THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Operations Department
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EMPLOYMENT
OR RESERVE COMPONENT:
EXTRACTS OF LESSONS LEARNED

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WR-10 (Cover Page)
Gulf War was a Test of Reserve Components and They Passed
by Honorable Stephen M. Duncan

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Mr. Duncan is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. This article is taken from his 24 April testimony to the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

It took less than a week for the Army Reserve’s 100th Division (Training) in Kentucky to mobilize 1,147 soldiers for an armor training force at Ft. Knox, Ky., as part of the Operation Desert Storm buildup.

Since August 1990, the nation’s reliance on Reserve forces has been tested in ways that are unprecedented since the addition of the Total Force Policy.

As a consequence of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and of the first Presidential authorization to call up Reserve forces in over two decades, the Secretary of Defense authorized the military departments to call to active duty as many as 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve.

Almost 228,000 of those Reservists have actually been ordered to active duty and 106,000 have served in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.

Tens of thousands of additional Reservists have volunteered or have been called to active duty to serve at bases in the United States and in other parts of the world.

I would not presume to include in this statement a discussion of all of the many factors that contributed to the historic victory of our armed forces in the Persian Gulf War, but there can be no doubt that both the call to active duty and the performance of the National Guardsmen and Reservists who have served in connection with that conflict, have been marked by extraordinary success.

In his address to the Congress and the nation on 6 March the President declared,..."this victory belongs...to the regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history."

In testimony to the Congress on 7 February, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the contributions of the Reserve components to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as "magnificent." On 6 March, the commander in chief of Forces
WRAP-UP

Government Gave Its Share To Mobilization

Some of the most experienced members of the Reserve Components to be mobilized were already in federal service. They are government civilian workers.

That was determined by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). It found that of the 17,500 government workers called up with Reserve or Guard units, the average was a middle-aged white male well along in his federal career. The report found that only a few called did not go on active duty because of serious health or family problems. A very few were exempted because of critical federal jobs—and they may have to make a choice soon.

Not counting the US Postal Service and some other agencies, more than 16,000 "feds" went on active duty. Here are some statistics quoted by Mike Causey in the Washington Post on 8 May.

- Average age of 38.2 years with 11.8 years of government service compared with the government-wide average of 41.6 years of age and 12.1 years of service.
- Blue collar workers—skilled and trade employees—made up 43 percent of those mobilized compared to the 17.2 percent of those workers on the government payroll.
- More than 77 percent were Defense civilians compared to 45.9 percent of the total civilian force.
- Reserve Component personnel mobilized included 5,600 from the Air Force, 5,000 Army, 2,000 Department of Veterans Affairs, and 1,400 Navy. The Postal Service estimated that 1,500 of its employees were called.
- More than 550 mobilized were in civil service grades 13 through 15. A dozen members of the Senior Executive Service were called, taking big pay cuts.—HMH

Company B, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division of Yakima, Wash., was a shining example of readiness and training when it deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of the 2nd Marine Division. In a total of four engagements in February, it accounted for 59 Iraqi tanks with no losses to its own. Photos by John and Vern Forenpohar, from left below, from Company B, 4th Tank Battalion.

Command informed Congress that the performance of National Guardsmen and
Reservists has been "one of the major success stories of the entire operation."

The anecdotal stories about the performance of both Reserve combat and support units are legion, but the stories of Company B of the 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division, a Reserve unit from Yakima, Wash., and of the Air Force Reserve's 926th Tactical Fighter Group from New Orleans, La., are illustrative.

In December, Company B was ordered to active duty. Leaving its aging M60A1 tanks at home, the unit proceeded to Saudi Arabia after stopping for 18 days at the

The mechanics form the 4th Tank Battalion's Baltimore, Md., unit were activated in November, processed at Camp Pendleton, Calif., as shown here with the Maryland flag, then deployed to the Persian Gulf in the amphibious ship USS Mount Vernon. They spent a few days ashore on Kuwait, and were scheduled to return to the United States by the same ship in June until they were suddenly diverted to Bangladesh to assist with cyclone relief. Photo by LCpl. Patrick J. Hart, USMCR.

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, Calif., to train on modern M1A1 tanks. The training was completed on 14 February. The unit deployed three days later.

Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia on 19 February the unit picked up 13 M1A1s and took them into battle on 24 February, with the 2nd Marine Division. In its first engagement shortly before dawn on 25 February, Company B detected (using night vision devices) an Iraqi Mechanized Brigade. A formation of T72s (Iraq's most modern tank) was passing through another formation of Iraqi T55 tanks that were dug into revetments.

In an action that lasted only a few minutes, Company B destroyed or stopped 34 of 35 enemy tanks. In a total of four engagements Company B accounted for 59 enemy tanks, including 30 T72s.

Elements of the 926th Tactical Fighter Group were the first to score an air-to-air kill in the A-10 fighter. The unit was credited with two air-to-air kills and in the last days of combat, one pair of pilots from the 926th destroyed 20 Scud launchers.

To fully understand the extent of the nation's reliance on Reserve forces in the conflict, it is useful to focus first on its several stages.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. On 8 August, the President announced the major deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia to take up defensive positions against an attack by Iraqi troops and the Kuwait border.

The subsequent deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia was one of
the most challenging deployments in our nation’s history. In the first three weeks of the operation, the United States deployed more military capability than it did during the first three months of the Korean conflict.

Even before the President authorized an involuntary call-up of Reserve forces, Reserve volunteers made major contributions to Operation Desert Shield. More than 500 Reservists volunteered for active duty on the first day of the deployment. As soon as the decision was made to deploy forces to Southwest Asia, volunteers from the Air Reserve Components responded immediately to perform vital strategic airlift and tanker support missions with C-5, C-141, C-130 and KC-135 aircraft.

In August 1990 alone, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard volunteers flew 42 percent of the strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions.

By the time that Operation Desert Storm commenced on 16 January 1991, more than 188,000 personnel and 375,000 short tons of equipment had been airlifted by the Air Reserve Components to Saudi Arabia. Air Reserve Component volunteers also performed important maintenance, medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police operations.

Volunteers from the other Reserve components also provided critical skills. Army Reserve volunteers promptly addressed urgent water-purification, supply distribution and other support needs. Naval Reserve volunteers supported air operations with C-9 airlift and performed important medical, logistics support, intelligence and cargo handling missions.
Coast Guard Reserve volunteers provided port security and supervised and controlled the loading of explosives and other hazardous materials. Army National Guard volunteers also made important contributions by providing military police and movement control assistance.

By 22 August, the date on which the President authorized the involuntary activation of selected Reserve units and individuals, more than 10,000 volunteers from all of the Reserve Components were serving on active duty. The challenge was to match the military skills of the volunteers to those skills which were needed.

On 22 August, 20 days after the Iraqi invasion, and less than two weeks after the first US forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, the President signed Executive Order No. 12727, exercising Title 10, Section 673b of the US Code. By that action he authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve.

The exercise of Section 673b was the first involuntary call to active duty of Reserve forces since the adoption of the "Total Force" concept in the early 1970s. The next day, Secretary Cheney delegated authority to the secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty as many as 48,800 members of the Selected Reserve.

Ceilings of 25,000, 14,500, 6,300 and 3,000 were established for the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, respectively. The Secretary of Transportation authorized the Coast Guard to order to active duty as many as 1,250 Coast Guard Reservists.

On 24 August, the first call to active duty of specific Selected Reserve units from the Air Reserve Components was announced. Later the same day, the Army National Guard began giving advance notice to certain units, and within the next two days the first Army Guard and Army Reserve units were ordered to active duty.

Selected Reservists from the Navy and Coast Guard were also called. Units from the Marine Corps Selected Reserve were not called until 11 October because the initial plans for Desert Shield did not contemplate their use.

By 14 November the Army had activated 235 National Guard and Reserve units including 24,000 personnel from 44 states and Puerto Rico. Medical, maintenance, terminal operations, and a variety of other critical combat support and combat service support units were called to fill shortfalls in both in the continental United States and Saudi Arabia. More than 285 Naval Reserve units from 39 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were ordered to active duty.

Many of the units called, especially those with medical skills, were used to backfill critical vacancies created by the deployment of active duty personnel from CONUS facilities. Other Naval Reservists were
called to participate in cargo-handling, minesweeping, control or shipping, sealift, logistics and intelligence missions.

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<th>COMPONENT</th>
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<td>Maintenance</td>
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<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
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<td>7,731</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare</td>
<td>197</td>
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</table>
Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield

By 13 January 1991, a total of 146,106 Selected Reservists had been called to active duty in accordance with Section 673b and thousands of Reserve volunteers remained on active duty.

As the table [above] demonstrates, the Reservists were engaged in a wide range of activities and missions.

It is important to note that even before the armed conflict began, various combat units from the Selected Reserve were called to active duty along with a wide range of support units from each of the services. The labeling distinction between "combat" and "support" units and
personnel can be more artificial than real, but it is fact that by 15 January, the following National Guard and Reserve units were already serving in the Kuwait Theater of Operations:

Unit (Number of Personnel)

Army
142nd Field Artillery Brigade (1410)
196th Field Artillery Brigade (1490)

Marine Corps
14th Artillery Regiment (1150)
4th Tank Battalion (400)
8th Tank Battalion (950)
2/24th Infantry Battalion (810)
3/23rd Infantry Battalion (890)
1/25th Infantry Battalion (760)
3/24th Infantry Battalion (800)

Air Force
152nd Tactical Recon Group (140)
174th Tactical Fighter Wing (450)
169th Tactical Fighter Group (580)
926th Tactical Fighter Group (425)

Navy
USS Impervious (Minesweeper) (30)
USS Adroit (Minesweeper) (20)

Selected Reserve Combat Units Called Prior to Operation Desert Storm

On 5 November, Congress amended Section 673b to permit the activation by the President (in connection with Operation Desert Shield only) of combat units of the Selected Reserve for an extended period of time, up to 360 days. Only three days later, three Army National Guard "roundout" combat brigades were notified of the Army’s plans to activate them.

On 16 January, Operation Desert Storm commenced. On 18 January, the President authorized the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation to order to active duty members of the Ready Reserve, including units and individuals of both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve, pursuant to the provisions of Section 673 of Title 10, United States Code.

The immediate impact of the authorization was twofold. First, it permitted retention on active duty of certain Reservists who had critically needed skills for a period longer than the cumulative total of the 180 days authorized by Section 673b of Title 10.

Second, it permitted a call to active duty of a total number of Ready Reservists in excess of the 200,000 authorized by Section 673b.
The following day, Secretary Cheney authorized the secretaries of the military departments to order to active duty units and individuals of the Ready Reserve. The services were authorized to call as many as 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve, including 220,000 members of the Army Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Naval Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Marine Corps Ready Reserve, and 52,000 members of the Air Force Ready Reserve.

The subsequent call to active duty of members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was the first such call since May 1968. Members of the IRR are not assigned to units, have usually served previously on active duty or in the Selected Reserve, and have a remaining military service obligation. When Operation Desert Shield commenced, the IRR (including the inactive National Guard) constituted some 13 percent of the Total Force and 28.6 percent of the Ready Reserve.

When combat operations in Desert Storm ceased on 28 February, a total of 222,614 members of the Ready Reserve had been called to active duty, including 202,337 Selected Reservists and 20,277 members of the IRR.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>18 Nov</th>
<th>25 Nov</th>
<th>2 Dec</th>
<th>9 Dec</th>
<th>23 Dec</th>
<th>13 Jan</th>
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<td>Army</td>
<td>32,938</td>
<td>52,058</td>
<td>69,240</td>
<td>83,720</td>
<td>87,567</td>
<td>102,172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>4,616</td>
<td>5,416</td>
<td>6,849</td>
<td>6,979</td>
<td>7,428</td>
<td>11,366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,733</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>5,639</td>
<td>6,895</td>
<td>10,492</td>
<td>14,328</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>3,932</td>
<td>10,551</td>
<td>15,861</td>
<td>16,354</td>
<td>17,962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>278</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43,668</td>
<td>66,414</td>
<td>92,557</td>
<td>113,733</td>
<td>122,131</td>
<td>146,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selected Reservists (Unit Personnel) Called Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 637b.

The table [above] summarizes the number of Ready Reservists who have been called to date, including those called subsequent to the cessation of hostilities to assist in the return of equipment and units to the United States or the process of demobilization.

Subsequent to the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973, and until 22 August 1990, no unit or individual of the Ready Reserve had been involuntarily called to active duty. All available indicators reflected the high quality of Reserve personnel, but there was no historical experience upon which to base conclusions about their likely responsiveness to involuntary calls to active duty. While a test of the responsiveness or randomly selected units of the Selected Reserve was conducted on 24-26 October 1987, that test was limited in that it involved only 15,451 Selected Reservists from 120 units, and it did not involve personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve.

I informed the Congress in early 1988 that more than 92 percent of the Reservists contacted in that test reported to their Reserve center or armory (or were excused), but I could not inform the Congress of the
readiness or capability of the units involved in the test since readiness and capability were not tested.

The fact that it had not been necessary for any President to call Reservists to active duty in more than two decades caused some observers to believe that Reservists would not be called for any reason short of a global conflict.

Training Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) was the task of activated members of the 100th Division (Training) at Ft. Knox, Ky., for two months. Above, live ammunition was used on the armor firing ranges. When deactivation came by the end of March, they had trained more than 3,000 plus their own drill sergeants. At left, Col. Bill Barron pinned the National Defense Service Medal on his troopers before they left Ft. Knox; deactivation ceremony appears below. With the war over, welcome home celebrations became commonplace around America.

Two of the most impressive and rewarding aspects of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, however, have been the smoothness of the process by which Reservists have been activated, and the responsiveness of Reservists in every service to the nation’s call to arms in what the commander in chief of Forces Command has called "the largest, fastest mobilization since WW II."

The responsiveness to orders to active duty of units and individuals from the Ready Reserve was very impressive. They responded with alacrity and high motivation. No significant problems were encountered and with minor exceptions, the number of Ready Reservists who were unable to deploy was comparable to that of active units.

The fact that almost 228,000 Ready Reservists have responded in this way is, by itself, eloquent testimony to the quality of the modern American National Guardsman and Reservist.

The last 18 months have been a remarkable period for the nation’s Reserve forces. Volunteer National Guardsmen and Reservists and those who have been called to active duty have engaged in armed conflicts in Southwest Asia and Panama.

More than 228,000 Reservists responded to the nation’s call to arms in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They performed vital combat and support missions with high motivation and professionalism. They made great personal sacrifices to serve and 71 of them paid the ultimate sacrifice for freedom.

We will be studying our experiences in this most recent conflict for some time. We cannot yet predict with certainty what effect the conflict will have, if any, on our future ability to recruit and retain quality individuals in each of the Reserve components, but whatever the future holds, we are absolutely secure in our belief that the Reserve
forces of the United States are today the best in the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Selected Reserve</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>126,037</td>
<td>13,170</td>
<td>139,207</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>19,948</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19,963</td>
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<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>26,659</td>
<td>6,204</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
<td>33,792</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>34,634</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>990</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>207,426</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,231</strong></td>
<td><strong>227,657</strong></td>
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Selected Reservists Called to Active Duty as of 10 March 1991
War Confirms Total Force Policy

Performance of Guard, Reserve Forces A-One

By Stephen M. Duncan,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

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In the 1990 edition of ROAs NATO Reserve Forces Review, I noted that the objective of our nation’s Total Force Policy is to integrate the capabilities and strengths of Active and Reserve units and personnel in a manner that gives us the greatest total military capability and flexibility possible within budgetary limitations. I also noted that the best measure of quality and readiness of Reserve Forces is actual performance. Little did I anticipate then, that in this year’s edition--and at the CIOR-NRFC Conference in Paris, France, this month--I would be describing the recent performance of all of our US Reserve Components in a major armed conflict 8,000 miles from American shores.

Since August 1990, the wisdom of the Total Force Policy and our nation’s reliance on Reserve Forces has been tested in ways that are unprecedented since the adoption of the policy. As a consequence of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and of the first presidential call-up of Reserve Forces in over two decades, the Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney authorized the call to active duty of 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve. In excess of 228,000 of those Reservists were actually ordered to active duty and 106,000 served in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO). Tens of thousands of additional Reservists volunteered or were called to active duty to serve at bases in the United States and in other parts of the world. Many of these Reserve units also would deploy to Europe in the event of a crisis involving NATO.

In his address to the American people on 6 March 1991, President George Bush declared that"...This victory belongs...to the regular, to the National Guard, to the Reserves. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history." In testimony to the US Congress on 7 February, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell, USA, described the contributions of the American Reserve Components to

Air Force members get their fair share of adventure training. A Reservist (above) has her gas gear checked by the instructor prior to repelling from a helicopter.

A young second lieutenant (left) goes through Basic Infantry Officers Course at Ft. Benning, home of the Infantry School. There is no distinction made between Active or Reserve officers. Each is required to successfully complete the Advanced Officers Course and
Command and General Staff Officers courses in order to be promoted or be retained in the Reserves or on active duty.

Table 1: Use of Selected Reservists in Operation Desert Shield

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Desert Shield and Desert Storm as "magnificent." On 6 March, the Commander in Chief of US Forces Command informed the Congress that the performance of National Guard members and Reservists was "one of the major success stories of the entire operation."

As NATO plans for the future, the proven capabilities of Alliance Reserve Forces will constitute even greater deterrence to potential aggressors.

To fully understand the extent of America’s reliance on Reserve Forces in the Persian Gulf conflict, it is useful to focus on the several stages of that conflict.

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. On 8 August, President Bush announced the major deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia to rake up defensive positions against an attack by Iraqi troops across the Kuwait border. The subsequent deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia was one of the most challenging deployments in our nation’s history. In the first three weeks of the operation, the United States deployed more military capability than it did during the first three months of the Korean Conflict.

Even before the President authorized an involuntary call-up of Reserve Forces, Reserve volunteers made major contributions to Operation Desert Shield. Over 500 Reservists volunteered for active duty on the first day of the deployment. As soon as the decision was made to deploy forces to Southwest Asia, volunteers from the Air Reserve Components responded immediately to perform vital strategic airlift and tanker-support missions with C-5, C-141, C-130, and KC-135 aircraft. In August 1990 alone, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve volunteers flew 42 percent of the strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions.

Volunteers from the other Reserve Components also provided critical skills. Army Reserve volunteers promptly addressed urgent water-purification, supply distribution, and other support needs. Naval Reserve volunteers supported air operations with C-9 aircraft and performed important medical, logistics support, intelligence, and
cargo-handling missions. Coast Guard Reserve volunteers provided port security and supervised and controlled the loading of explosives and other hazardous materials. Army National Guard volunteers also made important contributions by providing military police and movement control assistance. By the time the President authorized the involuntary activation of Selected Reserve units and individuals, more than 10,000 volunteers from all of the Reserve Components were serving on active duty. The challenge was to match the military skills of the volunteers to those skills which were needed.

Selected Reserve Call-Up

On 22 August 1990, 20 days after the Iraqi invasion and less than two weeks after the first US forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, President Bush authorized the Secretary of Defense to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists of units and individuals that are so essential to initial wartime missions that they are paid to train on a regular basis and have priority over other Reserve Forces.

As I noted last year, the President may order to active duty as many as 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve--without any additional approval of the Congress--for a period of 90 days, for either an armed conflict or any type of peacetime operational mission. Reservists who are called for an initial period of 90 days may be required to serve an additional 90 days if the President deems it necessary. The exercise of this authority in the Persian Gulf was the first involuntary call-up of American Reserve Forces since the adoption of the Total Force Concept in the early 1970s.

On 24 August, the first call to active duty of specific Selected Reserve units from the Air Reserve Components was announced. Later the same day, the Army National Guard began giving advance notice to certain units, and within the next two days the first Army National Guard and Army Reserve units were ordered to active duty. By 14 November 1990, the Army had activated 235 National Guard and Reserve units, including 24,000 personnel, from 44 states and territories.

On 1 December 1990, the Secretary of Defense authorized the armed forces to order to active duty a total of 188,000 members of the Selected Reserve, including as many as 115,000 members of the Army Selected Reserve, 30,000 members of the Navy Selected Reserve, 20,000 members of the Air Force Selected Reserve, and 23,000 members of the Marine Corps Selected Reserve. By 13 January 1991, a total of 146,106 Selected Reservists had been called to active duty As Table 1 demonstrates, the Reservists were engaged in a wide range of activities and missions.

Ready Reserve Call-Up

January, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to order to active duty members of the Ready Reserve, including units and individuals of both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Members of the IRR are not assigned to units, have usually served previously on active duty or in the Selected Reserve, and have a remaining military service obligation. The following day, Secretary Cheney authorized the armed forces to order to active duty as many as 360,000 members of the Ready Reserve, including 220,000 members of the Army Ready Reserve, 44,000 members of the Naval Ready Reserve, 52,000 members of the Air Force Ready Reserve, and 44,000 members of the Marine Corps Ready Reserve. The subsequent call to active duty of members of the IRR was the first such call since May 1968. When Operation Desert Shield commenced, the IRR constituted some 13 percent of the Total Force and 28.6 percent of the Ready Reserve.

By 10 March 1991, less than two weeks after combat operations in Desert Storm ceased, a total of 227,657 members of the Ready Reserve had been called to active duty, including 207,426 Selected Reservists and 20,231 members of the IRR. Table 2 summarizes the number of Ready Reservists who had been called to date [1 May], including those called subsequent to the cessation of hostilities to assist in the return of equipment and units to the United States or the process of demobilization.

The deployment of US forces to the Persian Gulf was the largest logistics operation since the Vietnam Conflict. In the deserts of the Persian Gulf, Guardsmembers and Reservists of combat, combat service, and combat service-support units were mobilized to participate fully with the Active Component in many essential aspects of the operation.

A hero’s welcome greets US troops returning from the Persian Gulf (left and above). Across the country, every township is honoring their citizen-soldiers who served in Operation Desert Storm.

Performance

The anecdotal stories about the performance of both Reserve Combat and support units are legion, but the stories of Company B or the 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division, a Reserve unit from Yakima, Wash. and of the Air Force Reserves 926th Tactical Fighter Group from New Orleans, La. are illustrative. In December 1990, Company B was ordered to active duty. Leaving its aging M60A1 tanks at home, the unit proceeded to Saudi Arabia after stopping for 18 days at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, Calif., to train on modern M1A1 tanks. The training was completed on 14 February. The unit deployed three days later. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia on 19 February, the unit picked up 13 M1A1s and took them into battle on 24 February 1991 with the 2nd Marine Division. In its first engagement shortly before dawn on 25 February, Company B detected (using night division devices) an Iraqi
Mechanized Brigade. A formation of T72s (Iraq’s most modern tank) was passing through another formation of Iraqi T55 tanks that were dug into revetments. In an action that lasted only a few minutes, Company "B" destroyed or stopped 34 of 35 enemy tanks. In a total of four engagements, Company "B" accounted for 59 enemy tanks, including US National Guard and Reserve Forces regularly train overseas in support of both US and NATO operational missions. Their performance in the Persian Gulf crisis proved that they are string, well-trained, capable of performing their respective missions.

The Navy relies on the Naval Reserve to be the major repository of a number of important warfare skills, such as mine warfare and mobile inshore undersea warfare. The Naval Reserve Force has an inventory of 45 ships, two Reserve carrier wings, and 13 anti-submarine squadrons in addition to Reservists who support the Active fleet and shore establishments with their ongoing missions.

30 T72s. Elements of the 926th Tactical Fighter Group were the first to score in air-to-air kill in the A-10 fighter. The unit was credited with two air-to-air kills, and in the last days of combat, the pair of pilots from the 926th destroyed 20 Scud Launchers.

Table 2: Ready Reservists Recalled (as of 10 March 1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Selected Reserve</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>126,037</td>
<td>13,170</td>
<td>139,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>19,948</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>33,792</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>34,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>26,659</td>
<td>6,204</td>
<td>32,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>207,426</td>
<td>20,231</td>
<td>227,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subsequent to the adoption of the Total Force Policy in 1973 and until 22 August 1990, no unit or individual of either the Selected Reserve or the Individual Ready Reserve had been involuntarily called to active duty. The responsiveness to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm by American Reserve Forces and their performance, in what has been described as "the largest, fastest mobilization since World War II," was remarkably successful by any standard.

American Reservists performed vital combat and support missions in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and 71 of them paid the ultimate sacrifice for freedom.

Much of the success of our Reserve Forces was the result of their previous participation with other NATO forces in intensive overseas training exercises. Years of peacetime training in the deployment of
Reserve units to unfamiliar locations and in rigorous exercises like REFORGER in Europe paid large dividends when it became necessary to activate large numbers of Reservists for the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Our task is to build on this success as we mold the strengths of our Active, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guard members into a Total Force that can continue to stand as a bulwark against future tyrants who threaten freedom.

The EA-6B Prowler provides an umbrella of protection for the fleet by allowing strike aircraft to operate by denying the enemy use of radar, data links, and communications.
Sealift Supports "Shield" and "Storm"

"All Hands" Pitch in

by Cdr. William E. Legg, USNR (Ret.), Director, Navy Affairs, ROA

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The ROA Navy Section was privileged to be briefed by the Director of Naval Intelligence, RAdm. Thomas A Brooks, USN, and the Commander, Military Sealift Command, VAdm, Francis R. Donovan, USN, during the 1991 Mid-Winter Meeting. The following is a summary of Admiral Donovan’s remarks with the author’s comments. (The sensitivity of Admiral Brooks’s remarks preclude their publication.)

An army may travel on its stomach, but it will require sealift support if it is to travel very far or stay very long.

Admiral Donovan did not utter these precise words, but his principal message was the same. His other major point was that despite the image that may have been conveyed by the news media, the vast majority of supplies and equipment transported by sealift arrived on schedule.

Another message from Admiral Donovan was the dependence of his command on Naval Reservists. Approximately 400 Naval Reservists have augmented the Military Sealift Command (MSC) headquarters, area commands, and Military Sealift Command offices at ports worldwide, making up at least 60 percent of MSC’s military staff. Many were volunteers who were essential to the success of the initial stage of operations and were subsequently recalled to active duty for up to one year.

Two Phases

As of the time of the luncheon presentation by Admiral Donovan, the sealift operation had been in two major phases. Phase One started as soon as the President decided to send forces to Saudi Arabia to forestall any plans by Saddam Hussein to invade that country after his conquest of Kuwait. Naturally, the first forces to be sent to Saudi Arabia were airlifted. However, the transport of the massive volume of supplies necessary to equip fully and maintain and sustain the increasing number of deployed forces by ship also had to start immediately.

Phase One of the sealift operation officially started on August 1990 from a cold start"—no 30-, 60-, or 90-day-warning as in most scenarios—"and with only the 71 (including 59 dry cargo) ships routinely available to MSC. This operation was immediately augmented by a few
volunteer Reservists who supplemented the existing MSC staff in the planning and coordination of ship movements and many volunteer Coast Guard Reservists who supervised loading and provided port security at East Coast ports of embarkation. In addition, "all hands" pitched in. There were many hours of extra effort by all the military and civilian personnel working in the logistics chain of each of the services and within the Military Sealift Command.

One of the first tasks was to start the break-out of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and to identify, locate, and then contract for the services of the required number

Naval Reservists worked diligently around the clock to ensure that Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships were loaded; with inventories in order (left); were fully outfitted and ready for emergencies (above); and were safe to sail (right). These tasks were performed at naval sites all around the country and the Reservists proved that they were ready and able.

The ability to load and off-load quickly the roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ships, such as the PFC James Anderson, Jr., was critical to the rapid supply of our deployed forces. The ship is used for the mobile, long-term storage of vehicles, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other material to resupply a US Marine Amphibious Brigade anywhere in the world.

of commercial ships, both foreign and domestic. Another challenge facing MSC was the signing of crews for the ships activated from the RRF.

Another critical aspect of Strategic Sealift functioned exactly as planned—the use of Maritime Pre-positioned Ships. Two squadrons of these ships were ordered to the Persian Gulf on 7 August and the lead ship arrived on 15 August. These ships carried the material required to support the 33,000 men of two Marine Corps expeditionary brigades (MEBs). Ten afloat pre-positioned ships carrying equipment for the Army and Air Force got under way for the gulf on 9 August. Their cargo also included petroleum supplies and one of the Navy’s deployable fleet hospitals.

One incident that received a lot of attention from the news media during this period was the mechanical breakdown of USNS Antares not long after she departed the East Coast for Saudi Arabia. The subsequent off-load in Rota, Spain, and reload of her cargo on USNS Altair, which limited the delay in arrival to the port of debarkation to only two days behind schedule, was, to all effects, not reported.

An interesting sidelight to this story is the role played by Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalion 4 in the reload in Rota. This unit was deployed and in place in Spain within 72 hours of its recall notification and Reservists were busy off-loading cargo from Antares an
hour and a half after arrival.

The deployment of the hospital ships Mercy and Comfort also occurred during Phase One of this massive sealift operation. The single snag in this phase of the operation was the steering casualty that affected USNS Mercy as she approached Hawaii. The plans must have been flexible enough to accommodate such a contingency because both ships arrived on station before their need was critical.

Tremendous Performance

One of the real success stories has been the performance of the fast sealift ships. For example, one ship averaged 27 knots for its transit from the East Coast and was running at 33-1/2 knots most of the time in the open ocean. This speaks well for a ship that is normally kept in a reduced operating status with the minimum crew needed to "light the ship off and get it rolling." Admiral Donovan summed up his views of the fast sealift ship with these words: "We got tremendous performance out of these ships."

Use of pre-positioned ships enabled the delivery of large amounts of critical supplies as early as 15 August.

Phase Two of the operation started on 8 November after the President announced the increase in forces committed to Desert Shield from approximately 240,000 to almost one-half million personnel to ensure that sufficient forces would be available to pursue an offensive option, if necessary. There was also an early January target date for completion of this phase of the lift in conformance with the United Nations deadline for Iraq to complete withdrawal from Kuwait by the fifteenth.

Limited Time

Much of the sealift for this phase was from northern Europe to the gulf as Army units were moved from Germany to Saudi Arabia. The weather, the limited number of ships available for this new surge, the need to coordinate with a large number of dispersed individual units instead of a central supply point, and the limited time available to complete this lift all combined to make this phase particularly challenging. Admiral Donovan emphasized the intensity of this operation when he pointed out that "on a particular day in early January we had 133 ships outbound and 49 ships coming in, having off-loaded."

By the end of January 1991, this effort had evolved to a force of 215 ships which had delivered 4.4 billion pounds of cargo and 9 billion pounds of petroleum products to our forces in the Middle East--96 percent of all the supplies provided for operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
Naturally, the key element in the ability of MSC to move this vast amount of cargo was the capability to expand a force just over 70 ships to more than 200. This growth was not by accident. It was the result of diligent execution of standing plans that included the break-out of a significant portion of the Ready Reserve Fleet—66 of the 96 ships normally in this semi-active status are now operational.

Moving this quantity of material also required the expeditious chartering of both US and foreign ships to meet the requirements. In fact, more than two-thirds of the ships needed had to be chartered and most of them were foreign-owned, a sad commentary on the status of the commercial merchant fleet of the United States.

One surprising fact from the briefing was the information on the tonnage of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) transported to the Middle East to support Desert Shield and Desert Storm. To the layman; it would appear that we have been "carrying coal to Newcastle." However, it is readily apparent that today’s military equipment requires extraordinary POL support and that a similar crisis in another part of the world that does not have the indigenous POL supply of a Saudi Arabia would require even more sealift support.

Lesson Learned

Certainly, one lesson learned so far is that our national pool of qualified merchant seamen has dwindled to the point that it was a real challenge to man those ships of the RRF that were activated. In addition, although those who did answer the call responded with enthusiasm and professionalism, they are an aging population with many individuals now over 60 years of age. This fact does not bode well for the future.

The Ready Reserve Fleet is not getting any younger either. Most ships are steam instead of diesel powered, which creates problems in operating and maintaining such an obsolescent powerplant. In addition, most RRF ships are break-bulk carriers which require a much more manpower-intensive and time-consuming operation when on- or off-loading.

It also must be remembered that this sealift was performed in a non-hostile environment. There were only a few delays resulting from the inevitable mechanical breakdowns. There were no losses of ships or cargo to enemy action.

Although Admiral Donovan accurately noted that "we are still a maritime power and we can still get the job done," the four facts outlined above should provide cautions for planners of future operations. The success we have experienced so far in this operation must not be permitted to obscure our sealift requirements of the future.
Obtaining necessary pre-sail information (here in Germany) requires direct meetings with masters of ships chartered by the Military Sealift Command.

Skilled Reserve cargo-handling personnel check for proper stowage of equipment on board ship.
Semper Fi

There--When Needed
By Cpl. Roberta Hastings, USMC

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During the initial phases of Operation Desert Shield there was considerable concern expressed over the fact that, although authority had been granted, the Marine Corps had recalled only a very few Reservists to active duty. The Commandant, Gen. Alfred M. Gray, USMC, assured Marine Corps Reservists that they would be called when needed and tasked them to use the time available to get fully ready.

The Commandant was as good as his word. More than 25,000 Selected Marine Corps Reservists (out of a force of less than 44,000) and more than 7,000 members of the Marine Corps 36,000 strong Individual Ready Reserve were called to meet Marine Corps requirements throughout the world, including the Persian Gulf. At the beginning of the recall, the Marine Corps had the smallest percentage of its force on active duty when compared to the six other Reserve Components. With the start of the land phase of Operation Desert Storm, the proportion of Selected Marine Corps Reservists on active duty was the highest--almost six out of every ten.

This article provides some snapshots of the most extensive call to active duty of Marine Corps Reservists since World War II.

Since August 1990, many of the United States military forces have been deployed to Southwest Asia. Among those ranks that stood together side by side against the Iraqi menace were tens of thousands of Marine Reservists.

The jobs ranged far and wide and seemingly there was no end to tasks that had to be met to fulfill mission requirements. The commanders of troops both in the United States and overseas had been preparing for the liberation of Kuwait for months.

Col. Ulysses S. Grant, USMC, Regimental Inspector-Instructor for the 14th Marines, had sent more than 2,400 Reservists from across the nation. Headquartered in Dallas, Texas, the mission of the 14th Marines is to provide artillery fire in support of the 4th Marine Division or other forces as directed, and in execution of the over-all fire support effort. They deployed their troops in four separate detachments.

The first detachment was comprised of three radar teams with equipment (the ANT/TPQ-36 firefinder radar), a meteorological team, a survey team, and an engineer detachment. A total of 71 from Dallas went
in this first wave.

The second detachment, 19 Marines, went as the fire support coordination center (augmented) for the First Marine Expeditionary Force. It left for Camp Pendleton, Calif., on 4 December 1990) and consequently deployed to Southeast Asia.

On 14 January, ten more Marines were sent to Camp Lejuene, N.C., to help augment 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, a sister Marine Reserve unit.

The most recent wave of Texas Marines left 14 February and went to Camp Pendleton to fill the 4th Marine Division’s requirement for the Combat Replacement Company (CRC). These 17 Reservists left for California to act as potential replacements for casualties lost in the conflict in the Middle East.

According to Colonel Grant, the entire

The threat of a US Marine amphibious assault was an effective deception in the gulf as Iraqi forces remained deployed to counter an attack from sea that never came.

The air/ground Marine Corps team worked effectively during Desert Storm. Marine Corps Reservists were fully integrated into both elements of this fighting force.

evolution has gone smoothly. "Back in the middle of the year Gen. [Matthew T.] Cooper [USMC,] ordered all division units to conduct an admin stand-down," he said. He wanted all Marine Reserve units to be current from an administrative to a logistical standpoint. "With this area completed, everything went like clockwork when our people were called," he said.

Fourth Air Wing Responds

Additionally, many of the Reserve units called upon were comprised of air elements. One such unit, Marine Air Control Group 40, had several of its components called to serve in Operation Desert Storm.

Lt. Col. James E. Davis, USMC, Public Affairs Officer of this unit, said that in excess of 1,000 personnel from his unit were activated. "Basically, we’ve had two complete units VMGR-234 [an air cargo unit flying KC-130s] and HML-776 [a UH-IN Huey helicopter squadron] completely mobilized.

"Additionally, however, we activated components of MWCS-48 [Marine Wing Control Squadron], and Headquarters and Headquarters Support-48 to augment the II Marine Expeditionary Force for cold-weather operations being conducted in Norway," he said.
"The wing units also have some artillery components to support in air defense. Back in early September, the first increment of Marines from the Light Anti-Aircraft Defense Battalion was sent. They specialize in the stinger, a shoulder-fired, surface to air missile system," Colonel Davis said. "They are in southwest Asia now."

"The Light Anti-Air Missile Battalion has been assigned to Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., to train and upgrade to Phase III Hawk, a more sophisticated weapons system," he added.

"From a wing aspect, I really believe the most impressive point of the Reserve activation is seeing the motivation and esprit de corps of the Marine Corps Rescue. The Reservists made major changes across the board in their life styles, both officer and enlisted," Colonel Davis observed.

Impact on Individuals

Perhaps the area that has been hardest hit by the activation of Marine Reservists is that of the Marines’ personal lives, which have been drastically altered. Many things have been implemented to help alleviate some of these stressors. "All the units in the 14th Marines formed family support groups," Colonel Grant said. "We have seen individual case of hardships, but for the most part there was no hesitation to serve. As for the families, they are dealing with it the best they can. Very few have looked back."

Statistics show that a majority of Marine Reservists are currently pursuing higher education through benefits provided by the Montgomery GI Bill. Many wonder what the educational systems are doing to provide support for students who have been deployed to Southwest Asia. "In Texas, many of the learning institutions have given their students grades of "in complete" and are permitting them to pick up where they left off instead of having to enroll in the same course a second time," Colonel Grant said. "As for the remuneration of tuition, the state-run institutions fall under state legislation, therefore, a bill would have to be enacted to provide for this," he added.

Because the activation of Reservists has had far-reaching effects on American society and economy, Colonel Grant expressed concern for Marine Reservists once they are no longer needed in the Middle East. "I hope that once they return from their mission, they reintegrate into civilian life with minimum difficulty," he emphasized.
Reserve medical personnel were among the first recalled to active duty and sent off to the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations to treat allied--and enemy--wounded in the war.

Things Different at "Saudi Arabia General"
Docs in the Desert

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It’s a long way from pediatric nursing in Pittsburgh, Pa., to in-flight care of wounded over Saudi Arabia. Thanks to "marvelous training," however, the transition went smoothly for 1st Lt. Jackie Holsworth, USAFR nurse, who served with 74 other members of the 33rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron from Greater International Airport Pittsburgh, Pa., during Operation Desert Storm, from 14 January to 11 March 1991.

The group, which was split up upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, was responsible for in-flight care of wounded allied soldiers and EPWs (enemy prisoners of war).

"Our training really prepared us," Lieutenant Holsworth said, adding that in the midst of her two months’ duty "I realized how good our squadron really was."

She and 21 other squad members worked out of King Fahd International Airport near Dhahran, flying tactical missions on C-130s and strategic missions on C-141s that transported wounded to England or Germany. The latter flights took eleven and nine hours, respectively. While the aircraft were equipped for a maximum of 74 wounded, the largest group carried during Lieutenant Holsworth’s duty numbered 37. The staff included a flight surgeon, two nurses, and three medical technicians.

"So that we would have everything on us that we needed, we wore 'fanny packs' around our waists that contained our supplies," she said.

Even so, they had to improvise--in one case, grabbing a stomo-bag (usually used for colostomies) to serve as an emesis container for an EPW patient "with tubes coming out of every orifice" who was nauseous and had to be suctioned.

Injured SSgt. Daniel Stamaris, USA, a POW released by Iraq, was monitored en route home by US medics.
Many lessons were learned by Reserve medical teams who found themselves on short notice in the midst of the Persian Gulf conflict.

One of the dilemmas for Lieutenant Holsworth and other female care-givers was how to respect the Moslem customs of Iraqi wounded and still provide the comfort of a gentle touch on the arm or shoulder that is so much a part of American nursing technique.

When not assisting the wounded, "We did sandbags, carpentry, inventory and organizing of supplies, clean up, pulled alerts, and were constantly in training--both medical and intelligence," Lieutenant Holsworth reports.

Two Homecomings

She and the 33rd were treated to a double-header homecoming--the first, when they flew in at Westover AFB, Mass., where they were greeted by Brig. Gen. Frederick Walker, USAFR, Commander, 439th TAW (AFRes), and, the second, in Pittsburgh where brass bands, citation, speeches, a red carpet, and the news media awaited.

For Maj. Cher Brining, USAFR nurse with the 23rd Air Patient Staging Squadron, Griffis Air Force Base, Rome, N.Y., it was another case of having had good training in intensive-care skills.

Improvisation came into play. Since they were in a very basic holding facility, "we had to work around" some problems, plus go to different channels to obtain supplies, she said.

Some felt that wartime medical mission training could be improved. Other challenges reported by certain units included having to build their own facilities and ensuring the freshness of medical supplies. As one medical officer said: "It was another lesson learned".

Major Brining and Lieutenant Holsworth are members of the Reserve Officers Association.

There were dedicated ROA members capably performing their duties throughout the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations and stateside. Some ROA nurses serving in the Middle East formed the "ROA Department of Saudi Arabia Chapter Q8" at King Fahd Airport, near Dhahran. The inventive nurses are Capt. Terri Pato, USAFR, Capt. Joyce Keeler, USAFR, Capt. Linda Sposito, USAFR, Maj. Cher Brining, USAFR, and Lt. Jackie Holsworth, USAFR.
In the field: National Guardsmen from the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) gain ground with their Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle during training at Fort Stewart, Ga.

TOTAL FORCE OR TOTAL FAILURE?

Deployment sparks debate on the future of roundout brigades
by J. Paul Scicchitano, Times staff writer

WASHINGTON--At the height of Operation Desert Storm, SFC Mark McDaniel’s worst enemy was not Saddam Hussein, the miserable weather or the poor living conditions. It was the U.S. Army.

"We were looked down on from the beginning," said McDaniel, a Georgia Army National Guardsman who spent most of the war practicing on a mock battlefield in the California desert far from the real fight.

"There’s a lot of disappointed people. A lot of them feel put down; a lot of them are getting out," he said.

If McDaniel’s wartime experience has soured him on the Army, Desert Storm also has spoiled key Defense Department officials on the future role of National Guard and Reserve combat units in short-notice contingency operations. That could have profound implications on funding for, and the future of, National Guard programs in several states.

Tough Questions

For years, roundout brigades, National Guard and Reserve brigades teamed with active-duty brigades to make up Army divisions, have received a high priority for new equipment and funding based on the premise that they would be among the first units called to fight. If their status changes, so could their priority for money, and their national standing.

"Guard units have an active mission and role and Guard units therefore have substantial importance and prestige in the national defense scenario," said a congressional source who asked not to be identified. "I think the effort on the part of the Guard Lobbyists...is an attempt to make sure that America understands not everything went wrong."

From McDaniel’s perspective, the Army for years led him and 4,200 other National Guardsmen in Georgia’s 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) to believe they would be called to fight shoulder to shoulder with
active-duty soldiers in the event of war.

But when President Bush drew his line in the sand, the soldiers of the 48th were left behind to prepare for an uncertain mission, along with two other National Guard combat brigades, the 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of Louisiana and the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi.

Only one brigade, the 48th, was deemed ready for combat, but it took more than two months of training at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. The 48th spent more time there than any other visiting unit.

Singled Out

Based on its slow progress and the experience of the other brigades, the roundout concept has been widely singled out as the only major blemish in the first large-scale test of the Total Force Policy.

"It may well be that one of the lessons we’ll learn out of this is that the roundout brigade concept for early deploying forces is not a good one," Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said March 13.

"We ought to use the Guard combat units as sort of the second or third echelon," he said, adding that the issue requires further study. "I feel we made the right decision when we decided not to deploy those Guard units, but if that was a sound decision, then we have to go back and reassess in terms of the roundout brigades."

Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the usual 39 days of training per year for National Guard members is insufficient to prepare the Guard’s roundout brigades for war, given the complexities of the modern battlefield.

The roundout brigades’ performance also has generated criticism on Capitol Hill, where Les Aspin, D-Wis., the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, sees Desert Storm as a test of the roundout concept.

"I must tell you that frankly, I was a little disturbed at what the test showed," Aspin said March 8 during a committee hearing on the roundout concept.

Military experts disagree over the upshot of the official’s statements. Some see Cheney’s remarks as the watershed for the roundout concept. Other view them in the context of fine tuning.

The Army has seven roundout brigades—six in the National Guard and one in the Reserve. Only the 48th is teamed with a rapid-deployment force, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Ga.

Another congressional source who asked not to be identified said
members of Congress plan to examine the current mix of active and reserve forces, the future role of reservists in combat and the president’s call-up authority.

No matter what the result, the source said, "I think the Congress will remain committed to keeping modern equipment in the reserve component. [But] obviously they will not be as first to fight as they were intended to fight in the contingency corps."

Making it Work

What then can the United States expect from its National Guard roundout brigades in combat?

In downsizing the active Army over the next six years, the roundout concept will be necessary to preserve as much of the force structure as possible, said Air Force Lt. Gen. John Conaway, chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Even so, the complexities of the modern battlefield likely will continue to pose difficulties for the roundout brigades for some time, given the dynamics of the Guard structure, he said.

The components of the average reserve battalion are dispersed over a 150-mile radius, with some beyond 300 miles. Because of the distance and travel requirements, about 30 percent of all reserve-component armor units cannot perform gunnery training on weekends.

"There’s only 39 day a year to work on these large maneuver brigades, which is much more complex that about any other type unit we have," Conaway said. Officials are looking at ways to use computer simulation to enhance the ability of the roundout brigades to conduct large-unit training, he said.

Conaway said the roundout brigades can be made ready for war in 45 to 60 days, given some changes in the system. "I don’t think we have to make major changes in the funding," he said. But officials may want to look at increasing the level of full-time personnel for the roundout brigades. And "we may have to have a few additional training days for the part-time tank crews."

The roundout forces are one aspect of the Total Force policy adopted in 1973. Other reserve units also perform combat missions, combat support, and combat service support missions. To the extent that Guard and Reserve units performed those other missions, and performed them with little post-mobilization training, Desert Storm has been hailed as an overwhelming victory for the policy.

The Total Force policy essentially relies on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for active forces, and calls for the integrated use of all available forces.
Implementation of the policy has been uneven at times, but its objective always has been to maintain as small an active peacetime force as prudence dictates.

Past its prime?

Retired Lt. Gen. Herbert Temple, Jr., who headed the National Guard Bureau from 1986 to 1990, said the time may have come to discontinue the roundout concept. That suggestion is not based on any shortcomings identified in Desert Storm, but on the waning global threat, he said.

"It would appear to me that there’s no viable reason to continue with roundout," he said. "It seems unfair to the active-element commander to have a unit in his command that he really doesn’t command.

It is conceivable that the roundout brigades would have been as capable as the active units had they deployed to Saudi Arabia and been allowed to train there with their active counterparts, Temple said.

Given the investment of time and money, he said, it might be for the best for the Army to retain the existing brigades in other configurations, such as separate brigades, which can be deployed independent of full divisions in wartime.

"As you draw down the Total Army, those are the kind of decisions you have to make," he said.

Not everyone agrees such a move is necessary.

Retired Lt. Gen. Robert Yerks, one of the architects of the Total Force policy, said it would be drastic and unwise to do away with the roundout concept.

"I think we need not be overly critical of the roundout concept at this stage," he said. "It’s a concept that takes advantage of many things," including the citizen-soldier and greater economy of service, he said.

With minor changes in the law, he said, additional training time could be allotted to roundout units without altering the basic reserve structure in peacetime.

Testifying at the March 8 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Gen. Edwin Burba, who heads Forces-Command and was responsible for determining which units deployed from the United States, said officials never planned for roundout brigades to be used in limited contingency operations such as Desert Storm. The three brigades were called up in the event that reinforcements were needed, he said.

Now that Desert Storm is over, future enemies are not likely to repeat Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s error of giving the United States too much time to prepare for battle, Burba said.
That will require the United States to be ready in even less time. The roundout brigades had hoped to be combat-ready in as few as 30 days after mobilization, a task complicated by the complexity of synchronization.

"Proficiency with these synchronization tasks comes with rigorous, repetitive collective training at company level and above," Burba said. "The complex and unforgiving nature of these tasks and difficulty in training them during weekend drill periods pose a difficult challenge to roundout combat units."

Brigade was ready

Col. Fletcher Coker, who commands Mississippi’s 155th Armored Brigade, said he has mixed emotions about his unit’s wartime experience. The brigade spent about three weeks at the National Training Center after training at Fort Hood, Texas, and Camp Shelby, Miss.

"I would not have hesitated to have taken this unit into a combat theatre of operations," he said. "Nobody wants to go to war, but we were prepared to do our duty. I think that every one of us [was] very grateful and very pleased with the way the war turned out, that very few American lives were lost."

Had the war progressed differently, he said, the Army would have deployed the roundout brigades.

Coker said post-mobilization training time could be shortened by as much as two to three weeks if the Army accepts National Guard certifications for medical fitness, and weapons and common task training.

"I think that there was an understandable reluctance initially to accept anything that they had not been personally around to observe," he said.

Testifying before Congress, Coker said he was surprised by the initial gunnery problems his soldiers encountered at the NTC and at Fort Hood, giver their high level of proficiency at Camp Shelby, their mobilization station.

"The crews, they in effect memorized the range and they knew where the targets were," he testified. "Clearly we need wider ranges, more complex ranges and more maneuver space."

Since the brigade returned to Camp Shelby in late March, Coker said he has spoken with officials about improving the existing ranges.

Troubled leadership

Despite its long stint at the NTC, the 48th remained hampered by a
shortage of qualified leaders and the inability to perform to active-duty standards. It was only at the end of the war that the brigade was deemed ready.

Brig. Gen. William Bland, acting adjutant general of the Georgia National Guard, said the roundout concept is viable for the future, even if the 30-day target period for post-mobilization training proves inadequate.

"I think that any time we can augment the active force with a reserve component to be able to respond in time of a contingency requirement is very valid," he said. "I think we’ll have to look at how soon we want to deploy them."

The call-up also brought to light some apparent leadership deficiencies. Near the end of the 48th’s NTC rotation, the brigade’s head was replaced by the unit’s former deputy commander, ostensibly so he could fill a vacancy elsewhere.

Eight company commanders in the Louisiana brigade were changed during its training.

Reserve support hailed as overwhelming success
by J. Paul Scicchitano, Times staff writer

WASHINGTON--As U.S. led ground forces launched their sweeping offensive into Iraq and Kuwait, a contingent of Army National Guard soldiers was fighting alongside Regular Army soldiers for the first time since the Vietnam War.

And as the forces stretched farther into the desert, so did their life line, which hinged on the performance of additional Guard and Army Reserve transportation companies to ferry fresh supplies to the front.

"Some of them were shipped out almost instantly [upon being mobilized]," said Air Force Lt. Gen. John Conaway, chief of the National Guard Bureau. "We had only basically a handful of problems."

The performance of reserve combat support and combat service support units in Operation Desert Storm has been regarded as an overwhelming success of the Defense Department’s Total Force policy, which in 1973 formalized the country’s reliance on the reserve component.

In Desert Storm, the 196th Field Artillery Brigade, Chattanooga, Tenn., and the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade, Fayetteville, Ark., became the first Reserve units to fight alongside active-duty forces since Vietnam.

Technically not considered combat units, the artillery brigades
provided fire support for VII Corps as it made its wide, flanking thrust into southern Iraq. The brigades each had about 1,200 soldiers and elements from several states. They are still in the Persian Gulf region.

"The initial word is they did a superb job," Conaway said. "They were both mobilized, went into their post-mobilization training...and then were shipped over to meet their equipment. In most cases, they were ready to go before the equipment arrived in the theater."

In all, about 40,000 Guard and 40,000 Reserve soldiers deployed to the Middle East for Desert Storm by mid-February.

The speed of the reserve mobilization impressed Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an interview with Army Times, Powell described the performance of reservists in Desert Storm as an "outstanding success."

Besides the two artillery brigades, Powell cited reservists for maintaining the bulk of the Army’s medical capability and graves registration, as well as the majority of port handling capability.

Under current law, the president may call up to 200,000 of the select reserve--essentially, reservists from all services who drill on a regular basis--for an initial 90 days, and another 90-day extension without any action from Congress.

Conaway said he would rather see call-up authority for one set period.

"The 90 plus 90 is awkward for the system," he said. "I think one set period of time, 180 days, 150 days, whatever number of days the call-up would be."

As the law now reads, he said, soldiers face tremendous uncertainty about when they will be released from active duty,

"I think that’s too much uncertainty for a person in civilian life," he said. "I think you call them up for one set period of time...and you finish the contingency long before then and they come home, or you go to partial [mobilization]."

In an earlier interview, Maj. Gen. William Ward, chief of the Army Reserve, said the key to success of the operation was making sure units were used for the missions for which they were trained.

"One great lessons learned thus far is that there has to be more mutual understanding of both the warfighting and combat service requirements of the total structure across all the components," he said.

Army Times staff writer Jim Wolffe contributed to this report.
Reserve doctors tell of practices in "shambles"
by Kecia Clark

WASHINGTON--Some Army Reserve doctors called up in support of Operation Desert Storm say they are lingering on duty unnecessarily and with little to do, while their practices back home suffer.

"My practice is in the same condition as Kuwait--shambles," said one doctor from New York who was called up in September 1990 and still was on duty in early April.

At William Beaumont Army Medical Center, Fort Bliss, Texas, several reserve doctors said they have nothing to do except give stress tests and take the blood pressure of a handful of patients.

"Every day, we sit around the cafeteria and discuss how much money we’re losing," said another Reserve doctor from New York who was activated in September 1990 and assigned to Beaumont.

More than 1,700 Reserve doctors were activated in support of Operation Desert Shield. Fewer than 10 have been released as of April 4, said Marla Jones, a spokeswoman for Army Health Services Command, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

While the doctors were activated with units, unit members were split up most and most of the doctors were sent to work at hospitals in the United States. Army officials said they wanted enough doctors on hand in case there were mass casualties in the Persian Gulf War.

While the war is over and the need for the Reserve doctors as stateside hospitals is slight, the doctors must stay on duty. "Doctors can expect to stay on for a few months after the units have been released," Jones said. When that will be is not known.

President Bush has the authority to keep reservists on duty for one year, but reservists deemed "essential" by their commanders may be held up to two years.

Reserve doctors are still needed even though the war is won, said Virginia Stephanakis, spokeswoman for the Army Surgeon General’s Office, Falls Church, Va.

"There are still soldiers in the process of returning from the gulf who may need to be treated. The doctors who deployed [to the gulf] are just coming back. [The Reserve doctors in the United States] will be released as soon as we are convinced we no longer need them," Stephanakis said.

Reservists said they thought the speed of their release would mirror their rapid call-up. Some doctors said they were called up in fall 1990 with less than two days’ notice.
Reservists deployed to Saudi Arabia have said the length of their call-up and the harm it is doing to their practices probably will lead them to resigning their commissions.

Army officials are taking them seriously. Reserve and medical leaders have said the medical reserves, which make up at least 70 percent of the Army’s medical strength, may empty when Desert Storm is over.

Officials of the American Medical Association said the average military doctor who is called up in the Reserve loses $1,500 to $2,000 per month in salary. Doctors who are specialists may lose another $1,000 or more.

Depending on the size of their staff and number of patients at home, many doctors also must keep paying staff salaries, equipment upkeep and insurance fees.

"The financial drain is one I can live with while there is a war going on," said a Reserve doctor called up from California. "But the war is over. I feel like I’m being kept here as a source of cheap labor."

None of the doctors interviewed wanted to be identified by name or specialty. The doctors said they fear repercussions.

"We would never have joined if we were after the money. I wanted to do my share for the country, but now that I’m not needed, I don’t see any reason for me to sit here as my practice goes down the tubes," said a doctor from New York assigned to Beaumont.

Some called up doctors also worry about the patients they left behind.

A doctor from New Jersey said since he has been away, his regular patients call him often. "They need advice when their conditions change. They need to get medication. They need me to take care of them and I can’t do that from across the country," he said.

Several Reserve doctors said they have enough to do at Army hospitals, but the percentage of family members they see makes them question the Army’s motives.

"They want to bring in all the people off of [the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, or] CHAMPUS. That may be fine while we’re here, but when we’re gone, what kind of care are these people going to get?" one doctor said.

"We have tried to keep people in direct care because it’s a morale factor," Stephanakis said. "Soldiers overseas don’t want to worry about where their families are being treated."

Defense Department health officials also are encouraging dependents
to use military facilities to save money. This summer they plan to start a program encouraging dependents and retirees to enroll in health-care plans at their military post. The aim of the voluntary program, called coordinated care, is to lower taxpayers’ and patients’ costs.

But that doesn’t satisfy the Reserve doctors.

"They need to develop a plan to let us go as fast as they got us here. I had 48 hours to report in and now I sit here, weeks after the war is over, wondering when I can get my life back in order," another doctor from New Jersey said.

"They need to make [the Army] more attractive to specialists if they need them and want to keep them. But making a doctor stay on active duty just because they can is being shanghaied," said one doctor, a Reservist from Colorado.