliance for voluntary action of several major international humanitarian organizations and networks. The committee’s mission is to bring together major international humanitarian actors with common values and shared principles to make this vision reality. Its members pool experience and use their collective weight to carry out effective humanitarian action.
f. The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) (http://www.wango.org/) is a global organization whose mission is to serve its member organizations; strengthen and encourage the nongovernmental sector as a whole; increase public understanding of the nongovernmental community; and provide the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, and multiply their contributions to solve humanity’s basic problems. WANGO unites NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing world peace, as well as well-being at all levels: individual, family, tribal, national, and world. WANGO helps to provide the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, share, inspire, and multiply their contributions to solve humanity’s basic problems. WANGO publishes the NGO Handbook, which is designed to provide leaders of NGOs an ever-expanding resource. Emphasis in particular is placed on practical information of relevance for the success of NGOs.

g. The Alliance for Peacebuilding (http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/) is a global membership association of more than 70 peacebuilding organizations developing processes for change in the most complex, chaotic conflict environments around the world. The Alliance for Peacebuilding amplifies the strengths of its members and works collaboratively on issues that are too large for any one organization to tackle by itself. They are a leader in developing and disseminating innovative approaches to peacebuilding and link related fields including development, relief, human rights, democracy, security sector reform, and others.

h. NVOAD (http://www.nvoad.org) is a non-profit, nonpartisan, membership-based organization that serves as the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparation, response, and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their communities. This is accomplished through the national members, as well as local and state affiliates. Together they eliminate duplication and foster more effective service through cooperation, communication, coordination, and collaboration—by providing convening mechanisms, advocacy, and outreach for all people and organizations involved in disasters. It is recognized nationwide as the nongovernmental leader building community resiliency throughout the disaster cycle. Its vision has been one that seeks to maximize the effectiveness of the voluntary agencies as they work together toward their common goal of bringing help to disaster impacted communities across the country.

3. Building Effective Relations with Nongovernmental Organizations

The following factors may assist in building unity of effort among NGOs and JFCs:

a. Increase awareness and encourage contact between the military and NGOs through symposia, meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions.

b. Incorporate selected NGO training into Service and joint training and exercise programs; and conversely, incorporate interaction with military units and personnel into NGO training.
c. Review lessons learned as recorded in both joint and Services’ lessons learned databases.

d. Clearly articulate the role of the military to the NGOs. It is imperative these organizations understand the military mission, the level of support it can provide, and the process to receive support. Identify what NGOs could receive from DOD forces (e.g., medical care, FP, transportation). Explain who determines what priority NGO personnel and equipment will be moved. NGOs desire transparency. This implies openness, communication, and accountability when dealing with the military. Assets such as the crisis action team, HOC, HACC, CMOC, and LNOs can be used to provide such information.

e. Ensure the joint force understands their support role. While UN and NGO guidelines emphasize that requesting assistance from the military is a last resort, some NGOs assume the military has an inexhaustible resource reservoir and inundate the JFC with requests for various types of support. Members of the joint force must have a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they are authorized to provide. Normally, requests from NGOs should come to DOD through USAID/OFDA, which collects RFAs from all the relevant partners, then prioritizes and validates the requests, then transmits them to DOD (the JTF) via the MITAM. Importantly, the process does not end there. The JTF must report on the status of the MITAM requests back to OFDA. Sometimes the JTF will reject a MITAM (if it falls outside of their mandate, etc.). If OFDA is not involved in the crisis, and/or if displaced persons or refugees are involved in the complex emergency, the DOS PRM, via the embassy, can facilitate requests to DOD. When the JFC has been delegated authority to fill certain types of requests from these organizations, the granting of that authority, and guidance on its use, should be included in the execute order (or a modification thereto). Keep in mind that equivocal responses, such as “we’ll try,” can be interpreted as an affirmative response, and establish unrealistic expectations. Failure to meet expectations (real or not) can adversely affect relationships in both current and future operations.

f. Be aware that not all NGOs appreciate military assistance or intervention. Some NGO charters do not allow them to collaborate with armed forces based on political mandate, neutrality, religious, or impartiality concerns. JFCs need to honor this fact, while still striving for unity of effort.

(1) Most NGOs follow humanitarian principles when giving aid; all aid is based on need alone. Military aid does not follow the principles of humanitarian aid (impartiality, independence, humanitarianism, and neutrality), is politically motivated, and conditional. Therefore, NGOs do not see military aid—even aid in the form of HA—as humanitarian aid.

(2) The USG and NGOs may not share common objectives.

(3) Commanders may find it beneficial to use a third party to establish liaison with NGOs reluctant to establish direct contact with military organizations. USAID, which often provides funding for NGOs and therefore has pre-existing relationships with
them, is critical to this effort. If commanders establish good communication with USAID’s field officers, for example, they can provide the military with vital linkages to NGOs and other humanitarian entities operating in the operational area.

g. Be cognizant of legal requirements and regulations that apply to relationships between the military and NGOs.

h. Ensure agreements and MOUs fully address funding considerations, delineate authority, and define negotiation channels. Agreements may include air and surface transportation, petroleum products, telecommunications, labor, security, facilities, contracting, engineer support, supplies, services, and medical support.

i. Develop a mutually beneficial relationship with NGOs by developing methods for effective exchange of information, operating procedures, and areas of interest/future efforts to reduce potential for overlapping and duplicating efforts among local populations. As a basis for framing these working relationships, DOD and the humanitarian community produced a set of recommended guidelines (http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/guidelines_handout.pdf) to facilitate interaction between US military forces and NGOs belonging to InterAction.

j. Exercise due diligence in dealing with NGOs that do not adhere to accepted professional standards. Most NGOs follow the UN Principles of Humanitarian Assistance and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf). Disaster-affected communities have a right to expect those who seek to assist them to measure up to these standards. In maintaining these standards, it is important that CMOC officers are not perceived as favoring a particular relief organization, particularly at the expense of other organizations.

k. Seek the assistance of an individual from the NGO community to serve on the US force staff as an LNO to the NGO community. Such an LNO can perform duties such as initial collaboration activities with the humanitarian relief community prior to deployment, representation of the humanitarian relief perspective during planning, and advice to the joint force through membership in the CMOC or other coordinating mechanisms during operations.

l. Post information on the UN’s ReliefWeb Internet site (http://reliefweb.int/). ReliefWeb is a global hub for time-critical humanitarian information on complex emergencies and natural disasters. ReliefWeb is widely used by NGOs and other participants in HA operations to share and coordinate information. The humanitarian information center, if established, is also a site for information, as are the NGO websites themselves, and bulletin boards at the on-site operations coordination center or humanitarian operations coordination center location.

m. Share information with NGOs to the greatest extent possible, especially regarding security. Using information and communications technology will allow NGOs
to plan their response with up-to-date and accurate information and to integrate into the overall response more efficiently.

n. When working with NGOs in an uncertain or hostile operational environment, guidelines found in the USIP *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* (http://www.usip.org/publications/guidelines-relations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-in-hostile-or-potentially) may help mitigate friction between military and NGO personnel.

o. Identify and collaborate with the first responders to a disaster. While the US military may be the largest single organization on the ground in a disaster area, NGOs need to understand that the US military’s authority is limited in domestic disaster responses. The NGOs that normally operate in the disaster region or those that can respond quickly to a disaster will be present prior to the US military arrival on the ground.

4. Consultative Status with the United Nations

a. NGOs take a role in formal UN deliberations through the ECOSOC (http://csonet.org). Nearly 3,200 NGOs today have consultative status. The consultative relationship includes: eligibility requirements for consultative status, rights and obligations of NGOs in consultative status, procedures for the withdrawal or suspension of consultative status, the role and functions of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, and the responsibilities of the UN Secretariat in supporting the consultative relationship. ECOSOC grants consultative status upon recommendation of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, which is comprised of 19 member states.

b. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, sub-regional and national nongovernmental, nonprofit public, or voluntary organizations. NGOs affiliated with an international organization already in status may be admitted provided they can demonstrate their program of work is of direct relevance to the aims and purposes of the UN.

c. To be eligible for consultative status, an NGO must have been in existence (officially registered with the appropriate government authorities as an NGO/nonprofit) for at least two years, must have an established HQ, a democratically adopted constitution, authority to speak for its members, a representative structure, appropriate mechanisms of accountability, and democratic and transparent decision-making processes. The basic resources of the organization must be derived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members.

5. Faith-Based Nongovernmental Organizations

The USG supports faith-based organizations, but USG policy strictly states USG HA should be distributed based on need. It is also USG policy that no USG assistance may be provided based on religious affiliation or for the purpose of influencing the religious
beliefs of a population. Reports of USG assistance being distributed in violation of these policies should be reported to the embassy, DOS, and/or USAID.

6. Terrorist and Insurgent Abuse of Charities

   a. Protecting charities from terrorist abuse is a critical component of the global fight against terrorism. Charities provide essential services, comfort, and hope to those in need around the world. Unfortunately, terrorists have exploited the charitable sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations and operations. This abuse threatens to undermine donor confidence and jeopardizes the integrity of the charitable sector, whose services are indispensable to the world community. The government and the charitable sector share fundamental interests in promoting and protecting charitable giving. The government and private sector can identify terrorist financing risks, clarify obligations and best practices, facilitate compliance with US law, and help promote charitable giving while reducing the threats of terrorist abuse. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USG has conducted a comprehensive campaign against terrorists and their support networks, including the sources and conduits of terrorist financing. Investigations carried out during this campaign have revealed consistent terrorist abuse of the charitable sector through the diversion of charitable funds and services to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and Hamas. The US has designated several charities worldwide as supporting terrorist activity (http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/protecting-index.aspx). In addition, the US has designated several organizations that have operated under various names that appear as potential fundraising front organizations for terrorist activity.

   b. Terrorist and insurgent abuse of the charitable sector can take many forms, including:

   (1) Establishing front organizations or using charities to raise funds in support of terrorist organizations.

   (2) Establishing or using charities to transfer funds, other resources, and operatives across geographical boundaries.

   (3) Defrauding charities through branch offices or aid workers to divert funds to support terrorist organizations.

   (4) Leveraging charitable funds, resources, and services to recruit members and foster support for terrorist organizations and their ideology.
APPENDIX D
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Annex   A International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
         B International Committee of the Red Cross
         C International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
         D American Red Cross
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX D
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

1. Overview

a. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement) is the world’s largest humanitarian network and is made up of three components: the ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the 190 National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies (which are members of the IFRC). The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement currently has more than 17 million volunteers—the world’s biggest volunteer force. The ICRC, the IFRC, and the National Societies are independent bodies, with an individual legal status.

b. With the advent of more and more complex humanitarian emergencies, the work of two or more International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement institutions can be required in response to certain crises. When this is the case, the work of both is governed by an agreement known as the Seville Agreement and its Supplementary Measures, which establishes one institution within the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement as the lead agency responsible for spearheading the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s international operational activities in a specific emergency.

c. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s mission is to alleviate human suffering, protect life and health, and uphold human dignity, especially during armed conflicts and other emergencies. All three components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are guided by the same seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality (http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/movement/overview-the-movement.htm). For more information on the fundamental principles, refer to paragraph 6, “The Seven Fundamental Principles.”

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross

The ICRC is an independent and neutral organization whose mandate essentially stems from the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Its mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. In situations of armed conflict, it assumes the lead role in the Red Crescent Movement, directing and coordinating response efforts. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening international law. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/index.jsp).
3. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

The IFRC (http://ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/history/) is an impartial and neutral organization that was founded in Paris in 1919 just as World War I was ending, and was established and is comprised by its member National Societies. It works on the basis of the fundamental principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to inspire, facilitate, and promote all humanitarian activities carried out by its member National Societies to improve the situation of the most vulnerable people. The IFRC directs and coordinates relief assistance for international emergencies and acts as the official representative of its member societies in the international field. It promotes cooperation between National Societies and works to strengthen their capacity to carry out effective disaster preparedness, health, and social programs.

For more information on the IFRC, refer to http://ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/.

4. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies embody the work and principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. National Societies act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including DR, health, and social programs. During wartime, National Societies assist the affected civilian population and support the medical services of armed forces, where appropriate.

5. The Emblems

a. The Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal emblems (see Figure D-A-1) are symbols of protection in times of armed conflict and may be used as a protective device only by:

(1) Medical services and religious personnel of the armed forces.

(2) National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies duly recognized and authorized by their governments to lend assistance to the medical services of armed forces; the National Societies may use the emblem for protective purposes only for those personnel and equipment assisting official medical services in armed conflict, provided those personnel and equipment perform the same functions and only those functions and are subject to military laws and regulations.

(3) Civilian hospitals and other civilian medical facilities and units, and their staffs, recognized as such by the government and expressly authorized to display the emblem for protective purposes (e.g., first-aid posts, ambulances).

(4) Other voluntary relief agencies are subject to the same conditions as National Societies. They must have government recognition and express authorization, may use the emblem only for personnel and equipment allocated exclusively to medical services, and must be subject to military law and regulations.
b. Each state party to the Geneva Conventions is required to take steps to prevent and punish misuse of the emblem in wartime and peacetime alike, and to enact a law on the protection of the emblem.

c. During peacetime, the use of the emblems for protective purposes is limited to:

(1) Medical services and religious personnel of the armed forces.

(2) National Society medical facilities and means of transport that function as such in the event of armed conflict. Again, they must have government recognition and express authorization.

d. The ICRC and the International Federation are entitled, at all times (in peacetime and armed conflict) to use the emblems.

e. Misuse of the emblem. Any use not expressly authorized constitutes a misuse of the emblem. There are three types of misuse.

(1) Imitation is the use of a sign which, by its shape and/or color, may cause confusion with the emblem.

(2) Usurpation is the use of the emblem by bodies or persons not entitled to do so (e.g., commercial enterprises, pharmacists, private doctors, NGOs, and ordinary individuals). If persons normally authorized to use the emblem use the emblem in a manner inconsistent with the rules in the Geneva Conventions such use would also constitute usurpation.
(3) Acts of perfidy are acts that invite the confidence of enemy persons to lead them to believe they are entitled to, or are obliged to accord, protection under the law of war, with intent to betray that confidence. Perfidy is a violation of the law of war.

f. Misuse of the emblem for protective purposes in time of war jeopardizes the system of protection set up by the Geneva Conventions. Misuse of the emblem in peacetime undermines its image in the eyes of the public and consequently reduces its protective power in time of war. The states, party to the Geneva Conventions, have undertaken to introduce penal measures to prevent and repress misuse of the emblem in wartime and peacetime alike.

6. The Seven Fundamental Principles

Proclaimed in Vienna in 1965, the seven fundamental principles bond together the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC, and the IFRC. They guarantee the continuity of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work.

a. **Humanity.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting peace among all peoples.

b. **Impartiality.** It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

c. **Neutrality.** In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.

d. **Independence.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able, at all times, to act IAW the principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

e. **Voluntary Service.** It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

f. **Unity.** There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
g. **Universality.** The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.
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1. **Overview**

   a. The ICRC (http://www.icrc.org/eng/) is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization with an exclusively humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.

   b. The ICRC takes action in response to emergencies and, at the same time, endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting respect for universal humanitarian principles and international law, and its implementation in national law.

   c. Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the Geneva Conventions and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It directs and coordinates the international activities conducted by the Red Crescent Movement in armed conflicts and other situations of violence.

2. **Authority and Responsibilities**

   a. The work of the ICRC is based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocols, the statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the resolutions of the quadrennial International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. These provide a legal mandate from the international community:

      (1) The four Geneva Conventions, which are part of the law of war, confer on the ICRC a specific mandate to act in international armed conflict and a right of initiative to offer its services in non-international armed conflict, visiting prisoners of war and civilian internees, organizing relief operations, reuniting separated families, and performing similar humanitarian activities during armed conflicts.

      (2) The statutes of the ICRC and Red Crescent Movement task the ICRC to encourage respect for international law. This may include raising, in a bilateral, confidential manner, allegations of breaches of international law. These encourage it to undertake similar work in situations of internal violence, either non-international armed conflict or situations of violence not amounting to an armed conflict, when the ICRC may offer its services to governments without that offer constituting interference in the internal affairs of the state concerned.

   b. The Geneva Conventions are binding instruments of international law which, in times of armed conflict, protect wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilians. All states are party to these four conventions, which are consequently universal. ICRC mandate is further reinforced by resolutions adopted at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which takes
place every four years, and at which states that are party to the Geneva Conventions take part, including the US.

c. The 1949 Geneva Conventions confer on the ICRC the right to take action (e.g., to visit prisoners of war) and to make proposals to states (e.g., to offer its services). Additionally, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s statutes recognize the ICRC has a right of humanitarian initiative in situations not covered by the Geneva Conventions. All of these rights constitute the permanent mandate conferred on the ICRC by the international community. This specific mandate distinguishes it from other humanitarian organizations and confers a status distinct from an NGO.

d. The ICRC promotes respect for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s seven fundamental principles, in particular neutrality, impartiality and independence, which form a key part to its approach in its activities and operations.

NOTE: The US has signed and ratified the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, but has not ratified the two additional Protocols of 1977. The US follows the law of war, which is based on both customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare and to relationships between belligerent and neutral states.

3. Organizational Structure

a. The ICRC is the founding institution of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These, in addition to the ICRC, comprise the IFRC and the national Red Cross, or Red Crescent societies, whose primary roles are capacity building and DR. The ICRC’s HQ are in Geneva, Switzerland.

b. As a private association formed under the Swiss Civil Code, its existence is not in itself mandated by governments. Yet its functions and activities—to provide protection and assistance to victims of conflict—are mandated by the international community of states and are founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, which are the most widely ratified treaties in the world.

   (1) Therefore, the ICRC is recognized as having an international legal personality or status of its own. It enjoys working facilities (privileges and immunities) (e.g., exemption from taxes and customs duties, inviolability of premises and documents, and immunity from judicial process) comparable to those of the UN and its agencies.

   (2) The ICRC can only do its job of providing protection and assistance to conflict victims if its working principles of impartiality, independence, and neutrality are respected. It is through recognition of the ICRC’s privileges and immunities that states and international organizations acknowledge their respect for those principles. Thus, in line with its international legal mandate, the ICRC’s privileges and immunities are widely recognized by governments, the UN, and other organizations. This means the ICRC is not treated as a private entity or an NGO, but as an international organization for the work it does under its international mandate. The ICRC has been granted permanent observer status at the UN General Assembly and enjoys similar status with international organizations.
(3) In the nearly 80 countries in which the ICRC carries out significant operations, its international legal personality, judicial immunity, and testimonial privilege (right not to be called as a witness) is recognized either by treaty or by legislation. In recognition of its status under the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC is the only organization whose employees cannot be called upon to testify before the ICC.

c. The ICRC receives its funding from voluntary contributions from governments, supranational organizations, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and private sources. The US is the single largest donor to the ICRC and supports the whole range of its activities.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

ICRC’s tasks include:

a. Ensuring respect for the lives and dignity of prisoners of war and those detained or interned as a result of armed conflict or other situations of violence.

b. Reuniting dispersed families, along with efforts to trace missing persons.

c. Transmitting messages between family members separated by conflict or other situations of violence, including from prisoners of war and detainees.

d. Supporting existing health structures treating war wounded and other medical emergencies where there is insufficient capacity.

e. Providing urgently needed food, water, sanitation, and shelter to civilians without access to these basic necessities.

f. Monitoring compliance with international law, including monitoring the “conduct of hostilities,” and raising issues of concern on behalf of those affected.

g. Spreading knowledge of, and contributing to, the development of humanitarian aspects of international law.

5. Interorganizational Relationships

a. The ICRC and the IFRC keep each other informed of their respective activities and consult with each other regularly on the coordination and distribution of their work and on all matters of interest to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

b. The terms neutrality and independence acquire a specific meaning when related to the activities of the ICRC. The ICRC’s activities apply almost exclusively to armed conflicts, disturbances, and tensions. It strictly avoids any involvement in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature as an imperative to ensure access for humanitarian action. This strict and specific neutrality that fosters and maintains universal trust also requires the ICRC to act openly and in good faith toward all parties to a conflict, including armed non-state actors where relevant. To discharge the mandate
conferred by the Geneva Conventions and to take the humanitarian initiatives fundamental to its role as neutral intermediary, the ICRC must remain independent. Therefore, the ICRC adopts a special structure that allows it to resist political, economic, and other pressures and to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the governments and the public that support its activities.

c. In terms of civil-military relations, ICRC’s humanitarian activities aim to protect human dignity and lives. The ICRC’s humanitarian activities cannot be subordinated to political or military objectives. The ICRC must maintain its independence of decision making and action while, at the same time, it seeks to consult closely with military forces in the same theater of operations.
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX D
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES

1. Overview

   a. The IFRC (http://www.ifrc.org/) is the world’s largest humanitarian organization. Founded in 1919, the IFRC comprises nearly 190 member Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, a Secretariat in Geneva, and more than 60 delegations strategically located to support activities around the world. The Red Crescent is used in place of the Red Cross in many Islamic countries.

   b. The IFRC improves the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity. Vulnerable people are those who are at greatest risk from situations that threaten their survival or their capacity to live with an acceptable level of social and economic security and human dignity. Often, these are victims of natural disasters or poverty brought about by socio-economic crises, refugees, and victims of health emergencies.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

   a. The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters, and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member’s National Societies.

   b. The unique network of National Societies—which covers almost every country in the world—is the IFRC’s principal strength. Cooperation between and among National Societies gives the IFRC greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need. At a local level, the network enables the IFRC to reach individual communities.

3. Organizational Structure

   a. The role of the Secretariat in Geneva is to coordinate and mobilize relief assistance for international emergencies, promote cooperation between National Societies, and represent these National Societies in the international field.

   b. The role of the field delegations is to assist and advise National Societies with relief operations and development programs, and encourage regional cooperation.

4. Capabilities and Core Competencies

   a. The IFRC’s programs focus on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care.

   b. The IFRC promotes individual and community humanitarian values which encourage respect for other human beings and a willingness to work together to find solutions to community problems. Their aim is to influence the behavior of the people they work with.
c. Disaster response continues to represent the largest portion of the IFRC’s work. This includes emergency response units and issues relating to humanitarian policies as the IFRC strives to improve the quality of its immediate response and long-term rehabilitation work.

d. The sharp increase in the number of natural disasters worldwide in recent years has prompted the IFRC to devote more attention to disaster preparedness activities. These aim to make National Societies and communities more aware of the risks they face, how to reduce their vulnerability, and how to cope when disaster strikes.

e. Health and community care has become a cornerstone of HA and accounts for a large part of Red Cross and Red Crescent spending. Through these programs, the IFRC aims to enable communities to reduce their vulnerability to disease, and prepare for and respond to public health crises.

5. Interagency Relationships

The IFRC Secretariat is at the heart of a global network that helps National Societies develop and coordinate their work at the international level. It enjoys consultative status with the ECOSOC of the UN. In 1994, the UN General Assembly invited the IFRC to become a permanent observer and participate in the work of the Assembly. Through its many delegations, the IFRC maintains permanent contact, both in Geneva and in the field, with UN agencies, governments, the EU (especially the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department), and other NGOs. The IFRC has a delegation in New York City to maintain relations with UN agencies and diplomatic missions. In the field, IFRC delegates maintain very close contact with other humanitarian agencies, particularly with the ICRC, that are engaged in operations complementary to those of the IFRC.

6. Code of Conduct

The IFRC is the repository of signatories to The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/), to which it refers to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards. The Code of Conduct is voluntary and can be applied by any humanitarian agency and has more than 600 signatories. It lays down 10 points of principle that all humanitarian actors should adhere to in their disaster response work and describes the relationships that agencies working in disasters should seek with donor governments, host governments, and the UN system.
1. Overview

   a. The National Society in the US is the ARC (http://www.redcross.org). Since its founding in 1881 by Clara Barton, the ARC has been the nation’s premier emergency response organization. As part of a worldwide movement that offers neutral humanitarian care to the victims of war, the ARC distinguishes itself by also aiding victims of devastating natural disasters. Over the years, the organization has expanded its services, always with the aim of preventing and relieving suffering.

   b. In addition to domestic DR, the ARC offers compassionate services in five other areas: community services that help the needy; support and comfort for military members and their families; the collection, processing, and distribution of lifesaving blood and blood products; educational programs that promote health and safety; and international relief (includes disaster risk reduction and preparedness programs) and development programs.

   c. The ARC is where people mobilize to help their neighbors—across the street, across the country, and across the world—in emergencies. Each year, in communities large and small, disaster victims turn to neighbors familiar and new—the nearly 400,000 volunteers and almost 28,000 employees of the ARC. Through over 500 locally supported chapters, more than 15 million people gain the skills they need to prepare for, and respond to, emergencies in their homes, communities, and world.

   d. Some four million people give blood through the ARC, making it the largest supplier of blood and blood products in the US. The ARC helps thousands of US Service members separated from their families by military duty stay connected. As part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the ARC helps restore hope and dignity to the world’s most vulnerable people.

2. Authority and Responsibilities

   a. The ARC, a humanitarian organization led by volunteers and guided by its congressional charter and the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, provides relief to victims of disaster and helps people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.

   b. The purposes of the ARC, as stated in its congressional charter, are to:

      (1) Provide volunteer aid in time of war to the sick and wounded of the Armed Forces, IAW the spirit and conditions of the conference of Geneva of October 1863; the treaties of the Red Cross; or the treaties of Geneva (August 22, 1864; July 27, 1929; and August 12, 1949) to which the US has given its adhesion; and any other treaty, convention, or protocol similar in purpose to which the US has given or may give its adhesion.
(2) Perform all the duties devolved on a national society by each nation that has acceded to any of those treaties, conventions, or protocols.

(3) Act, in matters of voluntary relief and IAW the military authorities, as a medium of communication between the people of the US and the Armed Forces of the United States and to act in those matters between similar National Societies of governments of other countries through the ICRC and the USG, the people, and the Armed Forces of the United States.

(4) Carry out a system of national and international relief in time of peace; apply that system in mitigating the suffering caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities; and devise and carry out measures for preventing those calamities.

c. The ARC’s role as the nation’s largest mass care service provider is separate and distinct from its role in the NRF. As the largest mass care service provider, the ARC provides sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution of needed items, basic first aid, welfare information, and casework, among other services, at the local level, as needed. In its role as a service provider, the ARC works closely with state, local, and tribal governments to provide mass care services to victims of every disaster, large and small, in an affected area. In providing these services, the ARC fulfills its humanitarian mission, acting on its own behalf and not on behalf of the USG or any other governmental entity.
APPENDIX E
JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE

1. Introduction and Overview

a. The JIATF is a force multiplier that uses a unique organizational structure to focus on a single mission. A JIATF, like most task forces, is typically formed for a specific task and purpose. JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the DOD and one or more USG civilian department or agency, and guided by a MOA or other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the JIATF’s members. The JIATF is staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies under a single commander or director.

b. Forming a national-level JIATF takes a national charter that lays out authorities and mandates membership and resourcing. An executive order, national level directive, or mandate from the NSC/HSC that directs all agencies involved to support the JIATF with actual resources may be required. SecDef may, in cooperation with other Cabinet members, form a JIATF through the establishment of detailed MOAs. JFCs can form JIATFs with one or more USG departments and agencies based on mutual cooperation and agreement.

c. The establishment of functional and enduring JIATFs transcends the internal capabilities and authorities of CCMDs and JTFs. Based upon the analysis and the desire to establish JIATFs, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) or another designated staff entity should document the requirements for formal submission, through command channels, to JS and OSD for approval and pursuit through the NSC or HSC system. Success manifests in interagency consensus, commitment, and MOAs or MOUs that infuse JIATFs with supporting policy, legitimacy, defined purpose, authorities, leadership parameters, functional protocols, and resources.

d. Coordinating authorities, channels, and terms of reference should be carefully established and documented for JIATFs to facilitate their missions and flexibility while not duplicating effort or causing confusion. Such authorities constitute the scope for JIATFs, and they must contribute to unity of effort and common situational awareness.

e. Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power to bear on asymmetric threats. JIATFs are often created to address problems such as militias, bad neighbors, and foreign fighters, all of which complicate the operational environment. JIATFs may be separate elements under the JFC, or they may be subordinate to a functional component command, a joint special operations task force, or a staff section such as the J-3. JIATF members can coordinate with the country team, their home agencies, JIACGs (or equivalent organization) in the area of interest, and other JIATFs to defeat complex hostile networks. Because they use more than the military instrument of national power, JIATFs are generally not a lethal asset, but rather develop and drive creative solutions and coordinate or propose policy actions to accomplish their mission.
2. Considerations for Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force

a. Resolve the dual civilian and military chains of command to ensure both fall under the same directive authority, which ensures all departments and agencies work together.

b. The JIATF must be empowered, within the missions specified, to be the USG national authority to direct departments and agencies to collaborate, coordinate, plan, prioritize, and integrate resources provided from the USG and willing multinational and multilateral partners. Key in establishing the JIATF is for contributing leaders and organizations to negotiate and define the tasks and decision-making authorities of those elements being assigned or attached in support of planning and operations. This negotiation and definition will form the basis for the establishing directive and supporting MOUs that form the basis of the JIATF’s coordination and directive authorities. Some operational level JIATFs utilize a more collaborative approach, with less clearly defined C2, to great effect.

c. Establish operating procedures and protocols that are simple, general, and open to review and modification to accommodate the authorities that participating agencies bring with them. The authorities establishing the JIATF should clearly define the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the HN.

d. Although agency requirements can serve as the basis for JIATF procedures and formats, reporting procedures and doctrinal nomenclature must be developed and evolve to support the mission rather than individual agency requirements.

e. JIATF commanders and agency representative equivalents require an appropriate level of control (OPCON, TACON, or another arrangement) to commit dedicated resources to operations and mission outcomes. This may require an executive branch mandate and relief from restrictions on application of resources and Cabinet-level agreement and/or MOAs/MOUs among agencies. Operational-level commanders of JIATFs often do not have the authority to commit resources but use reachback and networking to obtain necessary assets and guidance when needed.

f. A JIATF should be a true interagency staff and leadership body, with cross-trained staff and senior representatives who have the authorities to commit resources. The leadership of the organization should be balanced and have the authority to direct actions within the staff and field elements operating for the organization, regardless of home department or agency (e.g., civilian deputies, watch officers can direct military units, and military officers can direct civilian organizations, in the name of the JIATF-like entity and its authorities).

g. Whatever mission or line(s) of operation are assigned to a JIATF, dedicated resources to be provided from each participating agency and/or nation should be specified in advance, with the authority to employ those resources assigned to the JIATF. When this authority does not reside in a JIATF, reachback and networking can serve this purpose.
h. Establishment and operation of a JIATF should be a separate, additional line item of funding for the establishing authorities. Costs should be allocated on an equitable basis. The JIATF should have its own resource management capability and administrative capability.

3. Joint Interagency Task Force South

a. JIATF South (http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx), located in Key West, Florida, serves as the catalyst for integrated and synchronized interagency illegal trafficking operations and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific. JIATF South also collects, processes, and disseminates counterdrug information for interagency and partner nation operations. As a designated national task force, JIATF South executes detection and monitoring of illicit trafficking and facilitates international and interagency interdiction to enable the disruption and dismantlement of illicit networks in support of national and hemispheric security. JIATF South is USSOUTHCOM’s executive agent for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

b. The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy produces the National Drug Control Strategy which directs the nation’s anti-drug efforts and establishes a program, a budget, and guidelines for cooperation among federal, state, and local entities. The office also evaluates, coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic anti-drug efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures such efforts sustain and complement state and local anti-drug activities.

c. While traditional joint operations focus on efforts among the Services, JIATF South has evolved past these traditional boundaries, becoming a fully integrated interagency command. Whereas most organizations count on LNOs to represent them, JIATF South takes this concept much further. The top command structure demonstrates total integration, with the Director being a USCG rear admiral and the Vice Director coming from CBP. Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command. While the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, their Deputies are from the DEA and DHS. Intelligence analysts from CBP, DEA, FBI, and Office of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) are located in the Joint Interagency Intelligence Operations Center to ensure LEAs are involved in daily operations and that information is not stovepiped.

d. JIATF South incorporates a wide range of governmental and international organizations in addition to those previously mentioned. The CIA; DIA; DOS; NGA; National Reconnaissance Office; NSA; Office of Naval Intelligence; LNOs from Canada, France, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom; and a host of Latin American countries all play an important role in intelligence, operations, and planning. Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom provide ships and aircraft to the task force, and the Commander of French Forces in the Caribbean and the Flag officer of the Netherlands Forces Caribbean command one task group each in the task force.
e. The focus of the command is a Joint Operations Command Center where intelligence and operations functions are fused in a state of the art command, control, communications, and intelligence facility. JIATF South coordinates the employment of DHS, DOD, and international ships and aircraft, a complete integration of sophisticated multi-agency and MNFs committed to the cause of interdicting the flow of illicit drugs.

4. Joint Interagency Task Force West

JIATF West (aspxhttp://www.pacom.mil/JIATFW.aspx) is USPACOM’s executive agent for DOD support to law enforcement for counterdrug and drug-related activities in the USPACOM AOR. JIATF West combats drug-related transnational crime to protect national security interests and promote regional stability. To accomplish this mission, JIATF West provides US and foreign law enforcement with fused interagency information and intelligence analysis, and with counterdrug training and infrastructure development support. The JIATF West staff consists of uniformed and civilian members from each Service, and representatives from the IC and US federal LEAs (e.g., DEA, FBI, and HSI). JIATF West closely aligns with USPACOM’s TCP in planning, developing, and implementing DOD’s counterdrug programs in Asia and the Pacific.

5. National Counterterrorism Center

a. The NCTC (http://www.nctc.gov/index.html) provides a full-time interagency forum and process to plan, integrate, assign lead operational roles and responsibilities, and measure the effectiveness of strategic operational CT activities of the USG, applying all instruments of national power to the CT mission.

b. NCTC was established by Executive Order 13354 and codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. NCTC implements a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: “Breaking the older mold of national government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”

c. The Director of NCTC is a Deputy Secretary-equivalent with a unique, dual line of reporting: to the President regarding executive branch-wide CT planning and to the DNI regarding intelligence matters. NCTC follows the policy direction of the President and NSC/HSC.

d. NCTC is staffed by personnel from multiple departments and agencies across the IC. NCTC is organizationally part of the ODNI.

e. NCTC serves as the primary organization in the USG for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to CT (except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism).

f. NCTC serves as the USG’s central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terrorist groups. NCTC provides USG departments and agencies with the terrorism intelligence analysis and other information they need to
fulfill their missions. NCTC houses more than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement, and HS networks under one roof to facilitate robust information sharing.

g. NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG. They integrate all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures effective integration of CT plans, through a single and truly joint planning process, and synchronization of operations across more than 20 USG departments and agencies engaged in a whole-of-government effort against terrorism.

6. National Joint Terrorism Task Force

   a. The FBI-led National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) was formed to address the complex information sharing, coordination, and logistical issues between the IC and LEAs. The NJTTF’s mission is to enhance communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and local government agencies representing the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety, transportation, and HS communities.

   b. The NJTTF provides a point of fusion for sharing intelligence and terrorism threat information among the 44 federal, state, and local agencies colocated within the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division. The NJTTF’s unique multi-agency collaborative approach positions it to assess known and developing threats and vulnerabilities, and to leverage timely information sharing and collaborative assessments to support the joint terrorism task forces throughout the US.

   c. In addition, the NJTTF is designed to provide administrative support to the more than 100 joint terrorism task forces nationwide. The joint terrorism task forces are a fusion of federal, state, and local agencies which act as an integrated investigative force to combat terrorism through cohesive operations.

7. Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force

   The Secretary of Homeland Security, under Title 6, USC, Section 465, may establish and operate a permanent Joint Interagency Homeland Security Task Force composed of representatives from the military and other USG departments and agencies for the purposes of anticipating terrorist threats against the US and taking appropriate actions to prevent harm to the US.
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APPENDIX F
CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMING

1. Introduction and Overview

Civil-military teams are temporary organizations of civilian and military personnel which are task-oriented to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific planning or assessment tasks or to conduct synchronized or integrated activities at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Civil-military teams can either be colocated or come together for designated planning or implementation functions. They provide the JFC with a means to understand the benefits of competencies that are normally external to the military. They help integrate the knowledge, expertise, and unique capabilities of USG departments and agencies with multinational military forces and civilian elements of multinational partners. Civil-military teams help the JFC understand the unique roles, responsibilities, parallel relationships and objectives of other international and nongovernmental actors and organizations that may be present in the operational environment, but over whom neither the JFC nor the COM exercise authority.

2. Command and Organizational Relationships

a. In large footprint operations, the physical colocation of civil-military teams is desirable, but not essential to achieve effective civil-military teaming. Experience suggests that civilian government organizations, from both the US and potential coalition partners, may not be resourced to provide dedicated manning to all counterpart military staffs on a continual basis. In cases where physical colocation is either not feasible or desirable, the JFC will normally consider options for virtual teaming or situational teaming to accomplish specific planning or operational activities. In addition, experience suggests that most NGOs prefer not to enter a military HQ. They will be very cautious about potential perceptions regarding their association with the military. Inherently, an effective civil-military teaming concept requires the JFC develop a reliable and accessible process that will permit communication and information sharing between the joint force and relevant nonmilitary organizations.

b. Importantly, the level of authority for the JFC is limited. Civilian interagency representation to the joint force may be dedicated or part-time. Only an LNO, with no decision-making authority, will represent some organizations. Others may possess full authority to make commitments for their organizations. The JFC should collaborate with the COM to establish a process between the military and civilian interagency partners when there is a disagreement regarding execution of specific operations. Interagency partners are obligated to raise issues up their individual lines of authority (chains of command) when they cannot be resolved at lower levels.

c. Civil-military teaming provides the JFC with a means to achieve horizontal integration across the multiple aspects of planning, execution, and assessment. For example, under the framework suggested by the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf), the four functional
components of political, economic, security, and information contribute to the overall objective of enabling the affected government to establish control, consolidate that control, and then transition that control from external intervening forces (e.g., US forces) to HN forces and from military to civilian institutions. The US Government Counterinsurgency Guide further emphasizes an “imperative to achieve synergy among political, security, economic, and information activities,” and demands unity of effort between all participants (i.e., the affected government, USG departments and agencies, and multinational partners).

d. **Realistic Division of Labor.** Participants best qualified and able to accomplish nonmilitary tasks are not always available. In those cases, military forces may be required to perform those tasks. Sometimes joint forces have the skills required; other times they learn them during execution.

(1) **Nonmilitary Contribution.** USG interagency partners and international organizations rarely have the resources and capabilities needed to address all tasks. Success requires adaptable leaders who perform required tasks with available resources. These leaders understand that long-term security cannot be imposed by military force alone; it requires an integrated, balanced application of effort by all participants with the goal of supporting the local populace and achieving legitimacy for the HN government. Military forces can perform civilian tasks but often not as well as the civilian agencies with people trained in those skills. Further, military forces performing civilian tasks are not performing military tasks. Diversion from those tasks should be temporary and only taken to address urgent circumstances. The implications of the military role in these areas should be discussed at length with the country team.

(2) **Military Capability and Capacity.** In uncertain or hostile security situations, US and multinational military forces often possess the only readily available capability to meet many of the local populace’s fundamental needs. Human decency, and even the law of war, may require joint forces to assist the populace in their operational areas. Leaders at all levels should prepare to address civilian needs (e.g., identifying people in their units with regional and interagency expertise, civil-military competence, and other critical skills needed to support a local populace and HN government). Even if lack of civilian capacity requires military forces to take on these tasks, military leaders should consult with the country team on the proper COA to follow. Commanders should also seek awareness of NGOs that may be operating in the region and providing for the basic needs of the population. The joint force should strive to support the population and other stakeholders that are supporting the population.

e. **Transitions.** Regardless of the division of labor, an important recurring feature in many operations is transitioning responsibility and participation. Whether the transition is between military units or from a military unit to a civilian agency, all involved must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being passed. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between organizations of different capabilities and capacities. Relationships tend to break down during transitions. A strong emphasis should be placed on cultivating relationships with transition stakeholders. Stakeholder capabilities and resources should be understood, and planned
for to ensure effective, efficient transitions. A transition is not a single event where all activity happens at once. It is a rolling process of little handoffs between different actors along several streams of activities. There are usually multiple transitions for any one stream of activity over time. Integration mechanisms discussed in paragraph 4, “United States Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms,” can help create and sustain the links that support effective transitions without compromising unity of effort.

f. Coordination and Liaison. External stakeholders may have many interests and agendas that military forces cannot and should not try to control. Their local legitimacy is frequently affected by the degree to which local institutions are perceived as independent and capable without external support. Nevertheless, military leaders should make every effort to ensure their actions are as integrated as possible. Active leadership by civilian and military leaders is imperative to effect coordination, establish formal and informal liaison, and share information. Influencing and persuading groups outside a commander’s authority requires skill and often subtlety. Commanders should recognize they will often be in a supporting role, and they may be on the receiving end of being influenced and persuaded by civilian agencies in charge. As commanders pursue unity of effort, they should be mindful of their prominence and recognize the wisdom of acting indirectly and in ways that allow credit for success to go to others—particularly local individuals and organizations. The joint force should remain in a supporting role to appropriate civilian agencies or groups and follow US policy and the COM’s direction.


3. United States Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms

There are several US civil-military integration mechanisms that facilitate unified action. These structures are often employed in missions such as counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief. These mechanisms fall into two general areas: those located outside of the theater and those located in the theater. It is important to note that these are options. They may not always be present, and their relationships can vary.

a. Civil-Military Mechanisms in the US. Key civil-military integration mechanisms located outside of the GCC’s AOR include the NSC, designated interagency working groups established in Washington to provide policy guidance for a theater (e.g., the Iraq Policy and Operations Group, and the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group), and appointed leaders focused on a particular effort.

b. Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms in Theater. GCCs are charged with coordinating US military policy and operations within an assigned AOR. Subordinate JTFs are assigned to conduct joint military operations within a designated operational area. The US country team, advance civilian team (ACT), JFC, executive steering committee, provincial authority, civil-military coordination board, joint CMO task forces, JIATFs, governmental assistance teams (GATs), PRTs, and CMOCs are key civil-military integration mechanisms that are normally located inside the designated
operational area. The more extensive the US participation is in an operation and the more dispersed US forces are throughout a country, the greater the need for additional mechanisms to extend civilian oversight and assistance. Operating with a clear understanding of the guiding political aims, members of the military at all levels must be prepared to exercise judgment and act without the benefit of immediate civilian oversight and control and ultimately to reinforce HN credibility and legitimacy. At each subordinate political level of the HN government, military and civilian leaders should establish the necessary integration mechanisms. These mechanisms should include military and civilian representatives of the HN and other coalition members. Commanders should be aware of the activities of international organizations and NGOs in the theater.

(1) **JIACG.** JIACGs help CCDRs by facilitating unified action in support of plans, operations, contingencies, and initiatives. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. The JIACG is a fully integrated participant on the CCDR’s staff with a daily focus on joint strategic planning. It provides a capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of interagency activities to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated activity. JIACGs include representatives from other USG departments and agencies, and state and local authorities, as well as LNOs from other commands and DOD components. It provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG departments and agencies. Representatives and LNOs are the subject matter experts for their respective agencies and commands. JIACGs provide the bridge between the CCDR and USG interagency partners; however, JIACGs can be called by different names in different CCMDs.

(2) **National-Level GATs.** A national-level GAT supports governance and development at the national level in an uncertain environment. GATs operate by combining civilian and military personnel for development and governance into one cohesive team. A DOS representative is the team leader and a military officer is normally the deputy commander. Personnel from appropriate USG departments and agencies make up the elements focused on governance and development where DOD personnel comprise the civil security focused staffs. However, when civilian agencies lack the capacity, DOD personnel, especially reservists with civilian skills, may be used to mitigate a shortfall. GATs vary in structure, size, and mission to suit their situation. GATs extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate reconstruction. While GATs are primarily concerned with addressing national-level conditions, they also work on building and improving communication and linkages between the central government and regional/local agencies.

(3) **Sub-National GATs.** PRTs, embedded PRTs, and district support teams are examples of sub-national civil-military teams that were formed to address unique aspects of counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. These teams were designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. PRTs vary in structure, size, and mission. PRTs extend the reach, capability, and capacity of governance and facilitate construction.
While PRTs and district support teams are primarily concerned with addressing local conditions, they also work on building and improving communication and linkages between the central government and regional and local agencies.

(4) **ACT.** An ACT may be formed to implement the USG strategic plan for reconstruction and stabilization through development and management of the interagency implementation plan, under the leadership of the COM. The ACT stands up at the USG field HQ, typically the embassy. When established, it is the integrating civilian counterpart of the JTF at the country level. The ACT is comprised of a combination of USG personnel already in-country and other agency personnel deployed to the country from agency HQ or elsewhere.

(5) **ESG.** The COM and a JTF commander can jointly form an ESG. The ESG may be composed of the principals from the JTF, the US embassy, NGOs/international organizations present in the operational area, and other organizations, as appropriate. Lacking another similar forum, the ESG can provide high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies as well as for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG plays a policy role and is charged with interpreting and coordinating operational area aspects of strategic policy. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to participating agencies. The ESG may be charged with formulating, coordinating, and promulgating local and theater policies required for the explanation, clarification, and implementation of US policies. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the JFC and COM or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission and possibly based on the security situation.

(6) **Regional Authority.** Direction and coordination of PRTs is conducted by a national-level interagency steering committee, under the supervision of the COM and JFC (for US-led PRTs) or a multinational executive committee (for coalition-led PRTs). This body will also conduct liaison with the HN national government to support PRT operations. Both embassy and JTF personnel staff the steering committee. Regional authorities may be established with regional commanders overseeing a number of PRTs to ensure coordination between provinces and with national-level objectives. The regional authority coordinates the deployment and operations of all US PRTs in the operational area, including ensuring that PRTs have a long-term vision in synch with the campaign plan. If an ACT has been established at the country level, a decision to deploy field ACTs to sub-national regions or provinces may follow. Field ACTs, which are an element of the ACT and are managed by its HQ, are responsible for implementing plans pertaining to their area of operations and for informing revisions of the overall USG strategic plan and interagency implementation plan. They are also responsible for coordinating planning with any US military entities operating in their area of operations to achieve the objectives in the interagency implementation plan. Field ACTs are primarily local, on-the-ground operational entities, but their role in assessments, plan revisions, and sub-national field level planning is also important.

(7) **Civil-Military Coordination Board.** If established, a civil-military coordination board is the JTF commander’s vehicle for coordinating CMO support.
Membership is typically restricted to key representatives from the JTF staff sections. A senior member of the JTF staff, such as the JTF deputy commander or chief of staff, serves as chairperson of this board. If a CMOC has been established at the JTF level, the CMOC director would be a key member of the board and also may serve as its chairperson. During multinational operations, the JTF commander should normally include multinational partners on the board unless there are compelling reasons not to. The type of C2 structure and the level of staff integration in the JTF should drive the decision to establish a coordination board and determine its membership. Depending on the situation, the JTF commander should include selected members from the US country team on the board.

(8) **JCMOTF.** The JTF commander may establish a JCMOTF to improve CMO. The JCMOTF can provide the JFC a subordinate command to exercise necessary control and coordinating support when the size and scope of the mission is beyond organic CMO capabilities. The JCMOTF should be functionally organized, with augmentation, around an existing command structure. The JFC designates the JCMOTF commander. A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one military department and is formed to carry out CMO. Although the JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there may be a requirement for strong representation of CA. Because of their expertise in dealing with NGOs, international organizations, and USG interagency partners, they will greatly enhance the opportunity for success in counterinsurgency operations. By design, the US Army CA brigade, the maritime CA group, or the USMC CA group can provide the structure to form a JCMOTF in support of the JTF commander. In rare instances, and depending on resource availability, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization.

*For more information, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*
APPENDIX G
NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS

1. General

a. The NG is forward-based in nearly 3,000 communities throughout the US; the territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico; and the District of Columbia. It is readily available to conduct domestic operations, including HD, DSCA, NG civil support, and HS activities. As a military organization, the NG routinely interacts with state and local emergency managers, local law enforcement, first responders, and Title 10, USC, forces. The NG is experienced in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis. NG forces have both federal and state responsibilities specified in the Constitution of the United States; Title 10, USC; Title 32, USC; and applicable state constitutional provisions and statutes. It operates not only as reserve components of the US Army and the USAF supporting the President and their assigned CCMDs when under Titles 10 and/or Title 32, USC, in time of war and in national contingencies, but also as an organized militia supporting governors in domestic operations in Title 32, USC, or state active duty status. It is important that other Service/component commanders and staffs understand that the statutory roles and authorities of NG forces, when acting under state control, vary from state to state.

b. State NG brings unique capabilities; community relationships; and partnerships with local and state governments, NGOs, the private sector, NVOAD, and others to integrate NG capabilities and plans to address emergency response situations. NG state plans are integrated at the local level and also link the NG’s non-federal capabilities to enhance unity of effort.

c. The non-federalized NG is commanded and controlled by the governor through TAG of each state (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, by SecDef through the commanding general of the District of Columbia NG.) TAG exercises C2 through that state’s NG JFHQ-State. The NG JFHQ-State is comprised of ARNG and ANG members of that state. It operates as a C2 organization for ARNG and ANG forces during an emergency response. In addition, they are designed and aligned to correspond to the HQ staff of a CCMD to facilitate a joint approach to plans, operations, and military-to-military coordination. The model depicted in Figure G-1 may be tailored according to state resources and requirements, including the assignment of a DSC who can provide C2 of both federalized and non-federalized forces.

For more information on the DSC, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
d. Additionally, some states maintain organized militias, generally referred to as state defense forces, that are generally integrated as additional forces under the command of the governor through TAG. Such forces may be integrated with ARNG and ANG forces during emergency response. These forces remain under state control and are not subject to DOD direction, regulations, or policy under any circumstances. They are subject to Title 32, USC, Section 109, which provides that state defense forces as a whole may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the Armed Forces of the United States, thus preserving their separation from the NG.
2. National Guard Bureau

   a. NGB is a joint activity of the DOD. Responsibilities of the CNGB include serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, Secretary of the Air Force, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on NG issues; serving as an advisor to CCDRs on NG matters pertaining to their missions; and supporting planning and coordination for such activities. NGB also serves as a channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the NG between SecDef, the CJCS, and DOD components other than the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, and the states. Similarly, it serves as a channel of communication on all matters pertaining to the NG. The CNGB also consults with the heads of the DOD components and the OSD principal staff assistants on NG matters. In addition to these functions, the NGB also provides interorganizational cooperation during operations by providing liaison and shared situational awareness capability and serving as a channel of communications among the NG JFHQs-State, JS, the CCMDs, the Military Departments, and the DOD components when NG JFHQs-State are operating under the C2 of their respective governors. It assists the NG JFHQs-State, with the consent of the governors, by facilitating mutual support among the states to the extent allowed by law, and helps establish unity of effort by facilitating the integration of state NG and DOD planning and other activities. The NG, at all levels, forges strong, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational partnerships to advance NG missions in the homeland, theater security cooperation, and emergency response environments.

   b. NGCC. The NGCC maintains and provides situational awareness and a COP of the NG’s operations and capabilities. Using situational awareness and the COP, the NGCC coordinates and optimizes the NG’s support to all states, territories, the District of Columbia Joint Force HQ, OSD, the CJCS, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and interagency partners. The NGCC is the NGB’s primary communication node and focal point for matters involving the NG.

   For more detailed information on the roles and responsibilities of the CNGB and the NGB, see DODD 5105.77, National Guard Bureau (NGB).

3. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State

   The NG JFHQ-State maintains trained and equipped forces as reserve components of the US Army and USAF and performs missions as directed by the governor of that state or, in the case of the District of Columbia, The Secretary of the Army, and, when federalized, by the President or appropriate federal authorities. The NG JFHQ-State exercises C2 of all ARNG and ANG forces and any ARNG or ANG forces of other states that are operating in that state under EMACs. IAW policies and procedures established by SecDef, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Air Force, the NG JFHQ-State is prepared to provide one or more JTF command elements; provide expertise and situational awareness to DOD authorities to facilitate integration of federal and state activities; participate in federal domestic preparedness planning, training, and exercises; and develop plans coordinated with local, state, and federal authorities and agencies. NG JFHQ-State gives DOD a focused communications channel through NGB between OSD,
JS, CCDRs (e.g., CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM), and the non-federalized NG; joint C2 for non-federalized NG operations; and a joint C2 capability in each state for Title 10, USC, HD, DSCA, and other related operations. In this respect, NG JFHQ-State is able to bridge the state and federal components of government as well as bridge the active and reserve components of the US military in a way that complements the constitutional roles and authorities of the state and federal governments. In addition, NG JFHQ-State:

a. Provides specific C2 and integration capabilities. The focus is on shared situational awareness and unity/continuity of effort under frequently complex command relationships and overlapping authorities.

b. Facilitates integration of DOD joint capabilities for HD, DSCA, NG civil support, and HS with local, state, and federal agencies.

c. Improves unity of effort among military organizations of all Services and components.

d. When a dual-status command relation is authorized, a DSC can facilitate unity of effort between state and federal military forces conducting domestic operations.

e. Creates synergy in many states where TAG is also the state HS and/or emergency operations director. See Figure G-2 for an overview of these roles.

For more information on NG JFHQ-State, refer to DODD 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQs-State). For more information on DSC, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

f. Enhances states’ ability to plan and operate in joint, interagency, and intergovernmental environments.

g. Plans, monitors, assesses, and guides the execution of TAG/commander decisions while maintaining and promoting situational awareness by all partners.

h. Maintains a deployable communications element. NG JFHQ-State may have joint incident site communications capability available for HD and DSCA operations.

4. National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State Joint Operations Center

The NG JFHQ-State joint operations center in each state is the fusion center for state (and territory) military operations. As the focal point for all domestic operational matters, its primary tasks are to initiate response to, monitor, alert, notify, and report on all activities ranging from natural or man-made disasters, terrorist attacks, NSSEs, or any civil-military related incidents in the state or territory. The NG JFHQ-State joint operations center monitors, plans, assesses, and assists the civil authorities; maintains and promotes situational awareness by all mission partners and agencies; and keeps the NGB aware of its actions and need for assistance.
5. Joint Task Force-State

a. Each state and territory is capable of fielding one or more JTF command element(s) to provide C2 for operations within the state. The joint task force-state (JTF-State) may be formed around an existing ARNG or ANG unit within the state, or may be formed as a sub-organization of an NG JFHQ-State. This JTF-State may function under the control of the governor (i.e., in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status), when federalized (i.e., Title 10, USC, status), or it may be a DSC.

*For more details on a DSC, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.*

b. As depicted in Figure G-3, the JTF-State commander interacts with multiple outside elements in working to achieve unity of effort in support of domestic operations. C2 always remains vested in the governor and TAG of that state, unless the forces and HQ in question have been federalized under Title 10, USC.
c. For response to a major incident, the JTF-State commander may have a variety of forces deployed. A governor or TAG may direct deployment of NG forces (e.g., a WMD-civil support team; a CBRN and high-yield explosives-enhanced response force package; or homeland response force) and these forces respond to an incident under state active duty or Title 32, USC, authorities. This includes interstate compact agreements or EMAC requests. Forces allocated to DOD CBRN response force or the C2 CBRN response elements will conduct operations in Title 10, USC, status under federal control. The C2 structures in response to an incident are dependent on the nature and size of the incident.

For more information on NG CBRN capabilities, see CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland; and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.
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The development of JP 3-08 is based upon the following primary references.

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   b. The Foreign Assistance Act (Title 22, USC, Sections 2151-2431k).
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   d. National Narcotics Leadership Act (Title 21, USC, Sections 1521-1524).
   e. Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18, USC, Section 1385).
   f. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Title 42, USC, Sections 5121-5207).
   g. DOD’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Authorities (Title 10, USC, Sections 401-407, 2557, 2561).
   h. PPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.
   i. PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013.
   k. National Protection Framework.
   l. National Prevention Framework.
   m. National Mitigation Framework.
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b. DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

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f. DODD 3025.14, Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad.

g. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

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q. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).
r. DODI 3020.48, *Guidance for Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)-Related Conferencing Coordination Activities Implementation.*

s. DODI 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.*

t. DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.*

u. DODI 3025.22, *The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.*

v. DODI 4000.19, *Support Agreements.*

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x. DODI 4515.13, *Air Transportation Eligibility.*

y. DODI C-5105.81, *Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies (U).*

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aa. DODI 6010.22, *National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).*

bb. DODI 8220.02, *Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations.*


dd. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

3. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications*


   b. CJCSI 3125.01D, *Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland.*

   c. CJCSI 3214.01E, *Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.*

   d. CJCSI 3710.01B, *DOD Counterdrug Support.*

   e. CJCSI 5130.01F, *Relationships Between Commanders of Combatant Commands and International Commands and Organizations (U).*
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f. CJCSI 5205.01C, Implementing Instructions for Defense Attaché Offices and Security Cooperation Organizations (U).

g. CJCSI 5715.01C, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

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i. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.


l. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

m. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

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o. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations.

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t. JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.


v. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

w. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

x. JP 3-13, Information Operations.


z. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.


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gg. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.*


ii. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs.*


kk. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics.*

ll. JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System.*

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oo. JP 4-08, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.*


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u. USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It.


w. James McArthur, Andrew Carswell, Jason Cone, Faith Chamberlain, John Dyer, Dale Erickson, George Katsos, Michael Marx, James Ruf, Lisa Schirch, and Patrick Shea,


5. Multi-Service Publication

APPENDIX J
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the Director for Joint Force Development (J-7). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011. The appendices in JP 3-08 will be updated on an as needed basis per requests from interorganizational stakeholders with modifications, deletions, or additions that have been approved by the Joint Doctrine Division.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine (DD JED), Attn: Joint Doctrine Division, 7000 Joint Staff (J-7), Washington, DC 20318-7000 or email:js.pentagon.j7.list.dd-je-d-jdd-all@mail.mil.

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and
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policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil or http://www.jllis.smil.mil.

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia- Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACT advance civilian team
AJP Allied joint publication
ANG Air National Guard
AOR area of responsibility
APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution
ARC American Red Cross
ARNG Army National Guard
ASD(HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and
            Global Security)
ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and
             Low-Intensity Conflict)
ASPR Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (DHHS)
AU African Union

BIS Bureau of Industry and Security (DOC)

C2 command and control
CA civil affairs
CAF Conflict Assessment Framework (USAID)
CBP Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCMD combatant command
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS)
CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIP critical infrastructure protection
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJOC Canada Joint Operations Command
CJTF commander, joint task force
CMC Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (USAID)
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau
CNMI Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<td>deputy development advisor</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
<td>dual-status commander</td>
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<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
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<td>DSPD</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>federal coordinating officer</td>
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<td>functional campaign plan</td>
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<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>humanitarian coordinator</td>
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<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>incident command system</td>
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<td>IDENT</td>
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<td>JCMOTF</td>
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<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>joint field office</td>
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<td>JIACG</td>
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<td>JIATF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
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<td>JLOC</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>MARAD</td>
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<td>MARAD RRF</td>
<td>Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force</td>
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<td>MC</td>
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<td>MITAM</td>
<td>mission tasking matrix</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>multinational corporation</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<td>MOC</td>
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<td>MOTR</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
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<td>MPAT</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
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<td>NA5CRO</td>
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**Societies**
- ILAB: Bureau of International Labor Affairs (DOL)
- INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization
- IO: information operations
- IOM: International Organization for Migration
- IPC: interagency policy committee
- IPI: indigenous populations and institutions
- IRC: information-related capability
- ISE: information sharing environment
- ITA: International Trade Administration (DOC)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCH</td>
<td>natural and cultural resources and historic properties (DOI)</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
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<td>NDMS</td>
<td>National Disaster Medical System (DHHS)</td>
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<td>NDRF</td>
<td>National Defense Reserve Fleet</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>NGA</td>
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<td>National Guard Coordination Center</td>
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<td>NG JFHQ-State</td>
<td>National Guard joint force headquarters-state</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NIH</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>NJTTF</td>
<td>National Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
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<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DOC)</td>
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<td>NPF</td>
<td>national planning framework</td>
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<td>National Response Framework</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSC/DC</td>
<td>National Security Council/Deputies Committee</td>
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<td>NSC/IPC</td>
<td>National Security Council/interagency policy committee</td>
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<td>NVOAD</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
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<td>PERMREP</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
<td>Presidential policy directive</td>
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<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DOS)</td>
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<td>request for assistance</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>recovery support function</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
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<td>SDO/DATT</td>
<td>senior defense official/defense attaché</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
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<td>SOST</td>
<td>special operations support team</td>
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<td>special security center</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
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<td>troop contributing country</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations country team</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDOPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USC</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>Department of Veterans Affairs</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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**PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

**chief of mission.** The principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual temporarily assigned to be in charge of such a facility. Also called **COM.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**development assistance.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**disaster assistance response team.** A team deployed by the United States Agency for International Development, if a large-scale, urgent, and/or extended response is necessary, to provide specialists to assist the chief of mission and the United States Agency for International Development mission (where present) with the management of the United States Government response to a disaster. Also called **DART.** (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**domestic intelligence.** Intelligence relating to activities or conditions within the United States that threaten internal security and that might require the employment of troops; and intelligence relating to activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the Department of Defense. (DOD Dictionary. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**downgrade.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**interagency.** Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DOD Dictionary. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**intergovernmental organization.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**internal security.** The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (DOD Dictionary. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**interorganizational cooperation.** The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (Approved for replacement of “interorganizational coordination” and its definition in the DOD Dictionary.)

**joint interagency coordination group.** A staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Also called **JIACG.** (DOD Dictionary. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**lead agency.** The United States Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**liaison.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)
**nongovernmental organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO.** (DOD Dictionary. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

**principal officer.** The officer in charge of a diplomatic mission, consular office, or other foreign service post, such as a United States liaison office. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature